Westchester Fire v. Campbell ( 1995 )


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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 94-2104

    WESTCHESTER FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,

    Plaintiff - Appellee,

    v.

    RICHARD H. CAMPBELL & DEBORAH D. CAMPBELL,

    Defendants - Appellants.

    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

    [Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Boudin, Circuit Judge, _____________

    John R. Gibson* and Campbell, Senior Circuit Judges. _____________________

    _____________________

    Stephen G. Morrell, with whom Laurie A. Dart and Eaton, ___________________ _______________ ______
    Peabody, Bradford & Veague, P.A., were on brief for appellants. ________________________________
    Keith R. Jacques, with whom Jensen Baird Gardner & Henry, _________________ _____________________________
    was on brief for appellee.



    ____________________

    June 1, 1995
    ____________________


    ____________________

    * Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.












    JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge. Richard and _____________________

    Deborah Campbell appeal the summary judgment entered against them

    in favor of Westchester Fire Insurance Company on a guaranty the

    Campbells executed for the benefit of their family-owned company,

    R. H. Campbell, Inc. We affirm the judgment of the district

    court.

    The facts are undisputed. In 1987 the Campbells signed

    an agreement with Universal Bonding Insurance Company to

    indemnify Universal against loss on any surety bonds it might

    execute on behalf of R. H. Campbell, Inc.1 The agreement had no

    termination date, and neither party terminated it. The agreement
    ____________________

    1 The operative language of the agreement provided:

    [S]hould the [Universal Bonding] Company
    execute or procure the execution of the
    suretyship for which application is now
    pending, or which may be hereafter
    applied for . . . the undersigned [i.e.,
    the Campbells] . . . hereby undertake and
    agree:

    . . .

    That the indemnitor will . . . at all
    times indemnify and save the [Universal
    Bonding] Company harmless from and
    against every claim, demand, liability
    [or] loss . . . sustained or incurred by
    the Company by reason of having executed
    or procured the execution of said bonds
    or obligations . . . .

    The agreement also stated:

    The indemnitor and his successors agree
    to indemnify and save harmless the Surety
    from and against any and all demands,
    liabilities, loss, costs, damages or
    expenses of whatever nature or
    kind. . . .

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    defined as the "Surety" entitled to indemnification: "Universal

    Bonding Insurance Company, its reinsurers, and any other person

    or entity which the surety may procure to act as Surety or co-

    surety on any bond or any other person or entity who executes any

    bond at its request." In 1990 Westchester issued payment and

    performance bonds for R. H. Campbell, Inc., at Universal's

    request, in reliance on the guaranty Universal had obtained from

    the Campbells. Richard Campbell was aware that his corporation

    was obtaining the bonds at the time Westchester issued them,

    since he signed the bonds in his capacity as president of R. H.

    Campbell, Inc.

    Westchester was eventually required to pay almost a

    million dollars in claims, expenses, and attorneys' fees on its

    surety bonds. Consequently, Westchester sued the Campbells on

    the guaranty agreement. The district court granted Westchester

    summary judgment. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 863 F. _________________________ ________

    Supp. 32 (D. Maine 1994).

    The Campbells argue that under Maine law, specifically

    Norton v. Eastman, 4 Me. 521 (1827), a guarantor on a continuing ______ _______

    guaranty is entitled to notice of acceptance of his offer of

    guaranty. They argue that they did not receive notice that

    Westchester issued its bonds in reliance on their guaranty. The

    Campbells quote from American Agricultural Chemical Co. v. _____________________________________

    Ellsworth, 83 A. 546 (Me. 1912): "Until acceptance and notice, _________

    the writing of guaranty is merely a proposal, making necessary




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    acceptance by the other party to complete the contract." Id. at ___

    547.

