United States v. Calderon ( 1996 )


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    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    ____________________

    No. 95-1707

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    JAIME CALDERON,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

    [Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
    ____________________

    Before

    Stahl, Circuit Judge, _____________

    Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________

    and Lynch, Circuit Judge. _____________
    ____________________

    Merin Chamberlain for appellant. _________________

    Jean B. Weld, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Paul M. ____________ _______
    Gagnon, United States Attorney, was on brief, for the United States. ______

    ____________________

    February 27, 1996
    ____________________



    LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Having been convicted by a LYNCH, Circuit Judge. _____________
















    jury of carjacking and kidnapping, Jaime Calderon was

    sentenced to 30 years of imprisonment, and five years of

    supervised release thereafter. He now challenges the

    verdict, saying that certain evidence should have been

    suppressed and he should have been given a hearing on the

    motion to suppress, that the superseding indictment was

    invalid, that there was insufficient evidence to convict, and

    that the jury's conviction of him on two counts was

    impermissibly inconsistent with its acquittal of him on two

    other counts. There being more than ample evidence to

    convict and none of the asserted errors having been

    committed, we affirm. Indeed, this is a case in which the

    police search was backed by more than the usual, and the

    careful efforts by the police to have both belt and

    suspenders to support the search marks more, rather than

    less, concern for adherence to the procedural protections

    afforded defendants.

    The Crime _________

    On the evidence, the jury was entitled to find the

    following. On August 31, 1994, Calderon heard that two young

    men were selling stereo speakers out of a van in his

    neighborhood in Nashua, New Hampshire. Emboldened by access

    to newly stolen guns, Calderon decided to take the van and

    the speakers. Calderon, age 33, recruited three teenagers,

    including his nephew Jose Hernandez, to help him. When



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    Hernandez originally balked, his uncle excoriated him and

    called him a "chicken." The other two recruits, Angel Rivera

    and Julio Sanchez, approached the two young stereo salesmen

    and asked if they would take them in the van to a nearby

    place where they could make a purchase outside of the

    presence of police officers who might be looking for them.

    Once inside the van, Rivera and Sanchez used a gun and

    chokeholds to force the two salesmen to the back of the van,

    where they were made to lie, face down. The carjackers

    struck one on the head with a gun, causing profuse bleeding,

    and told the two men that if they ever went to the police,

    they would be hunted down at their homes and killed.

    Rivera and Sanchez picked up Calderon in the van,

    at his apartment, where he assumed the role of driver.

    Hernandez joined the group as the van left the neighborhood.

    Because the salesmen were face down, they could not identify

    Calderon, but were aware of his presence in the van.

    Calderon, who was in charge, gave instructions that "if the

    kids get smart or something, . . . smack them around a little

    just to calm them down." The van was driven to

    Massachusetts. In Lowell, Calderon, a heroin addict, bought

    heroin and unloaded some of the speakers. The two "kids"

    were held with their faces down for three hours and then

    dumped into a wooded ditch in Billerica after one of them was

    kicked in the head.



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    Calderon's defense at trial was that he simply

    accepted a ride to Lowell, where he knew he could buy heroin,

    and had no part in the carjacking or kidnapping. A search of

    the apartment of Calderon's girlfriend, however, turned up

    both the stolen speakers and Calderon.

    In the interim, a disquieted Hernandez turned

    himself in to the Nashua police and voluntarily cooperated.

    The Search __________

    Based on information from a confidential informant

    that at least one pair of the stolen speakers was at the

    apartment of Carmen Delgado, Calderon's girlfriend, the

    police went to Delgado's apartment at 11 p.m. on September 6,

    1994. At that time the police had an outstanding warrant for

    Calderon's arrest for a failure to appear on a motor vehicle

    violation and Calderon was a prime suspect in the kidnapping

    and carjacking. The officers had reason to believe that

    Calderon was living at the address.

