Azubuko v. Motor Vehicles ( 1996 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion








    September 3, 1996
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________


    No. 95-2366


    CHUKWU E. AZUBUKO,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    THE REGISTRAR OF MOTOR VEHICLES,

    Defendant, Appellee.

    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
    Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________

    Chukwu E. Azubuko on brief pro se. _________________
    Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, and Beverly R. Roby, ___________________ _________________
    Assistant Attorney General, on brief for appellee.


    ____________________


    ____________________





    Per Curiam. Appellant Chukwu Azubuko appeals from __________













    the dismissal of his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

    1915(d). We agree with the district court, for the reason it

    gave, that appellant cannot premise a right of action on the

    criminal statutes he cited. We affirm the dismissal of the

    complaint as to the rest of appellant's claims, however, on

    reasons different than those relied upon by the district

    court.

    Appellant asserts that his driver's license was

    suspended by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles without due

    process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Bell v. ____

    Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), the Supreme Court addressed the ______

    question in what circumstances a hearing is required prior to

    the suspension of a driver's license. Georgia law provided

    for the suspension of an uninsured motorist's driver's

    license when that driver was involved in an automobile

    accident and could not post security to cover the amount of

    damages claimed by others in the accident report. Although a

    hearing was conducted prior to the suspension, the uninsured

    motorist could not raise the issue of fault. Thus, such a

    motorist was required to post security or lose his or her

    license even though he or she might not have been responsible

    for the accident.

    The Court held that once a state granted a driver's

    license, it could not take it away without due process of

    law. Id. at 539. It then held that since fault was an ___



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    important factor in the decision to suspend a license, due

    process required a predeprivation hearing which considered

    whether there was a reasonable probability of judgments

    against the driver in the amounts claimed. Id. at 540-41. ___

    In the case before us, appellant's license was

    suspended after a trial in which appellant was found liable

    for the damages resulting from the automobile accident in

    which he was involved. Thus, unlike Bell -- where there was ____

    no predeprivation hearing regarding liability -- appellant __

    received a full, judicial adjudication regarding fault before ______

    his license was suspended for failing to pay the judgment

    rendered at the trial. Moreover, M.G.L.c. 90, 22A provides

    for another, administrative hearing prior to the actual

    suspension. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

    found constitutional a statutory scheme similar 22A even

    though it did not provide for an administrative ___

    predeprivation hearing. See Tomai-Minogue v. State Farm Mut. ___ _____________ _______________

    Auto. Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 1228, 1230 (4th Cir. 1985). Thus, ______________

    22A itself appears to provide all that due process requires.

    Appellant also claims that the suspension of his

    license impaired his fundamental right to travel and violated

    the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We

    reject both challenges. See Ross v. Gunaris, 395 F.Supp. ___ ____ _______

    623, 627-28 (D.Mass. 1975) ( 22A does not impede the right

    to travel because it limits only one method of



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    transportation, nor does it deny equal protection of the law

    to those unable to satisfy a property damage judgment).

    For these reasons, appellant's claims, as set forth

    in both his complaint and amended complaint, are based on

    "indisputably meritless theor[ies]." See Neitzke v. ___ _______

    Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). As a result, the ________

    district court appropriately dismissed the action.

    The judgment of the district court is affirmed. In ________

    so ruling, we decide only the appeal from district court case

    No. 95-CV-10763. No notice of appeal was ever docketed in

    No. 95-CV-11661 and, thus, the later case is not before us.































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Document Info

Docket Number: 95-2366

Filed Date: 9/3/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015