Donovan v. Ritchie ( 1995 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion








    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    ____________________

    No. 95-1421

    CHRISTOPHER DONOVAN, ET AL.,

    Plaintiffs, Appellants,

    v.

    JOHN M. RITCHIE, PRINCIPAL,
    WINCHESTER HIGH SCHOOL, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.

    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Boudin, Circuit Judge, _____________

    Aldrich and Coffin, Senior Circuit Judges. _____________________

    ____________________

    Paul L. Kenny for appellant. _____________
    Mary Joann Reedy for appellees. ________________

    ____________________

    October 24, 1995
    ____________________
























    COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge. This appeal requires us to _____________________

    decide whether the procedural due process requirements of Goss v. ____

    Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), applied to and, if so, were correctly _____

    applied to a high school student before his suspension.

    Appellant, a senior at Winchester High School, brought

    suit under both federal and state statutes and constitutional

    provisions against the school principal, the superintendent of

    schools, and the school committee, seeking injunctive relief,

    compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney's fees and costs

    for his ten-day suspension from school and exclusion from various

    extracurricular activities.

    At the conclusion of a five-day bench trial, in which the

    evidence and argument focused solely on whether appellant had

    been afforded procedural due process, the district court granted

    judgment as a matter of law for the school committee members and

    found that the process given appellant was adequate. Appellant

    appeals from these dispositions but has not furnished us with a

    transcript of the trial proceedings. We affirm.

    The case revolves about a nine-page document bearing, in

    large capital letters, the scatological title, "The Shit List."

    Apart from a cover page and a concluding page containing general

    remarks of a boorish nature, the document zeroed in on some 140

    named students,1 each name being followed by one or more lines of
    ____________________

    1 The district court referred to the list as containing
    "the first name and the first initial of the last name" of
    students. The list appearing in the record as an exhibit
    contains the initial of the given name and the full surname of
    each student.

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    crude descriptions of character and/or behavior. The freshmen,

    fewer than a dozen, were treated to insulting comments about

    their appearance or social conduct. But the sophomores and

    juniors, more than thirty in each group, and more than sixty

    seniors were characterized by epithets that were not merely

    insulting as to appearance, but suggestive, often explicitly so,

    of sexual capacity, proclivity, and promiscuity.

    The sequence of events leading to appellant's suspension is

    the following. On September 18, 1994, a Sunday, some fifteen

    students were gathered in the home of one of them when the list

    was created by someone still unknown. On Thursday appellant and

    two other boys made copies of the list and put them in a trash

    barrel. They were delivered to the school soon after. After it

    was discovered by a faculty member the next day, Principal

    Ritchie announced to the school that the list was harmful and

    degrading, and urged students to provide information as to the

    perpetrators. On the following Monday, September 26, appellant

    and two others came to Ritchie's office and denied any

    involvement.

    The next day they came back and said that they had

    photocopied the list but denied knowing the contents and that,

    since the photocopying was outside of school premises, they were

    not subject to school discipline. The principal disagreed and

    said that they would probably face suspension. Meanwhile,

    Principal Ritchie met with other students and compiled a list of

    fifteen students who were said to be present at the creation of


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    the list. On Thursday, September 29, a letter was sent to the

    fifteen, announcing a meeting the next day for them and their

    parents.

    At the September 30 meeting, Principal Ritchie said that the

    list was a violation of the school's rules, as set forth in the

    school handbook, against harassment and obscenity. After the

    meeting, Ritchie met with appellant and his mother and said he

    was indefinitely suspended. He did not specify the length of the

    suspension, but said that information would soon be forthcoming.

    In a letter requested by the principal and received the following

    Monday, October 3, appellant wrote apologizing for this "bad

    mistake" and saying:

    My involvement in the list is such; I had the list
    copied with 2 other boys and we then proceeded to take
    the list put it in a trash bag and put it in the barrel
    at Gin [Ginn Field] where it was to be picked up.

    Two days later, Ritchie met with the school's "Crisis Team,"

    consisting of twelve staff members, and then wrote appellant's

    mother, specifying "the consequences for your son, Christopher's

    participation in the chain of events leading up to the

    distribution of the 'Shit List' at Winchester High School." They

    were suspension for ten days, and exclusion from any school

    social events and interscholastic athletics.