    The police knocked and, when Delgado answered the

    door, they asked for permission to search. An officer also

    read from a consent form. Delgado gave consent. The

    officers then asked her to sign the consent form, which she

    did. Two of the stolen speakers were in plain sight. In

    addition, there was a man in the living room. The man gave a

    name, not the name "Jaime Calderon," and four different dates

    of birth. An officer stepped outside to look at a photograph



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    of Calderon, realized the man was Calderon, and went back in

    and arrested him. Not knowing who or what was in the rest of

    the apartment, the police searched the remainder. They found

    two other speakers, of the type stolen, in a bedroom closet.

    A few hours later, the officers obtained a warrant to make a

    detailed search of the apartment for weapons and speakers.

    Delgado gave the police inconsistent versions of her story to

    the effect that the speakers came to her apartment

    innocently.

    Motion to Suppress __________________

    Calderon argues that the district court erred in

    denying his motion to suppress evidence without an

    evidentiary hearing and that on the merits the motion should

    have been granted. The decision to hold an evidentiary

    hearing is committed to the discretion of the district court

    and our review is for abuse of that discretion. See United ___ ______

    States v. Lewis, 40 F.3d 1325, 1332 (1st Cir. 1994). ______ _____

    Evidentiary hearings on motions to suppress are

    required only where a defendant makes a sufficient showing

    that the evidence seized was the product of a warrantless

    search that does not fall within any exception to the warrant

    requirement. Id. The burden is on the defendant to allege ___

    facts, "sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and

    nonconjectural, to enable the court to conclude that a





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    substantial claim is presented." Id. (internal quotations ___

    omitted).

    Calderon argues that the motion to suppress should

    have been granted because Delgado gave no valid consent to

    the search, and that it was error for the district court not

    to take evidence and grant the motion. Leaving aside the

    question of whether Delgado's consent was necessary under the

    circumstances,1 we analyze the issue as Calderon has framed

    it. Calderon posits that because Delgado primarily speaks

    Spanish, she could not have understood what the English-

    speaking police were saying in their late night, disorienting

    appearance at her apartment. But this is a supposition to

    which Calderon gave no flesh when he had the opportunity on

    the motion to suppress. Calderon filed no affidavits in

    support of the motion, not even from Delgado, on whose state

    of mind he now so heavily relies.2 In contrast, the

    prosecution, in opposing the motion, provided copies of the

    ____________________

    1. For example, the police believed Calderon to be living
    with Delgado and had an arrest warrant for Calderon.
    "Generally, the police do not need a search warrant to enter
    a suspect's home when they have an arrest warrant for the
    suspect." United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 214 (2d Cir. _____________ ______
    1995); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980). ___ ____ ______ ________


    2. On appeal, Calderon asserts for the first time that the
    police officers had already crossed the threshold of the
    apartment when they asked Delgado for her consent, and that
    this was an additional factor showing coercion. The
    argument, not having been made before the district court, is
    waived. See United States v. Carvell, 74 F.3d 8, _, No. 95- ___ _____________ _______
    1606, slip op. at 15 (1st Cir. Jan. 19, 1996).

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    police reports which told a different story. Delgado gave

    the police varying versions of how the speakers came to be in

    the apartment. There was no indication that she did not

    comprehend the explanation of the consent form or voluntarily

    execute it -- indeed, all indications were to the contrary.

    Calderon presented no evidence at all that Delgado's will was

    "'overborne'" or that she suffered a "'critically impaired

    capacity for self-determination.'" United States v. ______________

    Wilkinson, 926 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir.) (quoting Schneckloth v. _________ ___________

    Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)), cert. denied, 501 U.S. __________ _____ ______

    1211 (1991).

    The district court explained its denial of

    Calderon's motion to suppress without an evidentiary hearing:

    Defendant vaguely claims that Ms.
    Delgado's consent was coerced or was
    otherwise ineffective, but he offers no
    affidavit or statement from Ms. Delgado
    to that effect, describes no
    circumstances supporting his assertion,
    and makes no offer of proof relative to
    any other facts that might support his
    assertion.

    There is no basis to disturb the district court's decision.

