Ortiz-Pinero v. Rivera-Arroyo ( 1996 )


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    June 6, 1996
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________

    No. 95-2167

    WILLIE VICTOR ORTIZ-PI ERO,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    VICTOR RIVERA-ARROYO,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MAYOR OF GURABO, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.

    ____________________



    ERRATA SHEET


    The opinion of this Court issued on May 15, 1996, is amended as
    follows:

    Cover page: Change "[Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District ______________
    Judge" to "Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge" _____ __________________________






































    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 95-2167

    WILLIE VICTOR ORTIZ-PI ERO,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    VICTOR RIVERA-ARROYO,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MAYOR OF GURABO, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.

    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

    [Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________

    Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________

    and Cyr, Circuit Judge. _____________

    ____________________



    Carlos A. Del Valle Cruz for appellant. ________________________
    Elisa Bobonis Lang, with whom Jos R. Gaztambide and Gaztambide & __________________ __________________ ____________
    Plaza were on brief for appellees. _____


    ____________________

    May 15, 1996
    ____________________

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    CYR, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Willie Victor Ortiz CYR, Circuit Judge. _____________

    Pinero ("Ortiz") appeals from a district court judgment dismiss-

    ing his political discrimination claims against the City of

    Gurabo, Puerto Rico, and its incumbent Mayor. We affirm.


    I I

    BACKGROUND BACKGROUND __________

    In 1981, the City of Gurabo enacted an ordinance,

    pursuant to P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, 1351, designating eleven

    municipal offices as positions of "trust" or "confidentiality,"

    including the directorship of the Office of Federal Programs

    ("OFP"), the municipal agency charged with obtaining and adminis-

    tering federal funding for various public works projects. See ___

    Municipal Ordinance No. 3, Series 1981-82 (Sept. 14, 1981).

    In August 1991, then-Mayor Ramon Garcia Caraballo

    appointed Ortiz, a fellow member of the Popular Democratic Party

    (PDP), as OFP Director, and allegedly described the position to

    Ortiz as a non-"confidence" position. Mayor Caraballo later

    extended Ortiz' appointment through August 1993. In November

    1992, however, after the PDP mayoral candidate was rejected by

    the electorate, outgoing Mayor Caraballo notified Ortiz that he

    should resign forthwith because the OFP directorship was a

    "confidential" position which the new administration was entitled

    to fill. Ortiz refused to resign. Thereafter, the incoming New

    Progressive Party (NPP) mayor, defendant-appellee Willie Victor

    Rivera Arroyo ("Rivera"), dismissed Ortiz.

    In due course, Ortiz initiated the present action for

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    damages and reinstatement under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City

    of Gurabo and Mayor Rivera, claiming political discrimination and

    deprivation of his property interest in continued employment

    without the benefit of a pretermination hearing, in violation of

    the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Consti-

    tution. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground

    that the OFP directorship is a "trust" position for which compat-

    ible political affiliation constitutes a legitimate qualifi-

    cation. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. ___ ______ ______ _____

    Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Their motion was accompanied by a _____

    written "certification" from the City personnel office defining

    the responsibilities of the OFP directorship.1 After determin-

    ing that the evidence compelled a finding that the OFP director-

    ship is a trust position, the district court granted summary

    judgment for defendants on all claims. Ortiz-Pinero v. Rivera- ____________ _______

    Acevedo, 900 F. Supp. 574 (D.P.R. 1995). _______

    II II

    DISCUSSION DISCUSSION __________

    A. Standard of Review A. Standard of Review __________________

    We review de novo, to determine whether the pleadings, __ ____

    ____________________

    1The certification lists five responsibilities: (1) "[t]o
    direct, coordinate and supervise all the operations of the
    Federal Programs Office"; (2) "[t]o see to the compliance and
    good functioning of said Office"; (3) "[t]o submit all the
    corresponding reports to the Municipal Services Administration
    Program, the State Agency delegated upon by the C.D.G.B. Pro-
    gram"; (4) "[t]o take part in seminars and training that are
    offered on the Federal Programs as well as to accompany the Mayor
    in all matters concerning the Program"; and (5) "[t]o perform
    other similar duties as assigned."

