Schwartz v. Mitre Corporation ( 1996 )


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    January 23, 1996 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________

    No. 95-1817

    JACK SCHWARTZ,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    THE MITRE CORPORATION,

    Defendant, Appellee.

    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________

    Cyr, Circuit Judge, _____________

    and Skinner,* Senior District Judge. _____________________

    ____________________



    Paul H. Merry, with whom Garrity, Levin & Muir was on brief for _____________ _____________________
    appellant.
    David J. Kerman, with whom Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman _______________ ____________________________________
    was on brief for appellee.



    ____________________


    ____________________
    ____________________

    *Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.












    Per Curiam. Plaintiff-appellant Jack Schwartz chal- ___________

    lenges the summary judgment order dismissing his age discrimina-

    tion claims under federal and state law1 against his former

    employer, MITRE Corporation ("MITRE"). Following oral argument,

    full briefing, and careful plenary review of the entire record,

    we affirm the district court judgment, substantially for the

    reasons explained in Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d _____ ________________________

    255 (1st Cir. 1994).

    Schwartz commenced employment with MITRE in 1983, at

    age fifty-two, as a member of its technical staff. In the fall

    of 1990, his job performance rating placed him in the bottom ten

    percent of all technical staff employees in his division with

    comparable experience. A few months later, MITRE laid off __________ __________

    Schwartz and 118 other employees in a reduction in force.

    Approximately one year later, Schwartz instituted this age

    discrimination action.

    The parties acknowledge that the only issue on appeal

    is whether Schwartz proffered evidence sufficient to enable a

    reasonable trier of fact to find that MITRE's stated reason for

    discharging him was a pretext for age discrimination. See id. at _______ ___ ___ ______________ ___ ___

    262. There can be no question that MITRE gave a

    nondiscriminatory reason for firing Schwartz, viz., failure to

    perform as well as other division employees with similar experi-

    ____________________

    1See 29 U.S.C. 623 (1988 & Supp. V); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ___
    ch. 151B (West 1996); Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 631 N.E.2d ________ _________________
    555, 557-58 (Mass. 1994)(ruling that chapter 151B provides the
    exclusive statutory remedy for age discrimination).

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    ence. Schwartz responded, inappositely, with affidavits general-

    ly attesting to his abilities as an engineer and physicist; the

    affidavits did not, however, raise a material issue as to the

    comparability of Schwartz' job performance vis- -vis that of

    other division employees the articulated reason for the

    termination. Id. Nor did the statistical evidence submitted by ___

    Schwartz establish a trialworthy issue in this disparate treat-

    ment case, since it did not purport to show that he was dis-

    charged by MITRE based on a discriminatory animus, as distin-

    guished from inferior job performance. See LeBlanc v. Great Am. ___ _______ _________

    Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 848 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting limited proba- ________

    tive value of statistical evidence in disparate treatment case),

    cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1398 (1994). Finally, Schwartz _____ ______

    attested to an occasion in late 1989, when one George Randig, a

    MITRE department head, allegedly informed a group of employees,

    that MITRE management intended to rate senior employees according

    to a new, more exacting performance standard. Although Randig

    was not involved in any way in the decision to terminate him,

    Schwartz contends that this statement evinces that age bias

    infected MITRE's entire job performance evaluation system in the

    year prior to the reduction in force which cost him his job.

    Based on a careful review of the affidavit in the light most

    favorable to Schwartz, id. at 841, we conclude that it too failed ___

    to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the question of pre-

    text. First, as the district court held, the inferences

    Schwartz would have the court draw are highly speculative; just


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    how speculative cannot readily be determined due to Schwartz'

    failure to proffer the Randig language upon which he would have a

    factfinder draw the inferences for which he contends. And, in

    all events, MITRE considered Schwartz' job performance inferior

    to other division employees of similar experience and age. ___ ___

    Consequently, even assuming the affidavit were sufficient to

    support a reasonable inference that MITRE rated older employees

    more severely than younger employees to facilitate inclusion

    of older employees in any reduction in force the affidavit

    nevertheless is inapposite to the articulated basis for Schwartz'

    termination. In sum, there is no competent evidence of pretext

    which would support the present age discrimination claim.

    Affirmed. ________




























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Document Info

Docket Number: 95-1817

Filed Date: 1/23/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015