United States v. Schofield ( 1997 )


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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 96-2332

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    MICHAEL V. SCHOFIELD,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

    [Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________

    Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________

    and Boudin, Circuit Judge. _____________

    ____________________

    George J. West, by Appointment of the Court, for appellant. ______________
    Margaret E. Curran, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom ___________________
    Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, and Gerard B. Sullivan, __________________ ___________________
    Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for the United States.


    ____________________

    June 10, 1997
    ____________________





















    Per Curiam. Michael Schofield pled guilty to one count __________

    of being a "felon in possession" of a firearm, 18 U.S.C.

    922(g), and received a mandatory minimum sentence of 15

    years imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act

    ("ACCA"), id. 924(e)(1). He now appeals this sentence, ___

    arguing that certain prior state convictions in Rhode Island

    do not count as "predicate offenses" triggering the ACCA. We

    disagree and affirm.

    The ACCA establishes a 15-year mandatory minimum

    sentence for any person who violates section 922(g) and has

    three prior convictions "for a violent felony or a serious

    drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from

    one another." 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). Prior to Schofield's

    guilty plea, the government filed an information charging him

    with six prior "violent felony" convictions, which are also

    described in his Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR").

    On appeal, he does not challenge the classification as a

    violent felony of one robbery conviction. See PSR 40. ___

    Schofield does, however, argue that the other five

    convictions were not for "violent felonies" within the

    meaning of the statute.

    Schofield's argument might seem extraordinary with

    respect to his prior conviction for second degree robbery.

    See PSR 38. In the course of that offense, Schofield ___

    knocked his victim to the pavement and stole her purse--



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    certainly "violent" conduct. But the ACCA operates at a

    level of abstraction and requires courts, in determining

    predicate convictions, to employ "a formal categorical

    approach, looking only to the statutory definitions of the

    prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying

    those convictions." Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, ______ ______________

    600 (1990).

    Nevertheless, Rhode Island's second degree robbery

    offense is plainly a predicate offense for purposes of the

    ACCA. The statute--unchanged in pertinent part since

    Schofield's violation in 1991--defines second degree robbery

    as "robbery or other larceny from the person by force or

    threat, where there is no weapon and no injury and the victim

    is neither a handicapped person or an elderly person." R.I.

    Gen. Laws 11-39-1. The "force or threat" requirement

    undoubtedly brings the offense within the ACCA's category of

    violent felonies, which includes any felony that, inter alia, __________

    "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use

    of physical force against the person of another." 18 U.S.C.

    924(e)(2)(B).1


    ____________________

    1Accord United States v. Brown, 52 F.3d 415, 426 (2d ______ _____________ _____
    Cir. 1995) (New York attempted robbery conviction is a
    "violent felony"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 754 (1996); ____________
    United States v. Presley, 52 F.3d 64, 69 (4th Cir.), cert. ______________ _______ _____
    denied, 116 S. Ct. 237 (1995) (Virginia robbery conviction is ______
    "violent felony"); United States v. Dickerson, 901 F.2d 579, _____________ _________
    584 (7th Cir. 1990) (Illinois robbery conviction is "violent
    felony").

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    We are left to determine whether one or more of

    Schofield's breaking and entering convictions can serve as a

    predicate offense, bringing to three the total number of

    "violent felonies." One of those convictions was for

    breaking and entering a commercial or public building in

    violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 11-8-4. See PSR 39.2 We ___

    have previously held that convictions for conspiracy to

    violate this same statute are "violent felonies" within the

    meaning of U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(1), United States v. Fiore, 983 _____________ _____

    F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1024 _____________

    (1993); and cases interpreting that provision are pertinent

    in construing the ACCA's "violent felonies" category, see ___

    United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 18 n.3 (1st Cir. 1994). _____________ ______

    (Under Taylor, it is irrelevant whether the school was ______

    occupied or there was any actual threatened violence.)

    Because the schoolhouse breaking and entering offense was a

    violent felony, we need not consider the other three breaking

    and entering convictions.

    Finally, Schofield contends that the various prior

    offenses were not "committed on occasions different from one


    ____________________

    2As Schofield observes, the state judgment and other
    documents do not indicate the specific breaking and entering
    statute under which Schofield was convicted. But Schofield
    does not dispute the PSR's portrayal of the offense, which
    involved the breaking and entering of a public school
    building. Section 11-8-4 is the only Rhode Island breaking
    and entering statute that would have applied to this crime.
    See R.I. Gen. Laws 11-8-2 et seq. ___ _______

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    another," as required by section 924(e)(1). But there is no

    question that the three predicate offenses on which we have

    relied took place on different dates and at different

    locations, and that is all the ACCA requires. United States _____________

    v. Riddle, 47 F.3d 460, 462 (1st Cir. 1995). "Congress, ______

    thinking primarily about the protection of the public,

    adopted a definition of armed career criminal that ignores

    the duration of the career . . . or the lack of lengthy

    intervals or arrests between the crimes." Id. Because the ___

    district court properly sentenced Schofield under the ACCA,

    we need not reach his challenges to the alternative sentence

    imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines.

    Affirmed. ________



























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