-
USCA1 Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 96-1002
WILLIAM L. TAYLOR, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellants.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Raymond J. Pettine, Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Cyr, Circuit Judge, _____________
and Cummings,* Circuit Judge. _____________
____________________
Thomas A. Palombo, Special Assistant Attorney General, with __________________
whom Jeffrey B. Pine, Attorney General, Rebecca Tedford __________________ _________________
Partington, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Ellen Evans __________ ____________
Alexander, Deputy Chief Legal Counsel, were on brief for appell- _________
ants.
Richard A. Sinapi, with whom Sinapi Law Associates, Ltd. and _________________ ___________________________
American Civil Liberties Union, were on brief for appellees. ______________________________
____________________
December 4, 1996
____________________
____________________
*Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
CYR, Circuit Judge. The Rhode Island Department of CYR, Circuit Judge. _____________
Corrections ("Department") appeals from a district court judgment
declaring ultra vires and unconstitutional the Department's _____ _____
application of a Rhode Island statute which would impose a
monthly offender fee upon the appellees, all of whom were sen-
tenced to probationary terms under Department supervision for
criminal offenses committed prior to the effective date of the
statute as implemented by regulations promulgated by the Depart-
ment. The district court held that the Department's interpreta-
tion of the statute exceeded its authority under the enabling
statute and that the statute, as applied to appellees, violated
the ex post facto clauses in the United States and Rhode Island __ ____ _____
Constitutions. We vacate the district court judgment and remand
for the entry of summary judgment for appellants on the ultra _____
vires and ex post facto claims, and for further proceedings on _____ __ ____ _____
appellees' procedural due process claims.
I I
BACKGROUND BACKGROUND __________
Rhode Island General Laws 42-56-38, P.L. 1992, ch.
133, art. 97, 2, directs that "[e]ach sentenced offender
committed to the care, custody, or control of the [Department]
shall reimburse the state for the cost or the reasonable portion _________
thereof incurred by the state relating to such commitment."
(Emphasis added.) The offender fee statute itself expressly _________
delegates to the Department the power to determine its effective _________
date by declaring that its provisions "shall not be effective
2
until the date rules and regulations implementing its provisions
are filed with the office of the Secretary of State." Id. ___
The Department responded by promulgating, inter alia, _____ ____
Regulation 10.07.03, designating July 1, 1994 as the effective _____________
date of the "offender fee" program, following its filing of the
implementing regulations with the Secretary of State on June 17,
1994. See also R.I. Gen. Laws 42-56-10(v) (Powers of the ___ ____
director); R.I. Gen. Laws 42-56-38 (Assessment of costs). The
Regulation further provides for "offender fee" waivers based on
inability to pay, see Regulation 10.07.03(II)(E), and, in cases ___
of nonpayment, authorizes notification of the appropriate crimi-
nal court at any parole or probation revocation hearing, id. __
10.07.03(II)(D), as well as civil actions to collect unpaid
offender fees, id. Mere nonpayment does not constitute a parole __
or probation violation, however. Id. 10.07.03(II)(D)(3). Nor __
are offenders in "banked" status (i.e., either residing outside
Rhode Island or not on supervised status) liable for the fee, id. __
10.07.03(II)(C)(3).
Appellees, all convicted offenders sentenced to proba- _________ __ ______
tion prior to July 1, 1994, each received advance written notice ____ _____ __ ____ _ ____
that the $15.00 offender fee would become effective July 1, 1994,
and subsequently received monthly bills. Appellees thereafter
commenced suit in federal district court claiming that the
offender fee statute, as applied, violates the Ex Post Facto and
Due Process clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Consti-
tutions. In due course, the parties submitted cross-motions for
3
summary judgment on a stipulated record and the district court
ruled that (i) the Department had exceeded its authority under
the enabling statute by interpreting the statute so as to render
the offender fee retroactive as to appellees and (ii) the statute
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause since it retroactively in-
creased the "punishment" for their preenactment crimes. See ___
Taylor v. State of Rhode Island Dept. of Corrections, 908 F. ______ _____________________________________________
Supp. 92 (D.R.I. 1995).
II II
DISCUSSION1 DISCUSSION1 __________
A. The Ultra Vires Claim A. The Ultra Vires Claim _____________________
The district court concluded that the statutory inter-
pretation adopted by the Department exceeded the scope of its
delegated authority because it (i) results in an unauthorized
"retroactive" application and (ii) would not be accorded defer-
ence by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. As the plain language of
the statute demonstrates that the Department did not exceed its
mandate, we demur.
