-
USCA1 Opinion
_________________________
No. 96-2071
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
v.
GARY T. DETHLEFS,
Defendant, Appellee.
_________________________
No. 96-2072
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
v.
DAVID C. WHITE,
Defendant, Appellee.
_________________________
No. 96-2073
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
v.
PETER CLAUDE PICCIANDRA,
Defendant, Appellee.
_________________________
No. 96-2074
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
v.
RICHARD RECORD,
Defendant, Appellee.
_________________________
No. 96-2075
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
v.
THOMAS K. STONE,
Defendant, Appellee.
_________________________
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge]
_________________________
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
_________________________
Margaret D. McGaughey , Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Jay P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, and Jonathan R.
Toof, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for the
United States.
John A. Ciraldo, with whom Perkins, Thompson, Hinckley &
Keddy, P.A., Richard M. Egbert, Robert N. Launie, Joseph J.
Balliro, Bruce B. Hochman , and Black, Lambert, Coffin & Rudman were
on consolidated brief, for the appellees.
_________________________
August 18, 1997
_________________________
SELYA, Circuit Judge . In this case, the sentencing court
granted a full three-level acceptance of responsibility discount to
each of five defendants (Gary T. Dethlefs, David C. White, Peter C.
Picciandra, Richard Record, and Thomas K. Stone) on the ground that
their guilty pleas were opportune. See USSG S3E1.1(b)(2) (1995).
Then the court essayed general, global downward departures under
USSG S5K2.0 (1995), reasoning that the defendants' pleas
substantially assisted the judicial system and the administration
of justice by obviating the need for trial of a complex,
potentially time-consuming case. Concluding, as we do, that the
record contains no sufficient justification for the downward
departures, we vacate the sentences and remand for resentencing.
I. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
To the modest extent that the offense conduct pertains to
the issues on appeal, we extract the facts from the undisputed
portions of the five presentence investigation reports, the plea
colloquies, and the transcripts of the sentencing hearings. See
United States v. Talladino, 38 F.3d 1255, 1258 (1st Cir. 1994);
United States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 51 (1st Cir. 1991). We also
consider the transcript of the hearing on the motions for downward
departures (which the district court expressly incorporated into
the sentencing record).
In September 1994, a federal grand jury in Maine returned
a superseding indictment which charged the five appellees and four
confederates with conspiring to possess and distribute marijuana
(count 1) and conspiring to commit tax fraud (count 3). See 21
3
U.S.C. SS 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846 (1994); 18 U.S.C. S 371
(1994). Count 2 of the indictment sought the forfeiture of certain
property based on the owners' involvement in the marijuana
operation. See 21 U.S.C. S 853 (1994); see also United States v.
White, 116 F.3d 948 (1st Cir. 1997) (discussing forfeiture aspect).
The court treated an epidemic of motions during the next several
months. Along the way, one defendant, Thomas Baker, entered into
a plea agreement and, for present purposes, dropped out of sight.
Faced with the prospect of trying eight defendants on
drug and tax charges, the district court opted to bifurcate the
anticipated trial and to sever defendants. See March 14, 1995
Order. The court proposed to start the process by trying five
defendants on the drug charges. A planned rehabilitation of the
Portland courthouse complicated the court's scheduling efforts.
After contemplating his options, Judge Carter moved the trial to
Bangor and decreed that Phase I would begin on September 6, 1995.
The record reflects that the judge vigorously promoted
plea negotiations. At pretrial conferences, defense counsel
bemoaned the government's rigidity and suggested that the court
This was to be Phase I, encompassing Record, Dethlefs, Baker,
Irvin Morris and Stuart Smith. Phase II was to involve trying the
Whites (who are siblings), Picciandra, and Stone on the same
counts. The bifurcation order left the tax count for subsequent
resolution. Some two months later, the court entered a new order
vacating the severance of the defendants into two groups but
retaining the principle of bifurcation. See May 12, 1995 Order;
see also United States v. Morris, 914 F. Supp. 637, 639 (D. Me.),
aff'd, 99 F.3d 476 (1st Cir. 1996). While the court referred to a
three-phased trial in subsequent discussions, the record leaves the
impression that only two phases a drug trial and a tax trial
would have been necessary.
4
could restore the balance if it agreed to depart downward from the
defendants' normal sentencing ranges. The judge signalled some
degree of receptivity to this idea, stating at one pretrial
conference:
If all of the defendants got together and
pleaded straight up in this case and made
strong arguments to me for downward departure
in order to recognize the alleviation of an
immense load upon the time, effort and
resources of this Court, I would consider it
very[,] very favorably.
