Rodriguez-Rodriguez v. Iberia Lineas Aereas ( 1996 )

USCA1 Opinion

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]



                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT



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          No. 96-1729



                          JESUS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ,



                                Plaintiff, Appellant,



                                          v.



                           IBERIA LINEAS AEREAS DE ESPANA,



                                 Defendant, Appellee.



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                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO



                    [Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
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                                        Before



                           Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges,
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                            and Woodlock,* District Judge.
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               Alberto Acevedo Colom on brief for appellant.
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               James  D.  Noel,  III  and  McConnell  Valdes on  brief  for
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          appellee.



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                                December 9, 1996



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          *Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.









































                    Per  Curiam.   This appeal stems  from a  suit alleging
Per  Curiam.
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          failure   to  pay   proper  overtime   and  other   extraordinary



          compensation in violation of both federal statutes and local law.



          The  plaintiff, Jesus  Rafael  Rodriguez  Rodriguez  (Rodriguez),



          alleges that his former employer, Iberia Lineas  Aereas de Espana



          (Iberia), a commercial passenger  airline, underpaid him during a



          portion of the period in which he served as its traffic manger at



          the Luis  Munoz Marin  International Airport in  Carolina, Puerto



          Rico.    Iberia  defended  on the  ground  that  the  plaintiff's



          position was "administrative"  and-or "executive" in nature,  and



          therefore exempt from the statutory sweep.



                    The district  court conducted a  three-day bench  trial



          concerning Rodriguez's allegations.  The court thereafter wrote a



          carefully reasoned opinion in which it concluded  that Iberia had



          carried the devoir of  persuasion in regard to the  applicability



          of the cited  exemptions.  See Rodriguez v. Iberia,  923 F. Supp.
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          304 (D.P.R. 1996).   The court thereupon dismissed  the complaint



          with prejudice and entered judgment for the defendant.  Rodriguez



          appeals.



                    Having  read the entire record and carefully considered



          the parties' briefs,  we find  no basis to  disturb the  district



          court's  decision.    Moreover,  we  have  determined  that  oral



          argument of this appeal would not advance the decisional process.



          In the final analysis, we regard this as a suitable case in which



          to act upon our previously stated belief that when "a trial court



          has  produced a  first-rate  work product,  a reviewing  tribunal





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          should  hesitate to wax longiloquent simply to hear its own words



          resonate."  In re  San Juan Dupont Plaza  Hotel Fire Litig.,  989
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          F.2d  36,  38  (1st Cir.  1993).    Consequently,  we affirm  the



          judgment for substantially the  reasons elucidated in the opinion



          below.  We add only a brief comment.



                    Rodriguez  rehashes the  evidence and  essentially asks



          that we reweigh the facts  de novo.  Our proper  office, however,



          is  much  more  circumscribed.    Following  a  bench  trial,  an



          appellate court is  not warranted in rejecting  the trial judge's



          "findings of  fact or conclusions drawn therefrom  unless, on the



          whole of the  record, [the  court of appeals]  form[s] a  strong,



          unyielding belief that  a mistake  has been made."   Cumpiano  v.
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          Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1990); see also
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          Fed.  R. Civ. P. 52(a).  Contrary to Rodriguez's suggestion, this



          paradigm applies  full force to  findings of fact  concerning the



          significance (or  lack of significance) of  documentary evidence.



          See Reliance Steel Prods. Co. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 880 F.2d
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          575, 576 (1st  Cir. 1989);  RCI Northeast Servs.  Div. v.  Boston
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          Edison Co., 822 F.2d 199, 202-03 (1st Cir. 1987).
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                    The   clearly   erroneous   standard   of   review   is



          determinative of the outcome here.  The record, read objectively,



          does not yield a conviction that a mistake has been  made.  Thus,



          clear error is clearly absent.



                    This does not mean,  of course, that the case  was open



          and  shut at the district court level.   But once the trier found
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          the facts, the dynamics changed.  Where, as here, the trial court





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          has  indulged no  error of  law and  its conclusions  following a



          jury-waived   trial  are   dependent  upon   its  choices   among



          conflicting facts  and its elections  as to  which inferences  to



          draw  from the  facts as  found, appellate  tribunals are  not at



          liberty  to meddle.   See Foster v.  Dalton, 71 F.3d  52, 55 (1st
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          Cir. 1995); Irons v. FBI, 811 F.2d 681, 684 (1st Cir. 1987).  Nor
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          do the appellant's criticisms of certain testimony suffice to tip



          the  balance; credibility calls  are for the  district court, not



          for the court of appeals.   See Anthony v. Sundlun, 952 F.2d 603,
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          606 (1st Cir. 1991).



                    We  need go no further.   The judgment  of the district



          court is summarily affirmed.  See 1st Cir. R.27.1.
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                    Affirmed.
Affirmed.
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