Glassman v. Computervision ( 1996 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion











    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    ____________________

    No. 95-2240

    MORRIS I. GLASSMAN, et al.,

    Plaintiffs, Appellants,

    v.

    COMPUTERVISION CORPORATION, et al.,

    Defendants, Appellees.

    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Lynch, Circuit Judge, _____________

    Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________

    Cummings, Circuit Judge.* _____________

    ____________________

    Peter J. Macdonald, with whom Jeffrey B. Rudman, David E. Marder, __________________ __________________ _______________
    S. Tara Miller, Hale and Dorr, Bruce D. Angiolillo, Nicholas Even, ________________ ______________ ___________________ _____________
    Elisabeth Bassin, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, Thomas J. Dougherty, _________________ ____________________________ ____________________
    Dennis M. Kelleher, and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, were on __________________ _____________________________________
    brief, for the defendants-appellees.

    Thomas G. Shapiro, with whom Michelle Blauner, Shapiro Grace __________________ _________________ ______________
    Haber & Urmy, Glen DeValerio, Norman Berman, Michael Lange, Berman _____________ _______________ ______________ ______________ ______
    DeValerio & Pease, Daniel W. Krasner, Peter C. Harrar, Wolf ___________________ ____________________ __________________ ____


    ____________________

    *Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.















    Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, L.L.P., I. Stephen Rabin, Joseph P. _________________________________________ ________________ _________
    Garland, and Rabin & Garland, were on brief, for the plaintiffs- _______ ________________
    appellants.


    ____________________

    July 31, 1996
    ____________________























































    LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Computervision Corporation, LYNCH, Circuit Judge. _____________

    a Massachusetts high technology company, made an initial

    public offering ("IPO") of securities on August 14, 1992.

    Six weeks later, on September 29, 1992, Computervision

    announced that its revenues and operating results for the

    third quarter of 1992 would be lower than expected. The

    prices of Computervision's stock and notes fell sharply. On

    the day after this announcement, the first investor suit was

    filed. Computervision and the IPO underwriters were sued

    under Sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933

    (the "Securities Act"). The investors also sued

    Computervision's principal officers and directors, alleging

    controlling person liability under Section 15 of the

    Securities Act. Plaintiffs asserted that they represented

    the class of investors who purchased common stock or notes

    between August 14, 1992 and September 29, 1992. The district

    court, after lengthy pre-trial proceedings and full

    discovery, both dismissed the case for failure to state a

    claim and denied as futile plaintiffs' motion for leave to

    file a second amended complaint. See In re Computervision ___ ____________________

    Corp. Sec. Litig. ("Computervision II"), 914 F. Supp. 717, __________________ __________________

    719 (D. Mass. 1996).

    The investors appeal from the denial of their

    motion for leave to amend, arguing that their proposed second

    amended complaint (the "Proposed Complaint") passed the Rule



    -3- 3













    12(b)(6) threshold. They say the Proposed Complaint

    adequately alleged violations of the securities laws in that

    the Prospectus1 for the IPO contained actionable

    misrepresentations,"half-truths" or omissions regarding: (1)

    the factors considered in determining the prices for the

    offerings; (2) certain mid-quarter information for the third

    quarter of 1992; (3) the importance of Computervision's low

    backlog; (4) the latest release of Computervision's key new

    software product, CADDS 5, which Computervision said was

    commercially shipping when (plaintiffs say) it was not, and

    the development and commercial prospects of CADDS 5.

    We affirm, although our reasoning as to the first

    claim differs from that of the district court.

    I.

    Background __________

    Computervision is a leading supplier of work

    station-based computer aided design and computer aided

    manufacturing ("CAD/CAM") software and related services to

    the mechanical design automation market. Its software

    products are utilized in the design of complex parts and

    assemblies for the automotive, aerospace, and other

    mechanical industries. Its products enable users to reduce


    ____________________

    1. The term "Prospectus" will be used throughout although
    there were two prospectuses, one for stock and one for notes.
    The parties treat them as identical for all material
    purposes.

    -4- 4













    the time required for designing, engineering and

    manufacturing a product before market introduction. This

    "time-to-market" is a key factor in ensuring profitability

    and competitiveness.2

    The company was organized in 1972 under the name

    Prime Computer, Inc.3 Until 1988, Prime was in the business

    of making and selling computer systems. In 1988, Prime

    acquired Computervision Corporation, a leading supplier of

    CAD/CAM hardware and software products. In 1989, the company

    was acquired by DR Holdings, and shifted its focus from

    computer systems to the CAD/CAM market. A principal

    shareholder of DR Holdings, Shearson Holdings,4 provided the

    company with a $500 million bridge loan in connection with

    the acquisition. That bridge loan was intended to be repaid

    with the proceeds from a high-yield bond offering. However,

    that offering never occurred and Computervision instead


    ____________________

    2. At the time of the IPO, Computervision had an installed
    base of 58,000 units, predominantly in North America and
    Europe. In 1991, international revenues accounted for
    approximately 66% of its total revenues.

    3. The company's name was changed to Computervision Corp. at
    the time of the IPO at issue here. For clarity, we refer to
    the company as "Computervision" throughout.

    4. Shearson Holdings is the parent company of a co-lead
    underwriter for the IPO, Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. In
    addition to Shearson Holdings and its affiliate, Shearson
    Lehman Brothers Capital Partners II, L.P., the principal
    shareholders of DR Holdings were J.H. Whitney & Co. and
    affiliates and the Prudential Insurance Company of America
    and affiliates.

    -5- 5













    refinanced the bridge loan with $500 million in notes. In

    December 1991, interest on the notes was itself converted

    from cash payments to payments "in kind," i.e., additional ____

    notes.

    The proceeds from the IPO were intended to repay

    half the principal amount, of the notes held by Shearson

    Holdings, with the rest of the debt to Shearson Holdings to

    be converted to Computervision common stock or written off by

    Shearson. Both Shearson Holdings and DR Holdings signed

    "lock-up" agreements, promising not to sell their equity

    positions in Computervision until a year after the IPO.

    Plaintiffs posit that Computervision's worsening financial

    condition5 placed Shearson Holdings' investment in jeopardy

    by increasing the likelihood that Computervision would

    default on its debt to Shearson Holdings. Allegedly, the

    solution was to take the company public and use the proceeds

    to repay a substantial portion of the debt. Plaintiffs say

    that defendants believed that if Computervision was not taken

    public during the summer of 1992, the opportunity for

    Shearson Holdings to recoup its investment would be lost.

    ____________________

    5. In the three and a half years prior to the IPO,
    Computervision suffered close to $1 billion in losses. In
    1989, its net losses were $281 million; in 1990, $71 million;
    in 1991, $461 million; and for the first six months of 1992,
    $143 million. Computervision's CAD/CAM revenues for the
    first six months of 1992 decreased by 5% from the
    corresponding period in 1991. However, software revenues
    from the CADDS line increased 10% from the corresponding
    period in 1991.

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    On August 14, 1992, Computervision sold $600

    million of securities in a registered IPO. The offering was

    composed of 25 million shares of common stock at $12 a share

    (for a total of $300 million); $125 million of 10-7/8% Senior

    Notes due 1997; and $175 million of 11-3/8% Senior

    Subordinated Notes due 1999. The Computervision IPO was a

    firm-commitment underwriting, in which the underwriters

    purchased the securities from the company and assumed the

    risk that the market would not accept the securities at the

    price set. See Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., 82 F.3d ___ ____ ________________________

    1194, 1200 n.1 (1st Cir. 1996). Shearson Lehman Brothers,

    Inc., Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp., The

    First Boston Corp., and Hambrecht & Quist, Inc., were the co-

    lead underwriters for the domestic offering, representing a

    syndicate of over forty firms.

    On September 29, 1992, six weeks after the

    offering, Computervision announced that its revenue and

    operating results for the third quarter of 1992 would be

    below expectations. Within a day, the stock price fell 30%,

    to $6.25, and the notes were trading at approximately 8%

    below face value.

    On October 22, 1992, Computervision quantified its

    results for the third quarter, which ended on September 27,

    1992. Computervision had suffered a net loss of roughly $88

    million, including a $25 million non-recurring charge



    -7- 7













    occasioned by its decision to lay off more than 11% of its

    work force.

    II.

    Description of Actions and Procedural History _____________________________________________

    On September 30, 1992, one day after Computervision

    announced that its operating results for the third quarter of

    1992 would be lower than expected, plaintiffs filed the first

    of eighteen separate complaints. In addition to claims under

    Sections 11, 12(2) and 15 of the Securities Act, plaintiffs

    asserted a violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities

    Exchange Act of 1934 and negligent misrepresentation.

    The eighteen actions were consolidated into one

    class action and on June 11, 1993, plaintiffs filed a

    Corrected Supplemental Consolidated Amended Class Action

    Complaint (the "1993 Amended Complaint").6 Among other

    things, the 1993 Amended Complaint alleged that the

    Prospectus: (i) distorted Computervision's earning trends;

    (ii) omitted disclosure of known uncertainties impacting upon

    Computervision's operating results; (iii) omitted disclosure

    of the increasing likelihood that Computervision would not

    meet its internally projected results for 1992; (iv) omitted


    ____________________

    6. The 1993 Amended Complaint formally withdrew any claims
    of fraud under section 10(b). Nevertheless, the district
    court ruled that the complaint sounded in fraud and that Fed.
    R. Civ. P. 9(b)'s strict pleading standards applied. See In ___ __
    re Computervision Corp. Sec. Litig. ("Computervision I"), 869 ___________________________________ ________________
    F. Supp. 56, 63-64 (D. Mass. 1994).

