Strickland v. Comm. Maine ( 1996 )


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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    _________________________

    No. 96-1435
    NANCY STRICKLAND, ET AL.,

    Plaintiffs, Appellants,

    v.

    COMMISSIONER, MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

    Defendant, Appellee,

    v.

    SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

    Third-Party Defendant, Appellee.

    _________________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

    [Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    _________________________

    Before

    Selya, Circuit Judge, _____________

    Aldrich and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judges. _____________________

    _________________________

    Rufus E. Brown, with whom Jack Comart, Patrick Ende, and _______________ ___________ ____________
    Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Inc. were on brief, for appellants. ________________________________
    Jennifer H. Zacks, Attorney, Civil Division, Dept. of ___________________
    Justice, with whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, _______________
    Mark B. Stern, Attorney, Civil Division, Dept. of Justice, and ______________
    Jay McCloskey, United States Attorney, were on brief, for ______________
    Secretary of Agriculture.

    _________________________

    September 24, 1996

    _________________________













    SELYA, Circuit Judge. Nearly four centuries ago, an SELYA, Circuit Judge. ______________

    English playwright wrote of a young monarch exhorting his battle-

    weary comrades to stride "once more unto the breach, dear

    friends, once more." William Shakespeare, King Henry the Fifth, ____________________

    Act III, Sc. 1, l.1 (1600). Nancy and Lyle Strickland, the

    appellants here, issue a similar call, again requesting that this

    court invalidate a regulation which the Secretary of Agriculture

    (the Secretary) promulgated under authority granted by the Food

    Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. 2011-2025 (1988) (the Act). In Strickland __________

    v. Commissioner, Me. Dept. of Human Servs., 48 F.3d 12 (1st __________________________________________

    Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 145 (1995) (Strickland I), we _____ ______ ____________

    applied the teachings of Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural ______________________ _______

    Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and upheld ________________________________

    a portion of the regulation that gave meaning to an ambiguous

    phrase contained within the Act. See Strickland I, 48 F.3d at 21 ___ ____________

    (upholding 7 C.F.R. 273.11(a)(4)(ii)(D) (1994) as a reasonable

    rendition of 7 U.S.C. 2014(d)(9)). This second time around the

    appellants seek to strike down a different (but closely related)

    section of the same regulation. Because Chevron is still the law _______

    of the land, we affirm the lower court's entry of summary

    judgment in the appellees' favor.

    I. THE STATUTORY SCHEME I. THE STATUTORY SCHEME

    First enacted in 1964, the Act is designed "to

    safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's population by

    raising levels of nutrition among low-income households." 7

    U.S.C. 2011; see generally Strickland I, 48 F.3d at 14-15. The ___ _________ ____________


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    states administer most aspects of the Food Stamp Program (the

    Program) while the federal government underwrites the cost (which

    now amounts to some $29 billion per year). Recipients, whose

    eligibility is determined by income and family size, receive

    assistance in the form of coupons that may be used to purchase

    groceries at local stores. In order to implement the Program,

    Congress has authorized the Secretary to promulgate "such

    regulations . . . as [he] deems necessary or appropriate for the

    effective and efficient administration" of the Program's federal

    aspects. See 7 U.S.C. 2013(a), (c). Responsibility for other ___

    elements of the Program devolves upon state agencies. In Maine,

    that obligation reposes with the Department of Human Services

    (DHS).

    In 1971, Congress instructed the Secretary to set

    national eligibility standards for the Program. The Secretary

    did so. Of particular interest for present purposes, the

    Secretary barred any consideration of principal payments made on

    the purchase price of capital assets in computing the costs which

    could be offset against the income of a self-employed individual

    to determine whether that person met the national eligibility

    standard. See 36 Fed. Reg. 14102, 14107 (July 29, 1971). Six ___

    years later, Congress overhauled the Act. It directed, inter _____

    alia, that for purposes of determining eligibility for ____

    participation in the Program, a person's income should not

    include the "cost of producing self-employment income." 7 U.S.C.

    2014(d)(9). Though Congress did not define the term "cost,"


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    the House Committee on Agriculture noted, seemingly with

    approbation, that existing Program regulations did not treat

    principal payments as a "cost" that could be set off against

    income. See H. Rep. No. 464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 25, reprinted ___ _________

    in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1978, 2001-02. __

    Throughout, the Secretary has consistently hewed to the

    position that principal payments on capital assets are not a cost

    of producing self-employment income. The current regulation

    epitomizes this longstanding viewpoint; it states that "cost,"

    when figured for that purpose, shall not include "[p]ayments on

    the principal of the purchase price of income-producing real

    estate and capital assets, equipment, machinery, and other

    durable goods." 7 C.F.R. 273.11(a)(4)(ii)(A).

