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USCA1 Opinion
United States Court of Appeals United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit For the First Circuit
____________________
No. 94-1547
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
JOHN P. FLYNN,
Defendant, Appellant.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Shane Devine, Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________
____________________
George F. Gormley with whom John D. Colucci was on brief for __________________ ________________
appellant.
Jean L. Ryan, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Paul M. ____________ _______
Gagnon, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee. ______
____________________
March 1, 1995
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STAHL, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant John P. STAHL, Circuit Judge. _____________
Flynn challenges the district court's revocation of his
probation and imposition of a five-year prison sentence on
the grounds that his probation had already expired and the
district court therefore lacked jurisdiction. Flynn also
attacks on due process grounds the district court's findings
respecting two of his alleged thirteen probation violations.
We affirm.
I. I. __
BACKGROUND BACKGROUND __________
Flynn pled guilty in 1983 to one count of
conspiracy to commit mail fraud ("Count I") and two counts of
mail fraud ("Counts II/III"). On August 8, 1983, the
district court imposed a five-year prison sentence for Count
I and another five years for Counts II/III. The district
court suspended the prison sentence for Counts II/III,
however, and placed Flynn on probation for five years. At
the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that "[t]he
sentences herewith imposed on Counts II and III are ordered
to run concurrently with one another, but consecutively to
the sentence imposed for Count I." Similarly, the district
court wrote in its Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order
("Sentencing Judgment") filed on August 8, 1983, that "[t]he
sentences for Counts II and III are ordered to run
concurrently with one another but consecutively to Count I."
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Flynn began serving his five-year Count I prison
term on August 29, 1983. He was released on parole on June
27, 1986. On August 16, 1993 -- just shy of ten years from
the date Flynn began serving his Count I sentence, and more
than six years after he was released on parole -- Flynn's
probation officer, Vincent Frost, filed a petition to revoke
Flynn's probation, alleging that Flynn had committed thirteen
probation violations since his release in 1986. The petition
alleged in detail that Flynn had committed the crimes of
threats of violence, forgery, theft, theft by deception, wire
fraud, insurance fraud, bank fraud, and false statements to
the Probation Office. It also alleged that Flynn had
violated his probation by traveling to Colorado on a ski
vacation and associating with a convicted felon, one of his
former co-conspirators.1
Flynn's probation revocation hearing began on
February 2, 1994, and lasted six days. On February 24, 1994,
the district court issued its Memorandum Opinion, finding
that the government had proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that Flynn had committed forgery, theft by
____________________
1. The details of Flynn's violations are amply described in
the district court's Memorandum Opinion. See United States ___ _____________
v. Flynn, 844 F. Supp. 856, 860-75 (D.N.H. 1994). Because _____
our decision is limited to a jurisdictional issue wholly
separate from the probation violations themselves, we do not
describe them in any detail.
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deception, credit card fraud,2 bank fraud, and making false
statements, and had also violated probation by leaving the
judicial district without permission and by associating with
a convicted felon. On April 6, 1994, the district court
imposed on Flynn the full five-year prison sentence it had
earlier suspended -- the maximum sentence the court could
impose under 18 U.S.C. 3565(a)(2) (limiting term of
sentence upon revocation of probation to sentence available
at time of initial sentencing).
On appeal, Flynn asserts that his five-year
probation term began to run upon his release from prison on
June 27, 1986 and expired no later than June 27, 1991.
Therefore, Flynn argues, the district court lacked
jurisdiction to revoke his probation in 1993. The government
contends that Flynn's probation did not commence until August
28, 1988, when Flynn completed his parole, and thus the
____________________
2. Although the crime of credit card fraud was not
specifically alleged in the probation revocation petition,
the government claimed in its hearing brief filed on the day
the final revocation proceeding began that the same behavior
that constituted wire fraud also constituted credit card
fraud and theft by deception. The court found that the
government had failed to prove an element of the crime of
wire fraud, but that it had proved credit card fraud and
theft by deception. See 844 F. Supp. at 865-68. Flynn ___
claims that because the government amended the charges
against him on the day of his hearing, he did not have
adequate notice and was therefore deprived of due process.
We discuss this claim infra at Part II.B. _____
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probation revocation proceedings were initiated before
Flynn's probation term expired.3
II. II. ___
DISCUSSION DISCUSSION __________
A. The District Court's Jurisdiction _____________________________________
"The intent of the sentencing court must guide any
retrospective inquiry into the term and nature of a
sentence." United States v. Einspahr, 35 F.3d 505, 506 (10th _____________ ________
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 531 (1994). See also United _____ ______ ___ ____ ______
States v. King, 990 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir.) (stating that ______ ____
sentencing court's intention is "controlling consideration"
in determining commencement date of probation, as expressed
____________________
3. At oral argument, counsel for Flynn raised the novel
argument that even under the government's interpretation of
the consecutive sentences, Flynn's parole could have ended,
and his probation could have commenced, no later than 180
days prior to August 28, 1988. This, counsel argued, is _____
because of 18 U.S.C. 4164, which states:
A prisoner having served his term or
terms less good-time deductions shall,
upon release, be deemed as if released on
parole until the expiration of the
maximum term or terms for which he was
sentenced less one hundred and eighty
days.