    -8- 8













    disclosure of known declines in the demand for

    Computervision's services and products; and (v) omitted

    disclosure of software development problems.

    On November 23, 1993, the district court heard

    argument on defendants' motion to dismiss. While the motion

    was under advisement, discovery commenced. Discovery was

    extensive. Plaintiffs reviewed more than 130,000 documents

    and deposed over twenty witnesses. Plaintiffs have

    represented that, should the case be reinstated, it does not

    require the reopening of discovery.

    On November 22, 1994, the district court issued its

    decision, dismissing all but a sliver of the claims,

    primarily on the grounds that they failed to satisfy the

    requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 9(b). See ___

    Computervision I, 869 F. Supp. at 64. The district court ________________

    noted that the Prospectus warned investors of the risks

    involved and that, with one exception, the alleged

    misrepresentations were made in a context that adequately

    "bespoke caution." Id. at 60-61. As to the omissions, the ___

    court noted that these, in large part, referred either to

    information that was effectively disclosed, or to information

    for which there was no duty to disclose. Id. at 62-63. ___

    On January 20, 1995, plaintiffs served a motion for

    leave to file a second amended complaint. Defendants served

    their opposition to that motion on February 24, 1995 and



    -9- 9













    moved for summary judgment on the sole allegation surviving

    the district court's 1994 decision.7 The parties then

    entered into a Stipulation of Dismissal, dismissing, with

    prejudice, the surviving claim. The stipulation was to be

    effective the day after the district court ruled on the _____

    motion for leave to amend.

    On May 1, 1995, plaintiffs moved for leave to file

    the Proposed Complaint at issue here. The court heard

    argument on September 13, 1995, and a week later, on

    September 20, denied the motion for leave to amend. The

    basis for the denial was futility, in that the Proposed

    Complaint failed to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

    The court dismissed the case, entered judgment for the

    defendants, and promised a full opinion.

    Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on October

    20, 1995. Subsequently, on February 12, 1996, the district

    court issued an opinion setting forth the rationale

    underlying its September 1995 order. Computervision II, 914 _________________

    F. Supp. at 717-22. The one claim that had given the

    district court pause at oral argument was the allegation that

    the Prospectus had misrepresented that the securities were

    "appropriately" priced. The district court nevertheless ruled


    ____________________

    7. Pursuant to the parties' Rule 16.1(D) Joint Statement
    filed December 28, 1994, plaintiffs' proposed amended
    complaint and summary judgment motions were served but not
    filed with the court.

    -10- 10













    that that claim failed because: (a) the Prospectus had not

    warranted or insured the appropriateness of the securities'

    prices; and (b) the claim was keyed to the nondisclosure of

    internal projections, which were not required to be disclosed

    in any event. Id. at 719-20. The district court ruled that ___

    plaintiffs' other misrepresentation claims, relating to

    backlog and CADDS 5, failed because they were based on

    unreasonable inferences drawn by reading statements in the

    Prospectus out of context.8 Id. at 719-22. This appeal ___

    followed.

    III.

    Analysis ________

    A. Standard of Review __________________

    This appeal lies from the district court's denial

    of plaintiffs' motion to file an amended complaint. The

    motion was denied after full discovery and after the

    dismissal of an earlier complaint. The district court ruled

    that amendment would be futile. The parties disagreed then,

    as they do now, over the proper standard for analyzing this

    motion to amend. See id. at 719. Plaintiffs argued that ___ ___

    leave to amend should be "freely given when justice so

    requires," Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Computervision II, 914 F. _________________


    ____________________

    8. Since there were no actionable misstatements or
    omissions, the court held that the negligent
    misrepresentation claim against the underwriters failed as
    well. Computervision II, 914 F. Supp. at 722. _________________

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    Supp. at 719. Defendants embraced the more stringent

    "substantial and convincing evidence" standard set forth in

    Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gold, 30 F.3d 251, 253 (1st Cir. _______________________ ____

    1994). Computervision II, 914 F. Supp. at 719. The district _________________

    court did not decide the issue, finding the question academic

    "as the plaintiffs cannot maintain this action under either

    standard." Computervision II, 914 F. Supp. at 719. _________________

    Denial of a motion to file an amended complaint is

    reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Romani v. Shearson ___ ______ ________

    Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 880 (1st Cir. 1991); Arazie v. ______________ ______

    Mullane, 2 F.3d 1456, 1464-65 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting, _______

    however, that the relevant pleading standards must be kept in

    mind when applying the abuse of discretion standard). Rule

    15(a) provides that "leave [to amend] shall be freely given

    when justice so requires." Unless there appears to be an

    adequate reason for the denial of leave to amend (e.g., undue ____

    delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, futility of amendment,

    prejudice), we will not affirm it. Grant v. News Group _____ __________

    Boston, Inc., 55 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995). ____________

    Here, there was no finding that plaintiffs acted in

    bad faith, or in an effort to prolong litigation. Nor was

    there a finding that defendants would have been prejudiced by









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    the amendment.9 See Ward Electronics Serv., Inc. v. First ___ _____________________________ _____

    Commercial Bank, 819 F.2d 496, 496-97 (4th Cir. 1987). _______________

    Rather, the dismissal rested on other grounds. The

    district court's order explicitly states: "the motion to

    further amend the complaint is denied as futile." "Futility"

    means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a

    claim upon which relief could be granted. See 3 Moore's ___ _______

    Federal Practice 15.08[4], at 15-80 (2d ed. 1993); see also ________________ ___ ____

    Vargas v. McNamara, 608 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1979). In ______ ________

    reviewing for "futility," the district court applies the same

    standard of legal sufficiency as applies to a Rule 12(b)(6)

    motion. 3 Moore's, at 15.08[4], at 15-81. _______

    The Gold standard, which requires that proposed ____

    amendments have substantial merit and be supported by

    substantial and convincing evidence, is inapplicable for

    several reasons. To date, it has only been applied where the

    motion to amend is made after a defendant has moved for _____

    summary judgment. See e.g., Gold, 30 F.3d at 253; Torres- ___ ____ ____ _______

    Matos v. St. Lawrence Garment Co., 901 F.2d 1144, 1146 (1st _____ _________________________

    ____________________

    9. It is unlikely that defendants could have been
    prejudiced. Plaintiffs have represented that the allegations
    of the Proposed Complaint do not require reopening discovery.
    There is also no claim that defendants would need additional
    time to change their trial strategy in light of the proposed
    amendment. Cf. Tiernan v. Byth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 719 ___ _______ ____________________________
    F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding prejudice even where
    additional discovery was not necessary; the additional claims
    "may well have affected defendants' planned trial strategy
    and tactics" and both defendants and the court would likely
    have "required additional time to prepare for trial").

    -13- 13













    Cir. 1990); Cowen v. Bank United of Texas, FSB, 1995 WL _____ ___________________________

    38978, *9 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd 70 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1995); _____

    Carey v. Beans, 500 F. Supp. 580, 582 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd, _____ _____ _____

    659 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir. 1981); Artman v. International ______ _____________

    Harvester Co., 355 F. Supp. 476, 481 (W.D. Pa. 1972). In _____________

    that context, a plaintiff's motion to amend is an attempt to

    alter the shape of the case in order to defeat summary

    judgment.

    Here plaintiffs served the motion to amend before ______

    defendants moved for summary judgment. Further, the claims

    in the summary judgment motion were dropped by agreement of _________

    the parties and, as a result, no summary judgment motion was

    pending when the district court considered the motion to

    amend.

    Nor does Gold apply by analogy. This is not a ____

    situation in which plaintiffs seek amendment solely to avert

    imminent defeat. Cf. Cowen v. Bank United of Texas, FSB, 70 ___ _____ __________________________

    F.3d 937, 944 (7th Cir. 1995). Nor is this a situation in

    which it is rational to presume that defendants would be

    prejudiced by amendment. Cf. Carey v. Beans, 500 F. Supp. at ___ _____ _____

    582 (calling prejudice to non-movant the "``touchstone for the

    denial of the amendment'" (quoting Cornell & Co. v. OSHA, 573 _____________ ____

    F.2d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1978)). Although, under these

    circumstances, plaintiffs could be guilty of undue delay or

    prejudice to defendants might exist, the district court made



    -14- 14













    no such finding. Further, the district court did not rely on

    Goldandits reasoningwas almostpurelya legalfutility analysis. ____

    Thus, we look at whether the district court

    correctly determined that the Proposed Complaint failed to

    meet the pleading standards of Rule 12(b)(6). There is no

    practical difference, in terms of review, between a denial of

    a motion to amend based on futility and the grant of a motion

    to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Motorcity of ___ _____________

    Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d 1317, 1323 ___________________ ______________

    (11th Cir. 1996); see also Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. ___ ____ ______________________________

    Michigan, 11 F.3d 1341, 1348 (6th Cir. 1993). Review is de ________ __

    novo. See, e.g., Serabian v. Amoskeag Bank Shares, Inc., 24 ____ ___ ____ ________ __________________________

    F.3d 357, 361 (1st Cir. 1994) (motions to dismiss are

    reviewed de novo). __ ____

    B. Securities Law Claims _____________________

    "Sections 11 and 12(2) are enforcement mechanisms

    for the mandatory disclosure requirements of the Securities

    Act." Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1201. Section 11 imposes liability ____

    on signers of a registration statement and on underwriters,

    among others, if the registration statement "contained an

    untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a

    material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to

    make the statements therein not misleading." 15 U.S.C.