    II. THE COURSE OF LITIGATION II. THE COURSE OF LITIGATION

    Mr. and Mrs. Strickland operate a construction business

    in Belgrade, Maine (where they reside). When their business

    faltered, they applied for admission to the Program and began

    receiving benefits. In 1993 the DHS determined that the

    Stricklands' average monthly income was more than double the

    Program's eligibility limit. Had they been permitted to deduct

    depreciation on business equipment as a "cost of producing self-

    employment income," they would have remained eligible for food

    stamp assistance. Consequently, they challenged the regulation

    that excluded depreciation, 7 C.F.R. 273.11(a)(4)(ii)(D),

    arguing that it had been promulgated in derogation of 7 U.S.C.

    2014(d)(9). See Strickland I, 48 F.3d at 15-16. In due season ___ ____________


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    the appellants asserted claims against both the DHS and the

    Secretary, and the district court certified the Stricklands as

    representatives of a class of "all Maine food stamp applicants or

    recipients adversely affected by the [] regulation on or after

    July 1, 1992." Id. at 16. ___

    The appellants enjoyed some initial success. After the

    parties submitted the case on a stipulated record, the trial

    court invalidated the Secretary's "no depreciation" regulation.

    See Strickland v. Commissioner, Me. DHS, 849 F. Supp. 818 (D. Me. ___ __________ _____________________

    1994). We reversed, finding ambiguity in the term "cost" as used

    in the statutory phrase "cost of producing self-employment

    income." See Strickland I, 48 F.3d at 19. Stressing that ___ ____________

    ambiguity made deference appropriate, we upheld the Secretary's

    right to exclude depreciation from "cost" as a permissible

    rendition of the statute. See id. at 21. In what may now be ___ ___

    viewed as an overabundance of caution, we noted that the parties'

    arguments in Strickland I did "not require us to decide whether ____________

    self-employed food stamp recipients must be given some

    alternative deduction, such as a deduction for replacement costs,

    in recognition of either the cost of acquiring capital goods or

    their consumption in the course of producing income." Id. at 21 ___

    n.6.1

    Apparently convinced that a judicial footnote is a
    ____________________

    1That issue was neither briefed nor argued in this court
    during the pendency of Strickland I. In any event, the _____________
    appellants had told the district court that they did not dispute
    the Secretary's authority to disallow principal payments on
    equipment loans as a cost of producing self-employment income.

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    terrible thing to waste, the Stricklands promptly reformulated

    their suit to challenge that portion of 7 C.F.R.

    273.11(a)(4)(ii) in which the Secretary purposed to exclude

    payments on the principal of the purchase price of capital

    assets, averring that a favorable finding would entitle them to

    continued eligibility for food stamp assistance.

    This about-face proved unproductive. The district

    court granted summary judgment in favor of the state and federal

    defendants, holding that the Secretary permissibly excluded

    principal payments in determining the cost of producing self-

    employment income. See Strickland v. Commissioner, Me. DHS, 921 ___ __________ _____________________

    F. Supp. 21, 24 (D. Me. 1996) (Strickland II) (concluding that ______________

    "if the Secretary is not required to recognize even depreciation,

    he certainly cannot be required to recognize cash principal ________

    payments"). This appeal followed.

    III. STANDARD OF REVIEW III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

    Because the interpretation of a statute or regulation

    presents a purely legal question, courts subject that

    interpretation to de novo review. See United States v. Gifford, ___ _____________ _______

    17 F.3d 462, 472 (1st Cir. 1994); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. _______________________

    Commercial Union Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 750, 757 (1st Cir. 1992). __________________________

    This standard of review is between appellate tribunals and lower

    courts. It does not diminish the deference that courts must

    accord to authoritative interpretations of opaque statutory

    provisions undertaken by those whom Congress has empowered to

    administer or enforce particular laws. As we have regularly


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    held, such deference is due the Secretary's interpretation of a

    less-than-pellucid food stamp statute. See, e.g., Strickland I, ___ ____ ____________

    48 F.3d at 16; Massachusetts v. Secretary of Agric., 984 F.2d _____________ ____________________

    514, 520-21 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 81 (1993); see _____ ______ ___

    also 7 U.S.C. 2013(a), (c) (empowering the Secretary to ____

    administer the Act).

