Dill v. General Electric ( 1995 )

USCA1 Opinion

          July 28, 1995

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL

                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT











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        No. 95-1042



                               IN RE:  DANIEL J. DILL,



                                       Debtor.

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                     GENERAL ELECTRIC MORTGAGE INSURANCE COMPANY,



                                      Appellant,



                                          v.



                                   DANIEL J. DILL,



                                      Appellee.

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                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                        FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS



                   [Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
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                                        Before



                                Selya, Cyr and Boudin,

                                   Circuit Judges.
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            Richard W. Gannett on brief for appellant.
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            Leonard A. Berkal and Berkal, Stelman,  Davern & Shribman on brief
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        for appellee.





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                 Per Curiam.   We have carefully  reviewed the record  in
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            this case, including the briefs of the parties.  We find that



            appellant  has failed to meet  its burden, see  In re Nelson,
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            100 Bankr. 905, 906  (Bankr. N.D. Oh. 1989), of  showing that



            "assets of such probability, administrability and substance .



            .   .  exist  as  to  make  it  unreasonable  under  all  the



            circumstances for the court  not to deal  with them."  In  re
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            Herzig,  96  B.R.  264,  266  (Bankr.  9th   Cir.  BAP  1989)
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            (citations  omitted).   We  note  as  well  that  the  record



            discloses  no  justification  for  the  substantial  delay in



            filing the  motion to  reopen.   See Fed.  R. Bankr.  P. 9024
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            (motion to reopen  must be made within  reasonable time after



            case is closed); Virgin Islands Bureau of Internal Revenue v.
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            St.  Croix  Hotel Corp.,  60  B.R.  412, 414  (D.V.I.  1986).
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            Therefore,  we find no abuse of discretion in the decision of



            the bankruptcy court not  to reopen this case pursuant  to 11



            U.S.C.   350(b).



                 Affirmed.
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