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USCA1 Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 95-1096
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
JOSE LEBRON,
Defendant - Appellant.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Boudin, Circuit Judge, _____________
Coffin and Rosenn,* Senior Circuit Judges. _____________________
_____________________
David A.F. Lewis, by Appointment of the Court, for ___________________
appellant.
Jean B. Weld, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom _____________
Paul M. Gagnon, United States Attorney, was on brief for _______________
appellee.
____________________
February 14, 1996
____________________
____________________
* Of the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. This appeal from a guilty plea ROSENN, Circuit Judge. _____________
and sentence requires that we consider the process due a
defendant whose behavior may raise questions concerning his
mental competency.
I. I.
A federal grand jury for the District of New Hampshire
indicted Jos Lebr n on ten counts stemming from his two armed
robberies of a pawnshop and a bank in Manchester, New Hampshire.
His co-defendants, Paul Hazen and Frank Jones, pled guilty to
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g).
The court imposed sentence and neither of them appealed. Lebr n
requested counsel under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C.
3006A. However, he vehemently objected to his court-appointed
counsel and filed several motions with the court requesting new
counsel. A magistrate judge denied the motion, finding that
Lebr n had not articulated sufficient reasons. The magistrate
informed Lebr n that he could either retain his appointed
counsel, or proceed pro se. ___ __
At a hearing on Lebr n's motion for a new court-
appointed counsel, the district court found no valid reason to
substitute counsel. The court informed Lebr n that he could
proceed pro se and that his court-appointed counsel would stand ___ __
by, and take over the case if Lebr n did not conform to courtroom
rules. Lebr n lost his temper, and his behavior prompted the
marshals to handcuff him before the hearing ended. The court
denied his motion for reconsideration. Lebr n then filed a
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Renewed Motion for Reappointment of Counsel, in which he asserted
that there was medication he could take which could "affect his
ability to be aware of exactly what is happening around him."
On May 10, 1994, Lebr n represented himself during jury
selection. Although he initially asked for, and was denied, an
interpreter, Lebr n was able to communicate with the jury.
Several of his objections to jury members were granted. After
jury selection, the court held an ex parte session with Lebr n
and his counsel to enable them to air the disagreements between
them without compromising the attorney-client privilege. At this
session, the judge informed Lebr n that he had done a good job in
jury selection, but that he was "not competent to represent
himself in the sense he's not aware of fundamental issues that
ought to be raised on his behalf." Lebr n concedes that the
district court meant this statement to refer to Lebr n's
competence as an attorney, not to Lebr n's mental competence. At
the same ex parte session, Lebr n's counsel informed the court
that Lebr n used to receive prescriptions for thorazine (an
antipsychotic) and trazodone (an antidepressant) from the
Veteran's Administration hospital, and that he would like to take
these drugs during the trial.
In response, the judge alerted the Government that
Lebr n had a previous psychiatric history. He believed that this
might be relevant to the defendant's ability to intelligently
waive his right to counsel. The court then held a hearing later
that day to determine the issue of Lebr n's competency, and
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whether Lebr n should be permitted to take his requested drugs
during trial. The court took testimony from Dr. Nathan Sidley,
the prison psychiatrist. Sidley stated that he had briefly
reviewed Lebr n's Veteran's Administration medical records, which
revealed a possible diagnosis of schizophrenia in the 1970s.
Sidley had attempted to meet with Lebr n, but Lebr n terminated
their meeting within the first five minutes, upon learning that
their discussion would not be confidential. Sidley concluded
that, based on these facts, Lebr n was not psychotic, and was
competent to stand trial. He further concluded that any possible
benefits from the drugs Lebr n requested were outweighed by the
detriments of giving him massive quantities needed without
sufficient time for the drugs to build up in his bloodstream.
Lebr n then testified that he was using heroin and
Valium, and that he had both drugs in his system at the time.
Two days later, the district court judge issued an order which
continued the trial date, permitted Lebr n's counsel to withdraw,
and appointed Paul Twomey as new counsel for Lebr n.
The next day, the Government and Twomey jointly filed a
request for a psychiatric evaluation pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
4241, which the court granted. The parties agreed that Dr.