Under Rhode Island law, it "is well established . . .
that statutes and their amendments are presumed to apply prospec-
tively." Hydro-Manufacturing v. Kayser-Roth, 640 A.2d 950, 954 ___________________ ___________
(R.I. 1994). See also VanMarter v. Royal Indem. Co., 556 A.2d ___ ____ _________ ________________
____________________
1We review summary judgment rulings de novo, and must uphold __ ____
them if the record, "viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, reveals no trialworthy issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Velez-Gomez v. SMA Life Assur. Co., 8 F.3d 873, 874-75 (1st Cir. ___________ ___________________
1993).
4
41, 44 (R.I. 1989); Lawrence v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 523 A.2d ________ ____________________
864, 869 (R.I. 1987). It is only in the event that "it appears
by strong, clear language or necessary implication that the
Legislature intended the statute or amendment to have a retroac-
tive effect," id.; see also Pion v. Bess Eaton Donuts Flour Co., ___ ___ ____ ____ ____________________________
Inc., 637 A.2d 367, 371 (R.I. 1994), that the new enactment "will ____
be interpreted to operate retrospectively." Avanzo v. Rhode ______ _____
Island Dept. of Human Servs., 625 A.2d 208, 211 (R.I. 1993). ____________________________
The statute itself explicitly states that the offender
fee "shall not be effective until the date the rules and regula-
tions are filed." R.I. Gen. Laws 42-56-38. Thus, its plain
language requires no interpretation, see Whitehouse v. Rumford ___ __________ _______
Liability & Ins. Co., 658 A.2d 506, 508 (R.I. 1995), as it ______________________
mandates prospective application. See, e.g., Hydro-Manufactur- ___ ____ _________________
ing, 640 A.2d at 955 (statute which states that it "shall take ___
effect upon passage" evinces plain legislative intent that it be
given only prospective application); Avanzo, 625 A.2d at 211 ______
(holding that phrase "shall take effect" indicates legislative
intent that statute be given prospective effect). As the Rhode
Island Legislature explicitly delegated to the Department the
responsibility for promulgating and filing the required imple-
menting rules and regulations with the Secretary of State before
the offender fee program could take effect, R.I. Gen. Laws 42-
56-38, and there is no claim that the Department failed to comply
with the legislative mandate, its designation of a later (July 1,
1994) effective date could not render its interpretation either
5
ultra vires or retroactive.2 _____ _____
B. The Ex Post Facto Claim B. The Ex Post Facto Claim _______________________
The district court awarded appellees summary judgment
on their claims that the offender fee statute violates the Ex
Post Facto Clause under both the United States Constitution and
the Rhode Island Constitution.3 As the Rhode Island Supreme
Court has held that Federal Ex Post Facto Clause jurisprudence
likewise guides the required analysis under the Rhode Island
Constitution, Lerner v. Gill, 463 A.2d 1352, 1356 (R.I. 1983), ______ ____
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1010 (1985), these claims merge. _____ ______
The Ex Post Facto Clause effectively prohibits laws
____________________
2It appears that the district court may have been misled by
an ambiguity in the statutory language, which states that the
offender fee shall apply to "each sentenced offender committed to _________
the care, custody or control of the [Department]." R.I. Gen.
Laws 42-56-38 (emphasis added). The court correctly noted that
"[t]he word 'committed' could mean either 'who has been commit-
ted,' which would include existing probationers, or 'who is
committed,' which would implicate only new probationers."
Taylor, 908 F. Supp. at 104. However that may be, we suggest, ______
the Department's interpretation cannot be considered ultra vires. _____ _____
As the agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the
statute, it was entirely appropriate that the Department
disambiguate the statutory language. See Gallison v. Bristol ___ ________ _______
Sch. Comm., 493 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I. 1985). __________
We need not decide at this time, however, whether the
Department's interpretation of the term "committed" would be
material under a due process analysis. See Avanzo, 625 A.2d at ___ ______
208 (retroactive application violates due process); Lawrence, 523 ________
A.2d at 864 (due process challenge to explicitly-retroactive
legislation); but see Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection ___ ___ ___________________________________________
Corp. v. Brown, 659 A.2d 95, 103 (R.I.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. _____ _____ _____ ______
476 (1995) (retrospectivity alone does not render statute viola-
tive of due process).
3Article 1, 10, of the United States Constitution pro-
vides: "No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law."
Article 1, 12, of the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island
reads: "No ex post facto law . . . shall be passed."