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    depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

    together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue

    as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

    judgment as a matter of law. See O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d ___ ________ _______

    905, 906-07 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 634 (1993). _____ ______

    Although all competent evidence and reasonable inferences are

    viewed in the light most favorable to Ortiz, he cannot carry the

    day on mere "``conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and

    unsupported speculation.'" Id. (quoting Medina-Munoz v. R.J. ___ ____________ ____

    Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990)). ____________________

    B. First Amendment Claim B. First Amendment Claim _____________________

    1. Applicable Law 1. Applicable Law ______________

    In a political discrimination case, the plaintiff first

    must show that party affiliation was a substantial or motivating

    factor for the challenged action. See Mount Healthy City Sch. ___ ________________________

    Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Jirau- ___________________ _____ ______

    Bernal v. Agrait, 37 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1994).2 The burden ______ ______

    then shifts to defendants to establish either a nondiscriminatory ______

    reason for the dismissal, see Ferrer v. Zayas, 914 F.2d 309, 311 ___ ______ _____

    (1st Cir. 1990), or that plaintiff held a "political" position __

    for which party affiliation constituted an appropriate qualifica-

    tion for continued employment, see Branti, 445 U.S. at 518; De ___ ______ __

    Choudens v. Government Dev. Bank of P.R., 801 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. ________ ____________________________

    1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987). Thus, the Branti/- _____ ______ ______ _
    ____________________

    2We assume, without deciding, that there is sufficient
    competent evidence that political affiliation motivated the
    dismissal.

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    Elrod defense is designed to ensure that "representative govern- _____

    ment not be undercut by tactics obstructing the implementation of

    policies of the new administration, policies presumably sanc-

    tioned by the electorate." Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367. _____

    Whether a government position is "political" does not

    depend upon such loose-fitting labels as "confidential" or

    "policymaking," but on the substance of the duties inherent in _________ __ ___ ______ ________ __

    the position itself. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518 (noting: "a ___ ________ ______ ______

    position may be appropriately considered political even though it

    is neither confidential nor policymaking in character," and, by

    the same token, party affiliation is not a relevant consideration

    for all policymaking or confidential positions); see Romero ___ ______

    Feliciano v. Torres Gaztambide, 836 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1987) _________ __________________

    (abjuring reliance on "rigid labels" in Branti/Elrod analysis). ______ _____

    We employ a two-part inquiry to identify "political"

    positions under the Branti/Elrod analysis: ______ _____

    First, we inquire whether the overall func-
    tions of the employee's department or agency
    involve "decision making on issues where
    there is room for political disagreement on
    goals or their implementation." Second, we
    decide whether the particular responsibili-
    ties of the plaintiff's position, within the
    department or agency, resemble those of "a
    policymaker, privy to confidential informa-
    tion, a communicator, or some other office
    holder whose function is such that party
    affiliation is an equally appropriate re-
    quirement" for continued tenure. Among the
    indicia material to the second element are
    "``relative pay, technical competence, power
    to control others, authority to speak in the
    name of policymakers, public perception,
    influence on programs, contact with elected
    officials, and responsiveness to partisan
    politics and political leaders.'"

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    O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 910 (quoting Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres ________ ________________ ______

    Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. __________ _____

    denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987)) (other citations omitted). ______

    Although obviously fact-intensive, the ultimate deter-

    mination whether a government position is "political" presents a

    question of law for the court, rather than an issue of fact for

    jury resolution. See McGurrin Ehrhard v. Connolly, 867 F.2d 92, ___ ________________ ________

    93 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J.) (noting that the "important

    constitutional and governmental interests surrounding the appli-

    cation of the [Branti/Elrod] exception" make it more suitable for ______ _____

    determination by the court). Examining all competent evidence in

    the light most favorable to Ortiz, we conduct a de novo assess- __ ____

    ment of the relevant factors, see In re Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, ___ _____ ______

    1327 (1st Cir. 1993) (plenary appellate review generally accorded

    issues of law), and "make a common sense judgment in light of the

    fundamental purpose to be served [by the Branti/Elrod analysis]." ______ _____

    Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242. _______________

    2. The OFP and "Partisan Political Interests" 2. The OFP and "Partisan Political Interests" _________________________________________