    However, there are several situations in which notice

    of acceptance is unnecessary, since acceptance can be inferred

    from the circumstances of the offer of guaranty. In Ellsworth _________

    the Maine Supreme Judicial Court stated:

    There are some exceptions to the
    general rule [requiring notice], three of
    which the plaintiff relies upon in this
    case. One is when the consideration of
    the guaranty is a valuable one, moving,
    directly or indirectly to the guarantor
    from the creditor. Another is when the
    guaranty is made at the request of the
    creditor. And a third is when the
    agreement to accept, or the contract
    guaranteed, is contemporaneous with the
    guaranty. In such cases notice of
    acceptance of the guaranty is
    unnecessary.

    Id. at 547. ___

    This case presents the first exception listed in

    Ellsworth, since the Campbells agreed in the 1987 guaranty: _________

    "Undersigned warrant that each of them is specifically and

    beneficially interested in the obtaining of each Bond." The

    import of this language is that the consideration for the

    guaranty--that is, the Surety's issuance of the bonds--was

    valuable consideration benefitting the Campbells themselves.

    This exception makes perfect sense, because when the guarantor

    benefits from the surety's execution of the bond, he has already

    received something under the arrangement and is not entitled to

    withdraw from it. Moreover, the very receipt of that benefit

    functions as notice of acceptance of the guaranty, making further

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    notice superfluous. Here, the Campbells were sole shareholders

    of R. H. Campbell, Inc., and as such had an obvious interest in

    the issuance of bonds enabling R. H. Campbell, Inc. to do

    business. Under these circumstances, the Campbells are not

    entitled to insist on further notice of acceptance under

    Ellsworth.2 _________

    Westchester also states without objection from the

    Campbells, that the Campbells executed the guaranty at the

    request of the creditor, thus coming within the second exception

    to the notice requirement. See Ellsworth, 83 A. at 547; see ___ _________ ___

    generally, Annotation, Necessity of Giving Creditor Notice of _________ _________________________________________

    Acceptance of Guaranty, 6 A.L.R. 3d 355, 10 (1966 and 1994 _______________________

    Supp.); Restatement (Second) of Contracts 54, cmt. d (1981).

    Westchester's assertion is corroborated by the fact that the

    guaranty agreement consists of a Universal Bonding form signed by

    the Campbells. Thus, the Campbells' arguments based on Maine law

    are unavailing.

    ____________________

    2 These facts also establish another generally recognized
    proviso to the notice of acceptance requirement: when a
    guarantor is an insider of the principal corporation, notice of
    acceptance to the guarantor is considered redundant once the
    corporation has received notice. See Richard F. Dole, Jr., ___
    Notice Requirements of Guaranty Contracts, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 57, __________________________________________
    79-80 (1963); Annotation, Necessity of Creditor Giving Guarantor _______________________________________
    Notice of Acceptance of Guaranty, 6 A.L.R. 3d 355, 13 (1966 ___________________________________
    and 1994 Supp.); Restatement (Second) of Contracts 54, cmt. d
    (1981). In this case, the Campbells were the sole shareholders
    and were officers and directors of the principal corporation.
    Richard Campbell was aware that the corporation was obtaining the
    bonds. Campbell's knowledge of the transaction between debtor
    and creditor is an adequate basis for inferring notice of
    acceptance. See, e.g., Cobb v. Texas Distrib., Inc., 524 S.W.2d ___ ____ ____ ____________________
    342, 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).

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    Finally, to the extent the Campbells are arguing that

    Westchester should have notified them about each transaction

    concluded in reliance on their guaranty, they have waived such

    notice. Their guaranty agreement states: "Undersigned waive

    notice of . . . Surety's loaning funds to Principal." Since in

    executing the payment and performance bonds the surety lent its

    credit to R. H. Campbell, Inc., it was in effect lending R. H.

    Campbell funds. Certainly, this was the effect of the

    transaction from the guarantor's point of view, since the

    guarantor's concern is whether the principal will contract a debt

    he cannot repay. Therefore, our decision is bolstered by the

    fact that the Campbells waived notice of principal-surety

    transactions in their guaranty agreement. See Davis v. Wells, ___ _____ _____

    104 U.S. 159, 169 (1881).

    We affirm the judgment of the district court.

    Affirmed. ________






















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Document Info

Docket Number: 94-2104

Filed Date: 6/1/1995

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015