    Principal Ritchie identified the following parts of the

    Student Handbook as being violated: (1) the cover, which called

    for an end to name calling, harassment, "put downs;" (2) an

    opening statement proscribing "harassment of any kind;" (3) a

    section proscribing violent behavior, vandalism, or violation of

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    students' civil rights on school premises or at school-related

    events, carrying the sanction of indefinite suspension or

    expulsion; and (4) a section barring abusive or obscene language

    or materials. Possible reinstatement to athletic programs (in

    appellant's case, lacrosse) and removal of the letter from

    appellant's file was to depend on steps "to repair the damage" to

    individuals and the school.

    In a subsequent, undated letter to the principal, appellant

    complained of his "excessive punishment" and added to his prior

    statement that he thought "it was the Underground Newspaper."

    Appeals to the superintendent and later to the school

    committee, in which presentations were made by both appellant's

    attorney and the principal, were unsuccessful.



    Discussion __________

    We must first face a threshold question: whether the

    sanction imposed on appellant was an expulsion or a ten-day

    suspension. Appellant's brief assumes throughout that it was the

    former, citing the fact that Principal Ritchie initially told

    appellant and his mother than he was indefinitely suspended.

    Appellant then cites Jones v. Fitchburg, 211 Mass. 66, 68, 97 _____ _________

    N.E. 612, 613 (1912), for the proposition that a suspension,

    "intended to operate[] for an indefinite period, . . . in effect

    amount[s] to a permanent exclusion. . . ." Accordingly, he

    invokes the authorities that specify a considerable panoply of

    rights, including the assistance of counsel and the right to


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    examine witnesses at a hearing. See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama ___ ___ _____ _______

    State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961). __________________

    Unfortunately for appellant, the mere repetition of the

    expulsion label is of no avail. As the district court found,

    Principal Ritchie, after informing appellant and his mother that

    he was indefinitely suspended, told them that they would receive

    the information as to the length of the suspension in the mail

    "shortly thereafter." Five days later, after conferring with the

    "Crisis Team," he sent his letter of October 5, containing the

    details of the ten-day suspension. Appellant cannot attack the

    basis of the district court's finding that he was suspended, for

    he has not furnished us with a transcript. Real v. Hogan, 828 ____ _____

    F.2d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 1987) ("If [the existing record] proves

    inconclusive, it is the appellant who must bear the brunt of an

    insufficient record on appeal.") In any event, however, we would

    be unlikely to find "clear error" in the finding. Cf. Roland M. __ _________

    v. Concord School Committee, 910 F.2d 983, 990 (1st Cir. 1990). ________________________

    We are, therefore, dealing with the kind of temporary

    suspension at issue in Goss v. Lopez. In that case the Court ____ _____

    succinctly summarized the three procedural prerequisites: "that

    the student be given oral or written notice of the charges

    against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the

    evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his

    side of the story." 419 U.S. at 581. The Court added, "In the

    great majority of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss

    the alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has


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    occurred." Id. at 582. In order for the student "to explain his ___

    version of the facts at this discussion, [he should] first be

    told what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the

    accusation is." Id. "Requiring that there be at least an ___

    informal give-and-take between student and disciplinarian," the

    Court concluded, would at least give the student "the opportunity

    to characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the

    proper context." Id. at 584. ___

    It is clear, first of all, that appellant had adequate

    notice. The principal warned him several days before the

    suspension took effect that the conduct he had acknowledged

    likely would result in his suspension. The principal's letter of

    October 5, elaborating on and specifying the bases for the

    suspension, referred to the High School Handbook, which every

    student was obliged to read and understand. Its cover, as the

    letter noted, briefly but clearly identified name-calling,

    harassment, and "put downs" as actions to be resisted. The

    principal also referred to the "Opening Remarks" of the Handbook,

    prohibiting "harassment of any kind." This introductory section

    defined "harassment" as "conduct, behavior, or comments that are

    personally offensive, degrading, or threatening to others," and

    gave such examples as "sexually suggestive remarks, . . . and the

    display or circulation of written materials . . . that are

    degrading to any individual. . . ."

    Thirdly, the principal cited to a regulation barring

    fighting, violent behavior, or "violation of other students'


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    civil rights" on school premises, the violation of which called

    for an indefinite suspension and possibly expulsion. Appellant

    challenges the relevance of this regulation to the facts of his

    case. He also argues that more formal procedures regarding

    notice, counsel, and presentation of witnesses are required under

    this regulation. This would seem to be true but it is obvious

    from the sanction imposed, a temporary suspension, that this

    regulation was not a ground for decision.