    The OFP is charged with marshaling and administering

    the million or so dollars obtained annually from federal agen-

    cies, and with doling it out for various public works projects

    within the municipality. Thus, the OFP unmistakably is a munici-

    pal "department or agency [whose overall functions] involve

    ``decision making on issues where there is room for political

    disagreement on goals or their implementation.'" O'Connor, 994 ________

    F.2d at 910 (citations omitted). Indeed, its inherent responsi-


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    bilities inevitably entail the kinds of discretionary decisions

    traditionally associated with municipal politics.3 Accordingly,

    we conclude that defendants met the first-prong test under

    Jimenez Fuentes.4 _______________

    3. The Duties Inherent in the OFP Directorship 3. The Duties Inherent in the OFP Directorship ___________________________________________

    Under the second prong, we examine any evidence the

    defendants may have adduced that "the particular responsibilities __________ ________________

    ____________________

    3See id. (noting that the first prong of the Jimenez Fuentes ___ ___ _______________
    test was readily met where the municipal department for which
    plaintiff worked was responsible for developing and implementing
    public works programs, since "[e]lections often turn on the
    success or failure of the incumbent [administration] to provide
    these services"); Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242 (finding that _______________
    regional director of commonwealth housing department, charged
    with ameliorating housing conditions among low and middle income
    families, was a position "relate[d] to partisan political inter-
    ests"); accord Juarbe-Angueira v. Arias, 831 F.2d 11, 15 (1st ______ _______________ _____
    Cir. 1987) ("Where, how, and when the government will repair or
    reconstruct public buildings, . . . when and where money is to be
    spent, may well be a matter of considerable interest to . . .
    political leaders."), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 960 (1988); Mendez- _____ ______ _______
    Palou v. Rohena-Betancourt, 813 F.2d 1255, 1260 (1st Cir. 1987) _____ _________________
    (finding Administration for Environmental Quality Board engaged
    in a "politically-sensitive mission" for purposes of Branti/Elrod ______ _____
    analysis).

    4Ortiz also contends that the first prong of the Jimenez _______
    Fuentes test should focus upon the City as the pertinent "depart- _______
    ment or agency," not on the OFP. Ortiz does not contend that
    this shift in focus would alter the first-prong inquiry itself,
    since under either scenario the City or the OFP would have to
    undertake the politically sensitive mission of allocating federal
    funds among various constituencies within the municipality. He
    argues, instead, that the shift in focus could affect the inquiry
    under prong two, see infra Section II.B.3(b), since Ortiz could ___ _____
    then be viewed as a subordinate City official rather than the
    head of the first-prong "department or agency" (i.e., the OFP). ____
    Be that as it may, the attempt to distance Ortiz from political
    decisionmaking not only distorts the function of the second-prong
    inquiry under Jimenez Fuentes, but runs counter to our precedent _______________
    in O'Connor, where we focused the inquiry under prong one upon ________
    the municipal department of public works, rather than the munici- __________ _______
    pality. See O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 907-08; supra note 3. ______ ___ ________ _____

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    of the plaintiff's position, within the [OFP], resemble those of

    ``a policymaker, privy to confidential information, a communica-

    tor, or some other office holder whose function is such that

    party affiliation is an equally appropriate requirement' for

    continued tenure." O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 910 (citations omitted) ________

    (emphasis added).

    a) Lack of Written Job Description a) Lack of Written Job Description _______________________________

    Ortiz first argues that summary judgment is precluded

    because the City of Gurabo has no official, written job descrip-

    tion (a.k.a. Form OP-16) for its OFP Director, nor indeed for any ___

    of its municipal employees. He relies upon cases in which we

    have held that courts should determine the duties inherent in a

    particular position by examining the governmental entity's

    written, signed job descriptions, rather than the duties actually

    performed by the plaintiff or prior occupants of the position in

    question. See, e.g., Mendez-Palou v. Rohena-Betancourt, 813 F.2d ___ ____ ____________ _________________

    1255, 1260 (1st Cir. 1987). Ortiz would have us conclude that

    the absence of any written job description, combined with con-

    flicting circumstantial evidence as to the duties performed by

    the OFP director, leaves unresolved issues of material fact which

    preclude summary judgment. See Romero Feliciano, 836 F.2d at 3 ___ ________________

    ("[W]e have considered the OP-16 dispositive in other Puerto Rico

    political discrimination cases . . . ."). In so doing, Ortiz

    misconstrues our precedents and the nature of the issue under

    consideration.