On August 22, 1995, the appellees changed their pleas
pursuant to agreements which stipulated drug quantities but which
contained no other commitments as to sentencing. In anticipation
of their disposition hearings, the appellees moved for downward
departures on the ground that their guilty pleas substantially
assisted the judiciary by conserving resources important to
judicial administration. The district court entertained oral
argument. During the hearing, the court expressed concern about
whether it had the authority to, or should, depart downward "for
conduct of these defendants consisting of their tender of guilty
pleas" which "results in a benefit to the Court in aiding in the
conservation of judicial resources without direct benefit to the
prosecution." Despite its avowed reservations, the court concluded
that "there was a substantial benefit that accrued to the Court
from the fact that it did not have to go to trial in this case";
that the proceedings would have been "very complex" and would have
generated a host of issues on appeal; that, due to bifurcation, the
trial proceedings would have taken four to six months of courtroom
5
time spanning a period of ten to twelve months, followed by a
significant post-trial motion practice; and that the situation
would have been exacerbated by the transfer of the case to Bangor
(which would have required Judge Carter to suspend operations in
Portland, transport his staff to Bangor, and disrupt the wonted
operations of the resident district judge).
Pondering these factors, Judge Carter concluded that the
entry of pleas was a mitigating circumstance which, given the
significant conservation of judicial resources that resulted, was
not adequately considered under the applicable guideline
provisions. He therefore announced that he would grant downward
departures in favor of all five appellees.
The court convened individualized disposition hearings.
We eschew the interstitial details of the various sentencing
computations, save only to note that each appellee received a
three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Judge
Carter calculated the guideline sentencing range (GSR) to be 87-108
months for White, Record, and Stone, see USSG Ch. 5, Pt. A
(Sentencing Table) (adjusted offense level 29; criminal history
category I), 108-135 months for Picciandra, see id. (adjusted
offense level 31; criminal history category I), and 235-293 months
Rebecca White also pleaded guilty in the same time frame, but
her case took a different turn. See United States v. White, ___
F.3d ___ (1st Cir. July 28, 1997) [No. 96-2215] (rejecting Rebecca
White's appeal). The two remaining defendants, Morris and Smith,
proceeded to trial on the drug charges and were acquitted. When
last we visited the matter, the government was preparing to try
them for tax fraud. See United States v. Morris, 99 F.3d 476, 478
(1st Cir. 1996).
6
for Dethlefs, see id. (adjusted offense level 37; criminal history
category II). The judge then essayed wholesale departures. He
sentenced White, Record, and Stone to 60-month incarcerative terms
and Picciandra to a 72-month incarcerative term (attributing the
larger departure to the perceived need "to maintain parity in terms
of receipt of proper recognition of benefit received by the
Court"). As to Dethlefs, the judge imposed a 175-month
incarcerative term, deeming him "entitled to a very significant
downward departure for his role in bringing about the pleas of five
other defendants, and in bringing to the Court his own plea,
obviating the need for extensive trial proceedings." Displeased by
the court's rulings, the government appealed.
II. ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY
These appeals present two distinct questions. We first
address the easier question: acceptance of responsibility.
Whether a defendant has accepted personal responsibility is a fact-
intensive determination. Absent an error of law, we will not
disturb the sentencing court's judgment in this area unless it is
clearly erroneous. See Talladino, 38 F.3d at 1263; United States
v. Morillo, 8 F.3d 864, 871 (1st Cir. 1993).
The applicable guideline provision is USSG S3E1.1 (1995),
reprinted in the appendix. It authorizes a basic two-level
reduction in a defendant's offense level if the court determines
In addition to prison sentences, the court also imposed terms
of supervised release on all the appellees; levied special
assessments but no fines; and entered forfeiture orders against
White, Record, and Dethlefs.
7
that he has accepted responsibility. See id. S3E1.1(a). A
recently added subsection permits an additional one-level reduction
for certain defendants, provided that the court makes particular
findings. See id. S3E1.1(b). The district court gave all five
appellees the full three-level discount pursuant to section
3E1.1(b)(2).
The government concedes the appellees' entitlement to the
basic two-level reduction and also concedes that they meet the
threshold eligibility criteria for the bonus one-level reduction.