Albert Druktenis should perform the evaluation. Druktenis met
with Lebr n and evaluated him pursuant to the court's order to
determine both Lebr n's sanity at the time of the offense, and
his competency to stand trial now. Druktenis concluded that
Lebr n was not insane at the time of the offense, and that he was
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competent to stand trial. He noted that Lebr n's personality was
manipulative, but that he was aware of the charges against him,
and had been able to speak intelligently, lucidly and logically
at court hearings. Druktenis also addressed the issue of
Lebr n's current medications, and noted that they "would not
cloud his thinking in any substantial way and, in fact, are
probably helping him by reducing anxiety and agitation."
After the psychiatrist submitted this report, Lebr n
withdrew his motion to dismiss based on incompetency, and the
parties reached a plea agreement. Under this agreement, Lebr n
would plead guilty to two counts of use and carrying of a firearm
in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and the Government would
dismiss the remaining eight counts.
The court conducted a change of plea hearing on
October 3, 1994. Before the judge entered the courtroom for the
hearing, Lebr n threw a pitcher of water at the case
investigators, narrowly missing one agent. Soon thereafter, the
hearing proceeded, with the court stating that it understood
there was "no issue at this point with regard to the defendant's
competence." Both counsel agreed that Lebr n was competent.
Defense counsel then added that he had come to that conclusion
himself independently after reviewing the psychiatric report.
The court then asked Lebr n if the Government's proffer of the
evidence to the charges was correct. At first Lebr n claimed
that he could not remember any of the events. On further
questioning, he admitted to the conduct. After fully advising
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Lebr n of the rights he would waive by pleading guilty, the court
accepted the plea.
The court sentenced Lebr n to imprisonment for 240
months on one count and 60 months on the other, to be served
consecutively, three years supervised release with a condition of
treatment for his chemical dependency, $500 in restitution, and a
$100 special assessment. Lebr n appeals, raising as his sole
issue whether the district court denied him due process by not
holding a hearing under 18 U.S.C. 4241 to determine his
competency when he changed his plea. We affirm.
II. II.
The conviction of a criminal defendant while he is
legally incompetent violates due process. Pate v. Robinson, 383 ____ ________
U.S. 375, 378 (1965). The test for a defendant's mental
competency to plead guilty is the same as that of a defendant's
competence to stand trial. United States v. Harlan, 480 F.2d _____________ ______
515, 517 (6th Cir. 1973). That test, as set forth by the Supreme
Court, is whether the defendant understands the proceedings
against him and has sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). _____ _____________
To assist courts in making this test, Congress has
established certain procedures. Section 4241 of Title 18 of the
United States Code provides the relevant reference in matters of
a criminal defendant's competency to stand trial. 4241(a)
provides in pertinent part:
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...[T]he defendant or the attorney for
the Government may file a motion for a
hearing to determine the mental
competency of the defendant. The court
shall grant the motion, or shall order
such a hearing on its own motion, if
there is reasonable cause to believe that
the defendant may presently be suffering
from a mental disease or defect rendering
him mentally incompetent to the extent
that he is unable to understand the
nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist
properly in his defense.
In the present case, no such hearing was held or requested.
Lebr n, however, asserts that the district court had reasonable
cause to believe that he, Lebr n, was suffering from a mental
disease or defect. Therefore, he claims, the court violated his
due process rights by not ordering a competency hearing on its
own motion.
By the language of the statute, a district court judge
has a duty to order a competency hearing only if there is
"reasonable cause" to doubt the defendant's mental competence. A
district court's findings about the competency of a defendant
after holding such a hearing will be upheld unless they are
clearly erroneous. United States v. Collins, 949 F.2d 921, 927 ______________ _______
(7th Cir. 1991). When there has been no hearing, and no
examination of the defendant whatsoever, the appellate court
reviews the district court's findings comprehensively. Id. This __
case falls in between these two standards.
Although the trial judge did not order a formal
hearing, he carefully and painstakingly sought, commencing with
the defendant's initial appearance before him, to ascertain
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whether there was any question of mental competency and to
protect Lebr n's due process rights. To this end, the judge
discharged the jury, continued the trial and ordered that the
defendant be examined by a psychiatrist. Thus, the court had
before it the psychiatrist's report, as well as Lebr n's
Veteran's Administration medical records and the testimony of the
prison psychiatrist. In addition, defendant's counsel also had
concluded that Lebr n was mentally competent to enter a guilty
plea. Because the judge had substantial facts before him when he
made findings as to defendant's competency, we will give his
decision not to hold a competency hearing due deference.