    Although written, signed job descriptions may provide


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    highly probative evidence as to the responsibilities inherent in

    a particular government position, and may even prove "disposi-

    tive," see id. at 3, we have never suggested that their absence ___ ___ _______

    is dispositive, cf. Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1260 ("Whenever ___ ____________ ________

    possible, we will rely upon this document because it contains ________

    precisely the information we need . . . .") (emphasis added), or

    precludes a defendant from resorting to other evidence, see, ___

    e.g., Romero Feliciano, 836 F.2d at 3 (noting that defendant "may ____ ________________

    present additional evidence at trial" besides the disputed OP-

    16). Nor does the absence of a written, signed job description

    preclude summary judgment, so long as defendants adduce other

    competent evidence as to the responsibilities inherent in the OFP

    directorship from which the "political" nature of the position

    can be determined as a matter of law, see McGurrin Ehrhard, 867 ___ ________________

    F.2d at 93 (ultimately, the Branti/Elrod defense poses a question ______ _____

    of law), even though some nonessential facts may remain in

    dispute. See Mariani-Giron v. Acevedo-Ruiz, 877 F.2d 1114, 1117 ___ _____________ ____________

    n.5 (1st Cir. 1989).5

    b) The Responsibilities Inherent in the Position b) The Responsibilities Inherent in the Position _____________________________________________

    Ortiz contends that the district court incorrectly
    ____________________

    5The district court relied on the lack of a written job
    description as probative evidence that the OFP directorship is a __
    "political" position. Ortiz-Pinero, 900 F. Supp. at 580 (citing ____________
    Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1262-63 ("``[A]n employee with responsi- ____________
    bilities that are not well defined or are of broad scope more
    likely functions in a policymaking position.'") (citing Elrod, _____
    427 U.S. at 368)). But since the City had adopted no job de-
    scription for any position, cf. supra note 1, and it obviously ___ ___ _____
    could not reasonably be inferred on that basis that all City
    positions are "political," we give no weight to such an inference
    in the present context.

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    assessed the record evidence relating to the duties inherent in

    the OFP directorship. He claims that he administered the OFP in

    a politically-neutral fashion and took no meaningful part in

    mayoral "policymaking" or "political" decisions concerning

    federal funding allocations among the various constituencies

    within the municipality.

    As previously noted, probative indicia that a position

    is "political" include "``relative pay, technical competence,

    power to control others, authority to speak in the name of

    policymakers, public perception, influence on programs, contact

    with elected officials, and responsiveness to partisan politics

    and political leaders.'" O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 910 (citations ________

    omitted). Defendants adduced evidence that Ortiz had not had to

    compete with other candidates for the OFP directorship. More-

    over, Ortiz concedes that he was no "expert" in the financial and

    accounting aspects of the OFP's responsibilities. Thus, we think

    the evidence does not support a fair inference that Ortiz was

    selected for his managerial or technical expertise. Moreover,

    Ortiz' prominent PDP affiliation, see Ortiz Deposition at 179-81 ___

    (acknowledging that, at various times, he was a "political

    activist," electoral commissioner, and campaign finance director

    for the PDP and PDP candidates), plainly permits a fair inference

    that he was selected for the OFP directorship based on his

    "political" service and talents. See McGurrin Ehrhard, 867 F.2d ___ ________________

    at 93 (finding position "political" where plaintiff, formerly a

    clerical employee, was tapped for position as director of secre-


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    tary of state's regional office, after having worked on Secre-

    tary's state senate campaign, and where Secretary "did not

    advertise the job, solicit applications, or . . . consider any

    [other] applicant").

