United States v. Kerrigan ( 1997 )


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    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________


    No. 96-1558


    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Petitioner, Appellee,

    v.

    RICHARD M. KERRIGAN,

    Respondent, Appellant.

    ____________________


    No. 96-1559

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Petitioner, Appellee,

    v.

    MILDRED E. KERRIGAN,

    Respondent, Appellant.

    ____________________


    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Nancy J. Gertner, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Cyr, and Boudin, Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________


















    Richard M. Kerrigan on brief pro se. ___________________
    Loretta C. Argrett, Assistant Attorney General, Donald K. Stern, __________________ ________________
    United States Attorney, Charles E. Brookhart and Theodore M. ______________________ ____________
    Doolittle, Attorneys, Tax Division, Department of Justice, on brief _________
    for appellee.

    ____________________

    April 28, 1997
    ____________________



















































    Per Curiam. Richard and Mildred Kerrigan appeal pro se __________ ___ __

    from district court orders enforcing Internal Revenue Service

    ("IRS") summonses. We affirm.

    The Kerrigans argue that the summonses were issued for

    improper purposes and that the testimony and other data

    sought were already in the possession of the IRS. Contrary

    to the Kerrigans' suggestion, the fact of having been audited

    for six and a half years is not, by itself, sufficient to

    raise an inference of bad faith. Moreover, we think the

    Kerrigans failed to create a substantial question regarding

    their allegation that the IRS already possessed everything it

    sought. With the exception of third party bank records, the

    Kerrigans provided no specific details about what was

    provided, by whom, and when.

    Nor do we think the fact that the revenue agent admitted

    to having bank records shows bad faith. Cf. United States v. ___ _____________

    Groos Nat'l Bank of San Antonio, 661 F.2d 36, 37 (5th Cir. ________________________________

    Unit A Oct. 1981) (per curiam) (rejecting argument that

    because the IRS already had some of the information it sought ____

    in its possession the summonses were not issued in good

    faith). Rather, at most, it is a reason to restrict the

    scope of the enforcement order. See United States v. Davis, ___ _____________ _____

    636 F.2d 1028, 1037 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981); cf. United ___ ______

    States v. Medlin, 986 F.2d 463 (11th Cir. 1993) (upholding ______ ______

    enforcement order which granted partial relief by modifying



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    the summons). Here, the district court limited enforcement

    of the summons so as not to require the Kerrigans to provide

    third party records already produced.

    The Kerrigans' remaining contentions are either waived,

    because they are unaccompanied by some effort at developed

    argumentation, or are meritless. We note, in particular,

    that the district court did not err in declining to entertain

    the Kerrigans' counterclaim or in denying their discovery

    requests. Enforcement proceedings are designed to be

    summary. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 529 ___ _________ _____________

    (1971); United States v. Gertner, 65 F.3d 963, 966 (1st Cir. _____________ _______

    1995). Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are

    generally applicable to such proceedings, courts may limit

    their application when to apply them literally would impair

    the summary nature of the proceedings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. ___

    81(a)(3); Alphin v. United States, 809 F.2d 236, 238 (4th ______ ______________

    Cir. 1987). The Kerrigans' counterclaims (assuming for the

    sake of argument that they are viable) would have greatly

    prolonged the proceedings, and there was no abuse of

    discretion in declining to entertain them. And, having

    concluded at the hearing that the Kerrigans' allegations of

    bad faith largely boiled down to the fact that they have

    "disagreements with the IRS" (a conclusion we do not think is

    clearly erroneous), the court did not abuse its discretion in

    failing to allow the discovery requests.



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    Affirmed. ________



















































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