Rivera-Feliciano v. United States ( 1997 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion



    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]



    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

    ____________________

    No. 96-1233

    ANGEL RIVERA-FELICIANO,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Defendant, Appellee.

    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

    [Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________

    Coffin and Campbell, Senior Circuit Judges. _____________________

    ____________________

    Jose F. Quetglas Jordan for appellant. _______________________
    Philip Urofsky, Attorney, with whom John C. Keeney, Acting _______________ ________________
    Assistant Attorney General, Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, and _____________
    Theresa M.B. Van Vliet, Chief, Narcotic & Dangerous Drug Section, _______________________
    Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, were on brief for the
    United States.


    ____________________

    January 9, 1997
    ____________________





















    Per Curiam. Upon consideration of the record, the __________

    briefs and the arguments, we affirm the judgment of the

    district court for substantially the same reasons expressed

    by that court in its opinion and order of January 20, 1996.1

    We add the following: With regard to Rivera-

    Feliciano's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, his

    counsel's failure to move to dismiss the 1986 charges based

    on the earlier plea agreement did not demonstrate

    constitutionally ineffective assistance as, for reasons

    explained in the opinion below, there was little likelihood

    that such a motion would have been allowed. See Strickland ___ __________

    v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-696 (1984). __________

    Rivera-Feliciano contends that the district court

    erred in assigning his 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition to Judge

    Perez-Gimenez, the judge who had presided over the 1986 trial

    and had sentenced him in Cr. Case No. 86-419(PG). Rather,

    appellant argues, the case should have gone to Judge Pieras,

    the judge who in 1985 had accepted his guilty plea in Cr.

    Case No. 85-114(JP), and sentenced him on the plea. This

    contention runs counter to Rule 4(a) of the Rules Governing




    ____________________

    1. The district court's opinion is published as Feliciano v. _________
    United States, 914 F. Supp. 776 (D.P.R. 1996). We note a _____________
    typographical error in the opinion: on page 778, at the
    beginning of the second paragraph under the heading
    "Background," "1986" should read "1985." See United States ___ _____________
    v. Rivera-Feliciano, 930 F.2d 951, 952 (1st Cir. 1991). ________________

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    Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District

    Courts, which provides, in relevant part:

    The original motion shall be presented
    promptly to the judge of the district
    court who presided at the movant's trial
    and sentenced him, or, if the judge who
    imposed sentence was not the trial judge,
    then it shall go to that judge who was in
    charge of that part of the proceedings
    being attacked by the movant.


    Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United

    States District Courts, Rule 4(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. 2255

    (1994).

    The section 2255 petition here challenged the

    convictions and sentences following trial in 1986. As Judge

    Perez-Gimenez had also been the trial judge in that

    proceeding, he was the appropriate judge to hear the

    petition. That petitioner's challenge to the 1986

    convictions and sentences was based on the 1985 plea

    proceeding is immaterial.

    Finally, we find no merit in the argument that the

    district court was required to accept as true, or hold an

    evidentiary hearing on, Rivera-Feliciano's conclusory

    allegation that the government had sufficient evidence to

    indict him in 1985 for charges later included in the 1986

    indictment. See Shraiar v. United States, 736 F.2d 817, 818 ___ _______ _____________

    (1st Cir. 1984) ("A 2255 motion may be denied without a

    hearing as to those allegations which, if accepted as true,



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    entitle the movant to no relief, or which need not be

    accepted as true because they state conclusions instead of

    facts . . . .") (citations omitted).

    As suggested in the district court's opinion, see ___

    Feliciano, 914 F. Supp. at 781 (quoting from United States v. _________ _____________

    Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1976)), it will ordinarily be _______

    up to the government to decide when it has sufficient

    evidence to prosecute. Here, the government offered a

    plausible reason for its delay, which the district judge

    could evaluate based on his having presided over the trial,

    to wit, that the testimony of Jos Panzardi-Alvarez was

    deemed essential to the 1986 conspiracy prosecution. The

    district court's determination that a separate hearing on the

    state of the government's evidence in 1985 was not needed in

    order to permit it to rule intelligently on the petition was

    well within its discretion. See Parsons v. United States, ___ _______ ______________

    404 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1968) (On motion to vacate sentence,

    federal district court has discretion to ascertain whether

    claim is substantial before granting a full evidentiary

    hearing) (per curiam).

    Affirmed. ________











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