    More importantly, Ortiz was appointed to head the OFP, ____

    whose overall functions clearly involved "``decision making on

    issues where there is room for political disagreement on goals or

    their implementation,'" under the first prong of the Jimenez _______

    Fuentes test. See supra Section II.B.2.6 By his own account, _______ ___ _____

    Ortiz was in complete charge of the OFP staff,7 as well as the

    applications for, and the administering of, all federal grant and

    loan programs involving the City, amounting to approximately one-
    ____________________

    6See, e.g., O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 911 ("[W]hatever difficul- ___ ____ ________
    ties we might face in applying the second prong of the Jimenez _______
    Fuentes test to subordinate positions within the Department, the _______
    Superintendent's 'inherent responsibilities' . . . plainly '"had
    a bearing on the partisan goals and policies"' of the Department
    as a whole.") (citations omitted); De Choudens, 801 F.2d at 9-10 ___________
    (noting that it would have been much more likely that the posi-
    tion would be considered "political" had plaintiff been president _________
    of the bank, rather than senior vice-president); cf. Juarbe- ___ _______
    Angueira, 831 F.2d at 15 (finding it not "clearly established" ________
    that regional directorship of public building authority was other
    than a "political" position, even though it involved only a
    "'modicum' of 'policymaking responsibility,'" given that supervi-
    sory position was "moderately-high-level position within the
    agency").

    7Ortiz points out that he supervised an OFP staff of only
    four persons (accountant, secretary, and two clerks). As we have
    noted, however, the relative staff size, not its absolute size, ________
    affords the more illuminating insight. See, e.g., O'Connor, 994 ___ ____ ________
    F.2d at 911 n.3 (noting that, on per-capita basis, plaintiff's
    supervision of smaller municipality-level staff may be equivalent
    to supervision of much bigger staff in a larger municipality);
    McGurrin Ehrhard, 867 F.2d at 95 (finding position "political" ________________
    even though plaintiff supervised four-person regional office,
    where satellite branch was but one of two such offices in Massa-
    chusetts).

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    third of its municipal budget. See Ortiz Deposition, at 29-30.8 ___

    Ortiz reported directly to the mayor, rather than

    through intermediaries, meeting with him on an average of six or

    seven times a year. Cf. Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1260 (noting ___ ____________

    that plaintiff performed duties with "only general instructions

    and superficial supervision" from the administration). He served

    as the mayor's "eyes" and "ears," periodically visiting public

    work projects and reporting back to the mayor on their progress.

    See McGurrin Ehrhard, 867 F.2d at 95 (noting that employee who ___ ________________

    acted as "eyes and ears" for secretary of state engaged in an

    "overtly political task[]").9 Such first-person (thus, more

    subjective) field assessments often influence policy formulation,

    and policymaking influence, even though indirect, is an important

    ____________________

    8We reject the contention that the April 1993 certification
    of duties issued by the City personnel department, see supra note ___ _____
    1, is without any probative force because it is unsigned and was
    not prepared until after Ortiz left office. Of course, an OP-16
    signed by the employee has added probative value since it consti-
    tutes the employee's contemporaneous "admission" concerning the
    duties inherent in the position. But it does not follow that the
    unsigned certificate, by which the City prospectively commits
    itself to its description of the duties inherent in the OFP
    directorship, is without probative weight. Although we have
    noted that an unsigned OP-16 may leave a factual dispute as to
    its authenticity, see Romero Feliciano, 836 F.2d at 3-4, Ortiz ___ ________________
    asserts no challenge either to the authenticity or the validity
    of the certification. Nor did we suggest in Romero Feliciano _________________
    that such evidence should be completely discounted in a trial on
    the merits.

    9See Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 246 (noting that "politi- ___ _______________
    cal" position holders, like directors, "monitor the progress of
    the agency's programs and thus gauge the success of the Admini-
    stration's . . . policies"); cf. Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1260 ___ ____________
    (finding it relevant that plaintiff "represents the President in
    activities . . . [and gives] top level counselling [to] the
    President").

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    indicium of "political" positions.10

    Ortiz admittedly received and reviewed copies of

    federal audits and oversight reports, including the Federal

    Transit Administration's Triennial Review of the City's federally

    funded transit program, which identified areas where the City was

    not in compliance. See Defendant's Exh. 6; see also 49 U.S.C. ___ ___ ____

    5307(i) (2). This politically-sensitive report is precisely the

    type of document whose contents are not likely to be shared

    freely with any but the mayor's trusted political confidants for

    fear it might become fodder for the political opposition. Cf. ___

    Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1262-63 ("[W]e believe that an official ____________

    working in close contact with the head of a government agency is

    also more likely to be privy to a substantial amount of confiden-

    tial information. . . .").