But the government strenuously protests the appellees' entitlement
to that bonus. Section 3E1.1(b)(2) requires a finding that a
defendant "timely notif[ied] authorities," that is, the prosecution
and the court, "of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby
permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and
permitting the court to allocate its resources efficiently," and
the government says that pleas tendered more than a year after
indictment and only two weeks before trial cannot meet that
benchmark.
To be sure, we have upheld the denial of a one-level
discount under section 3E1.1(b) in situations where defendants have
waited less time to plead, see, e.g., United States v. Nunez-
Rodriguez, 92 F.3d 14, 17 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1996); Morillo, 8 F.3d at
872, and we have suggested that defendants who put the prosecutors
through their paces by loosing a heavy barrage of pretrial motions
(as did the appellees) usually cannot expect to receive the bonus
discount, see United States v. Munoz, 83 F.3d 7, 9 n.1 (1st Cir.
8
1996) (per curiam) (dictum). But generalities are often unhelpful
in specific cases, and the trier's judgment on acceptance of
responsibility issues is entitled to great respect. See USSG
S3E1.1, comment. (n.5); see also United States v. Royer, 895 F.2d
28, 29 (1st Cir. 1990).
Here, the district judge made particularized findings and
articulated a plausible basis for his determination that the
appellees had satisfied the timeliness requirement:
I think the timeliness of notification in
these cases is one that is in some sense
relative . . . . Here it is clear to the
Court that the plea entered at a point in time
[taking into account] the total future
duration of this effort if the pleas were not
entered, such that they did serve the purpose
intended to be served by section 3E1.1(b)(2),
of cutting off a significant portion of
preparation for trial . . . and afford[ing]
the Court an opportunity to employ its
resources to good advantage and in an
efficient manner. I think there was a
timeliness in that respect in the full context
and circumstances of the case . . . .
Although the matter is arguable, we cannot say that this
finding is clearly erroneous. Timeliness is a concept, not a
constant, and it normally must be evaluated in context. This is
especially true in connection with section 3E1.1(b), since that
guideline defines timeliness in functional, rather than strictly
temporal, terms. See USSG S3E1.1, comment. (n.6) ("The timeliness
of the defendant's acceptance of responsibility . . . is context
specific."); see also United States v. Wetwattana, 94 F.3d 280,
285-86 (7th Cir. 1996). Thus, the timeliness requirement of
section 3E1.1(b)(2) cannot always be measured simply by counting
9
calendar pages.
The trial court, which enjoys a superior coign of
vantage, found that the notification given, though late in absolute
terms, was still early enough in the game to be of substantial
benefit to both the prosecution and the court because it
forestalled the need to make final preparations for a full-scale
drug trial, and, perhaps more importantly, because it eliminated
the arduous task of preparing to try, and then actually trying, the
tax charge vis-a-vis the appellees. On this basis, the district
court's finding that the appellees timely notified the authorities
of their intent to enter guilty pleas is supportable.
III. THE DOWNWARD DEPARTURES
The government assigns error to all five downward
departures. We review departures for abuse of discretion, see Koon
v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2046-47 (1996), employing an
analysis which, like all Gaul, is divided into three parts. First,
we determine as a theoretical matter whether the stated ground for
departure is permissible under the guidelines. If the ground is
theoretically appropriate, we next examine whether it finds
adequate factual support in the record. See United States v. Diaz-
Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1989). If so, we must probe
the degree of the departure in order to verify its reasonableness.
While this prong of the test poses a question of law, see
Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2047, it nonetheless falls within the abuse of
discretion rubric. That "standard includes review to determine
that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions."
Id. at 2048.
10
See United States v. Quinones, 26 F.3d 213, 219 (1st Cir. 1994).
In this instance, the government posits that the district court's
departure decisions fail each prong of this tripartite test.
A. The Ground for Departure.
The lower court departed under USSG S5K2.0 (1995) (the
text of which is reprinted in the appendix). This proviso, echoing
18 U.S.C. S 3553(b) (1994), permits (but does not require) a
sentencing court to venture outside the GSR if it detects "an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a
sentence different from that described." Not any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance will do; the circumstance must "render the
case atypical and take it out of the ``heartland' for which the
applicable guideline was designed." United States v. Carrion-Cruz,
92 F.3d 5, 6 (1st Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
Here, the court's stated basis for departing was
substantially the same in respect to all five appellees: the
significant conservation of judicial resources which the entry of
a guilty plea yielded. Consequently, we first must ask whether, in
theory, a guilty plea which conserves judicial resources and
thereby facilitates the administration of justice is a mitigating
feature on which a court may predicate a downward departure (which
we sometimes shall call a "facilitation" departure). Although this
issue has generated disagreement among the courts of appeals, it is
new to us.