Dr. Druktenis, after conducting a two-hour interview
with Lebr n, concluded that Lebr n was competent to stand trial.
If a psychiatrist has determined that a defendant is competent, a
court is not required to hold a further evidentiary hearing
absent extenuating circumstances. See United States v. Prewitt, ___ _____________ _______
553 F.2d 1082, 1086 (7th Cir. 1977). It was well within the
district court's discretion to conclude that such circumstances
were not present here.
Lebr n points to his irrational and outrageous behavior
in the courtroom. He claims that this should have alerted the
district court judge that Lebr n was incompetent to enter a plea.
Lebr n had been handcuffed at the April hearing. Also, at this
hearing, he had pleaded to be removed from the courtroom,
stating, "I have too much trouble on my mind, your Honor." At
the change of plea hearing, Lebr n threw a pitcher full of water
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at case investigators. Such behavior may be uncontrolled,
manipulative, or even theatrical. It is not determinative of
competency. Agitated or violent courtroom antics alone do not
mandate a finding by the trial court of reasonable cause. United ______
States v. Marshall, 458 F.2d 446, 450 (2d Cir. 1972). In ______ ________
Marshall, the defendant behaved belligerently in the courtroom, ________
shouted obscenities, and threw not only a water pitcher, but also
a chair in the courtroom. Two psychiatric reports, however,
disclosed that the defendant was competent, and predicted that he
would engage in disruptive behavior. The Court of Appeals held
that the trial court was within its discretion in failing to hold
a competency hearing. Similarly here, two psychiatrists examined
Lebr n and found him competent.1
Lebr n further argues that his medical record and
history of taking medications should have provided the necessary
reasonable cause. However, past treatment or drug use is not
determinative of present competency. United States v. Pryor, 960 _____________ _____
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992). Lebr n's Veteran's Administration
records were from the 1970s, twenty years ago. Moreover, Dr.
Druktenis expressly addressed the issue of the medications Lebr n
____________________
1 Lebr n argues that Dr. Sidley's opinion should be discounted
because their meeting was inadequate. It is true that Sidley had
little contact with Lebr n, and that his review of Lebr n's
medical records was cursory. We agree that Dr. Sidley's
testimony alone would not have sufficient indicia of reliability
to obviate the need for further findings. However, Dr. Druktenis
conducted an extended face-to-face examination of Lebr n.
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was currently taking and noted that they would not cloud his
thinking.
In summary, although Lebr n occasionally behaved
belligerently and has a medical history showing past possible
mental illness and past drug use, these are more than
counterbalanced by Dr. Druktenis' report of Lebr n's present
competence, his counsel's assertion that Lebr n was competent to
enter the plea, and the trial court's careful plea colloquy
ensuring that Lebr n understood the charges against him, and the
consequences of pleading guilty to them. All of these factors
pointed unequivocally to the defendant's mental competency.
There was no reasonable cause for the trial court to hold a
hearing when all the information from the psychiatrist, the
defense counsel, and the judge himself were in agreement. See ___
id. United States v. Pryor, 960 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1992)(where ___ _____________ _____
district court had an opportunity to observe defendant rationally
and vigorously participating in his defense at a pretrial
proceeding, and psychiatrist found that defendant was oriented as
to time and place, there was no cause for the court to hold a
further hearing, under section 4241 despite defendant's history
of drug problems and psychiatric treatment).
As this court noted in Hern ndez-Hern ndez v. United ___________________ ______
States, 904 F.2d 758 (1st Cir. 1990), a ruling that this case ______
provides reasonable cause for a hearing would "come close to
requiring district courts to order competency hearings sua sponte
in every case where a defendant has some history of psychiatric
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treatment and, even vaguely, mentions the problem." Id., at 760 ___
(quoting Figueroa-V zquez v. United States, 718 F.2d 511, 612 ________________ _____________
(1st Cir. 1983). We decline to impose such a heavy, unnecessary,
and costly burden on district courts.
III. III.
We hold that when a qualified psychiatrist examines a
defendant before he enters a plea to criminal charges, and the
psychiatric report and other pertinent current information reveal
that the defendant is competent to stand trial, it is not
reversible error for a district court to fail or refuse to
conduct a formal hearing under the provisions of 18 U.S.C.
4241(a). Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence is
affirmed. affirmed ________
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Document Info
Docket Number： 95-1096
Filed Date： 2/14/1996
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/21/2015