NH Motor Transport v. Town of Plaistow ( 1995 )


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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 94-2095

    NEW HAMPSHIRE MOTOR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,

    Plaintiffs, Appellants,

    v.

    TOWN OF PLAISTOW,

    Defendant, Appellee.

    ____________________

    Before

    Cyr, Circuit Judge, _____________

    Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________

    and Boudin, Circuit Judge. _____________


    ORDER ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

    Entered October 25, 1995


    On petition for rehearing, New Hampshire Motor Transport
    Association has expanded its reliance on an agency regulation
    touched upon lightly at one point in the original brief. This
    regulation of the Department of Transportation states that access
    review processes adopted by the state shall provide inter alia _____ ____
    for "denial of access to terminals . . . only on the basis of
    safety and engineering analysis of the access route." 23 C.F.R.
    658.19 (i)(2)(A). It is apparently the Association's position
    that this provision represents a controlling agency
    interpretation of the "reasonable access" provision of the
    Surface Transportation Systems Act of 1982 to which deference is
    required under the Chevron doctrine. We reject this belated _______
    suggestion.

    First, the ordinance and order in this case do not
    "deny . . . access to the terminal"; they impose reasonable
    restrictions upon it, as the statute itself clearly permits.
    This is no more an outright denial of access than a detour around ______
    a school zone or a bridge raised for maritime commerce during
    rush hour. Nor does the regulation itself even purport to define
    "reasonable access" as that term is used in the statute; the
    quoted provision is one element in a check list of elements for












    state review processes to be established under the regulations.

    Indeed, if the regulation were read as the Association
    intends, there would be a very serious question about its
    validity. As explained in the panel opinion, the original 1982
    statute did not even arguably impose the requirement that all
    reasonable restrictions on access be based solely on safety; and
    whatever the precise purpose of the 1984 amendment that
    emphasized that safety regulations could be imposed on certain
    tractor-trailers, a drastic recasting of the original "reasonable
    access" provision is nowhere suggested. Even under Chevron, _______
    deference to an administrative interpretation is not unlimited.

    Second, the implications of the suggested reading of the
    regulation, like the suggested reading of the statute, weigh
    heavily against it. There is no federal regime of zoning or use
    restrictions that applies to terminals, like the one in this
    case, located miles from the interstate highway system. Thus,
    the Association's reading of the statute and the regulation would
    mean that no one--neither the federal government, nor the states
    and localities--would have the power to carry on this traditional
    function of government.

    It would be remarkable enough for Congress to determine to
    transfer such authority sub silentio from the states and local ____________
    governments to federal authorities or for it to empower the
    Department of Transportation to make such a shift by regulation.
    What is to us almost inconceivable is that Congress effectively
    abolished anyone's authority to impose reasonable non-safety ______
    based restrictions on access to such terminals. The notion that
    trucking terminals have been completely exempted from regulation
    that affects every other kind of business in the United States is
    difficult to take seriously.

    The petition for rehearing is denied. ______

























Document Info

Docket Number: 94-2095

Filed Date: 10/25/1995

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015