11
The touchstone for our analysis is Koon. There, the
Justices made it clear that, in considering whether a valid basis
for departure exists, an inquiring court should take a series of
related steps. The initial step is to identify "[w]hat features of
th[e] case, potentially, take it outside the Guidelines'
``heartland,'" thus making it "special" or "unusual." Koon, 116 S.
Ct. at 2045 (quoting United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949
(1st Cir. 1993)). After the distinguishing feature has been
identified, the next step is to determine whether the Sentencing
Commission has prohibited departures based on that feature. See
id. If so, the inquiry ends. But if the Commission has not
outlawed departures on that account, the court must ascertain
whether the Commission has considered the identified feature at
all, and if so, whether it has either encouraged or discouraged
departures premised thereon. See id.
Once this segment of the analysis is complete, the
contours of the sentencing court's authority to depart begin to
take shape. If the distinguishing feature is a factor which is not
mentioned in the sentencing guidelines, the court, mindful of the
"structure and theory" of the guidelines, is free to decide whether
that feature logically suffices to remove the case from the
heartland. Id. If, however, the distinguishing feature is a
discouraged factor or an encouraged factor which already has been
taken into account in the framing of the applicable guideline, the
court may depart only if the feature is present to an exceptional
degree or the case is distinctive in some other way. See id.
12
In this case, the sentencing judge identified a feature
_ a timely guilty plea which conserved judicial resources and
thereby facilitated the administration of justice _ which he
thought differentiated the case from those within the heartland.
Because the government concedes that the Commission has not
expressly forbidden courts from considering this feature, the
pivotal issue becomes whether the Commission took the identified
feature into account in formulating the guidelines (and if so, to
what end). This issue implicates the reach of two guidelines, USSG
SS3E1.1 and 5K1.1, the full text of which we set out in the
appendix. We discuss them in reverse order.
Section 5K1.1 depends on a defendant's "assistance to the
authorities," a phrase which, in context, means assistance to the
prosecution. The language of that section targets assistance in
reference to interests and duties unique to the prosecution. See
USSG S5K1.1 (referring to "substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person"); see also USSG Ch.
1, Pt. A, intro. comment. 4(g). Indeed, a sentencing judge cannot
depart under section 5K1.1 unless the prosecution chooses to place
that guideline in play. See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181,
185 (1992); United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1155 (1st Cir.
1993). We think it is extremely unlikely that the Commission, if
it had considered a defendant's assistance to the courts under
section 5K1.1, would have placed the availability of such a
departure in the prosecutor's sole discretion. It is, after all,
self-evident that what is beneficial for the administration of
13
justice and what is of assistance to the prosecution are not
necessarily congruent, and the judge, not the prosecutor, is in the
best position to assess a defendant's assistance to the judicial
system. It is equally self-evident that, even if assistance to the
prosecution accrues benefit to the court, or vice versa, the extent
of the conferred benefit can vary appreciably between the two
institutions.
USSG S3E1.1(b) is closer to the mark. It rewards the
efficient allocation of judicial resources which is a normal
concomitant of a guilty plea. Still, consideration under that
guideline is tied exclusively to timeliness. See id. comment.
(n.6). We easily can envision circumstances in which a guilty plea
materially assists a court (even though the assistance may not be
temporally focused) and confers benefits beyond scheduling
efficiency. Then, too, assistance to the court may result from
efforts which include, but which go well beyond, the timely entry
of a plea.
Courts are divided as to whether these guidelines leave
any room for facilitation departures. The court below saw no
barrier. It relied mainly on United States v. Garcia, 926 F.2d 125
(2d Cir. 1991). There, three defendants initially pleaded not
guilty to drug-trafficking charges. Two months later, one of them,
Garcia, agreed to furnish information and testify for the
But cf. Charles Erwin Wilson, To the Senate Armed Forces
Committee (1952) (suggesting that "[w]hat is good for the country
is good for General Motors, and what's good for General Motors is
good for the country").
14
prosecution. At that juncture, he pleaded guilty to the conspiracy
count in the indictment. Shortly thereafter, his codefendants
changed their pleas. See id. at 126. The sentencing court granted
Garcia a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility _ the
added level for timely notification of a guilty plea was not
available, as section 3E1.1(b) had not yet been adopted _ and then
departed downward on the ground that Garcia's actions had
facilitated the administration of justice. See id. at 126-27.