    IV. ANALYSIS IV. ANALYSIS

    When courts review an agency's interpretation of a

    statute that it administers, Chevron directs them to engage in a _______

    bifurcated inquiry. See Passamaquoddy Tribe v. State of Me., 75 ___ ___________________ ____________

    F.3d 784, 794 (1st Cir. 1996); Strickland I, 48 F.3d at 16. In ____________

    an oft-quoted passage, the Chevron Court delineated the nature of _______

    the inquiry:

    First, always, is the question whether
    Congress has directly spoken to the precise
    question at issue. If the intent of Congress
    is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
    the court, as well as the agency, must give
    effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
    of Congress. If, however, the court
    determines Congress has not directly
    addressed the precise question at issue, the
    court does not simply impose its own
    construction on the statute, as would be
    necessary in the absence of an administrative
    interpretation. Rather, if the statute is
    silent or ambiguous with respect to the
    specific issue, the question for the court is
    whether the agency's answer is based on a
    permissible construction of the statute.

    Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted). These are the _______

    same questions that this court posed in Strickland I, 48 F.3d at ____________

    16, and we retrace our steps to the extent appropriate.

    A A


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    We first look to see if Congress has spoken to the

    precise question at issue by mandating either the inclusion or

    the exclusion of principal payments on capital assets from the

    computation of the "cost of producing self-employment income"

    under 7 U.S.C. 2014(d)(9).2 Since this branch of the inquiry

    deals exclusively with statutory construction and congressional

    intent, no deference is due the Secretary's views.

    In Strickland I we determined that the statute, 7 _____________

    U.S.C. 2014(d)(9), did not require depreciation to be included

    as a "cost of producing self-employment income." In reaching

    this conclusion, we focused on the ambiguity inherent in the word

    "cost" a word that Congress chose not to define. We concluded

    that "the word ``cost' is a chameleon, capable of taking on

    different meanings, and shades of meaning, depending on the

    subject matter and the circumstances of each particular usage."





    ____________________

    2In their complaint, the appellants asked the district court
    to strike down the Secretary's policy, embodied in 7 C.F.R.
    273.11(a)(4)(ii)(A), of disallowing principal payments made to
    purchase capital assets (which they term "capital costs"). The
    district court confined its ruling accordingly. See Strickland ___ __________
    II, 921 F. Supp. at 24-25. At oral argument before us, however, __
    the appellants' counsel suggested that the pivotal issue should
    be cast in broader terms; he posed the ultimate question of
    whether the Secretary's general regulatory scheme, in not
    allowing any offset for wear and tear on capital assets by means
    of depreciation, principal payments, or otherwise, is
    permissible. For purposes of Chevron's first step, it makes no _______
    difference whether we accept or reject this formulation of the
    issue. Because the statute (and, particularly, the word "cost")
    is ambiguous, see text infra, either formulation of the issue ___ _____
    leads ineluctably to the second step of the Chevron inquiry. _______

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    Strickland I, 48 F.3d at 19.3 We therefore found that Congress ____________

    had not spoken directly to the matter at issue. See id. at 19- ___ ___

    20.

    Although Strickland I did not address exactly the same ____________

    question that confronts us today, we agree with the district

    court that its analysis controls. The appellants would have us

    believe that by some thaumaturgical sleight-of-hand the word

    "cost" has acquired a plain meaning in the brief interval since

    we decided Strickland I. They seek to persuade us that, though ____________

    "cost" was not clear enough to force the inclusion of

    depreciation, the word nonetheless possesses sufficient clarity

    to force the inclusion of either principal payments on capital

    assets, or, at least, some offset for the expense of acquiring

    and using up such assets.4 We are unconvinced. Statutory

    ambiguity does not flash on and off like a bank of strobe lights

    ____________________

    3Though noting the open question as to whether legislative
    history could be considered at the first stage of a Chevron _______
    inquiry, see Strickland I, 48 F.3d at 16-18, we examined the slim ___ ____________
    legislative history underpinning 7 U.S.C. 2014(d)(9) and deemed
    it insufficient to "suck the elasticity from the word ``cost' and
    convey an ``unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,'" id. at ___
    19-20 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43). That conclusion _______
    remains unscathed.

