BTZ v. Great ( 1995 )


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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    Nos. 92-2219
    92-2274

    BTZ, INC.,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    GREAT NORTHERN NEKOOSA CORP., ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.
    ____________________


    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

    [Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Torruella, Selya and Cyr,

    Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________



    David L. Lee, with whom Law Offices of Frederic F. Brace, Jr. was ____________ _____________________________________
    on brief for appellant.
    Peter J. Brann, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Michael E. _______________ __________
    Carpenter, Attorney General, and Thomas D. Warren, Director, _________ ___________________
    Litigation Unit, were on brief for State of Maine, Amicus.
    Tami L. Brown for appellee Great Northern Nekoosa Corp. _____________

    ____________________

    February 16, 1995
    ____________________




















    CYR, Circuit Judge. BTZ, Inc., a former shareholder in CYR, Circuit Judge. _____________

    Great Northern Nekoosa Corporation ("Great Northern"), appeals a

    district court order disallowing its application for an award of

    attorney fees against Great Northern. The fee application was

    predicated on the theory that the lawsuit BTZ brought against

    Great Northern in the United States District Court for the

    District of Maine caused Great Northern to capitulate to a

    hostile takeover by Georgia Pacific Corporation ("GPC") which

    resulted in substantial benefit to other Great Northern share-

    holders. We affirm.



    I I

    BACKGROUND1 BACKGROUND __________


    In October 1989, GPC made an unsolicited tender to

    acquire Great Northern. The Board of Directors of Great Northern

    ("Board") balked. GPC commenced suit in Maine federal district

    court, seeking a judicial declaration that the Board's anti-

    takeover defenses violated state and federal law, as well as the

    Board's fiduciary duty to Great Northern shareholders. Several

    Great Northern shareholders [hereinafter: "plaintiffs"], includ-

    ing appellant BTZ, brought derivative "class action" suits
    ____________________

    1We set forth only the facts essential to our holding.
    Greater factual detail is provided in other reported decisions.
    See Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518 (1st ___ __________ ___________________________
    Cir. 1991); Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 801 F. __________ ____________________________
    Supp. 804 (D. Me. 1992); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great Northern _____________________ ______________
    Nekoosa Corp., 731 F. Supp. 38 (D. Me. 1990); Georgia-Pacific ____________ _______________
    Corp. v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 727 F. Supp. 31 (D. Me. ____ ____________________________
    1989).

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    against the Board in Maine federal district court. The class

    action suits were consolidated and the State of Maine intervened

    to defend its anti-takeover statute from constitutional chal-

    lenge.

    The Board concurrently opened a second line of defense

    by instituting an antitrust action against GPC in Connecticut

    federal district court. Plaintiffs' counsel took no part in the __ ____

    Connecticut action. On February 12, 1990, GPC announced its

    divestiture of all paper company holdings, thereby effectively

    mooting the Board's antitrust action. One week later, the Board ___ ____ _____

    capitulated and accepted GPC's tender offer. See Weinberger v. ___ __________

    Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 521 (1991). ___________________________

    Concerned that the plaintiffs in the Maine anti-take-

    over suits might impede the GPC-Great Northern settlement and

    merger, GPC entered into a "clear sailing" agreement with plain-

    tiffs: plaintiffs would dismiss their federal actions in Maine

    and "take no steps to attach any part of the funds to be paid to

    [Great Northern] shareholders pursuant to the upcoming tender

    offer"; GPC-Great Northern, in turn, would "pay the plaintiffs'

    attorneys' fees and expenses [up to $2 million,] as shall be

    awarded by the United States District Court for the District of

    Maine." Id. at 518 n.1, 521. ___

    The federal district court in Maine ultimately denied

    plaintiffs' fee applications, however, ruling that their attor-

    neys' services were not a significant precipitating "cause" of

    the GPC-Great Northern merger. Rather, their legal services


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    merely mimicked GPC's legal efforts in the Maine lawsuits, and

    played no role whatever in the truly decisive takeover skirmish __ ____

    the Connecticut antitrust litigation. Weinberger v. Great __________ _____

    Northern Nekoosa Corp., 801 F.Supp. 804, 811 (D. Me. 1992). BTZ ______________________

    appeals.2



    II II

    DISCUSSION DISCUSSION __________


    A. The American Rule A. The American Rule _________________

    Under the American Rule, absent a specific statutory

    authorization or contractual agreement to the contrary, litigants

    are responsible for their own attorney fees. See In re San Juan ___ _______________

    Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 982 F.2d 603, 606 (1st Cir. _________________________________

