Hayes v. RI Dept. of Bus. Reg ( 1995 )


Menu:
  • USCA1 Opinion



    December 4, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT


    ____________________


    No. 95-1726

    SUSAN HAYES,

    Plaintiff, Appellee,

    v.

    STATE OF RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS
    REGULATION,

    Defendant, Appellee.

    __________

    MAURICE A. PARADIS,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND


    [Hon. Raymond J. Pettine, Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
    Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________

    Steven E. Snow, Thomas R. Noel and Partridge, Snow & Hahn on _______________ _______________ ________________________
    brief for appellant.
    Amato A. DeLuca, Miriam Weizenbaum and Mandell, DeLuca & _________________ ___________________ ____________________
    Schwartz, Ltd. on brief for appellee, Susan Hayes. ______________

    ____________________


    ____________________



















    Per Curiam. Defendant-appellant Maurice C. Paradis __________

    has filed this interlocutory appeal from the district court's

    denial of his motion for summary judgment on the issue of

    qualified immunity that would shield him from damages in this

    sex discrimination suit. Plaintiff-appellee Susan Hayes

    argues that under Johnson v. Jones, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. _______ _____

    2151 (1995), this court lacks appellate jurisdiction.

    Paradis has raised two issues on appeal. The first

    issue is a purely legal one: whether in 1991, when the

    challenged conduct occurred, there was a clearly established

    right under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection

    clause to be free from sex discrimination in the workplace.

    Under Johnson, "a district court's pretrial rejection of a _______

    proffered qualified immunity defense remains immediately

    appealable as a collateral order to the extent that it turns

    on a pure issue of law . . . ." Stella v. Kelley, No. 95- ______ ______

    1223, slip op. at 10 (1st Cir. Aug. 23, 1995). Exercising

    this jurisdiction, we summarily affirm the district court's _________ ______

    purely legal determination that, at the time of the

    challenged conduct, there existed a clearly established right

    under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause to

    be free from sex discrimination in the workplace. See ___

    Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 884-85 _______ __________________________

    (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that sex-based discrimination is





    -2-













    actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as a violation of the equal

    protection clause).

    Paradis' second argument on appeal is as follows:

    even if there was a clearly established constitutional right

    to be free from sex discrimination in the workplace, "[i]t

    cannot be said that Paradis' action was objectively

    unreasonable given the extraordinary circumstances

    confronting him." Although cloaked as a purely legal issue,

    this argument is actually fact-based. The objective

    reasonableness of Paradis' conduct (under clearly established

    law) will necessarily turn on an issue of fact: whether the

    conduct was motivated by sex-based animus. See Poe v. ___ ___

    Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 431 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 ______ ____________

    U.S. 1007 (1989). Under Johnson, "a district court's _______

    pretrial rejection of a qualified immunity defense is not

    immediately appealable to the extent that it turns on . . .

    an issue of fact . . . ." Stella, supra, at 6-7. Therefore, ______ _____

    we lack jurisdiction to consider the second issue raised by

    this appeal.

    Affirmed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded ___________________________________________________

    for further proceedings. Costs to appellee. _______________________ _________________











    -3-