    Finally, Municipal Ordinance No. 3, enacted in 1981

    pursuant to P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, 1351, designates only eleven

    municipal offices as positions of "trust" or "confidentiality,"

    including the Director of the Office of Federal Programs.11
    ____________________

    10See McGurrin Ehrhard, 867 F.2d at 94 (noting that plain- ___ ________________
    tiff did not have "final authority to hire or fire employees,
    [but] she had 'input'"); Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 245 ("That _______________
    Regional Directors do not have final decision-making authority is
    not determinative . . . . 'because such positions [i.e., direc-
    torships] are a natural source of influential recommendations of
    changes in policy.'") (citation omitted).

    11Section 1351 of the Personnel Act provides, in pertinent
    part:

    1. Each [commonwealth] agency shall present
    for approval of the [Central] Office [of
    Personnel Administration] a plan containing
    the confidential positions by which it de-

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    Consistent with the ordinance, former Mayor Caraballo notified

    Ortiz in writing on December 24, 1992, that he was among the

    eleven municipal officials who must resign to make way for the

    incoming NPP administration.

    Against this formidable array, Ortiz offers five

    arguments. First, he contends that Municipal Ordinance No. 3 is

    a nullity because the defendants have not shown that it was duly

    submitted to the Central Office of Personnel Administration for

    approval, as supposedly required by the Personnel Act. But see ________ ___ ___

    supra note 11. This claim is unavailing. _____

    On its face, the ordinance reflects that it had been

    submitted to the Central Office of Personnel Administration

    ("Central Office") for review. See Municipal Ordinance No. 3, ______ ___

    3. Thus, the burden lay with Ortiz to show that the City did not

    comply with the statutory requirements,12 and he proffered no
    ____________________

    sires to operate. In the case of municipali-
    ties, the Municipal Assembly shall follow the
    ordinance or resolution approving the plan
    submitted by the mayor and shall send it to
    the Office for the sole purpose of ascertain- ___ ___ ____ _______ __ __________
    ing that the provisions of section 1350 of ___ ____ ___ __________ __ _______ ____ __
    this title have been complied with. ____ _____ ____ ____ ________ ____

    P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, 1351 (emphasis added).

    12We recognize that the burden of proof normally shifts to
    the governmental entity to establish that the substantive re- ___________
    quirements of its enactment comport with the First Amendment.
    But we have found no authority, nor can we discern any sound
    reason, for shifting the burden of proof where the challenging
    party alleges only procedural irregularities of nonconstitutional __________
    dimension in an ordinance-enactment process. See, e.g., Friends ___ ____ _______
    of the City Market v. Old Town Redev. Corp., 714 S.W.2d 569, 575 __________________ _____________________
    (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) ("Ordinances are presumed to have been
    adopted in accordance with the requirements of the law . . . .").


    16












    evidence that the ordinance was not duly submitted to the Central

    Office. See O'Connor, 994 F.2d at 906-07 (noting that summary ___ ________

    judgment opponent must proffer more than "'conclusory allega-

    tions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation'")

    (citation omitted). In all events, the statutory language does

    not purport to make submission to the Central Office a prerequi-

    site to the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 3. Rather, the ________

    requirement of post-enactment compliance "review" by the Central

    Office, in relation to a municipal ordinance, stands in sharp __ ________ __ _ _________ _________

    contrast to the heightened obligation of Commonwealth agencies to ____________ ________

    seek Central Office approval. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, 1351 ________ ___

    (mayor's "plan" to be submitted to Central Office "for the sole

    purpose of ascertaining that the provisions of section 1350 of

    this title have been complied with"). See Appendix A for text of ___

    1350.

    Second, Ortiz correctly notes that state laws identify-

    ing government positions as "trust" or "confidential" are not

    dispositive of the federal-law question whether a particular

    position is "political." See Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 243 ___ _______________

    n.9. On the other hand, we have explained that state laws and

    municipal ordinances designating positions as "trust" or "confi-

    dential" like P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, 1351, and Municipal

    Ordinance No. 3 are entitled to "some deference" under the

    Branti/Elrod formula, see Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 246; ______ _____ ___ ________________

    accord Juarbe-Angueira, 831 F.2d at 14, especially where other ______ _______________

    evidence clearly points in the same direction.