The Second Circuit upheld the sentence. It reasoned that
the guidelines did not adequately consider the mitigating
circumstances present in Garcia's case: USSG S5K1.1 focuses on
assistance to the government, not the judicial system, and
acceptance of responsibility as that term is used in USSG S3E1.1
differs qualitatively from activities facilitating the
administration of justice. See id. at 127-28. The court then
upheld the departure on the basis that:
[T]he additional assistance rendered the
[district] court in the disposition of the
charges against the other defendants justified
the departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.
As [the district judge] found, Garcia's
conduct "broke the log jam" in a multi-
defendant case. His relatively early guilty
plea and willingness to testify against co-
defendants induced [them] to enter guilty
pleas. This conserved judicial resources by
facilitating the disposition of the case
without a trial.
Id. at 128.
Garcia is to some extent a waif in the wilderness. Other
appellate courts, fortified in their resolve by the enactment of
USSG S3E1.1(b), see USSG App. C, amend. 459 (effective Nov. 1,
15
1992), have declined to follow Garcia, concluding that, because the
sentencing guidelines adequately consider a defendant's assistance
to the judicial system under sections 3E1.1 and 5K1.1, facilitation
is not a permissible basis for a downward departure. See, e.g.,
United States v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 260, 262-63 (4th Cir. 1995)
(upholding a district court's refusal to depart downward for
professed assistance to the judicial system), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 732 (1996); United States v. Haversat, 22 F.3d 790, 794-95 &
n.5 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing the sentencing court and holding
that neither the defendant's early plea nor his help in settling a
related civil suit warranted a downward departure under USSG
S5K2.0); United States v. Shrewsberry, 980 F.2d 1296, 1297-98 (9th
Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (rejecting the defendant's plaint that she
should receive a downward departure for her aid in cracking a
case). Indeed, the Fourth Circuit went so far as to say that "[w]e
can envision no circumstance in which ``assistance to the judicial
system' would not also be of assistance to the Government."
Dorsey, 61 F.3d at 262.
The problem with all these cases, Garcia included, is
that they were decided without the benefit of Koon. We read Koon
to mean that courts, as a general rule, should not categorically
reject any factors (save only forbidden factors and factors which
lack relevance) as possible bases for departures. See Koon, 116 S.
Ct. at 2051 (warning that too ready resort to categorical
interpretations "would nullify the Commission's treatment of
particular departure factors and its determination that, with few
16
exceptions, departure factors should not be ruled out on a
categorical basis"); see also USSG Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro. comment.
4(b) (explaining that, apart from forbidden factors, the Sentencing
Commission "does not intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether
or not mentioned anywhere else in the guidelines, that could
constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case"). Post Koon,
it would be folly to conclude that a timely guilty plea which
conserves judicial resources and thereby facilitates the
administration of justice must not be considered under any
circumstances in the departure calculus.
On this basis, then, we hold that a categorical bar (such
as the government urges here) would contradict Koon and undermine
the theoretical foundations on which the sentencing guidelines
rest. See United States v. Olbres, 99 F.3d 28, 34-35 (1st Cir.
1996). Viewed at an appropriate level of generality, cf. Koon, 116
S. Ct. at 2047, the mere existence of sections 5K1.1 and 3E1.1(b)
does not foreclose the theoretical possibility of predicating a
downward departure on such conduct. Cf., e.g., Olbres, 99 F.3d at
36 (reaching a substantially similar conclusion as to business
failure and attendant loss of jobs by innocent employees stemming
from a defendant's proposed incarceration); Rivera, 994 F.2d at 953
(reaching a substantially similar conclusion as to a defendant's
family circumstances); United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 116
(1st Cir. 1990) (reaching a substantially similar conclusion as to
a defendant's rehabilitation).
B. The Factual Predicate.
17
To this point, we have established that, consistent with
the method of the sentencing guidelines as elucidated in Koon, a
defendant's timeous agreement to enter a plea and his actions
ancillary thereto may have ameliorative consequences so far beyond
ordinary expectations as to warrant a downward departure for
conserving judicial resources and thereby facilitating the
administration of justice. We next inquire whether the court below
had a sufficient factual predicate for its determination that the
departure-justifying feature exists in this situation to a degree
which suffices to distinguish the case from the mine-run. See
Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2045.