    Constructive Amendment ______________________

    Calderon's second argument is that there was a

    "constructive amendment" to his indictment, in violation of

    his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. "The [F]ifth

    [A]mendment requires that a defendant be tried only on a

    charge made by the grand jury," and the Sixth Amendment



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    "requires that the defendant be informed of the nature and

    cause of the accusation." United States v. Kelly, 722 F.2d _____________ _____

    873, 876 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1070 (1984). _____ ______

    When Calderon was first indicted on September 14, 1994, the

    kidnapping charge omitted the phrase "for ransom or reward or

    otherwise," a necessary element of the offense. See 18 ___

    U.S.C. 1201. Subsequently, the missing phrase was added,

    and that superseding indictment was presented to a grand jury

    on October 26, 1994, which returned it. And that fact

    disposes of Calderon's claim. Cf. United States v. Dunn, 758 ___ _____________ ____

    F.2d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 1985) (constructive amendment occurs

    where "the charging terms of the indictment are altered,

    either literally or in effect, by prosecution or court after _____

    the grand jury has last passed on them" (emphasis added; __________________________________________

    internal quotations omitted)). A defendant cannot complain

    of an improper constructive amendment if the indictment is

    actually amended by resubmission to the grand jury.3 Cf. ________ ___

    United States v. Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956, 964 (1st Cir.), cert. _____________ _______ _____

    denied, 488 U.S. 852 (1988). ______

    Sufficiency of Evidence _______________________

    Calderon argues that there was insufficient

    evidence for the jury to have found him guilty, and so the

    ____________________

    3. Since Calderon's argument that it was error for the
    district court to have denied his motion for the transcripts
    of the second grand jury sitting is premised on there having
    been an improper constructive amendment, we do not address
    it.

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    district court erred in not granting his motion for acquittal

    under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. "In reviewing a sufficiency of

    the evidence claim we look at the evidence in the light most

    favorable to the verdict." United States v. Cruz-Kuilan, _ _____________ ___________

    F.3d _, _, Nos. 94-2217 & 95-1390, slip op. at 6 (1st Cir.

    Feb. 5, 1996).

    The thrust of Calderon's challenge is that the jury

    should not have believed the version of the story, contrary

    to his, recounted by two of his accomplices and a

    confidential informant whose son was in prison. The argument

    fails. It was well within the jury's province for it to

    choose to believe the testimony of Calderon's accomplices --

    in the face of his cross-examination of their characters and

    motives -- and to disbelieve Calderon's version of the story.

    See id. "Credibility determinations are uniquely within the ___ ___

    jury's province, and we defer to the jury's verdict if the

    evidence can support varying inferences." Id. (citations ___

    omitted).

    Alleged Verdict Inconsistency _____________________________

    Calderon also argues that his carjacking conviction

    cannot stand because he was acquitted of the firearms

    possession charges and firearm possession was an essential

    element of the carjacking offense. In criminal law "the

    Supreme Court has made it clear that verdict inconsistency in

    itself is not a sufficient basis for vacating a conviction."



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    United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33, 41 (1st Cir. 1991) ______________ _____

    (citing United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984), and Dunn _____________ ______ ____

    v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932)). _____________

    This Court explained in Lopez: _____

    Verdict inconsistency does not indicate
    that the government necessarily failed to
    prove an essential element of its case
    beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . We
    cannot necessarily assume[] that the
    acquittal . . . was proper -- the one the
    jury really meant. It is equally
    possible that the jury, convinced of
    guilt, properly reached its conclusion on
    [one] offense, and then through mistake,
    compromise, or lenity, arrived at an
    inconsistent conclusion on the [other]
    offense. As long as the trial and
    appellate courts are convinced on
    independent review that there was
    sufficient evidence to sustain a rational
    verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable
    doubt, the defendant is properly
    protected against any risk of injustice
    resulting from jury irrationality.

    Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). Because ___

    Calderon's conviction was supported by sufficient evidence,

    the challenge based on alleged verdict inconsistency fails.



    Affirmed. _________














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