6
"'retroactively alter[ing] the definition of crimes or
increas[ing] the punishment for criminal acts.'" California __________
Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 115 S. Ct. 1597, 1601 (1995) ____________________ _______
(quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990)). See _______ __________ ___
also Hamm v. Latessa, 72 F. 3d 947, 956 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. ____ ____ _______ _____
denied, 117 S. Ct. 154 (1996). Thus, ex post facto laws operate ______ __ ____ _____
retroactively either to redefine a crime or increase its "punish-
ment." Morales, 115 S. Ct. at 1602 n.3. See also Dominique v. _______ ___ ____ _________
Weld, 73 F.3d 1156, 1162 (1st Cir. 1996). ____
It would appear that the parties failed to call the
district court's attention to significant precedents governing
the pivotal determination whether civil fees constitute "punish-
ment." See Taylor, 908 F. Supp. at 98. Although it involved a ___ ______
"double jeopardy" claim, United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 ______________ ______
(1989), applies as well in the ex post facto context. See Martel __ ____ _____ ___ ______
v. Fridovich, 14 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Halper for the _________ ______
view that a civil sanction is "punishment" only when it serves
the aims of retribution or deterrence).4 As we explained recent-
ly, the Halper "punishment" test applies to "fines, forfeitures, ______
and other monetary penalties designed to make the sovereign whole
for harm or loss that is quantifiable in monetary terms." United ______
States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710, 717 (1st Cir.) , cert. dismissed, ______ _______ _____ _________
S. Ct. (1996). Since it is clear that the challenged __ ____
____________________
4Subsequent to the district court decision in this case, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the Halper test for determin- ______
ing whether a civil fee constitutes "punishment" under the Double
Jeopardy Clause. See State v. One Lot of $8,560, 670 A.2d 772 ___ _____ _________________
(R.I. 1996).
7
offender fee fits the Stoller mold, the Halper "punishment" test _______ ______
applies. See also Artway v. Attorney General of State of New ___ ____ ______ __________________________________
Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1256 n. 18 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that ______
Halper test applies because Ex Post Facto Clause serves aims ______
similar to Double Jeopardy Clause); DiCola v. Food & Drug Admin., ______ __________________
77 F.3d 504, 506-07 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying Halper test to ______
both ex post facto and double jeopardy claims); Bae v. Shalala, __ ____ _____ ___ _______
44 F.3d 489, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1995) (employing Halper standard to ______
determine whether civil sanction implicates ex post facto con- __ ____ _____
cerns).
Halper adapted the Supreme Court's longstanding subjec- ______
tive test for defining "punishment," see DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 ___ ______ ________
U.S. 144, 160 (1960) ("The question is . . . whether the legisla-
tive aim was to punish that individual for past activity."), by
coupling it with an objective standard. Accordingly, under the
current regime governing civil provisions, we inquire not only
whether the legislative intent was punitive in nature, but ______
whether the challenged civil provision is "so extreme . . . as to
constitute punishment." Halper, 490 U.S. at 442. ______
For purposes of determining whether a law is penal in
nature, "the labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount
importance." Id. at 447. Rather, the court must "assess[]. . . ___
the [sanction] imposed and the purposes [it] may fairly be said
to serve. Simply put, a civil . . . sanction constitutes punish-
ment when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves
the goals of punishment[,]" id. at 448; see Martel, 14 F.3d at 3; ___ ___ ______
8
that is to say, retribution and deterrence. Halper, 490 U.S. at ______
448.
On its face, the offender fee statute, suitably located
among other Rhode Island civil statutes, imposes a civil charge.5
The modest fee authorized by the statute comprises no part of any
sentence imposed for the crimes committed by offenders. Rather,
it is expressly designed to "reimburse" the Department for costs
directly associated with providing goods and services required to
supervise probationers and parolees living in the community.
R.I. Gen. Laws 42-56-38. Moreover, all offender fee revenues
are dedicated to such use, Regulation 1.12.01(IV)(K), and waivers
are available to offenders unable to pay, Regulation
10.07.03(II)(E). Finally, the same monthly fee is assessed
against all offenders released into the community who are cur-
rently under Department supervision, without regard to the nature
or severity of their respective offenses.6 In our judgment, so
____________________
5Our research discloses no relevant legislative history.
6In determining that the offender fee constituted "punish-
ment," the district court ruled that it was part of "the law
annexed to the crime," Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798), ______ ____
since probation is punishment and the offender fee is linked to
appellees' probationary sentences. In our view, this analysis
overlooks several determinative distinctions.