    17












    Third, Ortiz attempts to estop defendants from assert-

    ing a Branti/Elrod defense by pointing to the putative assurance ______ _____

    made to him by Mayor Caraballo in August 1991, that the OFP

    directorship was not a "trust" position, see supra p.2. Even ___ _____

    this evidence is not hefty enough to ward off summary judgment,

    however.13

    For one thing, application of the equitable estoppel

    doctrine against governmental entities, including municipalities,

    is narrowly circumscribed. See Heckler v. Community Health ___ _______ _________________

    Servs. of Crawford County, 467 U.S. 51, 60-62 (1984). Moreover, __________________________

    any attempt to interpose estoppel as a bar to the Branti/Elrod ______ _____

    defense must fail, since reliance on the Caraballo representation

    would not have been objectively reasonable in the circumstances.

    See United States v. Javier Angueira, 951 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. ___ _____________ ________________

    1991) (noting that even if estoppel is available against govern-

    mental entity, "``the party raising the [estoppel] defense must

    have reasonably relied on some "affirmative misconduct" attribut-

    able to the sovereign.'") (citations omitted); A.E. Alie & Sons _________________

    v. United States Postal Serv., 897 F.2d 591, 593 (1st Cir. 1990) __________________________

    (same).

    ____________________

    13We note, as a threshold matter, that its admissibility is
    far from clear. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Even assuming that ___
    former Mayor Caraballo could bind the City by his representa-
    tions, see Fed. R. Evid. 801 (permitting "admissions" of party- ___ ______
    opponent), it is extremely problematic whether the successor ________
    mayor, defendant Rivera, can be bound, especially since the very
    nature of the 1983 claim made by Ortiz appears to preclude any
    characterization of former Mayor Caraballo as a party "opponent."
    As this evidence is otherwise deficient, however, we need not
    determine its competence at this time.

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    Immediately prior to his appointment to the OFP direc-

    torship, Ortiz, concededly a "political activist," served for

    three years as City assemblyman, a position which would have ___________

    brought all City ordinances within his constructive knowledge.

    See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 531 n.25 (1982) (noting ___ ____________ _____

    that all persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of

    duly enacted statutes/ordinances); Deibler v. City of Rehoboth _______ _________________

    Beach, 790 F.2d 328, 331 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); cf. Good v. _____ ___ ____

    Dauphin County Social Servs. for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d ______________________________________________________

    1087, 1091 (3d Cir. 1989) (reasonably competent government

    officials should know laws governing their conduct). Similarly,

    Ortiz admitted to having served for four years in a previous

    "trust" position, as Regional Director of the Administracion de

    Derecho al Trabajo, making it highly unlikely that he was not on

    actual notice of P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, 1351, or of the fact

    that municipalities were required to designate certain "trust"

    positions by ordinance. __ _________

    Fourth, without citing either authority or a policy

    rationale, Ortiz argues that the OFP directorship cannot be

    considered a "political" position since there is no requirement

    that the municipal assembly approve the mayor's selection for the

    post. We think this far too thin a reed to warrant rejection of

    the traditional Branti/Elrod criteria. Many "political" appoint- ______ _____

    ments (e.g., to the executive staff of a governor or mayor) are

    not subject to legislative approval, a requirement which corre-

    lates more closely to the issue of political accountability in


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    the legislative branch, than to the partisan political attributes

    of an executive position.

    Finally, Ortiz insists that the OFP directorship duties

    actually performed by him under Mayor Caraballo were merely

    administrative and technical, that Caraballo alone decided how

    federal funds were to be spent, and that Ortiz merely informed

    the mayor regarding the administrative status of federal funding

    applications. These claims are insufficient to overcome the

    well-supported legal determination, see supra pp. 9-14, that the ___ _____

    OFP directorship is a "political" position. At most, Ortiz'

    contrary characterizations, fully credited, establish the servic-

    es actually rendered by Ortiz while he served as the director, as

    distinguished from the responsibilities inherent in the position

    itself. Cf. Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1258 (actual duties not as ___ ____________

    probative as inherent duties). As the ultimate issue presented

    is one of law, rather than fact, McGurrin Ehrhard, 867 F.2d at ________________

    93, summary judgment was warranted on the political discrimina-

    tion claim.