Departures which depend on the presence of a
distinguishing characteristic to an exceptional degree are
sometimes called quantitative departures (as opposed to qualitative
departures, which depend upon the presence, simpliciter, of a
distinguishing characteristic). See Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R.
Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure Jurisprudence Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 22-24
(1991). Although descriptions of the phenomenon vary, their
essence remains the same: when a sentencing court mulls a ground
already considered by the Commission, there must be something very
special about how that ground manifests itself in the particular
case if it is to bear the weight of a departure. See Koon, 116 S.
Ct. at 2045; Rivera, 994 F.2d at 949.
Judge Carter understood the nature of this inquiry. He
reasoned that the appellees' guilty pleas negated a potentially
18
cumbersome trial and thus accrued a substantial benefit to the
court. He premised this conclusion primarily on four subsidiary
determinations: (1) the appellees' courage in changing their pleas
without first having secured any commitments as to sentencing, (2)
the length of the anticipated trial, (3) the case's complexity, and
(4) the need to relocate the proceedings to Bangor. In the judge's
view, these circumstances made the case sufficiently atypical to
warrant departures across the board.
In our estimation, the collateral circumstances relied on
by the sentencing court, whether viewed singly or in combination,
do not justify the wholesale departures that ensued.
We start with the most obvious point. To the extent that
the district court based its departure decision on the fact that
the appellees, though facing potentially severe sentences, entered
pleas without sentencing agreements, it erred. Notwithstanding
that most categorical interpretations are disfavored under the Koon
Court's regime, some boundaries are essential if the guidelines are
not to be emptied of all meaning. Considering a straight plea as
a factor supporting departure impinges upon one of these
boundaries. Permitting courts to pass freely across this line
would intrude upon the Commission's prerogatives and undercut the
sentencing guidelines. After all, the Commission specifically
recognized the high percentage of guilty pleas in federal criminal
The court colorfully described this scenario as one in which
the appellees had agreed "to plead with their hearts in their
throats . . . knowing that the sky is the limit and the judge
determines the height."
19
cases, see USSG Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro. comment. 4(c) (observing that
"[n]early ninety percent of all federal criminal cases involve
guilty pleas"), and pleading straight up is commonplace.
No deviation from this principle is warranted here. In
point of fact, these appellees did not tender bare pleas. They
received a significant concession in exchange for eschewing trial:
the government stipulated to drug quantities (a critical integer in
the formula for constructing a defendant's GSR). Even more
importantly, the district court indicated in advance that the
appellees could anticipate receiving solicitous treatment in
sentencing if they changed their pleas.
The remainder of the lower court's analysis is also
flawed. The court placed great emphasis on the fact that trial
would have taken four to six months, spread over a period spanning
ten months to a year. In and of itself, this estimate is puzzling.
The court had abandoned the idea of splitting the defendants into
groups for purposes of trial, and, in its procedural order setting
the conditions for the upcoming trial, entered on May 12, 1995, the
court had allotted 12 days for trial on the drug-related counts.
By coincidence, the drug-count trial of the two defendants who did
not plead took exactly 12 days. See United States v. Morris, 914
This appeal does not raise the question of whether the
district court's actions impinged on Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)
(ordaining that the sentencing court "shall not participate" in
plea discussions). Consequently, we express no opinion either on
that question or on the somewhat related question whether, with or
without regard to Rule 11(e)(1), the appellants might have a basis
for seeking to withdraw their guilty pleas.
20
F. Supp. 637, 639 (D. Me.) (recounting travel of the case), aff'd,
99 F.3d 476 (1st Cir. 1996). It is hard to believe that a separate
tax-fraud trial, if one proved necessary, would have consumed more
than this amount of time.
Judicial time is a valuable commodity, and to save a
half-year or more of trial time, along with jury costs and other
associated expenses, might be a significant savings. But multiple-
defendant/multiple-count criminal cases of the duration involved
here (five to six weeks seems a generous estimate) are not
uncommon. Even in the case of a trial projected to take much
longer, we think it would require a very detailed and specific
showing to give full weight to such a projection _ especially in
view of the perverse incentive created by encouraging defendants to
threaten to prolong proceedings as a wedge for obtaining downward
departures.
In the same vein, it will be exceedingly rare that the
complicated nature of an anticipated trial will warrant a downward
departure. While we can conjure up some byzantine case in which
complexity might be a proper factor in assessing whether the
defendant's facilitative conduct benefitted the judiciary to a
degree not contemplated by the applicable guideline range, cf.
