United States v. Restrepo ( 1995 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion










    UNITED STATES OF COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT



    ____________________


    No. 94-1053

    UNITED STATES,

    Appellee,

    v.

    JUAN JOSE RESTREPO, A/K/A JAIME VALENCIA,

    Defendant, Appellant.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
    Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________

    Anthony M. Cardinale and Nicholas J. DiMauro on brief for ____________________ ___________________
    appellant.
    Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Emily R. Schulman, _______________ __________________
    Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.


    ____________________

    March 24, 1995
    ____________________



















































































    Per Curiam. Defendant-appellant Jaime Valencia pled ___________

    guilty to conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to

    distribute it. See 21 U.S.C. 846. The district court ___

    sentenced appellant to 188 months imprisonment followed by a

    period of supervised release. Valencia now appeals, arguing

    that the district court erred in increasing his offense level

    under U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. For the

    following reasons, we affirm.

    I.

    Valencia was arrested on August 31, 1991 following a

    government "sting" operation. On September 3, 1991, prior to

    his initial appearance before a magistrate judge, a pretrial

    services officer interviewed him for the purpose of making a

    recommendation about his pretrial release. Valencia provided

    false identifying information during this interview,

    including the false name "Juan Jose Restrepo." The pretrial

    services officer prepared a report which stated that "a

    record check reveals no criminal history." The report,

    however, recommended that Valencia, referred to as

    "Restrepo," be detained on the grounds that he presented a

    risk of flight and danger to the community.

    At the initial appearance, the government moved for a

    detention hearing under 18 U.S.C. 3142(f). This hearing

    was held before the magistrate judge on September 11, 1991.

    When asked to spell his name, Valencia, who was under oath,



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    responded, "R-E-S-T-R-E-P-O." Counsel for Valencia cross-

    examined the government's sole witness, Special Agent Russell

    Protentis. At the conclusion of the hearing, Valencia

    consented to the entry of an order of detention, reserving

    his right to produce conditions of release at a later time.

    On February 7, 1992, an FBI investigation revealed his true

    identity, as well as the fact that he was a fugitive from

    drug and firearm charges in New York.

    Valencia pled guilty on April 8, 1993. His presentence

    investigative report recommended a two level increase under

    U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. A sentencing

    hearing was conducted, and sentence was imposed, on November

    9, 1993. The district court found that at least two events

    made an upward adjustment under 3C1.1 appropriate. The

    first event was Valencia's identification of himself as

    "Restrepo" in his interview with the pretrial services

    officer. The second event was his giving the false name,

    under oath, at the outset of the detention hearing when

    "detention was still an open issue."

    II.

    Pursuant to 3C1.1, the sentencing court shall increase

    the offense level by two "[i]f the defendant willfully

    obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede,

    the administration of justice during the investigation,

    prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense." One type



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    of conduct to which this enhancement applies is providing

    "materially false information to a . . . magistrate."

    U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, comment. n. 3(f). An obstruction of

    justice increase is also warranted when a defendant provides

    materially false information to a pretrial services officer

    who is conducting a bail investigation for the court. See ___

    United States v. St. James, 38 F.3d 987, 988 (8th Cir. 1994) _____________ _________

    (observing that commentary note 3(h) describes very similar

    conduct). A material statement is a "statement . . . that,

    if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue

    under determination." U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, comment. n. 5.

    Valencia argues that his false identification of himself

    as "Restrepo" to the pretrial services officer did not

    warrant an enhancement under 3C1.1. In particular, he

    contends that the officer's investigation was not impeded,

    and could not be impeded, since a routine fingerprint

    analysis performed by the FBI revealed his true identity.

    This argument is misplaced. Although materially false

    statements made to law enforcement officials do not warrant

    an enhancement unless they "significantly obstructed or

    impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the

    instant offense," see U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 n.3(g), the same is ___

    not true of materially false statements made to probation

    officers and, by analogy, pretrial services officers, in

    respect to an investigation for the court, see U.S.S.G. ___



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    3C1.1, comment. n. 3(h); United States v. St. Cyr, 977 F.2d _____________ _______

    698, 705 & n.6 (1st Cir. 1992). Accordingly, no showing that

    pretrial services' investigation was significantly obstructed

    was required.1

    We add that Valencia's true identity was material to the

    officer's investigation, even if the false information he

    provided did not ultimately affect the officer's

    recommendation. His deliberate misrepresentation had the

    potential to do so. No more is required. Cf. United States ___ _____________

    v. Harrison, 42 F.3d 427, 430 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that ________

    whether the magistrate judge ultimately relied on defendant's

    false statement in ordering his detention is not relevant to

    the application of the enhancement); United States v. ______________

    Mafanya, 24 F.3d 412, 415 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming _______

    enhancement where defendant appeared before the magistrate

    judge using a false identity even though his true identity

    was discovered before the detention hearing).



    ____________________

    1. We note that Valencia's true identity was not discovered
    until some months after the pretrial services officer
    prepared his report and made his recommendation to the
    magistrate judge. Because Valencia provided a false name,
    the officer's report contained inaccurate information about
    his criminal history. Such reports must be prepared quickly
    and, in any event, prior to the detention hearing. See 18 ___
    U.S.C. 3154 (requiring the pretrial services officer to
    collect, verify, and report information pertaining to the
    pretrial release of a defendant "prior to the pretrial
    release hearing.") Under the circumstances, although we do
    not rely upon it, we think that Valencia's deception actually
    impeded the officer in the performance of his task.

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    In sum, we conclude that Valencia's false statements to

    the pretrial services officer justified the enhancement under

    3C1.1. Under the circumstances, we need not reach the

    issue whether his identification of himself as "Restrepo" at

    the detention hearing could constitute an obstruction of

    justice in light of the fact that he assented to detention.

    Accordingly, the judgment below is affirmed. See Loc. R. ________ ___

    27.1.





































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Document Info

Docket Number: 94-1053

Filed Date: 3/24/1995

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015