Williamson v. Busconi ( 1996 )


Menu:
  • USCA1 Opinion











    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________

    No. 95-2311
    ALAN D. WILLIAMSON,

    Appellant,

    v.

    LEWIS J. BUSCONI,

    Appellee.

    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________

    Cyr, Circuit Judge, _____________

    and Cummings,* Circuit Judge. _____________

    ____________________



    Rosario Mario F. Rizzo for appellant. ______________________
    Howard P. Blatchford, Jr., with whom Bruce F. Smith and Jager, __________________________ _______________ ______
    Smith, Stetler & Arata, P.C. were on brief for appellee. ____________________________


    ____________________

    July 3, 1996
    ____________________
    ____________________

    *Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.












    CYR, Circuit Judge. Appellant Alan D. Williamson CYR, Circuit Judge. ______________

    challenges a bankruptcy court ruling excluding evidence probative

    of the chapter 7 debtor-appellee Lewis J. Busconi's putative

    intent to defraud Williamson in a substantial real estate

    transaction. In due course Williamson commenced an adversary

    proceeding in the bankruptcy court to except his claim from the

    chapter 7 discharge on the ground that the debt had been induced

    by fraud. See Bankruptcy Code 523(a)(2)(A), 11 U.S.C. ___

    523(a)(2)(A) (1994). Following careful review of the entire

    record, we conclude that the bankruptcy court abused its

    discretion by excluding the proffered evidence, but that the

    error did not affect substantial rights.

    At the bench trial, Williamson unsuccessfully attempted

    to introduce evidence as to various events, including Busconi's

    conduct, subsequent to the closing of their real estate

    transaction, from which a factfinder reasonably could have

    inferred that Busconi had not intended to pay the note at the

    time it was executed. The evidence was excluded as irrelevant.

    Nonetheless, after hearing the testimony of both parties, the

    bankruptcy judge expressly credited Busconi's testimony, found

    that Williamson had failed to establish the requisite fraudulent

    intent, and ruled the Williamson debt dischargeable. On

    intermediateappeal, thedistrictcourtaffirmed withoutelaboration.1
    ____________________

    1The district court's conclusions of law are reviewed de __
    novo, Petit v. Fessenden, 80 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 1996); Fed. R. ____ ______ _________
    Bankr. P. 8013. The bankruptcy court's factual findings are
    reviewed for clear error. Id. Evidentiary rulings by the __
    bankruptcy court are subject to the "abuse of discretion"

    2












    As direct evidence is seldom available, fraudulent

    intent normally is determined from the totality of the

    circumstances. Charlie Kelton's Pontiac, Cadillac, Oldsmobile & _________________________________________________

    Isuzu Truck, Inc. v. Roberts (In re Roberts), 82 B.R. 179, 184 __________________ _______ _____________

    (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987). And since "subsequent conduct may

    reflect back to the promisor's state of mind and thus may be

    considered in ascertaining whether there was fraudulent intent"

    at the time the promise was made, proper application of the

    "totality" test in the instant context often warrants

    consideration of post-transaction conduct and consequences, as

    well as pre-transaction conduct and contemporaneous events. See ___

    Krenowsky v. Haining (In re Haining), 119 B.R. 460, 464 (Bankr. _________ _______ ______________

    D. Del. 1990); cf. United States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809, 816 __ _____________ _________

    (1st Cir. 1988) ("later events often may shed light on earlier

    motivations"). In sum, the bankruptcy court ruling excluding

    Busconi's relevant post-closing conduct constituted an abuse of

    discretion.

    Williamson must also show, however, that the

    evidentiary ruling adversely affected his "substantial rights."

    See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9005, 9017 (incorporating Fed. R. Civ. P. ___

    61; Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)). At a minimum, Williamson would need

    to demonstrate clear error in the ultimate assessment that the

    testimony given by Busconi was more credible than that given by

    Williamson. In light of all the evidence in the record, we are

    ____________________

    standard. See United States v. Cotto-Aponte, 30 F.3d 4, 6 (1st ___ ______________ ____________
    Cir. 1994).

    3












    not persuaded that the challenged judgment was substantially

    influenced by the erroneous evidentiary ruling. See Lubanski v. ___ ________

    Coleco Indus., Inc., 929 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991). As there ___________________

    was no clear error in the bankruptcy court's findings, the

    district court judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear affirmed The parties shall bear ________ ___ _______ _____ ____

    their own costs. their own costs. _____ ___ _____










































    4