Seifart v. Skane ( 1995 )

USCA1 Opinion

          April 27, 1995
                                [Not for Publication]
[Not for Publication]

                            United States Court of Appeals
United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-2160

                                  JAMES W. SEIFART,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                           HERBERT R. SKANE, ADMINISTRATOR,
                     MASSACHUSETTS STATE CARPENTERS PENSION FUND,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                       [Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
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                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
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                        John R. Gibson,* Senior Circuit Judge,
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                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
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                                 ____________________

            Frank J. McGee for appellant.
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            James  F.  Grosso with  whom  Orally  &  Grosso was  on  brief for
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        appellee.
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                                 ____________________

        ____________________
        *Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.





















                      STAHL,  Circuit Judge.    Pursuant to  29 U.S.C.
STAHL,  Circuit Judge.
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            1132(a)(1)(B),  James W. Seifart  brought this action against

            the  Administrator  of  the  Massachusetts  State  Carpenters

            Pension  Fund  ("Fund"), Herbert  R.  Skane, challenging  the

            denial of  disability benefits.   The district  court granted

            Skane's motion for summary judgment.  We reverse.

                                          I.
I.
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                      The parties do not dispute  the facts.  Seifart,  a

            carpenter, is  a member  of the International  Brotherhood of

            Carpenters and Joiners of  America ("the union").   Until May

            31,  1983,  Seifart worked  for  employers  who made  pension

            contributions on his behalf pursuant to collective-bargaining

            agreements  with  the union.    During  this period,  Seifart

            accumulated 8.9 pension credits and 9.6 vesting credits.

                      After May 31,  1983, Seifart began employment  with

            the  Boston Housing Authority ("BHA").  On May 8, 1991, while

            still working for BHA, Seifart became disabled.   In November

            of that  year, Seifart  applied to  the  Fund for  disability

            pension.  By  letter dated  November 14,  1991, Skane  denied

            disability  benefits  on  the  basis  that  Seifart  had  not

            accumulated 140 hours of  pension credits within a thirty-six

            month  period prior to the  date of his  disability, as Skane

            claimed  the  union's  pension  plan  ("the Plan")  required.

            Seifart  began  the   present  proceedings  in  Massachusetts

            superior court.    Skane  removed to  federal  court.    Both



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            parties moved for summary  judgment and, as noted  above, the

            district  court  entered judgment  for  Skane.   This  appeal

            followed.

                                         II.
II.
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                      Our review of a summary judgment motion is plenary,

            taking  the  record  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the

            nonmovants and  indulging all reasonable inferences  in their

            favor.  Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.
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            1990).   Summary  judgment  is appropriate  if  "there is  no

            genuine issue as to any material  fact and . . .   the moving

            party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Fed. R.

            Civ. P. 56(c).  

                      Where, as  here, the administrator or  fiduciary of

            an  ERISA-regulated  plan  has  "discretionary  authority  to

            determine eligibility  for benefits or to  construe the terms

            of  the plan," we set  aside a fiduciary's  decisions only if

            they are arbitrary and capricious.   Firestone Tire &  Rubber
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            Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
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                      The benefit provisions  of an ERISA-regulated  plan

            are interpreted under principles  of federal substantive law.

            Bellino v.  Schlumberger Technologies, Inc., 944  F.2d 26, 29
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            (1st Cir. 1991).  Contract language  in an ERISA action is to

            be given its plain  meaning, Hughes v. Boston Mut.  Life Ins.
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            Co., 26  F.3d 264, 267-68 (1st  Cir. 1994), and  a court must
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            give  reasonable effect  to  all terms  and conditions,  see,
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            e.g., Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase  Manhattan Bank, 986 F.2d 580,
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            586 (1st Cir. 1993).

                      At  the   heart  of  this   controversy  lies   the

            interpretation of section  3.10(b) of the  Plan.  Under  that

            provision, a  participant may retire on  a disability pension

            if:

                      He  has  become disabled,  as hereinafter
                      defined,  after  he  has  accumulated  at
                      least  10 Pension  Credits or  10 Vesting
                      Credits, which may  include a maximum  of
                      one Pension Credit  or one Vesting Credit
                      granted  under  Section  4.01(c)(II),  of
                      which  140 hours  of such  Pension Credit
                      was  accumulated  in the  36-month period
                      prior to the date of disability.

                      Under the provisions of  the Plan, Seifart  accrued

            vesting credits, but not pension credits, for his years  with

            BHA.    Accordingly,  Seifart  argues, he  has  16.9  vesting

            credits -- a point conceded by Skane in his brief -- and thus

            qualifies  under the  language of  the Plan.    Skane argues,

            however, that section 3.10(b) sets out a two-prong test:  (1)

            a  participant  must  accumulate  the  requisite  pension  or

            vesting credits, and  (2) 140 hours  of pension credits  must

            have  been earned within  the thirty-six months  prior to the

            date  of disability.1    Skane argues  that, because  Seifart

            earned no pension credits while working for the BHA, he fails

            the second prong.



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            1.  The   district  court  apparently   agreed  with  Skane's
            interpretation of the Plan's language.

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                      We think Skane's reading  flies in the face  of the

            plain  language of the Plan.   Under the  Plan, a participant

            may  qualify for  disability  retirement benefits  by earning

            pension  credits  or   vesting  credits;  if   a  participant
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            qualifies  by means  of  pension credits,  then the  140-hour

            requirement obtains.   Here,  the parties agree  that Seifart

            has earned more than ten vesting credits.  Under the language

            of the Plan, then, Seifart qualifies without reference to the

            pension credit requirements.

                      Interpreting a contract in a manner contrary to its

            clear  language is arbitrary  and capricious.   See, e.g., De
___  ____  __

            Nobel  v. Vitro Corp., 885  F.2d 1180, 1188  (4th Cir. 1989).
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            Skane did just that in this case, and accordingly, we reverse

            the decision of the district court.   That said, we note that

            the district court appears to have addressed this case on the

            premise   that  the  140-hour   requirement  applied  to  the

            appellant.  There is  even a trace of this assumption  in the

            appellant's  brief on  appeal,  and the  appellee takes  this

            position   for   granted.      We  find   the   purpose   and

            interconnection  of  the  pertinent  provisions  difficult to

            discern.   We have decided this case in light of what appears

            to us to be the plain language of the plan, but the fact that

            the parties have not discussed the seemingly crucial language

            on which  we base our holding  leads us to  invite a petition

            for reconsideration if  there is some reason why the language



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            should be taken to mean something that it does  not appear to

            say.

                                         III.
III.
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                      For  the  foregoing reasons,  the  decision of  the

            district court is

                      reversed.
reversed.
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