    1992). One notable exception to the American Rule obtains in so-

    ____________________

    2The State of Maine, as amicus curiae, suggests that we may
    lack appellate jurisdiction because the "clear sailing" agreement
    obligates GPC-Great Northern, not BTZ, to pay fees to BTZ's ___________________
    attorneys. Thus, it says, BTZ the only appellant named in the ____
    notice of appeal lacks either standing to appeal from a denial
    of the fee application, see United States v. AVX, 962 F.2d 108, ___ _____________ ___
    112-13 (1st Cir. 1993), or a demonstrable stake in the outcome of
    the appeal.
    Although dismissal on jurisdictional grounds might be
    warranted, the matter is not without difficulty and there is no
    circuit precedent directly in point. BTZ signed no enforceable
    fee agreement with its attorneys, but the "clear sailing" agree-
    ment, qua contract, might arguably afford BTZ a status analogous ___
    to a "prevailing party" in a statutory fee-shifting case. Cf. ___
    Pontarelli v. Stone, 978 F.2d 773, 775 (1st Cir. 1992) (since __________ _____
    statute specifically authorizes fees to "prevailing party,"
    prevailing party's attorney has no independent standing to appeal ________
    from grant or denial of fee award); Benitez v. Collazo-Collazo, _______ _______________
    888 F.2d 930, 933 (1st Cir. 1989) (same). We therefore bypass
    the jurisdictional issue and turn to the merits. See FDIC v. Bay ___ ____ ___
    Street Dev. Corp., 32 F.3d 636, 639 n.4 (1st Cir. 1994). _________________

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    called "common benefit" cases, where a plaintiff's suit is

    prematurely mooted but nonetheless results in a "substantial

    [pecuniary or nonpecuniary] benefit" to a larger class [hereinaf-

    ter: "beneficiaries"]. In these common benefit cases, a court

    may invoke its equitable jurisdiction to assess attorney fees

    against beneficiaries of the legal services; and, where the

    beneficiaries are corporate shareholders, their assessment may be

    imposed upon the corporate defendant. See, e.g., Reiser v. Del ___ ____ ______ ___

    Monte Properties Co., 605 F.2d 1135, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 1979) _____________________

    (citing cases).

    BTZ insists that its legal services fit squarely within

    the "common benefit" exception to the American Rule, since the

    GPC takeover enhanced the pecuniary interests of all Great

    Northern shareholders. The threshold question, of course, is

    whether the BTZ lawsuit in Maine federal district court actually

    caused the Board to capitulate to the GPC takeover, thereby ______

    contributing substantially to the per-share price increase in

    Great Northern shares. The district court rejected BTZ's claim

    on two fronts.


    B. Causation B. Causation _________

    First, the court found insufficient evidence that BTZ's

    legal services caused the Board to capitulate to the GPC take-

    over. As we have noted, "causation questions are grist for the

    factfinder's mill . . . ," Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms _______________ ________________

    Dairy, Inc., 972 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Peckham v. __________ _______

    Continental Cas. Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 830, 837 (1st Cir. 1990)), _________________________

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    which we review under the "clear error" standard, see ICC v. ___ ___

    Holmes Transp., Inc., 983 F.2d 1122, 1129 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting ____________________

    that "clear error" leaves reviewing court with the "definite and

    firm conviction that a mistake has been committed"). Cf. Lipsett __ _______

    v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 937, 941 (1st Cir. 1992) (according ______

    deference to trial court's "front row seat" determination as to

    whether legal services contributed to favorable outcome in

    underlying litigation) (citation omitted).

    The district court finding that the efforts of BTZ's

    counsel were neither a substantial nor a material factor in GPC's

    "decision to increase its bid or in Great Northern's decision to

    auction itself," Weinberger, 801 F. Supp. at 809, is amply __________

    supported by the record. The withdrawal of the Connecticut

    antitrust action and the defeat of Great Northern's anti-takeover

    mechanisms in the Maine litigation were the decisive factors

    contributing to the GPC takeover. See id. at 811 & n.11. BTZ's ___ ___

    counsel took no part in the pivotal Connecticut litigation. Id. __ _______ ___

    at 809. And to the limited extent that BTZ's counsel participat-

    ed in the Maine litigation, they did little more than track GPC's

    filings and audit depositions conducted by GPC. Id. at 808-811. __

    The district court's robust skepticism of the benefits

    contributed by BTZ's counsel is especially appropriate given the

    increasing concerns that redundant or peripheral legal services

    may parasitize the litigation efforts of lead counsel, yet

    command a substantial fee. Insofar as lead counsel reasonably

    perceive a consequent dilution of the limited resources available


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    for legal services, allowances for phantom legal services frus-

    trate the adversary process and undermine the congressional

    policy favoring private enforcement of the securities laws.3

    C. Burden of Proof C. Burden of Proof _______________

    The district court also rejected BTZ's fallback attempt

    to realign the burden of proof on the issue of causation. We

    review its legal ruling de novo. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. __ ____ ______________________