    77k(a). Section 12(2) provides that any person who "offers

    or sells" a security by means of a prospectus or oral



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    communication that contains a materially false statement or

    that "omits to state a material fact necessary to make the

    statements, in the light of the circumstances under which

    they were made, not misleading" shall be liable to any

    "person purchasing such security from him." 15 U.S.C.

    77l(2).

    As we said in Shaw, there is a strong affirmative ____

    duty of disclosure in the context of a public offering. 83

    F.3d at 1202. The same may be even more emphatically true in

    an initial public offering, where the securities have not

    before been publicly traded. Cf. Marcel Kahan, Securities ___ __________

    Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41 _________________________________________________________

    Duke L.J. 977, 1014-15 (1992). But the main thrust of

    plaintiffs' claims is not based on any duty to disclose.

    Rather, they say that this is primarily an affirmative

    misrepresentation or half-truth case.

    The Proposed Complaint centers on the claim that

    Computervision affirmatively misrepresented that the offering

    price was set after the exercise of due diligence by the

    underwriters, but that in fact the diligence exercised was

    deficient in that the most current information was not

    considered. In addition, plaintiffs contend that the

    Prospectus omitted certain mid-quarter information for the

    third quarter of 1992 and contained material misstatements or





    -16- 16













    omissions regarding Computervision's backlog and the state of

    its latest software product, CADDS 5.

    The district court held that the Prospectus would

    not bear the characterizations plaintiffs sought to place on

    it, and that the allegedly actionable "representations" were

    no more than unreasonable inferences drawn by plaintiffs and

    unsupported by the surrounding language. Computervision II, _________________

    914 F. Supp. at 719. Plaintiffs argue that the district

    court erred and that they should have been allowed to amend

    their complaint.

    Defendants respond by asserting that plaintiffs'

    pricing claims reduce to an argument that the securities were

    mispriced because their prices fell subsequent to the

    offerings, and that the omission of mid-quarter information

    claims reduce to nothing more than an argument that

    Computervision was required to disclose its internal

    forecasts. Plaintiffs' position, defendants say, is _________

    untenable because the securities laws impose no duty upon a

    company to either provide a warranty as to price or to

    disclose internal projections. They also say that the

    alleged misstatements concerning backlog and CADDS 5 are not

    actionably misleading when considered in the context of the

    Prospectus as a whole.

    1. Pricing/Due Diligence Claims ____________________________





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    The Computervision IPO was unusual in one respect

    which has bearing on plaintiffs' claims. Computervision had

    been owned by an entity, one of whose principal shareholders,

    Shearson Holdings, was affiliated with one of the co-lead

    underwriters, Shearson Lehman Brothers. As a result, the

    Prospectus informed investors:

    Under the provisions of Schedule E to the
    By-laws of the National Association of
    Securities Dealers Inc. ("NASD"), when
    NASD members such as Shearson Lehman
    Brothers Inc., participate in the
    distribution of an affiliate's
    securities, the public offering price can
    be no higher than that recommended by a
    "qualified independent underwriter"
    meeting certain standards.

    Hambrecht & Quist (for the stock) and Donaldson Lufkin and

    First Boston (for the notes) assumed the obligations of due

    diligence as to the public offering prices, and the

    Prospectus explicitly represented that they had done so.

    This representation in the Prospectus is

    significant in two respects. First, the fact that one of the

    lead underwriters was affiliated with a principal shareholder

    of Computervision arguably gave that underwriter a reason to

    inflate the offering prices. Second, the Prospectus, in

    effect, explicitly assured the members of the investing

    public that, despite the link between Shearson Holdings and

    Shearson Lehman Brothers, they had no reason to fear an

    inflated price. The Prospectus made a selling point out of

    the fact that independent underwriters had performed due


    -18- 18













    diligence, set maximum prices, and thus acted as gatekeepers

    against possible misdeeds by Shearson Holdings and Shearson

    Lehman Brothers. Cf. John C. Coffee, Re-Engineering ___ ______________

    Corporate Disclosure: The Coming Debate Over Company _____________________________________________________________

    Registration, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1143, 1168 (1995). ____________

    (i) The Pricing Claims in the Proposed Complaint ____________________________________________

    The Prospectus described the process by which

    Computervision and its underwriters arrived at prices for the

    offering:

    Prior to the Share Offerings there has
    been no public market for the Common
    Stock. The initial public offering price
    was determined by negotiation among the
    Company, the Representatives and the Lead
    Managers. Among the factors considered
    in determining the initial offering
    price, in addition to prevailing market
    conditions, was the Company's historical
    performance, estimates of the business
    potential and earnings prospects of the
    Company and market prices of and
    financial and operating data concerning
    comparable companies.

    These representations are at the heart of the

    Proposed Complaint, which alleges in paragraphs 3(a) and 45,

    respectively:

    The Stock Prospectus was misleading in
    stating that the Stock had been
    appropriately priced. The price of the
    Notes was also too high, causing their
    yields to be too low. The Stock ___________
    Prospectus stated that among the factors _________________________________________
    considered in determining the initial _________________________________________
    public offering price were "estimates of _________________________________________
    the business potential and earnings _________________________________________
    prospects of the Company." By the time _________________________________________
    of the Offerings, however, those _________________________________________


    -19- 19













    estimates were no longer valid. As of ________________________________
    the date of the Offerings, the Company's
    revenues, bookings, visibility and
    backlog were all substantially below the
    plan prepared by Computervision and
    reviewed by the underwriters in
    connection with their due diligence and
    pricing for the Offerings (the "IPO
    Plan"), as well as the Company's other
    internal plans and forecasts (emphasis
    added) (footnotes omitted).

    The Stock Prospectus represented that the
    initial public offering price for the
    Stock was based upon, among other things,
    "estimates of the business potential and
    earnings prospects of the Company . . ."
    The Prospectuses also stated that
    "qualified independent underwriters" had
    recommended the initial public offering
    price for the Shares and the yields on
    the Notes. Those formal, written
    recommendations were based on factors
    including "estimates of the business
    potential of the company" and on the
    "economic, market, financial and other
    conditions" as they existed on August 13,
    1992, the day before the effective date
    of the Offerings. Contrary to the
    representations in the Prospectuses, the
    price of the Shares and the yields on the
    Notes did not properly reflect the
    business potential, earnings prospects or
    financial condition of Computervision as
    of that date.10

    ____________________

    10. Related allegations are found at paragraphs 46 and 84 of
    the Proposed Complaint, respectively:

    As of the date of the Offerings, all of
    Computervision's internal planning and
    forecasting devices showed that results
    during the first seven weeks of the Third
    Quarter were substantially below the
    budgets set in the Company's internal
    plans and the IPO Plan which the Company
    had presented to the Underwriters in
    conjunction with their due diligence and
    pricing of the Offerings. In particular,

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    ____________________

    at the time of the Offerings,
    Computervision's U.S. sales were
    materially below sales at comparable
    points in the prior five quarters. Both
    U.S. and international sales were
    substantially below the Company's plans.
    In addition, Computervision had a $40
    million shortfall in visible orders
    needed to reach its quarterly budget.
    The Underwriters failed to perform
    adequate due diligence on
    Computervision's actual revenues, sales,
    orders, bookings and visibility for the
    seven weeks during the Third Quarter
    before the Offerings. The Underwriters _________________
    were required to but did not obtain _________________________________________
    information necessary to verify the _________________________________________
    Company's false statements that such _________________________________________
    results were "more or less where they _________________________________________
    were expected to be." To the extent the _________________________________________
    Underwriters obtained any information _________________________________________
    from the Company concerning these _________________________________________
    results, the Stock and Notes were _________________________________________
    mispriced because the initial offering _________________________________________
    price and the yields, as well as _________________________________________
    Underwriters' recommendations, did not _________________________________________
    take into account these low levels of _________________________________________
    sales and the $40 million order _________________________________________
    shortfall. Therefore, the representation __________
    in the Stock prospectus that the offering
    price was based upon "estimates of the
    business potential and earnings prospects
    of the Company" was false and misleading,
    as were the representations in the
    Prospectuses concerning the
    recommendations of the qualified
    independent underwriters (emphasis
    added).

