Adams v. Stephenson, M.D. ( 1997 )


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    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________


    No. 96-2266

    ANN S. ADAMS & JOSEPH F. ADAMS,

    Plaintiffs, Appellants,

    v.

    LARRY W. STEPHENSON, M.D.,

    Defendant, Appellee.

    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Circuit Judge, _____________
    Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
    and Lynch, Circuit Judge. _____________

    ____________________

    Ann S. Adams and Joseph F. Adams on brief pro se. ____________ _______________
    Nancy B. Schlacter, Howard M. Cooper and Todd & Weld on brief for __________________ ________________ ___________
    appellee.


    ____________________

    June 23, 1997
    ____________________



















    Per Curiam. In this pro se, diversity action, ___________

    plaintiffs Ann and Joseph Adams advance a trio of tort claims

    against defendant Dr. Larry Stephenson. Plaintiffs are in

    the business of preparing, editing and publishing medical

    texts and periodicals, often under the auspices of a

    Massachusetts corporation (Adams Publishing Group, Ltd.) of

    which plaintiff Ann Adams is the sole shareholder.

    Defendant, having worked with plaintiffs on earlier

    occasions, was engaged to edit a textbook published by the

    corporation in 1994. The instant action ensued when that

    relationship soured. After affording plaintiffs various

    opportunities to supplement their pleadings, the district

    court dismissed all claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for

    failure to state a claim. We affirm.

    It is true, as plaintiffs observe, that pro se

    complaints are accorded "an extra degree of solicitude."

    Rodi v. Ventetuolo, 941 F.2d 22, 23 (1st Cir. 1991). It is ____ __________

    also true that, at least in complex litigation, courts

    "normally hesitate" to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) prior to

    discovery, when "a party may not have all the facts."

    Resolution Trust Corp. v. Driscoll, 985 F.2d 44, 48 (1st Cir. ______________________ ________

    1993). Yet even a pro se plaintiff is required "to set forth

    factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting

    each material element necessary to sustain recovery under



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    some actionable legal theory." Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., ______ ________________

    851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir. 1988); accord, e.g., Dewey v. ______ ____ _____

    University of New Hampshire, 694 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1982) ____________________________

    (it is "not enough to allege a general scenario which could

    be dominated by unpleaded facts"; instead, the claim must "at

    least set forth minimal facts, not subjective

    characterizations, as to who did what to whom and why"). The

    demands on the pleader are not onerous: dismissal is

    appropriate at this stage only if "a lenient construction [of

    the complaint] demonstrates beyond doubt that the plaintiff

    can prove no set of facts to support [the] claim for relief."

    Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hosp., 26 F.3d 254, 260 (1st Cir. 1994). ________ ______________

    Yet "minimal requirements are not tantamount to nonexistent

    requirements"; "[t]he threshold [for stating a claim] may be

    low, but it is real." Gooley, 851 F.2d at 514; see also ______ ________

    Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 628 (1st Cir. ________ _____________________

    1996). Having exercised de novo review, we agree with the ________

    district court that, even with all reasonable inferences

    drawn in their favor, plaintiffs' amended complaint fails

    under these standards.

    The claim of interference with contractual rights

    requires little comment. See, e.g., Draghetti v. ___ ____ _________

    Chmielewski, 416 Mass. 808, 816 (1994) (listing elements of ___________

    claim). Defendant is alleged to have induced his former

    attorney to disclose proprietary information pertaining to



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    plaintiffs' business affairs, in violation of a

    confidentiality agreement reached in an earlier, unrelated

    lawsuit between plaintiffs and an individual represented by

    that same attorney. Plaintiffs were directed to submit,

    under seal, a description of the information that allegedly

    had been disclosed. They claim to have done so; they did

    not. Their submission recited the confidentiality provision

    in the agreement but failed to identify any actual

    information that was divulged. The resulting dismissal of

    this claim was therefore fully justified.

    Plaintiffs' "defamation" claim is subject to several

    alternative constructions. To the extent they are

    complaining of having been personally libeled, we agree with

    the district court that defendant's March 19, 1996 letter

    "was not reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation."

    Dulgarian v. Stone, 420 Mass. 843, 848 (1995) (internal _________ _____

    quotation omitted). Indeed, that letter (which cited a

    "controversy" over the rights to the textbook) made no

    mention of plaintiffs at all; it referred only to the Adams

    corporation, which owned the rights to the publication. We

    note in addition that, to the extent plaintiffs are advancing

    a claim of business defamation, they lack individual

    standing. Such a claim would belong to the Adams

    corporation, notwithstanding Ms. Adams' status as sole

    shareholder. See, e.g., Willis v. Lipton, 947 F.2d 998, ___ ____ ______ ______



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    1001-02 (1st Cir. 1991); Alford v. Frontier Enterprises, ______ _____________________

    Inc., 599 F.2d 483, 484 (1st Cir. 1979). A corporation, of ____

    course, may be represented in court only by counsel. See, ___

    e.g., American Metals Service Export Co. v. Ahrens Aircraft, ____ ___________________________________ ________________

    Inc., 666 F.2d 718, 719 n.2 (1st Cir. 1981). We fail to see, ____

    in any event, how defendant's reference to a "controversy"

    could be deemed defamatory--to either the plaintiffs or the

    corporation.

    The defamation claim might also be construed as one for

    "injurious falsehood," see, e.g., Dulgarian, 420 Mass. at 852 ___ ____ _________

    (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 623A (1977)), or,

    more particularly, a category thereof known as "slander of

    title," see, e.g., 37 Joseph Nolan & Laurie Sartorio, ___ ____

    Massachusetts Practice--Tort Law 132-33 (1989) (citing _________________________________

    Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, 624); Fischer v. Bar _____ _______ ___

    Harbor Banking and Trust Co., 857 F.2d 4, 7-8 (1st Cir. _______________________________

    1988); Erikson v. O'Brien, 362 Mass. 876 (1972). Again, _______ _______

    however, because the copyright to the textbook is held by the

    Adams corporation (rather than by plaintiffs personally), any

    such claim would belong to the corporation. Moreover,

    plaintiffs have made no allegation that special damages were

    sustained--a necessary element of the offense. See, e.g., ___ ____

    Sharratt v. Housing Innovations, Inc., 365 Mass. 141, 148 ________ __________________________

    (1974); Gott v. Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235, 238 (1877); 37 Nolan ____ ________

    & Sartorio, supra, 132, at 223-24. _____



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    Plaintiffs' remaining claim--for interference with

    advantageous business relationships--falters for much the

    same reasoning. See, e.g., Swanset Dev. Corp. v. City of ___ ____ __________________ ________

    Taunton, 423 Mass. 390, 397 (1996) (listing elements of _______

    claim). To the extent they are complaining of business

    opportunities lost by the Adams corporation, they again lack

    standing. The amended complaint is devoid of any description

    of plaintiffs' personal business pursuits, much less of how

    such pursuits may have been affected by defendant's actions.

    Nor have plaintiffs made any reference to actual damages--

    i.e., the "loss of advantage directly resulting from the

    defendant's conduct," Elm Medical Lab., Inc. v. RKO General, _______________________ ____________

    Inc., 403 Mass. 779, 787 (1989)--which is a necessary element ____

    of such a claim, see, e.g., Sharratt, 365 Mass. at 148; 37 ___ ____ ________

    Nolan & Sartorio, supra, 98, at 133. _____

    For these reasons, we conclude that the amended

    complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

    granted. Plaintiffs' motion to strike transcripts comes too

    late and is therefore denied. Defendant's motion to strike ______

    appendix is denied as moot. ______

    Affirmed. ________











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