United States v. Zorrilla ( 1996 )


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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    _________________________

    No. 95-2365

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,

    v.

    RAMON ZORRILLA,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    _________________________

    No. 95-2249

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,

    v.

    MIGUEL CALDERON SALMIENTO,
    Defendant, Appellant.

    _________________________

    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

    [Hon. Daniel R. Dominguez, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    _________________________

    Before

    Selya, Cyr and Lynch,
    Circuit Judges. ______________
    _________________________

    Gustavo A. Gelpi, Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, ______________________
    with whom Benicio Sanchez Rivera, Federal Public Defender, was on ______________________
    brief, for appellants.
    Jose A. Quiles-Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, with ________________________
    whom Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Antonio R. Bazan and _____________ ________________
    Nelson Perez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on __________________
    brief, for appellee.
    _________________________

    August 19, 1996
    _________________________














    SELYA, Circuit Judge. Defendants Ramon Zorrilla and SELYA, Circuit Judge. ______________

    Miguel Calderon Salmiento were charged, inter alia, with aiding _____ ____

    and abetting each other in the intended distribution of a

    controlled substance (approximately two kilograms of cocaine)

    within 1,000 feet of a school. See 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & ___

    (b)(1)(B), 860(a); 18 U.S.C. 2.1 They challenged the

    constitutionality of section 860(a), but the district court ruled

    against them. See United States v. Salmiento, 898 F. Supp. 45, ___ _____________ _________

    46-48 (D.P.R. 1996). They then pled guilty to the charge,

    reserving the right to revisit the constitutional question on

    appeal. The lower court sentenced them under 21 U.S.C. 841(b),

    making use of the enhancement directed by 21 U.S.C. 860(a).

    These proceedings followed.

    We review the constitutionality of an Act of Congress

    de novo. See United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 472 (1st ___ ______________ _______

    Cir. 1994). The statute that the appellants challenge, 21 U.S.C.

    860(a), by its terms applies to some but not all offenders

    who manufacture or distribute, or who possess with intent to

    manufacture or distribute, controlled substances, thereby

    violating 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The selection process under

    section 860(a) operates by plucking from the mine-run of

    miscreants who violate section 841(a)(1) those whose crimes are

    committed within 1,000 feet of a school and essentially doubling

    ____________________

    1We reproduce the relevant text of sections 860(a),
    841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B) in the appendix. 18 U.S.C. 2 is,
    of course, the familiar statute that criminalizes aiding and
    abetting, and we see no need to reprint it.

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    the maximum available punishment. Thus, section 860(a) is a

    sentence-enhancer, pure and simple.

    The defendants contend that this sentence-enhancement

    scheme runs afoul of the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I,

    8, cl. 3, because Congress lacked power under the Clause to

    legislate in this realm. They pin their hopes on the Court's

    opinion in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). Their _____________ _____

    reliance is mislaid.

    We need not tarry. Although the Lopez Court struck _____

    down the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. 922(q)

    (criminalizing the possession of firearms within a school zone),

    on the ground that the prohibited conduct was not of a type that

    substantially affects interstate commerce, 115 S. Ct. at 1631, it

    did so because the underlying conduct firearms possession

    simpliciter "has nothing to do with ``commerce' or any sort of ___________

    economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those

    terms." Id. at 1630-31. The Lopez Court nonetheless made it ___ _____

    perfectly clear that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress could

    regulate, inter alia, those activities which have a consequential _____ ____

    effect on, or which bear a meaningful relation to, interstate

    commerce. See id. at 1629-30 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin ___ ___ ____ _________________

    Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)). ___________

    This is such a case. Here, unlike in Lopez, the _____

    statutory scheme has an unmistakable commercial nexus and the

    underlying conduct possesses a significant economic dimension.

    Many courts, including this court, have held that drug


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    trafficking is precisely the kind of economic enterprise that

    substantially affects interstate commerce and that, therefore,

    comes within Congress's regulatory power under the Commerce

    Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Lerebours, 87 F.3d 582, 584- ___ ____ _____________ _________

    85 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461, 463, _____________ _______

    amended, ___ F.3d ___ (9th Cir. 1996) [1996 WL 359984]; United _______ ______

    States v. Genao, 79 F.3d 1333, 1336-37 (2d Cir. 1996); United ______ _____ ______

    States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1475 (10th Cir. 1995), petition ______ ______ ________

    for cert. filed, No. 95-9284 (U.S. June 10, 1996); United States ________________ _____________

    v. Brown, 72 F.3d 96, 97 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam), cert. _____ _____

    denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d ______ ______________ ______