    4In this connection, we are puzzled by the appellants'
    reliance on Estey v. Commissioner, Me. DHS, 21 F.3d 1198 (1st _____ ______________________
    Cir. 1994). We ruled there that the term "energy assistance" had
    a generally understood meaning and then proceeded to apply that
    meaning to a particular set of facts. See id. at 1201, 1207. ___ ___
    The appellants' suggestion that the term "cost" has an equally
    familiar meaning a meaning that includes principal payments on
    capital assets as a component of "cost" flies in the teeth of
    our unequivocal holding that "cost," as that term is used in the
    Act, does not have any readily apparent meaning. See Strickland ___ ___ __________
    I, 48 F.3d at 19. _

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    at a discotheque, shining brightly at the time of one lawsuit and

    then vanishing mysteriously in the interlude before the next suit

    appears.

    We need not dawdle. There is nothing in the record

    before us to indicate that Congress ever had an unambiguously

    expressed intent to include principal payments on capital assets

    as a cost of producing self-employment income. The text of the

    statute does not encourage such a construction and there is no

    legislative history (beyond that already considered and deemed

    insufficient in Strickland I, 48 F.3d at 19-20) that supports _____________

    including principal payments or any proxy therefor as a "cost."

    To the precise contrary, all the extrinsic evidence suggests that

    Congress concurred in the Secretary's longstanding decision to

    disregard such payments. The most persuasive datum comes from

    the archives of the Program. The Secretary had been excluding

    principal payments from the cost of producing self-employment

    income for several years by the time Congress enacted 7 U.S.C.

    2014(d)(9). That being so, the presumption is that Congress

    intended the word "cost" to be given the same meaning that

    already had been established in the regulatory context. See ___

    Commissioner v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 159 ____________ _____________________________

    (1993); Strickland I, 48 F.3d at 20. ____________

    Here, moreover, it cannot plausibly be argued that

    Congress merely overlooked the Secretary's contemporaneous

    treatment of principal payments, for the House Committee on

    Agriculture explicitly recognized the prevailing practice. See ___


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    H. Rep. No. 464, supra, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2001-02. This _____

    combination congressional awareness of an existing

    administrative praxis coupled with a concomitant unwillingness to

    revise that praxis strongly implies legislative approval.

    "[W]hen Congress revisits a statute giving rise to a longstanding

    administrative interpretation without pertinent change, the

    ``congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency's

    interpretation is persuasive evidence that the interpretation is

    the one intended by Congress.'" CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846 ____ _____

    (1986) (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 ____ __________________

    (1974) (footnotes omitted)).5

    In sum, because Congress has not plainly resolved the

    interpretive question that is now before us, we must move to the

    second step of the Chevron pavane. _______

    B B

    During the second stage of a Chevron analysis, an _______

    inquiring court accords substantial respect to authoritative

    agency interpretations. See Strickland I, 48 F.3d at 17-18. ___ _____________
    ____________________

    5We dismiss out of hand the appellants' contention that
    Strickland I etched in stone a particular conception of "cost," ____________
    equating the word with cash outlays. This contention reflects a
    misunderstanding of the thrust of our opinion. The first step of
    a Chevron inquiry requires a court to determine whether the _______
    language of a statute is susceptible to more than one natural
    meaning. Finding "cost" to be inherently ambiguous in the
    context of the Act, we held that plain meaning did not foreclose
    the Secretary's decision to exclude depreciation from the cost of
    producing self-employment income. See Strickland I, 48 F.3d at ___ ____________
    19. Our intention was to explain why the courts must defer to
    any permissible interpretation of "cost" adopted by the ___
    Secretary, not to endorse a particular conception of "cost"
    (whether it be that of an economist, a layman, or a food stamp
    recipient).

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    Thus, an interpretive regulation must be honored unless it is

    "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."

    Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. In deciding this issue, a court must _______

    avoid inserting its own policy considerations into the mix. "The

    agency need not write a rule that serves the statute in the best

    or most logical manner; it need only write a rule that flows

    rationally from a permissible construction of the statute."