    The Underwriters failed to perform
    adequate due diligence on the Company's
    actual sales, orders, bookings,
    visibility and backlog for the first
    seven weeks of the Third Quarter before
    the Offerings. The Underwriters were ______________________
    required to but either failed to obtain _________________________________________
    and review or ignored information about _________________________________________
    actual sales, orders, bookings, _________________________________________

    -21- 21













    Different claims, which require different analyses, appear to

    be asserted in these paragraphs.

    (ii) District Court's Characterization of the _____________________________________________

    Pricing Claims ______________

    In dismissing the action, the district court

    characterized plaintiffs' claim as being that the prices set ______

    for the securities were inappropriate. Computervision II, _________________

    914 F. Supp. at 720. The district court noted that the

    Prospectus never represented that the prices were

    "appropriate" and that if the Prospectus language quoted in

    paragraph 48 of the Proposed Complaint:

    constitutes a representation that the
    initial price was 'appropriate,'
    investors would effectively have
    insurance against any decline in price,
    rendering their investments risk-free.

    Id. We agree with the district court's view of any claim ___

    plaintiffs make that the Prospectus represented that the

    price itself was appropriate. We note, however, that

    plaintiffs vigorously deny that such was, or is, their claim.




    ____________________

    visibility and backlog necessary to _________________________________________
    verify the Company's statements that they _________________________________________
    were more or less on track. As a result, __________________________
    the Stock and Notes were mispriced
    because the initial offering price of the
    Stock and the yields on the Notes did not
    take into account these adverse results,
    including the $40 million order shortfall
    (emphasis added).


    -22- 22













    The price set for an offering of securities is

    essentially a forecast. Price can be characterized as a

    present value calculation of the firm's future streams of

    earnings or dividends. See In re VeriFone Sec. Litig. ___ _____________________________

    ("VeriFone I"), 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1479 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ___________

    ("securities prices on national exchanges reflect . . . the

    expected future cash flows from the security"), aff'd, 11 _____

    F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 1993); Richard A. Brealey and Stewart C.

    Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, 61-63 (4th ed. 1991); _______________________________

    cf. Niagara Hudson Power Corp. v. Leventritt, 340 U.S. 336, ___ ___________________________ __________

    339 & n.7 (1951) (approving the SEC's valuation of warrants

    in terms of current expectations of future events); Pommer v. ______

    Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 1992) _______________

    ("[p]robabilities determine the value of stock"); Wielgos v. _______

    Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 1989) ________________________

    (investors value securities on the basis of how they believe

    the firm will do in the future, and not on past performance).

    Since price is only a forecast of the firm's future

    performance, it is not actionable merely because the

    forecast, in hindsight, does not turn out to be correct. See ___

    In re VeriFone Sec. Litig. ("VeriFone II"), 11 F.3d 865, 871 ___________________________ ___________

    (9th Cir. 1993) (earnings forecasts made on reasonable basis

    not actionable); Wielgos, 892 F.2d at 518; Marx v. Computer _______ ____ ________

    Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 489-90 (9th Cir. 1974). _______________

    Forecasts are not guarantees of, or insurance policies for, a



    -23- 23













    firm's future performance, nor are they understood as such by

    reasonable investors. Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 _____ ________________________

    F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Raab v. General Physics ____ _______________

    Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 290 (4th Cir. 1993). Hence, to the extent _____

    plaintiffs' "price" claim rests on either the fact that the

    initial offering prices fell shortly after the offering or

    the fact that Computervision's third quarter earnings turned

    out to be worse than expected, it fails.11 Cf. Pommer, 961 ___ ______

    F.2d at 623 ("[S]ecurities laws approach matters from an ex __

    ante perspective."). ____

    (iii) Plaintiffs' Characterization of the Pricing _____________________________________________

    Claims ______

    Plaintiffs, however, argue that their attack is not

    on the appropriateness of the offering prices themselves.

    Instead, they assert that their claim before the district

    court was that the Prospectus materially misrepresented that:

    ____________________

    11. In addition, when the Prospectus statements about price
    are read in context, they appear to be anything but a
    guarantee. First, the Prospectus provided investors with _________
    explicit and specific warnings as to factors that might cause
    the prices of the securities to fall. Second, the Prospectus
    cautioned investors as to the possibility that no market for
    the securities would develop or be sustained after the
    offering. These cautionary statements in the Prospectus are,
    in and of themselves, reason to find this claim not
    actionable. See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1213 ("when statements of ___ ____
    ``soft' information such as forecasts, estimates, opinions, or
    projections are accompanied by cautionary disclosures that
    adequately warn of the possibility that actual results or
    events may turn out differently, the ``soft' statements may
    not be materially misleading"); In re Donald J. Trump Casino _____________________________
    Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993)(same). ___________


    -24- 24













    (a) certain types of information were considered by the

    underwriters and Computervision in determining prices for

    the offering, when, in fact, the most current information of

    those types was not considered (or, if considered, was

    ignored); and (b) the underwriters did due diligence in

    estimating the prices, when they did not because they did not

    consider the most current information.

    As a threshold matter, the explicit statements in ________

    the Prospectus that certain factors were considered and that

    due diligence was done are required by law to be true as of _____

    the effective date of the offering. See 15 U.S.C. 77k(a) ___________________________________ ___

    (liability attaches for misstatements in a prospectus at the

    time such part becomes effective); see also 3A Harold S. ___ ____

    Bloomenthal, Securities and Federal Corporate Law 8.23, at _____________________________________

    8-102 (1993) ("[T]he prospectus for purposes of section 11

    speaks as of the date the registration statement becomes

    effective."). Thus, plaintiffs assert that, to the extent

    current information up to the date of the offering was not

    incorporated into the prices, the statements in the

    Prospectus presented a misleading half-truth because they

    suggested that the underwriters and Computervision took into

    consideration current estimates of business potential and _______

    earnings prospects. Cf. Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 ___ ___________________ ________

    U.S. 1095, 1098 (1991) (literally accurate statement

    deceptive because only a half-truth). As a general matter,



    -25- 25













    we agree that such a theory, if sufficiently supported, could

    make out a viable legal claim.

    It may be asked whether the alleged misstatements

    are actionable, given that they were made in the context of

    offering prices, which as noted, are essentially forecasts of

    future earnings. While forecasts are not actionable merely

    because they do not come true, they may be actionable to the

    extent they are not reasonably based on, or are inconsistent

    with, the facts at the time the forecast is made. See Kowal, ___ _____

    16 F.3d at 1278; cf. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1093-94 ___ ___________________

    (board of directors' statement that merger price was "fair"

    was actionable to the extent it was not based on, or was

    inconsistent with, existing and available facts); Serabian, ________

    24 F.3d at 361 ("predictions about the future that prove to

    be off the mark likewise are immunized unless plaintiffs meet

    their burden of demonstrating intentional deception");

    Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 776 (3d Cir.) (prediction _________ ______

    violates securities laws if it is made without a genuine

    belief or reasonable basis), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 _____ ______

    (1985); Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 683 F.2d 51, 56-57 _______ ____________________

    (2d Cir. 1982) ("Although the fairness of the offering price

    is not a valid basis for an action under Sections 10(b) and

    14(e) . . . , a statement that experts have examined the

    price and certified it as fair may well be a material





    -26- 26













    misrepresentation if those experts have advised the offeror

    that the price is unfair.").

    The types of data which the plaintiffs allege

    should have been considered are, in general terms, within the

    realm of data relevant to the determination of price. The

    alleged misstatement as to factors that were considered, as

    of the effective date of the offering, lists the following

    factors: (i) the company's historical performance; (ii)

    estimates of the business potential and earnings prospects of

    the company; and (iii) market prices of, and financial and

    operating data concerning, comparable companies with publicly

    traded equity securities. This list of factors is, in

    effect, a laundry list of general factors that would likely

    be considered in any reasonable estimation of price. Cf. ___

    Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How ______________________

    Fair Are They And What Can Be Done About It, 1989 Duke L. J. ____________________________________________

    27, 34-35 (1989) (listing methods of estimating fair price);

    cf. generally Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman, The ___ _________ ___

    Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549 (1984) ________________________________

    (describing the types of information that are incorporated

    into securities prices). Therefore, if the defendants did

    not actually consider current information in the broad

    categories of data they claimed to have looked at, it is

    possible that plaintiffs would have a reasonable basis claim.





    -27- 27













    The due diligence claim also comes down to one that

    the setting of the price was done without a reasonable

    basis.12 The statement in the Prospectus that the

    independent underwriters conducted due diligence was an

    affirmative statement that a reasonable investigation of the ___________

    company was done and that, using that and other relevant

    information, a fair price was estimated. See 15 U.S.C. ___

    77k(b)(3) (due diligence defense under Section 11 requires

    "reasonable investigation") & 77l(2) (due diligence under

    Section 12 defined as "exercise of reasonable care");

    Software Toolworks, 50 F.3d at 621 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting ___________________

    that the two articulations of due diligence are "similar," if

    not identical).

