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USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 95-2339
SUSAN G. ISLES,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
WHC JR./COC, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Frank H. Freedman, Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges. ______________
____________________
Susan G. Isles on brief pro se. ______________
Francis D. Dibble, Jr., Ellen M. Randle, Carol E. Kamm and ______________________ _______________ _____________
Bulkley, Richardson and Gelinas on brief for appellees. _______________________________
____________________
October 17, 1996
____________________
Per Curiam. Three months after being hired, plaintiff __________
Susan Isles was discharged from her position as housekeeper
at the residence of William and Camille Cosby in Shelburne,
Massachusetts. She responded by filing the instant action in
which she claimed, inter alia, that her termination ___________
constituted: (1) sex discrimination in violation of Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a); (2) retaliation for the filing
of a worker's compensation claim, in violation of Mass. Gen.
L. ch. 152, 75B(2); and (3) breach of contract. Upon
completion of discovery, the district court rejected each of
these contentions and granted summary judgment for
defendants. Having reviewed the record in full, we affirm
substantially for the reasons recited by the district court.
We have little to add to Judge Freedman's comprehensive
analysis. As to the Title VII claim, we agree that plaintiff
has failed to adduce sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable jury could conclude that defendants' articulated
reasons for the firing were a pretext for sex discrimination.
See, e.g., Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1995). ___ ____ ___ _____
Defendants explained, on the basis of abundant evidence, that
plaintiff was fired primarily because of an overly aggressive
attitude and a tendency to criticize the work of others--
traits that proved disruptive to staff cohesion and morale.
Such concerns constitute a justifiable basis for discharge.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 731 F.2d 64, 73 ___ ____ _______ ____________________
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984). Plaintiff's _____________
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principal evidence to the contrary--a vague denial voiced
during her deposition--proves insufficient to create a
genuine dispute as to whether defendants' articulated reasons
were pretextual. See, e.g., Kaiser v. Armstrong World ___ ____ ______ ________________
Indus., Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 518 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[s]ummary ____________
judgment is appropriate even in the face of conflicting
evidence if the latter is insufficient to support a jury
verdict in the nonmovant's favor"). Indeed, plaintiff's own
written words (in the form of letters mailed to the Cosbys
and to an earlier employer) only lend further credence to the
concerns cited by defendants.
Plaintiff's evidence, in any event, fails to support an
inference of discriminatory animus. As the district court
explained, the specific factors on which she relies are of
minimal probative value. For example, the male employees who
allegedly received more lenient treatment in disciplinary
matters were not similarly situated to plaintiff. See, e.g., ___ ____
Smith v. Stratus Computers, Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. _____ _______________________
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1958 (1995). The alleged ____________
division of labor in the household staff entailed no
disadvantage to her with respect to conditions of employment.
And the alleged "breadwinner" remark was properly disregarded
as hearsay. Moreover, it is undisputed that plaintiff was
fired by a female, that she was replaced by a female, and
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that the only other household employee ever to have been
discharged was a male.
As to plaintiff's claim of retaliation, what we stated
in Byrd v. Bonayne, 61 F.3d 1026, 1033 (1st Cir. 1995), ____ _______
applies as well here: "For the most part, her retaliatory
discharge claim rests on the identical inferences of pretext
found wanting above." Id. at 1033; accord, e.g., Grant v. ___ ______ ____ _____
News Group Boston, Inc., 55 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting _______________________
that showing of pretext is essential to retaliation claim).
In any event, we agree with the district court that
plaintiff's evidence fails to support the inference that Mrs.
Cosby even knew of plaintiff's alleged head injury, much less
that she harbored a retaliatory motive in deciding to
discharge her. See, e.g., Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds ___ ____ ____________ ______________
Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that non- ___________
moving party's reliance on "conclusory allegations" and
"improbable inferences" is insufficient to defeat summary
judgment, even "where elusive concepts such as motive or
intent are at issue") (quoted in Fennell v. First Step _______ ___________
Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 535 (1st Cir. 1996)). _____________
Finally, plaintiff's claim that she enjoyed a "lifetime"
contract, terminable only for cause, is equally unavailing.
As the district court explained, nothing in the comments
voiced by Mrs. Adams or Mrs. Cosby could be reasonably
construed under the circumstances as creating any such
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arrangement. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Analog Devices, Inc., 34 ___ ____ _______ ____________________
Mass. App. Ct. 905, 906-07 (1993) (requiring "strong proof"
and "particularly explicit expressions of intent" to
establish lifetime contract); accord, e.g., Smith v. F.W. ______ ____ _____ ____
Morse & Co., Inc., 76 F.3d 413, 427 (1st Cir. 1996). Nor did _________________
Mrs. Adams have the authority to commit the Cosbys to such a
permanent contract. See, e.g., Simonelli v. Boston Housing ___ ____ _________ ______________
Auth., 334 Mass. 438, 440-41 (1956). _____
Plaintiff also advances a trio of procedural challenges
on appeal, each of which we reject. First, she complains of
a discovery ruling restricting access to employment
information concerning defendants' past and present workers.
This court will intervene in such matters "only upon a clear
showing of manifest injustice, that is, where the lower
court's discovery order was plainly wrong and resulted in
substantial prejudice to the aggrieved party." Mack v. Great ____ _____
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 186 (1st Cir. 1989) __________________________
(quoted in Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., ___ F.3d ____________ ________________________
___, 1996 WL 494221, at *2 (1st Cir. 1996)). No such showing
has been made. Far from being plainly wrong, the discovery
order strikes us as balanced and fair. And plaintiff
suffered minimal prejudice. Indeed, we note that seven of
the nine excluded employees ended up being deposed, and that
the payroll information sought as to such individuals would
have been of negligible relevance.
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Second, plaintiff challenges the court's award of costs.
Her contention that the costs of depositions cannot be
taxable when a case is resolved at the summary judgment stage
is misplaced. See, e.g., Merrick v. Northern Natural Gas ___ ____ _______ _____________________
Co., 911 F.2d 426, 434-35 (10th Cir. 1990); 10 Charles ___
Wright, Arthur Miller & Mary Kane, Federal Practice and _____________________
Procedure 2676, at 341 & n.17 (1983 & '96 Supp.); see _________ ___
generally Templeman v. Chris Craft Corp., 770 F.2d 245, 249 _________ _________ __________________
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021 (1985). The district ____________
court acted within its discretion in taxing costs only with
respect to those depositions on which it had relied in ruling
on the summary judgment motion.
Finally, plaintiff complains of the circumstances
surrounding the district court's allowance of her original
attorney's motion to withdraw. As with its handling of all
other aspects of the case, we think the court resolved the
matter in an equitable and conscientious fashion. No
discussion is required, however, inasmuch as plaintiff has
not identified (and we do not discern) any legally cognizable
prejudice stemming therefrom.
Affirmed. _________
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Document Info
Docket Number： 95-2339
Filed Date： 10/17/1996
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/21/2015