United States v. Adames-Santos ( 1996 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion








    July 18, 1996
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________


    No. 95-2323


    UNITED STATES,

    Appellee,

    v.

    MARCELINA ENRIQUE ADAMES-SANTOS,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

    [Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
    Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________

    Michael c. Shklar on brief for appellant. _________________
    Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, and Zechariah Chafee, __________________ ________________
    Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.


    ____________________


    ____________________




    Per Curiam. Marcelina Enrique Adames-Santos ___________














    appeals his conviction on three grounds. We summarily

    affirm.

    I. Brady Violation _______________

    The first argument is that the government's failure

    to disclose prior to trial the identity of the confidential

    informant Miguel Morel, violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. _____ ________

    83 (1963). "[F]avorable evidence is material, and

    constitutional error results from its suppression by the

    government, 'if there is a reasonable probability that, had

    the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

    proceeding would have been different.'" Kyles v. Whitley, _____ _______

    115 S. Ct. 1555, 1565 (1995). The Brady rule does not _____

    require the prosecution to reveal before trial the names of

    all witnesses who will testify against the defendant. See ___

    Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). "There is ___________ ______

    no requirement under F.R. Crim. P. 16 or otherwise in the

    law, mandating the disclosure to the defense of the identity

    of the government's trial witnesses. . . . [T]he decision to

    admit the testimony or evidence is within the discretion of

    the trial judge." United States v. Reis, 788 F.2d 54, 58 _____________ ____

    (1st Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Edwards, 47 F.3d ___ ____ _____________ _______

    841, 843 (7th Cir. 1995) ("It is well-settled that the

    Constitution does not require pretrial disclosure of

    prosecution witnesses.")





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    Appellant has failed to show a reasonable

    probability that if he had been informed of Morel's identity

    prior to trial, the result of the proceeding would have been

    different. Morel testified on cross-examination that the

    money he earned as an informant for the Drug Enforcement

    Administration ("DEA") was his main source of income. Even

    now, appellant has failed to identify any additional evidence

    that could have been used to further impeach the witness.

    The government's failure to disclose Morel's identity prior

    to trial does not undermine confidence in the jury's verdict.

    See Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1566. Therefore, there was no ___ _____

    constitutional violation.

    II. Sufficiency of the Evidence ___________________________

    To establish a violation of 21 U.S.C. 846, the

    government is required to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, in

    addition to the existence of the conspiracy itself, an intent

    on the part of the defendant: "to agree and . . . to

    effectuate the commission of the substantive offense. A

    defendant need not have had the intent personally to commit

    the substantive crime." United States v. Piper, 35 F.3d 611, _____________ _____

    615 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1118 (1995). _____________

    The government establishes the requisite intent by proving

    beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "agree[d] to

    undertake activities that facilitate[d] commission of a

    substantive offense, [notwithstanding that he did] not intend



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    to commit the offense himself." Id.1 "[T]he Government 1 ___

    need not prove the commission of any overt acts in

    furtherance of the conspiracy." United States v. Shabani, _____________ _______

    115 S. Ct. 382, 385 (1994).

    "When a criminal defendant undertakes a sufficiency

    challenge, all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, must

    be viewed from the government's coign of vantage, and the

    viewer must accept all reasonable inferences from it that are

    consistent with the verdict." United States v. Valle, 72 _____________ _____

    F.3d 210, 216 (1st Cir. 1995). The government's burden of

    proof "may be satisfied by either direct or circumstantial

    evidence, or any combination thereof." United States v. _____________

    Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 467 (1st Cir. 1994). _______

    The evidence presented to the jury was sufficient

    to sustain defendant's guilty verdict. The record contains,

    among other evidence, accounts of frequent meetings between

    Morel, Domingo Peguero and appellant in which they discussed

    drugs and, specifically, ways to "make some transactions of

    crack." Morel recounted a specific conversation in which

    appellant said that he had contacts in New York who could

    supply crack to Morel's contacts in Boston. The evidence

    also included the transcript of a telephone call from


    ____________________

    1Defendant argues that the evidence does not show "an 1
    intent on the defendant's part to engage in the sale of
    crack." Appellant's Brief, p. 15. No such showing is
    required,however.

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    appellant to Morel, made for the purpose of notifying Morel

    that Peguero was in Boston "doing business" and that "in case

    these people call you, tell them to hold on until Monday."

    DEA agents testified that during the October 30 drug

    transaction, appellant was circlingthe area in Peguero's car.

    "[I]t is not a pre-requisite of conviction that the

    prosecution adduce evidence to preclude 'every reasonable

    hypothesis of innocence.'" United States v. Montas, 41 F.3d _____________ ______

    775, 779 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1986 _____________

    (1995). In addition, this court must "resolve all

    credibility disputes in the verdict's favor." United States _____________

    v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 974 (1st Cir. 1995). Our review of ______

    the record persuades us that a rational jury could have found

    beyond a reasonable doubt that the government had

    successfully proved the essential elements of the conspiracy

    charge.

    III. Failure to Grant Mistrial _________________________

    Appellant's final argument is that the district

    court erred in not granting a mistrial because of the

    testimony by DEA agent John D. Adams that he had purchased a

    firearm from Peguero. "[B]ecause mistrials are strong

    medicine, . . . it is only rarely -- and in extremely

    compelling circumstances -- that an appellate panel, informed

    by a cold record, will venture to reverse a trial judge's on-

    the-spot decision that the interests of justice do not



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    require aborting an ongoing trial." United States v. Pierro, _____________ ______

    32 F.3d 611, 617 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. ____________

    919 (1995). In United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, ______________ _________

    1184-85 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2714 _____________

    (1994), this court identified three factors that should be

    considered in reviewing a district court's decision to deny a

    mistrial: 1) the appropriateness of the curative instruction,

    2) the swiftness of the judicial response, and 3) the

    presumption that jurors will follow a direct curative

    instruction.

    In this case, consideration of the three Sepulveda _________

    factors indicates that there was no abuse of discretion in

    the district court's decision to deny a mistrial or its

    failure to revisit the issue sua sponte at the end of the ___ ______

    trial. The court's curative instructions, given almost

    immediately after the testimony in question, were swift,

    clear and direct. There was no room for misinterpretation by

    the jurors regarding the meaning of the court's instructions.

    Finally, appellant's claim that the evidence against him was

    so weak that the jurors must have relied upon the firearm

    testimony is belied by the record. As discussed above, the

    evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Appellant

    has failed to rebut the presumption that the jury followed

    the court's curative instructions.





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    Appellant's conviction is summarily affirmed. See _________ ________ ___

    Loc. R. 27.1.

















































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