United States v. McDonald ( 1997 )


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    _________________________


    No. 96-1534


    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Appellee,

    v.

    CECILIO F. MCDONALD,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    _________________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

    [Hon. Raymond J. Pettine, Senior U.S. District Judge]

    _________________________

    Before

    Selya, Circuit Judge,

    Hill,* Senior Circuit Judge,

    and Boudin, Circuit Judge.

    _________________________

    Robert D. Dimler , by appointment of the court, for appellant.
    Margaret E. Curran, Assistant United States Attorney, with
    whom Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, and Zechariah
    Chafee, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for
    appellee.

    _________________________


    August 20, 1997
    _________________________

    _______________




    *Of the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation.




    SELYA, Circuit Judge. In this proceeding, defendant-

    appellant Cecilio F. McDonald asks in the alternative (1) that we

    vacate his guilty plea because the district court failed to advise

    him of the applicable mandatory minimum sentence during the plea

    colloquy, or (2) that we set aside his sentence due to an alleged

    error in the calculation of his adjusted offense level. Taking

    second things first, we find no computational error. And while

    McDonald's first point is well-taken _ we agree that the district

    court erred in failing to apprise the appellant of the mandatory

    minimum sentence, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1) _ we find that this

    error was benign. Consequently, we affirm the appellant's

    conviction and sentence.

    I.

    Background

    On September 18, 1995, the authorities searched the

    appellant's one-bedroom apartment in Providence, Rhode Island,

    pursuant to a warrant. They found a cornucopia of drugs, money,

    and drug-related paraphernalia hidden in the parlor: 160.32 grams

    of crack cocaine, 2,656.47 grams of marijuana, $16,050 in cash,

    three digital scales, and two dust masks. They also found a 9mm

    semi-automatic pistol and a plastic bag containing several live

    rounds in a secret compartment in the bathroom vanity.

    A federal grand jury subsequently returned an indictment

    charging the appellant with possessing fifty grams or more of

    cocaine base (crack), intending to distribute it, in violation of

    21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) (1994). In due course, the


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    appellant pleaded guilty to the charge. During the plea colloquy,

    the district court questioned him extensively in order to ascertain

    that his guilty plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Yet

    the court neglected to mention that, due to the amount of crack

    involved, the offense carried a mandatory minimum ten-year

    sentence.

    Following standard practice, the district court

    commissioned the preparation of a Presentence Investigation Report

    (PSI Report). In it, the probation department reported that the

    amount of crack involved called for a base offense level (BOL) of

    36; recommended a series of adjustments to the BOL; hypothesized

    that the appellant belonged in criminal history category III; and

    forecast a guideline sentencing range of 210-262 months. In two

    places, the PSI Report unambiguously declared that a mandatory

    minimum sentence of ten years applied. The appellant (who told the

    court at sentencing that he had been afforded an ample opportunity

    to read and digest the PSI Report) filed a covey of objections, but

    he neither took issue with the applicability of the mandatory

    minimum sentence nor complained that its existence had previously

    been withheld from him.

    At the disposition hearing, the district judge determined

    that the BOL was 34, not 36. He made two adjustments, subtracting

    three levels for acceptance of responsibility, see USSG S3E1.1

    (1995), and adding two levels for possession of a firearm, see USSG

    S2D1.1(b)(1) (1995). The court then concluded that the appellant

    belonged in criminal history category I. These determinations


    4




    yielded a sentencing range of 135-168 months. See USSG Ch.5, Pt.

    A (Sentencing Table) (adjusted offense level 33, criminal history

    category I). The judge thereupon imposed a 135-month incarcerative

    sentence. This appeal ensued.

    II.

    Discussion

    We begin with the weapons enhancement, cognizant that the

    propriety vel non of that ruling may affect the harmless error

    analysis which the appellant's principal assignment of error

    entails.

    A.

    The Weapons Enhancement

    We review factual determinations made in the course of

    sentencing for clear error, mindful that such determinations need

    only be supported by preponderant evidence. See United States v.

    Lagasse, 87 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1996). Moreover, the district

    court's application of a relevant guideline to the facts of a given

    case is a fact-sensitive matter that engenders clear-error review.

    See United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 34 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir.

    1994). Under these standards, we must uphold the weapons

    enhancement in this case.