    The law on due diligence is sparse, but for our

    purposes it makes clear that certain inactions may constitute

    a failure to perform due diligence. First, a failure to

    continue to investigate the company up to the effective date _________________________

    of the offering is likely to be a failure to do due _________________

    diligence. See Software Toolworks, 50 F.3d at 625 & n.2 ___ __________________

    (intra-quarterly information available before the effective

    date of offering not taken into account by underwriters);

    Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 690 ______ _______________________


    ____________________

    12. Due diligence is equivalent to non-negligence. See ___
    Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 (1975); In re _____________ __________ _____
    Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 621 (9th _____________________________________
    Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 274 (1995). _____ ______

    -28- 28













    (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (where registration statement became

    effective on May 16, 1961, attorney did not make reasonable

    investigation where he failed to discover that statements

    made in January had become inaccurate by May); see also 3A ___ ____

    Bloomenthal, Securities and Federal Corporate Law, 8.23, at ____________________________________

    8-102-03. Second, it also may be a failure of due diligence

    to rely solely on management representations as to the state

    of the company where those representations can reasonably be

    verified. See Software Toolworks, 50 F.3d at 625-26 ___ ____________________

    (inadequate for underwriters to rely on company's assurances

    as to its financial condition where underwriters had access

    to all available information); BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 696- ________

    97 ("underwriters must make some reasonable attempt to verify

    the data submitted to them"). Notwithstanding these

    generalities, the specifics of plaintiffs' factual claims

    must be scrutinized.

    (iv) Rule 12(b)(6) _____________

    The next and dispositive question is whether there

    are sufficient factual allegations as to plaintiffs' theory

    in the Proposed Complaint for it to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

    motion. We are mindful that the case comes to us after over

    three years of litigation and full discovery. We thus look

    more closely at the factual allegations to see if they

    support the legal conclusions pled. As this court said in





    -29- 29













    Resolution Trust Corp. v. Driscoll, 985 F.2d 44 (1st Cir. ______________________ ________

    1993):

    It is, of course, true that at the start
    of complex litigation a party may not
    have all the facts, so courts normally
    hesitate to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
    12(b)(6) at the outset. At the start, a
    reasonable basis for belief and an
    outline of what one might reasonably hope
    to prove may suffice to permit discovery
    and ward off premature motions to
    dismiss. But [plaintiff's] complaint
    against [defendant] is deficient; this
    litigation has persisted for almost two
    years; and yet even now [plaintiff] is
    unable to explain what exactly
    [defendant] did that is wrongful . . .
    [plaintiff still has not supplied] a
    single, coherent, specific description of
    what [defendant] has done that is
    wrongful.

    Id. at 48. A complaint must contain "factual allegations, ___

    either direct or inferential, respecting each material

    element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable

    legal theory." Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 ______ _______________

    (1st Cir. 1988); see also Fleming v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 922 ___ ____ _______ __________________

    F.2d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 1990); cf. Dewey v. University of New ___ _____ _________________

    Hampshire, 694 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1982) ("it is not enough _________

    to allege a general scenario which could be dominated by

    unpleaded facts"), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 944 (1983); cf. _____ ______ ___

    also Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. ____ ______ _____________

    1995); Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 444 (1st _____ ___________________

    Cir. 1992); Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d _______________ __________________





    -30- 30













    49, 52 (1st Cir. 1990).13 "In deciding a motion to dismiss

    under Rule 12(b)(6), [we] must take all well-pleaded facts as

    true, but [we] need not credit a complaint's ``bald

    assertions' or legal conclusions." Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1216 ____

    (citations omitted).

    Plaintiffs' legal theory breaks down into two

    elements: (i) that defendants explicitly stated that the

    prices had been set after a reasonable investigation and the

    reasonable consideration of relevant facts; and (ii) that

    such an investigation was not done and the relevant facts

    were not considered (or were ignored).14 But plaintiffs'

    factual pleadings fail to convince us that they have stated a

    claim that relevant information was not considered.

    a. Failure to Consider Data ________________________

    It is true that a failure by the underwriters

    either to verify a company's statements as to its financial

    ____________________

    13. Defendants argue that the Proposed Complaint sounds in
    fraud and hence we should apply Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), which
    requires that claims of fraud be pled with "particularity."
    See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1223 (although Section 11 and 12(2) ___ ____
    claims do not require allegations of scienter and reliance,
    the claims may yet sound in fraud). Since the Proposed
    Complaint fails to meet even the lower threshold of Rule
    12(b)(6) in the procedural posture in which it comes to us,
    we do not decide whether Rule 9(b) is applicable.

    14. Facts or information may be "required" to be considered
    (e.g., if a company affirmatively represents that such was ____
    considered) but do not necessarily have to result in a
    reduction or increase in the offering price. The investment
    bankers and/or company may well look at the information and
    reasonably think that it has already been anticipated and
    incorporated into the price.

    -31- 31













    state or to consider new information up to the effective date

    of an offering would almost certainly constitute a lack of

    due diligence. See Software Toolworks, 50 F.3d at 625-26 & ___ __________________

    n.2. However, it is plaintiffs' responsibility to plead

    factual allegations, not hypotheticals, sufficient to

    reasonably allow the inference that the defendants actually

    did not consider the up-to-date data as of the offering date.

    Cf. Lefkowitz v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 804 F.2d ___ _________ ________________________________

    154, 156 (1st Cir. 1986) (rejecting plaintiff's suggested

    inferences as insufficiently grounded in fact). Here,

    plaintiffs provide none.

    Plaintiffs' 1993 Amended Complaint acknowledged

    that the "Stock Offering Price was twice lowered from its

    initial $19 per share price [as of May 1992] to its final

    price of $12 per share" in August 1992. Plaintiffs suggest

    that these downward adjustments in price reflected the

    disappointing results for the second quarter of 1992, but not

    the negative information from the first seven weeks of the

    third quarter of 1992. However, plaintiffs' claim that data

    from the first seven weeks of the third quarter was ignored

    both lacks factual support and is belied by context.

    Not only did Computervision and the underwriters

    lower the initially planned stock offering price by more than

    30%, but the Prospectus abounds with warnings that the market

    price might dip lower once trading commenced. The Prospectus



    -32- 32













    explicitly warned that an investment in the securities

    involved a high degree of risk; that Computervision was

    highly leveraged; that it operated in a highly competitive

    environment and that its products might not be accepted by

    customers; and that there had been a history of significant

    losses for at least three years. As discussed, price is

    essentially a forecast of future earnings. Reducing the

    price from $19 to $12 showed a reduced expectation of future ___________________

    earnings. Plaintiffs give us no basis from which to infer

    that this reduction in price factored in the disappointing

    second quarter results, but did not incorporate the

    information from the first seven weeks of the third

    quarter.15 Additionally, the cautionary language as to

    potential price drops belies plaintiffs' claim that certain

    disappointing third quarter information was not considered.



    ____________________

    15. Plaintiffs' own Proposed Complaint states that pricing
    meetings were held up to August 13, 1992, the day before the
    offering, and that the $12 price was established at a meeting
    on that day. Similarly, the price recommendations of the
    independent underwriters were not delivered until August 13,
    1992.
    Plaintiffs, in paragraphs 51 through 60 of the Proposed
    Complaint, purport to describe the pricing process that
    Computervision and its underwriters went through. These
    paragraphs mention an IPO Plan prepared by Computervision as
    one of the pieces of data considered by the underwriters in ___
    their due diligence work. The Proposed Complaint alleges
    that the IPO Plan did not fully reflect the information as to
    the first seven weeks of the third quarter of 1992. However,
    we cannot reasonably infer that the alleged shortcomings of
    the IPO plan (or other company forecasts) mean that the _______
    underwriters did not consider up-to-date information. ____________

    -33- 33













    Furthermore, the factual context of the offerings

    provides no support for the inference plaintiffs seek to

    draw. Here the offering was conducted pursuant to a firm-

    commitment underwriting, in which the underwriters bore all

    the initial risk that the offering prices may have been set

    too high.16 Further, as part of the offering, both

    Shearson Holdings and DR Holdings agreed to lock up their

    Computervision stock holdings for an entire year after the

    offerings, thereby decreasing any incentive they would have

    had to inflate the short-term stock price as of the offering

    date.

    It has been over three years since the first

    complaint in this case was filed and plaintiffs have been

    allowed full discovery. In this procedural setting,


    ____________________

    16. Although one of the lead underwriters, Shearson Lehman ___
    Brothers, was affiliated with a principal shareholder of
    Computervision, the offering also involved three other lead ________________
    underwriters, Donaldson Lufkin, First Boston, and Hambrecht & ____________
    Quist (who also played the roles of qualified independent
    underwriters). Each had both monetary and reputational
    capital at risk in the offerings. Cf. Brealey and Myers, ___
    Corporate Finance, at 351. Further, the lead underwriters _________________
    represented a syndicate of over forty underwriters. There is
    not enough here for us to draw an inference of inadequate
    diligence on the part of the underwriters. Cf. Harold S. ___
    Bloomenthal, Going Public Handbook, 3.04[4], at 3-20 _______________________
    (1996)(underwriters look for a price that assures that the
    offering will be oversubscribed); James D. Cox, Robert W.
    Hillman and Donald C. Langevoort, Securities Regulation, 236- _____________________
    37 (1991) (empirical research on IPOs shows that initial
    offering prices tend to be systematically lower than the
    short-term aftermarket prices, arguably because underwriters
    want both insurance against lawsuits and to ensure that the
    offering is oversubscribed).

