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USCA1 Opinion
June 17, 1996
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 95-2011
RUBEN SANTANA-DIAZ,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellee.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Selya, Cyr and Lynch,
Circuit Judges. ______________
____________________
Ruben Santana-Diaz on brief pro se. __________________
Guillermo Gil, Acting United States Attorney, John C. Keeney, ______________ ________________
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Theresa M.B. Van Vliet, Chief, and ______________________
Lena Watkins, Attorney, Criminal Division, Narcotic and Dangerous Drug ____________
Section, U.S. Department of Justice, on brief for appellee.
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. Ruben Santana Diaz appeals from the __________
district court's dismissal of his petition under 28 U.S.C.
2255. We affirm for the reasons given briefly below.
1. Santana did not raise his claim that the trial
court's failure to order identification or production of a
confidential informant prejudiced his ability to assert an
entrapment defense in his direct appeal. See United States ___ _____________
v. Panet-Collazo, 960 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, _____________ ____________
506 U.S. 876 (1992). Failure to raise a constitutional claim
on direct appeal ordinarily bars raising the issue on
collateral attack unless the petitioner can show cause for
the failure and actual prejudice from the alleged trial court
error. See Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 769, 774 (1st ___ ______ _____________
Cir. 1994).
As cause, Santana asserts his appellate counsel's
ineffective assistance of counsel. However, as the district
court correctly concluded in resolving that issue, the
failure to obtain the confidential informant's testimony at
trial did not prejudice Santana's ability to assert an
entrapment defense. Even assuming that the informant would
have testified as Santana suggests, at most his testimony
would have established only one element of the entrapment
defense -- that the government induced Santana to participate
in the drug deal in question. To assert an entrapment
defense, however, Santana also had to establish at trial that
he was not predisposed to commit his crime. See United ___ ______
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States v. Panet-Collazo, 960 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir.), cert. ______ _____________ _____
denied, 506 U.S. 876 (1992). As we held on direct appeal, ______
he never did so. Id. at 259-60. ___
2. Santana bears the burden of showing that the
court vindictively sentenced him for exercising his right to
a jury trial, as he claims. United States v. Mena-Robles, 4 _____________ ___________
F.3d 1026, 1037 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. ____________
1550 (1994). He has not pointed to any statement by the
district court or any other evidence suggesting that there is
a "reasonable likelihood" that he received a harsher sentence
than he otherwise would have because he went to trial so as
to trigger a presumption of vindictiveness. See id. The ________
mere fact that co-defendants, who pled guilty, received
lesser sentences does not show that it is reasonably likely
that Santana was vindictively sentenced. Id. Hence, the ___
claim of vindictive sentencing fails. Id. ___
Affirmed. _________
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Document Info
Docket Number: 95-2011
Filed Date: 6/17/1996
Precedential Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 9/21/2015