    There is no cause to tarry. A firearm is a "dangerous




    This is to be distinguished from questions anent the
    interpretation or overall applicability of particular guidelines to
    particular situations. Such questions are questions of law and are
    therefore subject to de novo review. See United States v. Muniz,
    49 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 1995).

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    weapon," and the relevant guideline instructs the sentencing court

    to increase the BOL by two levels if the defendant possessed "a

    dangerous weapon." USSG S2D1.1(b)(1). The Sentencing Commission's

    commentary and application notes weigh heavily in construing the

    guidelines, see Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42-46

    (1993); United States v. Fiore, 983 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1992), and,

    in regard to this guideline, the Commission tells us that "the

    adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it

    is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the

    offense." USSG S2D1.1(b)(1), comment. (n.3). We have consistently

    honored this advisory, see, e.g., Gonzalez-Vazquez, 34 F.3d at 24;

    United States v. Jackson, 3 F.3d 506, 509 (1st Cir. 1993); United

    States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 507 (1st Cir. 1990), and the

    appellant has offered us no persuasive reason to repudiate it

    today.

    Of course, a certain nexus between the weapon and the

    offense must be shown in order for the enhancement to lie. See

    Lagasse, 87 F.3d at 22. But to establish the link the prosecution

    need only prove that the defendant possessed the weapon during the

    currency of the offense, not necessarily that he actually used it

    in perpetrating the crime or that he intended to do so. See id.

    Furthermore, a defendant need not have had the weapon on his person

    for the enhancement to apply; any possession _ actual or

    constructive _ can trigger the two-level increase. See United

    States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1485 (6th Cir. 1996). Thus, "when

    the weapon's location makes it readily available to protect either


    6




    the participants themselves during the commission of the illegal

    activity or the drugs and cash involved in the drug business, there

    will be sufficient evidence to connect the weapons to the offense

    conduct." United States v. Corcimiglia, 967 F.2d 724, 727 (1st

    Cir. 1992); accord Lagasse, 87 F.3d at 22; United States v. Ovalle-

    Marquez, 36 F.3d 212, 225 (1st Cir. 1994).

    Here, the government satisfied its entry-level burden.

    It showed that the appellant constructively possessed a weapon _

    after all, the gun was found in the bathroom vanity of the home

    that he alone occupied _ and a reasonable factfinder could infer

    from the apartment's contents that the premises served as the

    command post for the appellant's drug-trafficking activities. In

    short, the weapon, though hidden, was readily available to protect

    the appellant, the cash, and the drugs that he kept on the

    premises.

    Where, as here, the government has shown that a firearm

    possessed by the defendant was present during the commission of the

    offense, the burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the

    factfinder that a connection between the weapon and the crime is

    clearly improbable. See Jackson, 3 F.3d at 509. On this record,

    we cannot fault the lower court for holding that the appellant

    failed to carry this burden. To be sure, the appellant denied all

    knowledge of the gun. But he neither adduced any evidentiary

    support for this denial nor suggested an innocent explanation for

    the gun's presence. Credibility calls are for the trier, see,

    e.g., United States v. St. Cyr , 977 F.2d 698, 706 (1st Cir. 1992),


    7




    and Judge Pettine was not obliged to credit the appellant's

    unsupported disclaimer of guilty knowledge.

    To summarize, we discern no clear error in the court's

    imposition of a two-level enhancement pursuant to USSG

    S2D1.1(b)(1).

    B.

    The Rule 11 Colloquy

    We turn now to the appellant's principal claim _ a claim

    that makes its debut on appeal. In many instances, we will decline

    to entertain issues that were not seasonably advanced in the nisi

    prius court. However, a different rule sometimes obtains when a

    defendant seeks for the first time to set aside his guilty plea in

    the court of appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Parra-Ibanez,

    936 F.2d 588, 593 (1st Cir. 1991); see generally Fed. R. Crim. P.

    32(e). Here, the defendant's allegation implicates a core concern

    of Rule 11 and the record on appeal is adequately developed to

    permit direct review. See United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 69

    F.3d 1215, 1219 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1343

    (1996). Hence, we consider the appellant's argument.




    When a defendant moves in the district court to withdraw a
    guilty plea, we usually test that motion by means of a set multi-
    part analysis. See United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 34 F.3d 19,
    22-23 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Parrilla-Tirado, 22 F.3d
    368, 371 (1st Cir. 1994). We have on occasion used this same
    analytic tool as a guide in cases in which a defendant alleges for
    the first time on appeal that the district court violated Criminal
    Rule 11. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Pineda, 55 F.3d 693,
    696 (1st Cir. 1995). The multi-part test is not obligatory. Here,
    where both the trial court's error and the harmlessness of that
    error are manifest, we need not perform the multi-part test.