Unfortunately for Flynn, the section only applies to
"mandatory releasees," i.e., prisoners who must be released
because they have served their entire term less time accrued
for good conduct. See, e.g., Clay v. Henderson, 524 F.2d ___ ____ ____ _________
921, 922-23 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 995 _____ ______
(1976). Flynn was not a "mandatory releasee"; he was
released on parole well before his mandatory release date,
and thus he remained on parole for the full remainder of his
entire five-year term. Id. ___
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in "the language employed to create the probationary
status")(quoting Sanford v. King, 136 F.2d 106, 108 (5th Cir. _______ ____
1943)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 223 (1993). At Flynn's 1983 _____ ______
sentencing hearing, the district court stated that the Count
II/III sentence would run "consecutively to the sentence
imposed for Count I." The Sentencing Judgment filed the same
day ordered that the Count II/III sentence run "consecutively
to Count I." The district court did not explicitly state __________
that Flynn's probation term must run consecutively to any
parole granted to Flynn on Count I. Flynn would have us hold
that because of the district court's "silence" on this issue,
the sentencing language is ambiguous, and that the ambiguity
must be resolved in Flynn's favor. We are not persuaded.
It is true that the district court could have
employed sentencing language that would have explicitly made
Flynn's probation term consecutive to any parole served under
Count I. The Ninth Circuit has urged courts to
state explicitly and precisely when
probation is to commence. For example, a
probationary sentence could specify that
the period of probation shall be
consecutive to the confinement portion of
the sentence served on a remaining count
or counts or that the period of probation
shall be consecutive to the sentence
imposed on a remaining count or counts
including any parole or other supervision _________________________________________
time. ____
United States v. Adair, 681 F.2d 1150, 1151 n.3 (9th Cir. _____________ _____
1982) (emphasis added). While the use of such language by
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the district court probably would have obviated Flynn's
appeal on this issue, we decline to convert the Ninth
Circuit's suggested language into magic words a district
court must utter to achieve its desired result. The district
court "reveal[ed] with fair certainty" its intent and
"exclude[d] any serious misapprehensions" about the nature of
the sentence. United States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360, 363 _____________ _________
(1926). Nothing in the district court's sentencing language
suggested that the "sentence imposed for Count I" -- to which
the probation term was expressly made consecutive -- did not
include parole time. As the Tenth Circuit stated:
The granting of parole to a prisoner does
not terminate the sentence that he is
serving. Rather, supervision in the
prison setting is replaced with
supervision by probation authorities.
The confinement period and any subsequent
period of parole supervision are best
understood as two parts of a single
indivisible sentence.
Einspahr, 35 F.3d at 507 (internal quotation omitted). Cf. ________ ___
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963) (holding that _____ __________
parole "significantly confine[d] and restrain[ed]"
petitioner's freedom and therefore constituted "custody"
amenable to habeas corpus relief); Anderson v. Corall, 263 ________ ______
U.S. 193, 196 (1923) (stating that release on parole with
restrictions on freedom is "in legal effect imprisonment");
United States v. Williams, 15 F.3d 1356, 1359 n.3 (6th Cir.) ______________ ________
("A paroled convict is still, as a matter of law, `in
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custody,' and continues to serve the `custodial term' of his
or her sentence."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 431 (1994). _____ ______
In Einspahr, the Tenth Circuit was presented with ________
facts almost identical to those presented here.4 The
defendant in Einspahr received a forty-five month prison ________
sentence on one count and four years probation on another
count, which the district court stated was "`to run
consecutive to Count I.'" 35 F.3d at 505-06. The defendant
was released after serving fifteen months in prison, leaving
thirty months to serve on parole. At the conclusion of his
parole, the Probation Department activated his four-year
probation term on the second count. Two weeks before the
defendant's probation term would have expired, the government
initiated probation revocation proceedings. Just as Flynn
argues now, the defendant in Einspahr claimed that his ________
probation term commenced when he was released from prison,
ran concurrently with his parole, and had long since expired.
The court, however, found "no ambiguity in the district
court's sentence," stating that it "clearly indicated the
court's intent that the probation term not run concurrently
with any period of parole supervision." Id. at 506. The ___
court went on to state:
____________________
4. Indeed, we are surprised that neither party, and
particularly the government, cited this case to us while
directing our attention to a number of cases only
tangentially relevant to the central issue.
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Unless the sentencing court specifically
indicates that a consecutive sentence of
probation begins at a prisoner's release
from custody or confinement, the default
assumption is that the full term of the
earlier sentence must be completed before
the probation period commences.