    -34- 34













    plaintiffs' bald and factually unsupported hypothesis that

    the underwriters failed to obtain and use up-to-date

    information is not, standing alone, sufficient. Cf. ___

    Driscoll, 985 F.2d at 48 (dismissal proper where after almost ________

    two years of litigation plaintiffs' complaint contained no

    factual allegations to support its legal conclusions); Dewey, _____

    694 F.2d at 3-4 (dismissal proper where plaintiff, despite

    having eight months to make original complaint more specific,

    was not able to "fill in the gaps" in a "skeletal set of

    bland allegations"); Gooley, 851 F.2d at 515 (if, "despite ______

    multiple opportunities to finetune the complaint, a naked

    conclusion, unanchored in any meaningful set of factual

    averments" is the asserted basis for relief, dismissal may

    follow).

    In essence, all the Proposed Complaint alleges is

    that, by the close of trading on September 30, 1992, the

    prices of Computervision's securities fell because of an

    announcement on September 29 that third quarter earnings were

    going to be lower than expected. However, the assertion that

    the future fell below projections is not enough in itself to

    render the projection actionable. See Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1278 ___ _____

    (failure to meet performance projections "supports no

    inference" that projection lacked a reasonable basis when

    made); cf. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1092-94 ___ ____________________

    (describing the type of hard, contemporaneous facts that



    -35- 35













    could show a statement about the adequacy of price to be

    false). A ruling to the contrary would magnify the risk of

    nuisance litigation.17 The district court was justified in

    viewing the Proposed Complaint's pricing claims as no more

    than an attempt to seek a warranty of the accuracy of price,

    and therefore as insufficient. Computervision II, 914 F. _________________

    Supp. at 720. Rule 12(b)(6) may set a low threshold, but it

    is real. Gooley, 851 F.2d at 514. ______

    2. Mid-Quarter Information _______________________

    Plaintiffs assert that, as of week seven of the

    third quarter of 1992, the following intra-quarterly

    information was known, and should have been disclosed: (i)

    third quarter domestic bookings18 were only about 24% of _______

    Computervision's internal forecasts for those weeks, and _____________________________________

    significantly below bookings at comparable points in the past

    five quarters; (ii) Computervision's international sales were ____

    also short of internal forecasts; and (iii) Computervision _________________________________

    had a shortfall of $40 million in visible19 orders from its _________________________ ________

    internal forecasts and IPO Plan. _______________________________

    ____________________

    17. This risk would be heightened in the case of new-growth
    high-technology companies that have especially volatile
    prices. See, e.g., James Bohn and Stephen Choi, Fraud in the ___ ____ ____________
    New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class _____________________________________________________________
    Actions, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 903, 908 (1996). _______

    18. A "booking" represents the receipt of an order.

    19. "Visibility" is a measure of the status of potential
    orders and the likelihood that they will be turned into
    revenue producing sales.

    -36- 36













    But alleged deviations from internal forecasts,

    without more, do not produce a duty to disclose in the

    Prospectus. We recognize that investors may find information

    about a firm's internal projections and forecasts to be

    important. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, ___

    The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 305 (1991); cf. ___________________________________________ ___

    Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1090-91 (statement of ____________________

    opinion by a board of directors can be materially significant

    because investors know that directors usually have knowledge

    and expertise far exceeding that of the normal investor).

    Nonetheless, the federal securities laws focus on the

    mandatory disclosure of backward-looking hard information,

    not forecasts. See Easterbrook and Fischel, Corporate Law, ___ _____________

    at 305-06. A firm has the option to disclose its internal

    projections, but is not required to do so.20 See In re ___ ______

    Lyondell Petrochemical Co. Sec. Litig., 984 F.2d 1050, 1052 _______________________________________

    (9th Cir. 1993); In re Convergent Technologies Sec. Litig., __________________________________________

    948 F.2d 507, 516 (9th Cir. 1991) (as amended on denial of

    rehearing en banc); see also Arazie, 2 F.3d at 1468; Wielgos, ___ ____ ______ _______

    892 F.2d at 516. "The federal securities laws impose no

    obligation upon an issuer to disclose forward-looking

    information such as internal projections, estimates of future



    ____________________

    20. That internal forecasts are disclosed to underwriters
    does not make them any more susceptible to a duty to disclose
    to the investing public. See Lyondell, 984 F.2d at 1053. ___ ________

    -37- 37













    performance, forecasts, budgets, and similar data." Shaw, 82 ____

    F.3d at 1209.

    Plaintiffs' nondisclosure claims fail because they

    base their allegations solely on discrepancies between actual

    (but undisclosed) intra-quarterly information and

    Computervision's undisclosed internal projections. Cf. ___

    VeriFone I, 784 F. Supp. at 1484 (in order to assert a valid __________

    claim under the securities laws, plaintiffs must "establish a

    link between a misleading statement or implication in the

    prospectus and an actual fact, not a speculation about the

    future, omitted from the document"). The mere fact that

    intra-quarterly results lagged behind internal projections

    does not, without more, require disclosure. See In re Worlds ___ ____________

    of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1419 (9th Cir. 1994), ______________________

    cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 185 (1995). _____ ______

    Plaintiffs try to buttress their claims by

    referring to SEC Regulation S-K, Item 303, 17 C.F.R.

    229.303(a)(3)(ii) which requires that "known trends and

    uncertainties" about results of operations be disclosed in

    the management's discussion and analysis section of certain

    SEC filings. This rule, however, has to be read in light of

    the SEC's instruction to this paragraph which expressly

    states that forward-looking information need not be

    disclosed. 17 C.F.R. 229.303(a), Instruction 7; VeriFone ________

    II, 11 F.3d at 870; Lyondell, 984 F.2d at 1053. Given this __ ________



    -38- 38













    context, the phrase "known trends and uncertainties" has to

    be understood as referring to those trends discernible from

    hard information alone.21 Here, unlike in Shaw, the ____

    undisclosed hard information pled did not indicate a

    "substantial likelihood that the quarter would turn out to be

    an extreme departure from publicly known trends and

    uncertainties." 82 F.3d at 1194. Thus, the alleged

    nondisclosures fell neither within the ambit of 17 C.F.R.

    229.303(a) or Shaw. ____

    Indeed, of the three alleged nondisclosures, the

    only one that plaintiffs compare to hard data is the

    nondisclosure as to domestic bookings. Plaintiffs assert

    that domestic bookings as of week seven of the third quarter

    of 1992 were lower than the corresponding numbers for the

    prior five quarters. But the Prospectus explicitly

    represented that Computervision suffered cyclical variations

    in quarterly results, with its first and third quarter

    results typically being lower than those of the second and

    fourth quarters. Given those fluctuations, the meaningful

    comparison of Computervision's third quarter 1992 booking

    numbers is to those of the third quarter of 1991. See Capri ___ _____



    ____________________

    21. The SEC itself distinguishes "forward-looking
    information" from "presently known data which will impact
    upon future operating results, such as known future increases
    in the costs of labor or materials." Instruction 7, 17
    C.F.R. 229.303(a).

    -39- 39













    Optics Profit Sharing v. Digital Equip. Corp., 950 F.2d 5, 10 _____________________ ____________________

    (1st Cir. 1991). And that comparison is unavailing.22

    As we said in Shaw, "we reject any bright-line rule ____

    that an issuer engaging in a public offering is obligated to

    disclose interim operating results for the quarter in

    progress whenever it perceives the possibility that the

    quarter's results may disappoint the market." 82 F.3d at

    1210. We further noted in Shaw that when the allegedly ____

    undisclosed information (here only seven weeks into the

    quarter -- and where mid-quarter results were not

    particularly predictive23) is more remote in time and

    causation from the ultimate events of which it supposedly

    forewarns, a nondisclosure claim becomes "indistinguishable

    from a claim that the issuer should have divulged its

    internal predictions about what would come of the undisclosed

    information." Id. That quarterly results for the third ___

    quarter of 1992 did in fact turn out to be lower than

    expected is not enough to produce the inference that as of

    the offering date Computervision had hard mid-quarter results


    ____________________

    22. The relevant numbers are $2.5 million in domestic sales
    bookings as of week seven of the third quarter of 1992 and
    $3.3 million for the same period in 1991 -- a difference of
    $800,000, or less than 1% of the budgeted revenues for that
    quarter. This difference was immaterial as a matter of law.

    23. Indeed, the Prospectus specifically warns that early-
    quarter results are not necessarily predictive because a
    substantial portion of both orders and shipments typically
    occur in the last month of the quarter.

    -40- 40













    that would have predicted a material departure in the end-of-

    quarter results.24

    3. Backlog _______

    Plaintiffs separately allege that the Prospectus

    contained three material misstatements and omissions relating

    to backlog. One paragraph of the Prospectus is the subject

    of these claims:

    Shipments are generally made within 30 _________________________________________
    days of receiving an order. In light of ___________________________
    the short time between order and shipment
    of the Company's products, the Company ___________
    generally has relatively little backlog _________________________________________
    at any given date, and the Company does __________________ ____________
    not believe that backlog is _________________________________________
    representative of potential sales for any ______________
    future period (emphasis added).

