United States v. Girard ( 1996 )


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    October 4, 1996 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________


    No. 96-1369

    UNITED STATES,

    Appellee,

    v.

    ROBERT R. GIRARD,

    Defendant, Appellant.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

    [Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
    Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________

    Kara M. Fay on brief for appellant. ___________
    Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, and Andrew J. Reich, __________________ ________________
    Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.


    ____________________


    ___________________


















    Per Curiam. Appellant-defendant Robert R. Girard __________

    appeals from his conviction after a jury trial of

    intimidating and using physical force against a witness in

    retaliation for past testimony and to prevent future

    testimony in an official proceeding, in violation of 18

    U.S.C. 1512(b) and 1513(b). We affirm the conviction.

    I. Failure to Grant Continuance to Review Jencks ____________________________________________________

    Material "A trial court has wide discretion to grant or ________

    deny a request for continuance. 'Only an unreasoning and

    arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a

    justifiable request for delay violates the right to the

    assistance of counsel' and would amount to an abuse of that

    discretion." United States v. Brand, 80 F.3d 560, 564 (1st _____________ _____

    Cir. 1996)(citation omitted). In determining whether there

    has been an abuse of discretion, this court should consider

    "appellants' special reasons, plus relevant factors such as

    the amount of time needed for effective preparation and the

    amount actually available, diligence in preparing for trial

    and whether the defense contributed to its perceived

    predicament, the likely utility of a continuance,

    inconvenience to the court, opposing party, and witnesses,

    and any unfair prejudice caused by the denial." Id. ___

    "The Jencks Act by its terms limits disclosure of the

    disputed information until after a witness' direct testimony.

    18 U.S.C. 3500(a). The district court then, 'in its



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    discretion, upon application of [the] defendant, may recess

    proceedings in the trial for such time as it may determine to

    be reasonably required for the examination of such statement

    by said defendant and his preparation for its use in the

    trial.' 18 U.S.C. 3500(c)." United States v. Arboleda, 929 _____________ ________

    F.2d 858, 863(1st Cir. 1991).

    Here, appellant contributed to his own predicament by

    failing to request a continuance prior to cross-examination

    or at any time during Francisco's testimony. Although

    defense counsel was given the Jencks material before the

    start of Francisco's cross-examination, appellant did not

    request a continuance to review the transcripts until after

    the government had begun direct examination of its next

    witness. Moreover, appellant has failed to show "'a

    particular detriment suffered as a result of delayed

    disclosure.'" Id. at 864. In light of the considerable __

    evidence linking appellant to the assault on Francisco, the

    court's refusal to grant a continuance -- even if it

    precluded cross-examination on Francisco's allegedly

    inconsistent testimony about the color of the car -- did not

    seriously prejudice the defense.

    II. Failure to Read Back Testimony ______________________________

    "[W]e have long and repeatedly held that rereading

    testimony during jury deliberations rests in the presider's

    sound discretion." United States v. Akitoye, 923 F.2d 221, _____________ _______



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    226 (1st Cir. 1991). In Akitoye, we ruled that the district _______

    court had not abused its discretion in denying the jury's

    specific request for testimony to be read back. We

    emphasized that "[t]he trial was brief and the testimony

    fresh in the jurors' minds, a circumstance which ordinarily

    lessens the need for rereading." Id. at 226. We also noted ___

    that the request was "broad and general -- not 'well

    focused.'" Id. ___

    The factors supporting the denial of a reread in Akitoye _______

    were also present in this case. The trial in the instant

    case lasted for less than two days. The testimony that the

    jury sought to review had been given only the day before.

    Although defense counsel suggested that the jury might want

    to further focus its request, the jury did not pick up on the

    suggestion. Nor did defense counsel specifically request

    that the jury be questioned regarding the particular area of

    confusion that had led to the transcript request. Moreover,

    the jury in this case never specifically requested a read

    back once it was told that the transcript was not available.

    There was no abuse of discretion.

    III. Sufficient Evidence of Knowledge ________________________________

    Appellant argues that "the prosecution failed to prove

    'knowledge' of any degree that the Appellant was aware that

    Francisco implicated the Appellant in any federal proceeding

    or that any federal matter was pending." Under 18 U.S.C.



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    1512(b), it is unlawful to "knowingly use[] intimidation or

    physical force [or to threaten] . . . another person, with

    intent to . . . influence, delay or prevent the testimony of

    any person in an official proceeding." "[A]n official

    proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at

    the time of the offense." 18 U.S.C. 1512(e)(1). "Both a

    federal trial and a federal grand jury investigation are

    'official proceedings' within the meaning of the statute."

    United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 651 (1st Cir. _____________ ___________

    1996).