Id. at 507. See also Williams, 15 F.3d at 1358, 1359 n.3 ___ ___ ____ ________
(stating in dictum that "a convict's probationary sentence
begins not with parole" but only after completion of parole);
United States v. Chancey, 695 F.2d 1275, 1276-77 (11th Cir. _____________ _______
1982) ("This consecutive sentencing evinces the court's
intent . . . that there be no overlap between the end of the
first sentence and the beginning of probation.").
We find the Tenth Circuit's reasoning persuasive
and directly applicable to the facts of this case.5 The
____________________
5. The Tenth Circuit's interpretation of consecutive
sentencing is supported by two other Circuit Court decisions
that employ, without discussion, the identical
interpretation. See Williams, 15 F.3d at 1358 (probation ___ ________
term ordered to run consecutive to prison sentence did not
commence until parole completed); United States v. Wright, _____________ ______
744 F.2d 1127, 1128 (5th Cir. 1984) (same). Other courts
have held that probation terms imposed consecutively to
another sentence begin upon release from prison if the
sentencing courts clearly indicate such an intent. See, ___
e.g., United States v. Laughlin, 933 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir. ____ _____________ ________
1991) (rejecting defendant's argument that probation term did
not begin until parole had terminated; sentencing court
ordered probation "to commence upon his release from
prison"); King, 990 F.2d 190, 191 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding ____
that probation term ran concurrent with parole where
sentencing order stated that probation term would "commence
upon defendant's release from custody"). The King holding ____
appears to be inconsistent with authority cited above holding
that parole is in fact custody. Both King and Laughlin, ____ ________
however, complement Williams and Wright in underscoring the ________ ______
central principle of Einspahr: that the most natural reading ________
of unadorned language imposing a probation term consecutive
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district court's sentencing language unambiguously expressed
the court's intent to impose consecutive sentences. That all _________
parties, including Flynn, understood that Flynn's probation
would not commence until he had served his entire sentence on ______
Count I is borne out by the fact that Flynn submitted without
argument to supervision by the Probation Department during
the years 1991-93, when he claims that he was by law a free
man. Indeed, the lack-of-jurisdiction argument that Flynn --
a disbarred and, judging from some of his pro se petitions
contained in the record, not unskilled lawyer -- now advances
apparently did not even occur to him until after his
probation was revoked by the district court. Of course,
Flynn did not waive his jurisdictional argument by not
raising it below, but his failure to do so undercuts his
argument that there was any serious ambiguity in the district
court's original sentence.6
____________________
to a sentence on another count delays the commencement of
probation until the entire previous sentence, including any ______
parole, has been completed.
6. In support of his argument, Flynn directs our attention
to the Ninth Circuit's rulings in United States v. Adair, 681 _____________ _____
F.2d 1150 (9th Cir. 1982), and United States v. Carter, 827 _____________ ______
F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1987). Both cases are unavailing. Adair _____
held that a defendant's probation term ran concurrently with
his prison term on other counts because the sentencing court
was utterly silent as to when the probation term should ______
commence. Adair, 681 F.2d at 1151. In such cases, the court _____
held, "there is a strong presumption that the term starts on
the date sentence is imposed and runs concurrently with any
period of imprisonment imposed on any remaining count or
counts." Id. The Carter court then relied on this ___ ______
presumption in holding that probation began with the
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B. Due Process Challenges __________________________
Flynn also challenges on due process grounds two of
the court's findings of probation violations. Flynn does not
argue that the district court would not have revoked his
probation or resentenced him to five years imprisonment in
the absence of the challenged violations; indeed, the
district court expressly stated that each of Flynn's ____
violations warranted the revocation of his probation. Flynn, _____
844 F. Supp. at 875. Nevertheless, Flynn urges us to
consider his due process argument because, he claims, the
challenged violations could affect his eligibility for parole
under the Parole Commission guidelines found at 28 C.F.R.
2.20-21. This, however, is sheer speculation; it is far from
clear exactly what information the Parole Commission will use
in determining Flynn's parole eligibility date, much less
that the district court's findings as to the challenged
violations will have a determinative impact on that date.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded that the Parole Commission
may not legitimately use this information, and, since we do
not know if it will even enter the calculation of Flynn's
____________________
commencement of the defendant's twenty-day prison sentence on __
the same count and thereafter ran concurrently with a parole ______________
term on other convictions. Carter, 827 F.2d 546, 548. Even ______
if we were to adopt the Ninth Circuit's presumption, Flynn
could not reap its benefit, because the district court, far
from being silent as to when Flynn's probation term should
commence, expressly made the probation term consecutive to
his Count I sentence.
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parole date, this issue is not before us. See Dye v. United ___ ___ ______
States Parole Comm'n, 558 F.2d 1376, 1379 (10th Cir. 1977) _____________________
("the Commission is entitled to take into account factors
which could not, for constitutional reasons, be considered by
a court of law"). Thus, we need not decide the due process
issues Flynn raises.
III. III. ____
CONCLUSION CONCLUSION __________
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the
district court is
Affirmed. Affirmed ________
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Document Info
Docket Number： 94-1547
Filed Date： 3/1/1995
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/21/2015