    Plaintiffs say that: (i) Computervision was required to, but

    failed to disclose the dollar amount of backlog orders; (ii)

    Computervision misrepresented that backlog data was not

    significant to its results; and (iii) the statement,

    "shipments are generally made within 30 days of receiving an


    ____________________

    24. An issuer is not required to "disclose interim operating
    results for the quarter in progress whenever it perceives a
    possibility that the quarter's results may disappoint the
    market . . . . Reasonable investors understand that
    businesses fluctuate, and that past success is not a
    guarantee of more of the same. There is always some risk
    that the quarter in progress at the time of an investment
    will turn out for the issuer to be worse than anticipated."
    Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210. It is only when "the issuer is in ____
    possession of [hard] nonpublic information that the quarter
    in progress will be an extreme departure from the range of
    results which could be anticipated based on currently
    available information" that disclosure might be required
    under the securities laws. Id. ___

    -41- 41













    order," was false. "Backlog" is the dollar amount, on any

    given day, of orders received for which product has not yet

    been shipped. We address these claims in turn and find no

    error in the district court's rejection of them.

    (i) Dollar Amounts of Backlog _________________________

    Item 101 of Regulation S-K requires that a

    prospectus disclose "to the extent material, . . . [t]he _________________________

    dollar amount of backlog orders believed to be firm, as of a

    recent date and as of a comparable date in the preceding

    fiscal year."25 17 C.F.R. 229.101(c)(1)(viii) (emphasis

    added). Information is material when there is a reasonable

    likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it

    important. See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1219; Wielgos, 892 F.2d at ___ ____ _______

    517. The Prospectus disclosed that backlog levels were

    usually low. But, plaintiffs argue that that disclosure was

    not enough. They argue that the specific backlog numbers ________

    were material and hence required to be disclosed. This is

    so, they say, because backlog entering the third quarter of

    1992 was unusually low. Plaintiffs support their argument by _________

    comparing the backlog entering the third quarter of 1992


    ____________________

    25. Computervision issued its securities pursuant to Form S-
    1. Item 11(a) of the Instructions to Form S-1 requires the
    prospectus to furnish the information required by Item 101 of
    Regulation S-K. Liability for failure to disclose the
    information required to be stated by Item 101 arises under
    Section 11 of the Securities Act. See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1204- ___ ____
    06 (describing the statutory scheme in the context of a Form
    S-3 shelf offering).

    -42- 42













    ($26,875,000) to that entering the second quarter

    ($39,897,000) -- a difference of approximately $13 million or

    thirty-two percent.

    There is a threshold flaw in plaintiffs' argument.

    As Item 101(c)(1)(viii) itself says, the appropriate

    comparison is not to the numbers from an immediately

    preceding quarter, but to those from a comparable date in the

    preceding fiscal year. 17 C.F.R. 229.101(c)(1)(viii).

    This is particularly true here, where the Prospectus

    specifically stated that Computervision tended to experience

    seasonal declines in revenues in its first and third

    quarters. See Capri Optics, 950 F.2d at 10 (where ___ _____________

    defendant's business was seasonal, it was not meaningful for

    plaintiffs to compare results for the quarter in question to

    those for the immediately preceding quarter).

    Even if quarter-to-next-quarter comparisons were

    appropriate, Computervision's failure to provide more

    specific information is nonetheless not actionable. Roughly

    adjusting the numbers for seasonality, they show only a minor

    drop in initial backlog levels (as fractions of budgeted

    quarterly revenues) between the second and third quarters of

    1992.26 This minor drop of a few percent is not adequate

    ____________________

    26. As the defendants point out, plaintiffs' numbers have
    meaning only if they are adjusted for seasonality. While
    initial backlog levels for the second and third quarters of
    1992 were $39,897,000 and $26,875,000, respectively,
    Computervision's budgeted revenues for those quarters were

    -43- 43













    to support the claim that the difference in backlog levels __________

    between quarters was material and hence required specific

    backlog numbers to be disclosed. Where a variable, although

    material, is of only minor predictive value, disclosure of a

    rough estimate of that variable's value can obviate the need

    for more specific disclosure. Cf. Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1211 n.21 ___ ____

    (disclosure of a "soft" projection may, in some cases, render

    the "hard" information underlying the projection immaterial

    as a matter of fact or of law). Indeed, disclosure of only a

    rough estimate may keep investors from attaching undue

    importance to minor shifts in the variable's value and avoids

    the risk of "burying the [investors] in an avalanche of

    trivial information." San Leandro Emergency Medical Group _____________________________________

    Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 810 ___________________ __________________

    ____________________

    $159,500,000 and $121,000,000, respectively. When the
    initial backlog levels for the two quarters are looked at as
    fractions of the budgeted revenues for those quarters, the
    result is 25% for the second quarter and 22.2% for the third
    quarter -- a difference of less than 3%.
    The district court, in Computervision II, noted that the _________________
    Proposed Complaint calculated initial backlog levels for the
    second and third quarters of 1992 as a percentage of actual ______
    revenues (for the second quarter) and forecasted revenues ________ ___________________
    (for the third quarter), respectively, and found a 9%
    difference between the two percentages. 914 F. Supp. at 721.
    The district court ruled that this 9% differential was an
    insufficient basis to support plaintiffs' claim. Id. Not ___
    knowing the degree to which Computervision's forecasts may
    have been systematically biased vis-a-vis actual results, and
    not having been provided with this information by the
    parties, we are reluctant to endorse the plaintiffs' 9%
    number. Cf. Wielgos, 892 F.2d at 515 (defendant's cost ___ _______
    estimates were systematically biased). Nevertheless, we note
    that our conclusion would not be different whether we used 3%
    or 9%.

    -44- 44













    (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, _____________________ _________

    Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976)); Convergent, 948 F.2d at 516 ____ __________

    (same). In sum, plaintiffs have no claim that

    Computervision's general statement that backlog was usually

    low, without the disclosure of specific numbers, was

    materially misleading as of the effective date of the

    offering. Cf. Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 16 ___ _______ ______________

    (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc) ("Disclosing that Polavision was

    being sold below cost was not [materially] misleading by

    reason of not saying how much below."); Worlds of Wonder, 35 ________________

    F.3d at 1419.

    (ii) Immateriality of Backlog ________________________

    Plaintiffs argue that the Prospectus, in stating

    that "the Company does not believe that backlog is

    representative of potential sales for any future period," in

    effect falsely suggested that backlog was not significant to

    Computervision's results. Plaintiffs misread the Prospectus.



    The statement in the Prospectus does not say that

    information on backlog is insignificant or immaterial.

    Instead, it says that such information should not be taken as

    representative. The statement cautions investors that they

    should not take backlog levels as necessarily predicting

    results for future periods. In addition, there is at least

    one other statement on the very same page of the Prospectus



    -45- 45













    that warns investors that data available early in a quarter

    (i.e., opening backlog) is not necessarily a strong predictor ____

    of quarterly results because:

    a substantial portion of the Company's
    orders and shipments typically occur in
    the last month of each quarter.
    Therefore . . . unexpected delays or
    actions . . . could result in significant
    quarterly fluctuations in the Company's
    operating results.

    Hence, when read in context, Computervision's statement that

    backlog was not representative of sales was plainly a warning

    that investors should not draw too many conclusions from

    backlog figures, and not a statement that backlog itself was

    immaterial or insignificant.

    (iii) Shipments Within Thirty Days ____________________________

    Plaintiffs' final argument on backlog is that the

    district court erred in concluding that the statement

    "shipments are generally made within thirty days of receiving

    an order" was not materially false or misleading. Plaintiffs

    point to a backlog aging analysis from the seventh week of

    the third quarter of 1992, which indicates that 39% of the

    backlog balance, at that time, was to be shipped in more than

    thirty days. The first problem with the argument is that,

    although plaintiffs attack the word "generally," they base

    their claim solely on data from one portion of one quarter

    and fail to allege anything meaningful about Computervision's

    general practice. Second, even if one portion of one quarter



    -46- 46













    could be taken as representative, plaintiffs' factual

    allegations would not support a misrepresentation claim.

    Plaintiffs allege that approximately sixty-one percent of

    orders were shipped out in less than thirty days, six percent

    were shipped in between thirty and sixty days, and thirty-

    three percent were shipped in more than sixty days.

    Computervision's statement said that shipments were generally

    made within thirty days of receiving an order, not that they

    were always made within thirty days. That sixty-one percent

    of orders in one portion of one quarter were shipped within

    thirty days is perfectly consistent with the statement that

    orders were generally shipped within thirty days. There was

    no material misrepresentation.

    4. CADDS 5 _______

    Plaintiffs' final allegations focus on statements

    concerning CADDS 5, Computervision's then-newest CAD/CAM

    software product and the centerpiece of the firm's new

    business strategy. Plaintiffs allege that the Prospectus

    made two sets of material misstatements or omissions with

    respect to CADDS 5: (i) the Prospectus misrepresented that,

    as of June 1992, CADDS 5 was a "successful product," being

    shipped in "volume," i.e., to thousands of customers; and ____

    (ii) the Prospectus materially overstated CADDS 5's potential

    for success when, in fact, the product was beset with





    -47- 47













    problems. As with the backlog claims, we affirm the district

    court's rejection of the CADDS 5 claims.