    The principal's fourth basis for punishment was regulations

    barring the use of either obscene materials or language that was

    "abusive," "obscene," "profane," or "vulgar."

    Apart from the attack noted above to the third ground listed

    by the principal, appellant makes only two arguments. The first

    is that a passage in "Opening Remarks" urges sensitivity to the

    feelings of others and prompt communication between a student who

    feels aggrieved and an offender so that objectionable behavior

    may be brought to an end quickly. To read this as preempting any

    more severe treatment of what has been "strictly prohibited" is

    not only to treat the Opening Remarks section as internally

    inconsistent but also to ignore other parts of the Handbook

    detailing a twelve point "Range of Consequences" for violations

    of the student disciplinary code that extend from verbal warning

    to expulsion. Appellant's second thrust is against the charges

    of abusive or obscene language. His brief makes the assertion

    that "Notwithstanding that Ritchie found no evidence to support

    the foregoing, Ritchie cites this regulation without ever


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    explaining to Donovan how it was violated." This, in the light

    of "The Shit List" itself, defies rational justification even in

    the context of strenuous advocacy.

    By the same token, there can be no rational question raised

    as to the basis for the suspension. Indeed, appellant knew

    precisely what the basis was -- the preparation and distribution

    of the list; he acknowledged his part in making photocopies and

    merely asserts that he did not know the contents. This leads us

    to the third requirement of Goss v. Lopez, an opportunity for the ____ _____

    student to have presented his version of the facts.

    We conclude from the record that appellant had, and took

    advantage of, multiple opportunities to present his view of what

    occurred. On September 26, he and two others met with Principal

    Ritchie and denied any involvement. On September 27, they had

    another meeting and admitted photocopying, but no knowledge of

    contents. They also advanced their defense that their act did

    not take place on school property. On September 30, appellant

    and his mother met separately with Principal Ritchie, after a

    larger meeting, and had the opportunity to add to what had been

    said.

    We add these observations. At no time has appellant

    indicated the presence of any evidence other than his own say-so

    that could shed light on his defense of ignorance of contents.

    Moreover, as we reflect on the giant-sized capital letters

    spelling out the title of the list on the cover, and the

    following listing names with, generally, a salacious one-line


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    commentary, we can be skeptical of the likelihood of one

    remaining oblivious to content after feeding into and retrieving

    from the copying machine multiple copies of this nine-page

    document. Given the nature of the defense, the nature of the

    evidence, the lack of any trial transcript, and the opportunities

    given appellant to explain and support his position, we conclude

    that the disciplinarian was entitled to make a credibility

    judgment.

    We take note of an argument briefly advanced by appellant --

    that, because of the bar to interscholastic athletics and other

    school activities, in addition to a ten-day suspension, the

    punishment falls outside of Goss and required a higher level of ____

    procedural formalities. We are not unmindful of the impact of

    sanctions other than suspension and expulsion. As the Court in

    Goss recognized, there may be "unusual situations, although ____

    involving only a short suspension, [where] something more than

    the rudimentary procedures will be required." 419 U.S. at 584.

    But the mere fact that other sanctions are added to a short

    suspension does not trigger a requirement for a more formal set

    of procedures. In Goss itself one of the plaintiffs had not only ____

    been suspended, but had been transferred to another school. Id. ___

    at 569 n.4. What must remain the focus is whether the student

    was given the opportunity to present his version of what

    occurred. In this case appellant has never suggested any respect

    in which he was denied this opportunity.




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    We add one final word. We have said that appellant bears

    any risk stemming from an inadequate record. Our reading of

    appellees' Proposed Findings of Facts below suggests that the

    absence of a record may have deprived us of evidence that is more

    adverse than helpful to appellant. In any event, on this record

    we conclude that he received all of the process that was due.

    We make short shrift of two other arguments. One is that

    Mass. Gen. L. ch. 71, 84 prohibits the suspension of a student

    for "marriage, pregnancy, parenthood or for conduct which is not

    connected with any school-sponsored activities. . . ." While the

    context suggests that the statute is dealing with matters other

    than actions taken with and aimed toward other students, we are

    entirely satisfied with the district court's reasoning that

    appellant's "admitted off-premises conduct led to the

    distribution of the list on school premises." As for appellant's

    objection to the judgment dismissing the claim against the

    members of the school committee, our due process holding renders

    further statement unnecessary.

    We do not, however, deem this such a frivolous appeal as to

    grant appellees' motion for attorney's fees.

    AFFIRMED. ________












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