    Commercial Union Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 750, 757 (1st Cir. 1992). ________________________

    Under Delaware law, a fee award will be denied in a

    common benefit case only if the party opposing it proves that the _____ ________

    applicant's legal services did not contribute to the favorable ___

    outcome in the underlying takeover litigation. Compare Allied _______ ______

    Artists Pictures Corp. v. Baron, 413 A.2d 876 (Del. 1980); ______________________ _____

    Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Co., 209 A.2d 459 (Del. Chan. 1949)4 _________ _________________

    with Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) ("[T]he fee ____ _______ _________

    ____________________

    3See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private ___ _________ ____________________
    Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is _________________________________________________________________
    Not Working, 42 Md. L. Rev. 215, 249 (1983); John C. Coffee, Jr., ___________
    Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of _________________________________________________________________
    Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and _________________________________________________________________
    Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 (1986); Jonathan R. ___________________
    Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in ___________________________________
    Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and _________________________________________________________________
    Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 68 (1991). __________________________

    4The Delaware Chancery Court explained that "it is reason-
    able to impose on the defendants the burden of showing that the
    [benefit] was not in any way occasioned by the existence of the
    lawsuit," and that, even were the defendant corporation to prove
    that the fee applicant's suit in no way contributed to the
    benefit conferred, "the [fee applicant's] attorney would still be
    entitled to a fee if it is shown that the cause of action was
    meritorious." Rosenthal, 209 A.2d at 461. The Delaware Supreme _________
    Court later adopted the Rosenthal reasoning. See Allied Artists _________ ___ ______________
    Pictures Corp., 413 A.2d 876. ______________

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    applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to a [fee]

    award."); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 281 (1st Cir. 1978) ______ ________

    (fee applicant has burden to prove suit served as "catalyst");

    Koppel v. Wien, 743 F.2d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 1984) (same); 1 Mary ______ ____

    F. Derfner & Arthur D. Wolf, Court Awarded Attorney Fees _____________________________

    9.02[4][c], at 9-24.6 (1991).

    The district court correctly interpreted our decision

    in Weinberger, 925 F.2d at 522 n.6, to indicate that the BTZ fee __________

    application does not fit squarely within the common benefit

    exception to the American Rule, see Weinberger, 801 F.Supp. at ___ __________

    807, since "[BTZ] abjured a claim for fees under the common

    benefit doctrine[,]" Weinberger, 925 F.2d at 524, both by negoti- __________ ____

    ating the "clear sailing" agreement, which neutralized Great

    Northern's capacity to challenge a fee award, and by relying on ___

    the "clear sailing" agreement as the basis for its alleged fee

    entitlement. In contrast, neither Rosenthal nor Allied Artists _________ ______________

    involved a "clear sailing" agreement. Their realignment of the

    burden of proof was premised on the relative capacities of fee __________

    applicants and fee opponents to establish the "causation" ele-

    ment.

    Aside from BTZ, three entities had cognizable interests

    in the BTZ class action: Great Northern, GPC, and the State of

    Maine. None was better positioned than BTZ to establish what

    caused Great Northern to succumb to the GPC takeover bid. First,

    following its merger with GPC, Great Northern no longer existed

    as an independent legal entity. Second, immobilized as a fee


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    opponent by the terms of the "clear sailing agreement," GPC could

    not attempt to rebut a presumption of substantial benefit without

    breaching its agreement. Nor, finally, has there been any

    showing that the State of Maine, intervenor below and amicus on

    appeal even assuming it were able and inclined to oppose the

    BTZ fee application on policy grounds was better situated than

    BTZ to establish causation. There simply is nothing in the

    record to suggest that the State of Maine, aligned by happen-

    stance with Great Northern below, was privy to its inner workings

    or litigation strategy during the decisive stages of the takeover

    battle. Thus, the State of Maine likewise was not the "well-

    informed" fee opponent whose presence would warrant the burden

    shifting urged by BTZ.

    Contractual fee shifting in class action suits impinges

    on traditional judicial protocols for scrutinizing attorney-fee

    allowances, by increasing the potential for conflicts of inter-

    est. See id. at 524-25. Consequently, a rebuttable presumption ___ ___

    should not be endorsed in the context of a "clear sailing"

    agreement unless the court is well satisfied that "the advantages

    of the adversary process" are not blunted by undermining the

    parties' incentives to proffer relevant evidence on causation.

    Id. The district court prudently ruled out any rebuttable ___

    presumption in the instant case.

    As the district court findings and conclusions are

    fully supported, its disallowance of the fee application must be

    affirmed.


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    The district court order is affirmed. Costs to appel- _______________________________________________________

    lees. ____


















































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