    (i) Successful Product Shipping in Volume _____________________________________

    Plaintiffs' Proposed Complaint alleged that the

    "Prospectus[] misrepresented CADDS 5 as a successful product

    commercially shipping in volume." The Proposed Complaint

    then defined "``[v]olume commercial shipments'" as those

    "involving several thousand customers." The language in the

    Prospectus, however, neither refers to CADDS 5 as a

    "successful product shipping in volume," nor to shipments to

    "several thousand customers;" those descriptions are wholly

    the plaintiffs' own. The plain language of the Prospectus

    speaks for itself:

    Beta testing of CADDS 5 (release 2.0)
    commenced in March 1992 with 24 of the _______
    Company's largest CADDS customers and _________
    early introduction sales commenced in
    April 1992. Commercial shipments of
    CADDS 5 (release 2.0) began in June 1992
    and as of June 28, 1992, Release 2.0 had _____________________________________
    been shipped to 32 customers (emphasis _______________________________

    added).

    Far from alluding to thousands of customers, the Prospectus

    specified the number of customers to whom the product had _________

    been shipped -- 24 in the beta testing stage and 32 in the

    commercial shipping stage. Plaintiffs' assertion that this

    precise statement can be interpreted as implying that CADDS 5

    was being shipped, or was ready to be shipped, to thousands,

    is baseless.


    -48- 48













    Further, the Prospectus was replete with language

    cautioning investors that the market in general (i.e., a ____

    large volume of customers) had not accepted CADDS 5 as yet

    and that the product might need further enhancements. For

    example, the Prospectus stated that although Computervision

    hoped to replace its "declining hardware revenues and margins

    with sales of higher margin CAD/CAM software products . . .

    [n]o assurance can be given that the Company will be _____________________________________________________________

    successful in achieving this objective" (emphasis added). In ______________________________________

    addition, the Prospectus warned that "customer acceptance of _______________________

    CADDS 5 is critical" to continued customer purchase of ______________________

    Computervision's existing software product, CADDS 4X, that

    the "delayed release of CADDS 5 (Release 2.0) resulted in _______________________________________________________

    customers delaying product purchases" and that: ____________________________________

    the CAD/CAM industry is characterized by
    rapidly changing technology and frequent ________
    new product introductions and product _________________________________________
    enhancements . . . [and] [t]here can be ____________ _______________
    no assurance that the Company will _____________
    continue to be successful in identifying,
    developing and marketing new products or
    enhancing its existing products . . .
    [or] that new customers will change to ___________________________________
    the Company's new products even if they _________________________________________
    are judged to be superior (emphasis ______________________________

    added).

    Computervision's statement that it had commercially

    shipped CADDS 5 software to 32 customers must be viewed in

    the context of the Prospectus' numerous cautionary statements

    that CADDS 5 might never be accepted by the market. See ___



    -49- 49













    Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1213 (if a statement is couched in ____

    cautionary language that disclaims the drawing of a

    particular inference, a claim that the statement was

    materially misleading may fail as a matter of law). The

    context confirms that any possible misleading inference that

    might be drawn from Computervision's statement is properly

    deemed immaterial as a matter of law.

    (ii) Misleading Optimistic Statements ________________________________

    Plaintiffs' final claim is that certain optimistic

    statements in the Prospectus regarding the development and

    commercial prospects of CADDS 5 were materially misleading in

    light of Computervision's alleged nondisclosure of problems

    the product was facing. See, e.g., Hanon v. Dataproducts ___ ____ _____ ____________

    Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 502 (9th Cir. 1992). _____

    A duty to disclose technical or developmental

    problems with a product may arise where a company makes

    strongly optimistic or concrete statements about that product

    that are in stark contrast to its internal reports. Cf. ___

    Serabian, 24 F.3d at 363-65 (sustaining Section 10(b) claims ________

    where there was a "contrast between what company officials

    were hearing internally . . . and what the company was

    telling the public at the same time" (emphasis in original)). ________________

    But, in this case, the statements about CADDS 5 in the

    Prospectus were not so optimistic as to be materially

    misleading about the existence of developmental or commercial



    -50- 50













    difficulties with CADDS 5. To the contrary, the Prospectus

    frequently alludes to the uncertainties associated with the

    release of a new product. The key statements identified

    by the plaintiffs are that Computervision expected CADDS 5

    "to broaden the number of customers in existing accounts as

    well as attract new customers," and that "Computervision

    believes that CADDS 4X and CADDS 5 are likely to be used in

    tandem by major accounts in the foreseeable future." These

    statements, whether read in isolation or in the context of

    Computervision's numerous warnings that CADDS 5 might not be

    accepted by the market and might need further

    enhancements,27 suggest, at most, the hope that CADDS 5

    will eventually gain acceptance in the market. Such a hope

    is not unusual for a company releasing a new product. Cf. ___

    VeriFone I, 784 F. Supp. at 1484 ("securities laws presume __________

    that skilled investors are aware that a corporation's

    performance with a new product . . . is unlikely to replicate

    past successes"). Computervision's statements did not rise

    to the level of optimism or certainty that would make them

    materially misleading in the absence of disclosure of initial

    developmental problems the product was facing. Cf. Shaw, 82 ___ ____


    ____________________

    27. The Prospectus also states that "a significant delay" in
    the availability of CADDS 5 would adversely affect
    Computervision and that many of Computervision's competitors
    "have greater financial and operating resources" and that
    "there can be no assurance that competitors will not produce
    equivalent or superior products."

    -51- 51













    F.3d at 1219 n.33 (cautiously optimistic statements,

    expressing at most a hope for a positive future, do not

    trigger a duty to update); San Leandro, 75 F.3d at 811 ____________

    (subdued generally optimistic statements constituted nothing

    more than puffery and were not actionable); In re Time Warner _________________

    Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993) (statements _________________

    at issue lacked "definite positive projections" of the sort

    that would require later correction), cert. denied, 114 S. _____ ______

    Ct. 1397 (1994). Further, the statements here are markedly

    less enthusiastic than the statements that other courts have

    found actionable. See In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 ___ ________________________________

    F.2d 1109, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1989) (company executives stated

    that new computer product would be "phenomenally successful

    the first year out of the chute" and would make company's

    "growth before this look small"), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 943 _____ ______

    (1990); Hanon, 976 F.2d at 501-02 (company's press release _____

    stated that new product had received "strong interest and

    high acclaim from users and analysts alike" and its special

    features were "rapidly making [it] . . . one of the most

    popular in [the company's] line"). Computervision's mild

    statements of hope, couched in strongly cautionary language,

    cannot be said to have become materially misleading.

    IV.

    Conclusion __________

    The decision of the district court is affirmed. ________



    -52- 52






Document Info

Docket Number: 95-2240

Filed Date: 7/31/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015

Authorities (39)

martin-eisenberg-and-arthur-nissen-on-behalf-of-themselves-and-all-others , 766 F.2d 770 ( 1985 )

in-re-time-warner-inc-securities-litigation-zvi-trading-corp-employees , 9 F.3d 259 ( 1993 )

David Hanon v. Dataproducts Corporation Jack C. Davis , 976 F.2d 497 ( 1992 )

fed-sec-l-rep-p-98733-gordon-y-billard-and-edith-citron-on-behalf-of , 683 F.2d 51 ( 1982 )

motorcity-of-jacksonville-ltd-a-limited-partnership-by-and-through-its , 83 F.3d 1317 ( 1996 )

stanley-c-wielgos-individually-as-trustee-for-the-stanley-c-wielgos , 119 A.L.R. Fed. 639 ( 1989 )

harold-vargas-v-robert-c-mcnamara-iii-v-sidmar-enterprises-inc , 608 F.2d 15 ( 1979 )

fed-sec-l-rep-p-96211-in-re-convergent-technologies-securities , 948 F.2d 507 ( 1991 )

in-re-lyondell-petrochemical-company-securities-litigation-joseph-h , 984 F.2d 1050 ( 1993 )

Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp. , 82 F.3d 1194 ( 1996 )

Charles Kowal v. MCI Communications Corporation , 16 F.3d 1271 ( 1994 )

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 96,415 Capri Optics Profit Sharing v. ... , 950 F.2d 5 ( 1991 )

Edmund E. Fleming v. Lind-Waldock & Co., Barry Breech, ... , 922 F.2d 20 ( 1990 )

keweenaw-bay-indian-community-v-state-of-michigan-the-michigan-natural , 11 F.3d 1341 ( 1993 )

Carey v. Beans , 659 F.2d 1065 ( 1981 )

in-re-worlds-of-wonder-securities-litigation-rosetta-miller-walter , 35 F.3d 1407 ( 1994 )

Robert J. Pommer, Sr. v. Medtest Corporation and Donald West , 961 F.2d 620 ( 1992 )

fed-sec-l-rep-p-94714-in-re-apple-computer-securities-litigation , 886 F.2d 1109 ( 1989 )

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 94,904 William H. Marx and Florence ... , 507 F.2d 485 ( 1974 )

William R. Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corporation , 851 F.2d 513 ( 1988 )

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