    "Section 1513(b) requires proof of (1) knowing

    engagement in conduct; (2) either causing or threatening to

    cause, bodily injury to another person; (3) with intent to

    retaliate against any person for, inter alia, providing

    information relating to the commission of a federal offense."

    United States v. Paradis, 802 F.2d 553, 562 (1st Cir. 1986). ______________ _______

    Therefore, to prove intent to retaliate against a witness, it

    is necessary to prove knowledge by the defendant that the

    witness provided information relating to the commission of a

    federal offense.

    "On appeal, [this court] review[s] a challenge to the

    sufficiency of the evidence under a familiar standard. The

    evidence must be viewed 'in the light most favorable to the

    government, drawing all legitimate inferences and resolving

    all credibility determinations in favor of the verdict.'



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    Thus probed, the verdict must be upheld if any rational trier

    of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a

    reasonable doubt." United States v. Victor, 973 F.2d 975, 977 _____________ ______

    (1st Cir. 1992)(citations omitted).

    In this case, there was sufficient evidence from which

    the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt both that

    appellant was aware of Francisco's past cooperation with the

    federal authorities and that appellant at least expected

    there to be a future federal proceeding. In the context of

    the evidence as a whole, appellant's statements to Francisco

    on August 15, 1995, were "direct evidence that [the

    defendant] in fact expected a grand jury investigation and/or

    a trial in the foreseeable future, and that his intent was to

    [prevent the witness from testifying at] such a proceeding or

    proceedings." Frankhauser, 80 F.3d at 652. Appellant is not ___________

    entitled to relief on his insufficiency of the evidence

    claim.

    IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel _________________________________

    "To obtain a reversal on the basis of ineffective

    assistance of counsel a defendant must show that there is a

    reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional

    errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt

    respecting guilt." United States v. Palow, 777 F.2d 52, 57 ______________ _____

    (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1052 (1986). ______________

    Appellant raised the ineffective assistance claim before the



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    district court in his motion for a new trial. The district

    court ruled that appellant had failed to claim prejudice

    "other than to say that somehow Mr. Williams' performance

    fell below the performance one would expect of an attorney

    under the circumstances." We agree with the district court

    that appellant has failed to demonstrate prejudice.

    Accordingly, we need not reach the issue of whether counsel's

    performance was deficient.

    A. Failure to Cross-Examine Francisco Regarding ___________________________________________________

    Inconsistencies in Testimony on the Color of the Car. There ______________________________________________________

    was no prejudice from this failure for the reasons discussed

    above in connection with the court's failure to grant a

    continuance. Viewed in the context of the evidence as a

    whole, the alleged inconsistency does not raise a reasonable

    doubt that if the jury had been confronted with that

    inconsistency, it would have acquitted appellant.

    B. Conflict Between Attorney and Client. Appellant's _____________________________________

    second ineffective assistance argument is that the trial

    court erred in not determining the need for a hearing

    regarding the breakdown in communication between appellant

    and his attorney. "Where the accused voices objections to the

    appointed counsel, the trial court should inquire into the

    reasons for the dissatisfaction." United States v. Allen, 789 _____________ _____

    F.2d 90, 92 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 846 _____________

    (1986). In this case, however, appellant did not voice any



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    objections to counsel and, therefore, the court was not

    obliged to make an inquiry into the cause of dissatisfaction.

    Although appellant never requested a continuance or

    substitution of counsel, the district court's response to

    defense counsel's comments at the start of the second day of

    trial implied that it had found that there was not a "total

    lack of communication preventing an adequate defense." United ______

    States v. Pierce, 60 F.3d 886, 891 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. ______ ______ _____

    denied, __ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996). That implied ______

    finding is supported by the record. Defense counsel

    hesitated even to characterize the difference of opinion as a

    disagreement. The transcript of the second day of trial

    indicates appellant and his attorney were communicating

    effectively. The district court did not err.



    C. Failure to Call Kenneth Landry as a Witness. ____________________________________________

    "The decision whether to call a particular witness is

    almost always strategic, requiring a balancing of the

    benefits and risks of the anticipated testimony." Lema v. ____

    United States, 987 F.2d 48, 54 (1st Cir. 1993). Appellant ______________

    has failed to show how the failure to call Landry "deprived

    him of a 'viable defense.'" United States v. Porter, 924 F.2d _____________ ______

    395, 397 (1st Cir. 1991). Testimony by Francisco and

    Gonzvales that the Subaru was "dark-colored" does not

    contradict Landry's statement that the car was black. The



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    failure of Francisco and Gonzvales to comment on the

    noisiness of the Subaru is inconsequential in light of the

    considerable other evidence linking appellant to the events

    at Francisco's shop on August 15, 1995. The ineffective

    assistance of counsel claim fails.

    For all of the above reasons, appellant's conviction is

    summarily affirmed. See Loc. R. 27.1. __________________ ___







































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