    1105, 1112 (4th Cir. 1995). Indeed, Congress made particularized

    findings to this effect when it enacted the full panoply of

    criminal laws anent controlled substances. See 21 U.S.C. 801. ___

    Given both this background and the truism "that courts,

    when passing upon the constitutionality of a statutory provision,

    must view it in the context of the whole statutory scheme," Vote ____

    Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1993), it is ____________ _________

    not surprising to find that every court which has confronted the

    appellants' argument in the post-Lopez era has upheld section _____

    860(a) against a Commerce Clause challenge. See, e.g., United ___ ____ ______

    States v. Tucker, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (6th Cir. 1996) [1996 WL ______ ______

    413411, at *1-4]; United States v. Rogers, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (7th _____________ ______

    Cir. 1996) [1996 WL 399850, at *11-12]; United States v. Clark, _____________ _____

    67 F.3d 1154, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. _____ ______

    1432 (1996); United States v. Garcia-Salazar, 891 F. Supp. 568, ______________ ______________


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    569-72 (D. Kan. 1995); see also United States v. McDougherty, 920 ___ ____ _____________ ___________

    F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1990) (scuttling pre-Lopez Commerce _____

    Clause challenge to earlier version of 860(a)), cert. denied, _____ ______

    499 U.S. 911 (1991). Because we do not doubt that Congress has

    the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate an activity

    as clearly commercial in character as drug trafficking, and

    because the particular statute that the appellants challenge is

    nothing more than a sentence-enhancer applicable to certain

    proscribed drug trafficking activities, we hold that 21 U.S.C.

    860(a) does not trespass into constitutionally forbidden terrain.

    See generally Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633 (hypothesizing that a law ___ _________ _____

    enacted by virtue of Congress's "authority under the Commerce

    Clause to regulate numerous commercial activities that

    substantially affect interstate commerce and also affect the

    educational process" would survive a constitutional attack).

    We need go no further.2 The challenged statute, 21

    U.S.C. 860(a), passes constitutional muster under the Commerce

    Clause. Hence, the defendants' convictions and sentences must

    stand.



    Affirmed. Affirmed. ________





    ____________________

    2To the extent that the appellants raise a developed Tenth
    Amendment challenge to 21 U.S.C. 860(a), it is unavailing. See ___
    Lerebours, 87 F.3d at 585; United States v. Owens, 996 F.2d 59, _________ _____________ _____
    60-61 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).

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    STATUTORY APPENDIX __________________

    The sentence-enhancing statute, 21 U.S.C. 860(a),

    provides in relevant part (with certain exceptions not applicable

    here) that:

    Any person who violates section
    841(a)(1) . . . of this title by
    distributing, possessing with intent to
    distribute, or manufacturing a controlled
    substance in or on, or within one thousand
    feet of, the real property comprising a
    public or private elementary, vocational, or
    secondary school or a public or private
    college, junior college, or university, or a
    playground, or housing facility owned by a
    public housing authority, or within 100 feet
    of a public or private youth center, public
    swimming pool, or video arcade facility, is .
    . . subject to (1) twice the maximum
    punishment authorized by section 841(b) of
    this title; and (2) at least twice any term
    of supervised release authorized by section
    841(b) of this title for a first offense. A
    fine up to twice that authorized by section
    841(b) of this title may be imposed in
    addition to any term of imprisonment
    authorized by this subsection . . . .

    Section 860(a) cross-references 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), which

    provides in relevant part:

    Except as [otherwise authorized by law],
    it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly
    or intentionally

    (1) to manufacture, distribute, or
    dispense, or possess with intent to
    manufacture, distribute, or
    dispense, a controlled substance .
    . . .

    Section 860(a) also cross-references 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1), which

    provides in relevant part:

    Except as otherwise provided in section
    859, 860, or 861 of this title, any person
    who violates subsection (a) of this section

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    shall be sentenced as follows:

    * * *
    (B) In the case of violation of
    subsection (a) of this section
    involving
    * * *
    (ii) 500 grams or more of a mixture
    or substance containing a
    detectable amount of
    * * *
    (II) cocaine, its salts, optical
    and geometric isomers, and salts of
    isomers;
    * * *

    such person shall be sentenced to a term
    of imprisonment which may not be less than 5
    years and not more than 40 years . . . , a
    fine not to exceed the greater of that
    authorized in accordance with the provisions
    of Title 18, or $2,000,000 if the defendant
    is an individual . . . .






























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