First, though a probationary sentence is "punishment," the
supervisory services for probationers released into the community
are largely rehabilitative, both in nature and purpose. See R.I. ___
Gen. Laws 42-56-4(c) (Organization of department) ("Rehabilita-
tive services shall include . . . intermediary sanctions (includ-
ing but not limited to . . . probation, parole, restitution, and
community service) . . . ."). See also United States v. Cardona, ___ ____ _____________ _______
903 F.2d 60, 62 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that probation serves
goals of rehabilitation and public safety), cert. denied, 498 _____ ______
U.S. 1049 (1991); Tillinghast v. Howard, 287 A.2d 749, 752 (R.I. ___________ ______
1972) ("[I]t is for the purpose of giving a convicted accused the
9
modest a cost-based supervisory fee reasonably cannot be deemed
punitive in purpose, especially since any conceivable retributive _______
or deterrent effect could only be inconsequential. See Martel, ___ ______
14 F.3d at 3.
Finally, we inquire whether the fee nonetheless runs
afoul of the objective test announced in Halper: a monetary ______
assessment "that cannot be said solely to serve a remedial
purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment as we have come
to understand the term." Halper, 490 U.S. at 448. Under this ______
standard, the offender fee must be deemed "punitive" if it "bears
no rational relation to the goal of compensating the [State] for
its loss." Id. at 449.7 To state the question in this case is ___
to answer it.
____________________
opportunity for rehabilitation that he retains his liberty and is
placed on probation."). Second, the monthly fee is not imposed
on all offenders sentenced to probation, but only those actually
receiving the supervisory services whose costs are defrayed by
the fee. Regulation 10.07.03(II)(C)(3).
Thus, the offender fee differs materially from the fees at
issue in a case relied upon by appellees and cited by the dis-
trict court, see In re Petition of Delaware for a Writ of Manda- ___ ________________________________________________
mus, 603 A.2d 814 (Del. 1992), in which monetary sanctions were ___
imposed on the offenders at sentencing. The fees involved in __ __________
that case were blanket surcharges, calculated as percentages of
the criminal penalty, fine, or forfeiture imposed at sentencing,
rather than reimbursements for the costs of providing services to
the offenders. As the Halper Court explained, "it is the purpos- ______
es actually served by the sanction in question, not the underly-
ing nature of the proceeding giving rise to the sanction, that
must be evaluated." Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 n.7. ______
7We note no contention, and no evidence, that the $15.00
monthly fee exceeds the costs associated with providing Depart-
ment supervision of offenders released into the community. See ___
Halper, 490 U.S. at 452. ______
10
The offender fee statute mandates that "[m]onies
received under this section will accrue first to the department
of corrections for use to offset costs of the specific care or
service." R.I. Gen. Laws 42-56-38. The implementing regula-
tions in turn make clear that the offender fee was rationally
designed to promote its legislative objective; viz., reimburse- ___
ment of the Department for its costs in providing the required
supervisory services to its probationers and parolees. Regula-
tion 1.12.01(IV)(K). Furthermore, the implementing regulations
explicitly state that the offender fees collected from probation-
ers and parolees must be deposited in a restricted account,
exclusively available for defraying Department costs in affording
offenders the required community supervision.8 Thus, the legis-
lative intent actuating the offender fee program is entirely
remedial and its practical effect is neither retributive nor
deterrent in nature. Under the Halper test, therefore, the ______
offender fee is not punitive.9
____________________
8Moreover, as already noted, see supra p. 3, the offender ___ _____
fee is imposed only on probationers and parolees currently under
Department supervision in the community, not upon probationers in
"banked" status. Regulation 10.07.03(II)(C)(3). Thus, rather
than a blanket fee assessed at sentencing without regard to the
commencement or duration of any term of community supervision,
the Rhode Island offender fee is directly and rationally related
to recouping the State's costs in providing supervision to the
individual offenders for whose benefit the services are rendered.
Cf. In re Petition of Delaware for a Writ of Mandamus, 603 A.2d __ __________________________________________________
814 (Del. 1992); note 4 supra. _____
9The fact that nonpayment of the fee can be brought to the
attention of the court at a parole/probation revocation hearing,
see supra p.3, does not transform the fee into punishment. While ___ _____
revocation of parole/probation might constitute punishment, the
Supreme Court explained in Morales that courts must determine _______
11
III III
CONCLUSION CONCLUSION __________
For the foregoing reasons, the district court judgment
is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings on
appellees' procedural due process claims under state and federal
law. The parties shall bear their own costs.
SO ORDERED. SO ORDERED __ _______
____________________
whether a legislative change "produces a sufficient risk of
increasing the measure of punishment." Morales, 115 S. Ct. at _______
1603. A legislative change which creates only a "speculative and
attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect of
increasing the measure of punishment" is insufficient to raise
the ex post facto specter. Id. As the district court recog- __ ____ _____ ___
nized, any possible link between nonpayment of the offender fee
and the revocation of parole/probation is too attenuated to
render the offender fee violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause,
Taylor, 908 F. Supp. at 101, especially since inability to pay ______ _________ __ ___
constitutes grounds for waiver.
12
Document Info
Docket Number： 96-1002
Filed Date： 12/4/1996
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/21/2015