Selya & Kipp, supra, at 31-37 (canvassing cases examining
collateral circumstances to gauge a factor's quantitative weight),
there is nothing so unusual about the complexities of a garden
21
variety drug-and-tax case that warrants departing.
The need to manage large, multi-defendant, multi-issue
cases arises in federal district courts with the approximate
frequency of acne in adolescence. This case does not appear to
present problems so out of the ordinary as to pluck it from the
mainstream. The case, in its most cumbersome form, involved nine
defendants and three counts. Trying such a case is no small chore,
but, given the evolution of federal criminal cases in the modern
era, it is not an atypical configuration. See, e.g., United States
v. Gallegos, 108 F.3d 1272, 1275 (10th Cir. 1997) (22 defendants,
23-count indictment); United States v. McKinney, 98 F.3d 974, 976
(7th Cir. 1996) (10 defendants, 12-count indictment), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1119 (1997); United States v. Anderson, 89 F.3d 1306,
1308 (6th Cir. 1996) (29 defendants, 56-count indictment), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 786 (1997).
Before leaving the imbricated topics of duration and
complexity, we offer two additional insights. First, we flatly
reject the notion that the prospect of burdensome post-trial
motions or difficult appellate issues, no matter how tricky or
time-consuming, can justify a downward departure. Second, we think
it is important to note that the district court took what amounted
Withal, we reject the government's claim that the prospective
length and complexity of the proceedings should be disregarded
because these attributes were aggravated by the court's bifurcation
order. Such trial management decisions are peculiarly within a
nisi prius court's discretion, see, e.g., United States v.
Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 770 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 1322 (1996); United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 974 (1st
Cir. 1995), and that discretion was not abused here.
22
to an abstract view of the gross benefit that would accrue as a
result of the guilty pleas. Since not all the defendants pleaded,
the court still had to try the drug case and the tax case, albeit
with fewer parties, and to resolve much the same tangle of legal
issues. Consequently, the net savings to the justice system were
considerably more modest than the court projected.
The final idiosyncracy identified by the court below _
the shortage of suitable courtroom space _ is a somewhat different
matter. Although we can find no precedent on the point, we assume
arguendo that the hardship of proceeding to trial during a major
courthouse rehabilitation project which puts adequate courtrooms in
short supply might be a relevant collateral circumstance.
Nevertheless, the record suffers from a dearth of information. For
example, there are insufficient facts concerning both the lack of
alternative facilities in Portland and the availability of
courtrooms in Bangor. While we might perhaps take judicial notice
of the existence of other courthouses, the record furnishes no
basis for us to determine whether those alternatives really were
inadequate. This scarcity of record support weakens the influence
As we read the record, the lower court did not place much
weight on this factor. It found a substantial benefit to the
judicial system apart from the issue of limited trial space and
stated only that the removal to Bangor compounded its
considerations.
To be sure, the court stated that the only Portland location
at which it could try criminal cases was in the Cumberland County
Courthouse and that "[t]he courthouse facility there available was
in the new, modern wing where the courtrooms are relatively small,
and none of those courtrooms that were available to this court as
a result of that agreement were adequate to try 8 defendants with
23
of the courthouse renovation on the departure determination. In
all events, what we know about the courtroom problem in this case
indicates fairly conclusively that this distinguishing feature does
not warrant departure.
It thus appears that the district court's reasons, taken
one by one, do not justify the dispensing of wholesale departures.
And while factors insufficient in themselves sometimes may suffice,
in combination, to wrest a case from the heartland and thus clear
the way for a departure, see, e.g., United States v. Bowser, 941
F.2d 1019, 1024-25 (10th Cir. 1991), this is not such an instance.
The court's articulated reasons, even when taken in cumulation,
lack the force which is necessary to transport the case
sufficiently beyond the realm of the ordinary.
To summarize, we hold that in an appropriate case a
defendant's timely entry of a guilty plea might facilitate the
administration of justice in such an unusual way, or to so
inordinate a degree, that it substantially exceeds the reasonable
expectations the sentencing commissioners likely harbored when
formulating the guidelines. Garcia is such a case (or so the
Second Circuit thought). In our judgment, however, merited
downward departures of this stripe are bound to be rare. That is
so because some facilitation flows from virtually every timely
upwards of twenty lawyers participating in trial." But the court
did not explain why the bankruptcy court facilities (which were
used during the renovation to conduct civil jury trials) were not
utilized, or why the original severance order could not have been
reinstated (thus paring the size of the queue), or whether the
availability of other state facilities outside of Portland but
closer than Bangor was explored.