    Strickland I, 48 F.3d at 17; accord Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 ____________ ______ _____ ____________

    F.2d 888, 899 (1st Cir. 1993). Though the level of respect

    varies with the circumstances, deference to an agency's

    interpretation is "particularly appropriate in complex and highly

    specialized areas where the regulatory net has been intricately

    woven." Massachusetts Dept. of Educ. v. United States Dept. of _____________________________ _______________________

    Educ., 837 F.2d 536, 541 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting Citizens Sav. _____ _____________

    Bank v. Bell, 605 F. Supp. 1033, 1041 (D.R.I. 1985)). Moreover, ____ ____

    longstanding agency interpretations generally receive greater

    deference than newly contrived ones. See Visiting Nurse Ass'n of ___ _______________________

    No. Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 1996) [No. _______________ ______

    95-1849, slip op. at 24].

    Applying these standards, we readily conclude that 7

    C.F.R. 273.11(a)(4)(ii) is within the pale. The regulation,

    which reflects the agency's consistent interpretation for the

    past quarter-century, emanates from the Secretary's reasonable

    determination that the purpose of the Act is to help low-income

    families purchase food, not to underwrite the acquisition of




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    capital assets.6 To be sure, rental payments on capital assets

    are, as the appellants point out, deductible as a "cost," but

    such payments easily can be distinguished from principal

    payments. When one leases a capital asset (say, a tractor) no

    ownership interest is acquired, and the lease payments go

    entirely toward producing self-employment income. By contrast,

    when one buys a capital asset and pays for it in installments,

    the payments not only permit the payer to use the asset as a

    means of producing self-employment income but also permit him to

    build equity. This additional feature changes the nature of the

    transaction. The Secretary's regulation reasonably seeks to

    avoid subsidizing such "dual purpose" payments.

    Of course, the appellants now put a different spin on

    the situation. See supra note 2. They suggest that, instead of ___ _____

    appraising the validity of 7 C.F.R. 273.11(a)(4)(ii)(A), we

    should view the matter in broader terms and determine whether the

    Secretary must allow some offset for expenses associated with the ____

    acquisition and depletion of capital assets used in a trade or

    business.

    Passing potential procedural problems and addressing

    this argument on the merits, it does not benefit the appellants.

    ____________________

    6Our determination that the Secretary reasonably excluded
    principal payments on capital assets from the cost of producing
    self-employment income is bolstered by the evidence, already
    chronicled, that this interpretation of "cost" is very likely the
    one that Congress intended. See supra pp. 10-11. When an ___ _____
    agency's interpretation jibes with discernible congressional
    intent, a court is hard-pressed to declare that interpretation
    impermissible under Chevron's second step. _______

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    Their premise is that, by putting capital assets to one side, the

    Secretary has defined "cost of producing self-employment income"

    so grudgingly as to frustrate Congress' intent. But this premise

    is faulty. The Secretary has not ignored the costs of doing

    business; rather, he has recognized numerous items as allowable

    costs, e.g., labor, stock, inventory, business-related interest

    (including interest associated with installment payments on

    capital assets), and taxes paid on income-producing property.

    See 7 C.F.R. 273.11(a)(4)(i). He simply has refused to ___

    recognize the kind of costs for which the appellants seek credit,

    saying in effect that when a self-employed person is building

    equity (a phenomenon that almost invariably accompanies the

    purchase of capital assets), the Secretary will define "cost"

    very restrictively (probably because no good way exists to give a

    credit for expenses related to the purchase of capital assets

    without also subsidizing some intangible ownership interest). As

    a result, food stamp recipients who buy capital assets are able

    to claim relatively few offsets for the expense connected with

    acquiring and using those assets.

    We frankly acknowledge that the Secretary's

    interpretation is a harsh one, especially as it relates to

    persons in the appellants' position. The regulatory edifice that

    now exists may not be the one which we, if building on an empty

    site, would choose to construct. But that is largely beside the

    point. The term "cost" is ambiguous, and a harsh interpretation,

    as here, which arises out of the Secretary's reasonable refusal


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    to subsidize ownership, is not per se arbitrary or capricious. ___ __

    V. CONCLUSION V. CONCLUSION

    We need go no further. The "cost of producing self-

    employment income," 7 U.S.C. 2014(d)(9), is imprecise and

    Congress has neither specified that payments designed to amortize

    the purchase price of capital assets must be deemed part of the

    cost nor decreed that some equivalent write-off must be

    recognized in calculating the cost. Thus, the regulation here at

    issue represents a permissible construction of the statute.

    After all, within the wide limits that Chevron sets, courts must _______

    respect the Secretary's policy choices.



    Affirmed. Affirmed. ________































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