    C. Due Process Claim C. Due Process Claim _________________

    Ortiz advances essentially the same arguments as

    support for the due process claim: that he had a legitimate

    expectation of continued employment under commonwealth law, which

    gave rise to a "property right" entitling him to a pretermination

    hearing. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 ___ _______________________ __________

    (1985). The pretermination process due a government employee is

    a matter of federal law, see Rivera-Flores v. Puerto Rico Tel. ___ _____________ ________________


    20












    Co., 64 F.3d 742, 749 (1st Cir. 1995), whereas the preliminary ___

    question whether a government employee possessed a protectable

    "property right," or a legitimate expectation of continued

    employment, is controlled by the employment contract or state

    law. See id. ___ ___

    Since Ortiz' employment contract included a clause

    permitting his unilateral, unconditional termination by the mayor

    at any time, commonwealth or local law would be the only possible

    basis for an actionable claim to continued employment. Accord-

    ingly, Municipal Ordinance No. 3 is dispositive of the due

    process claim, since it designates the OFP directorship as a

    "confidential" position, pursuant to P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3,

    1351. The Personnel Act in turn defines "confidential" appoint-

    ees as, inter alios, "those who intervene or collaborate substan- _____ _____

    tially in the formulation of public policy, who advise directly

    or render direct services to the head of the agency," and are

    subject to "free selection and removal." Id. 1350. Thus, Ortiz ___

    had neither a property right nor a contract right to continued

    employment as OFP Director, and defendant-appellee Rivera was

    under no constitutional obligation to afford him a pretermination

    hearing.

    III III

    CONCLUSION CONCLUSION __________

    The claims for damages are barred under the doctrine of

    qualified immunity, because Ortiz failed to demonstrate that it

    was "clearly established" that the OFP directorship was not a


    21












    "political" position. See Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1259-60. ___ ____________

    Furthermore, since we conclude as a matter of law that the OFP

    directorship was indeed a "political" position, the claims for

    damages and reinstatement are foreclosed on the merits. Finally, ___ _____________

    the due-process claim fails because Ortiz possessed no right to,

    or reasonable expectation of, continued employment as OFP direc-

    tor.

    The judgment is affirmed; costs to appellees. The judgment is affirmed; costs to appellees. ____________________________________________






































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    Appendix A __________

    LAWS OF PUERTO RICO ANNOTATED
    TITLE THREE. EXECUTIVE
    CHAPTER 51. PUBLIC SERVICE PERSONNEL
    SUBCHAPTER V. PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM; STRUCTURE

    1350. Confidential employees

    Confidential employees are those who intervene or collabo-
    rate substantially in the formulation of the public policy, who
    advise directly or render direct services to the head of the
    agency, such as:
    (1) Officers appointed by the Governor, their personal
    secretaries and drivers; as well as their executive and adminis-
    trative assistants who answer directly to them.
    (2) Heads of agencies, their personal secretaries and
    drivers; as well as their executive and administrative assistants
    who answer directly to them.
    (3) Assistant heads of agencies and their personal secretar-
    ies and drivers.
    (4) Regional directors of agencies.
    (5) Personal secretaries and drivers of officials selected
    by popular election, as well as their assistants who answer
    directly to them.
    (6) Members of boards or standing committees appointed by
    the Governor and their respective personal secretaries.
    (7) Members and personnel of boards or commissions appointed
    by the Governor having a specific period of effectiveness.
    (8) Personnel of the offices of the Puerto Rico Ex-Govern-
    ors.
    Confidential employees shall be of free selection and
    removal. Likewise confidential shall be those employees who
    though of free selection may be removed only for good cause by
    provision of law or those whose appointment is for a term pre--
    fixed by law.
    Every regular employee in a career position who is appointed
    to a confidential position shall be entitled to be reinstated in
    a position equal or similar to the last one he held in the career
    service.













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