    8




    By entering a guilty plea, a defendant effectively waives

    a myriad of important constitutional rights. Thus, due process

    demands that such a plea be made voluntarily, knowingly,

    intelligently, and with an awareness of the overall circumstances

    and probable consequences. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,

    243 n.5 (1969). To this end, Rule 11 has a predominantly

    prophylactic purpose. The main thrust of the rule is to ensure

    that a defendant who pleads guilty does so with full comprehension

    of the specific attributes of the charge and the possible

    consequences of the plea. See United States v. Lopez-Pineda, 55

    F.3d 693, 695 (1st Cir. 1995).

    In neglecting to apprise the appellant of the mandatory

    minimum sentence applicable to the offense of conviction, the

    district court tarnished an otherwise irreproachable plea colloquy

    and violated Rule 11. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1) (stating,

    among other things, that "before accepting a plea of guilty . . .

    the court must address the defendant personally in open court and

    inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant

    understands, . . . the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law").

    It follows that the appellant's claim of error is well founded.

    This determination does not end our inquiry. Not every

    violation of Rule 11 invalidates a guilty plea, and the Criminal

    Rules specifically instruct courts to disregard any defect in a

    Rule 11 proceeding that does not affect the defendant's substantial

    rights. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h). In other words, even an error

    implicating Rule 11's core concerns will not require vacating a


    9




    guilty plea if the error, in context, is harmless.

    In the case at hand, the error did not impair the

    appellant's substantial rights. The court imposed a sentence of

    135 months _ fifteen months longer than the mandatory minimum _ and

    calculated that sentence without any reference to the mandatory

    minimum. It is, therefore, readily apparent that because the

    guideline sentencing range (at its nadir) outstripped the mandatory

    minimum, the latter had no relevance to, and no actual effect upon,

    the appellant's sentence. Consequently, the district court's

    failure to apprise the appellant of the mandatory minimum was an

    error that did no discernible harm. See Lopez-Pineda, 55 F.3d at

    696; United States v. Johnson, 1 F.3d 296, 303 (5th Cir. 1993).

    The appellant's fallback position is that, as a result of

    the court's failure to inform him of the mandatory minimum

    sentence, he was deprived of the benefit of his bargain. This

    argument rests on the notion that, without the mandatory minimum,

    the appellant had a chance to obtain a sentence less than 120

    months; and, while this prospect induced him to change his plea,

    the undisclosed mandatory minimum rendered the prospect illusory.

    The short answer is that this notion does not comport

    with the facts: any chance that the appellant had to obtain a

    sentence of less than 120 months depended, at least in part, on

    avoiding the two-level upward adjustment for possession of a

    firearm. Since that enhancement was properly awarded, without any



    Indeed, the existence of the mandatory minimum presented the
    appellant with an opportunity, through the operation of the so-

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    reference to the mandatory minimum, the court's omission could not

    have affected the appellant's substantial rights.

    We need go no further. The purpose of insisting that the

    judge inform a defendant of the existence and potential

    applicability of a mandatory minimum sentence is to ensure that the

    defendant is not induced to change his plea because of a totally

    unrealistic expectation as to how mild a sentence he might receive.

    That purpose was not in any way frustrated by the omission that

    occurred here. Since the district court's bevue did not harm or

    prejudice the appellant in any cognizable way, the appeal founders.



    Affirmed.














    called "safety valve" provision, see 18 U.S.C. S 3553(f) (1994);
    USSG S5C1.2, to obtain an appreciably lower sentence. In the final
    analysis, however, the weapons enhancement blocked this avenue too.
    See USSG S5C1.2(2).

    We note in passing that the evidence strongly suggests that
    the appellant, notwithstanding the district court's omission, knew
    of the mandatory minimum sentence all along. For instance, he
    confirmed at the disposition hearing that he enjoyed ample
    opportunity to read the PSI Report and discuss it with his counsel
    _ and that report states in two places that the offense carries a
    ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. Furthermore, the possible
    application of the "safety valve" provision was discussed in open
    court at the change-of-plea hearing _ and that provision only comes
    into play where a mandatory minimum sentence is in effect.

    11