24
guilty plea _ and the Sentencing Commission knew as much. Such a
readily foreseeable level of facilitation, while laudable, stops
well shy of what is necessary to take a case out of the heartland.
See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095, 1103 (2d Cir.
1992) (distinguishing Garcia on the facts); United States v.
Lockyer, 966 F.2d 1390, 1392 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)
(similar); United States v. Armstrong, 842 F. Supp. 92, 96 (S.D.N.Y
1994); United States v. Collazo, 798 F. Supp. 513, 518 (N.D. Ind.
1992). It is only the occasional instance, where circumstances
permit and the accused takes full advantage of them, that will
yield facilitation so dramatic as to cross the line. This is as it
should be: "If the guidelines are to provide a coherent system of
criminal sentencing, the trial court's right to depart, up or down,
must be restricted to those few instances where some substantial
atypicality can be demonstrated." United States v. Williams, 891
F.2d 962, 967 (1st Cir. 1989) (emphasis supplied).
On the record as it now stands, this case falls within
the general rule, not within the long-odds exception to it. Multi-
defendant criminal cases are mothers' milk in the federal courts.
So, too, are guilty pleas. Thus, multiple defendants participating
in the entry of guilty pleas, without quite a bit more, cannot
constitute the meaningful atypicality that is required to warrant
a departure. Here, there is not enough "more." Hence, the
departures were improvidently granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. The award of the third-level
25
acceptance of responsibility adjustment was not clearly erroneous.
As for the downward departures, we hold that, in theory, the court
had authority to depart for conduct (i.e., the timely guilty pleas)
which conserved judicial resources and thereby facilitated the
administration of justice. Here, however, the case for departure,
overall, falls so far short of Garcia that the court's global
departures cannot survive. We therefore vacate the appellees'
sentences and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
In this case, the record strongly suggests that not all the
appellees contributed in the same degree to bringing about the
global pleas. Moreover, in fixing the extent of the individual
departures, the judge commented on the especially significant
contributions that one or two defendants had made in breaking the
log jam. The court remains free, on remand, to pursue the question
of whether this is a distinguishing feature warranting a downward
departure in a particular instance. See Garcia, 926 F.2d at 128.
26
APPENDIX
S3E1.1. Acceptance of Responsibility
(a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates
acceptance of responsibility for his offense,
decrease the offense level by 2 levels.
(b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease
under subsection (a), the offense level
determined prior to the operation of
subsection (a) is level 16 or greater, and the
defendant has assisted authorities in the
investigation or prosecution of his own
misconduct by taking one or more of the
following steps:
(1) timely providing complete information to
the government concerning his own involvement
in the offense; or
(2) timely notifying authorities of his
intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby
permitting the government to avoid preparing
for trial and permitting the court to allocate
its resources efficiently,
decrease the offense level by 1 additional level.
USSG S3E1.1 (1995).
S5K1.1. Substantial Assistance to Authorities (Policy Statement)
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has
provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution
of another person who has committed an offense, the court may
depart from the guidelines.
(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the
court for reasons stated that may include, but are not
limited to, consideration of the following:
(1) the court's evaluation of the
significance and usefulness of the
defendant's assistance, taking into
consideration the government's evaluation
of the assistance rendered;
(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and
reliability of any information or testimony
27
provided by the defendant;
(3) the nature and extent of the
defendant's assistance;
(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or
risk of injury to the defendant or his
family resulting from his assistance;
(5) the timeliness of the defendant's
assistance.
USSG S5K1.1 (1995).
S5K2.0. Grounds for Departure (Policy Statement)
Under 18 U.S.C. S 3553(b) the sentencing court may impose
a sentence outside the range established by the
applicable guideline, if the court finds "that there
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
the guidelines that should result in a sentence different
from that described." Circumstances that may warrant
departure from the guidelines pursuant to this provision
cannot, by their very nature, be comprehensively listed
and analyzed in advance. The controlling decision as to
whether and to what extent departure is warranted can
only be made by the courts. Nonetheless, this subpart
seeks to aid the court by identifying some of the factors
that the Commission has not been able to take into
account fully in formulating the guidelines. Any case
may involve factors in addition to those identified that
have not been given adequate consideration by the
Commission. Presence of any such factor may warrant
departure from the guidelines, under some circumstances,
in the discretion of the sentencing court. Similarly,
the court may depart from the guidelines, even though the
reason for departure is taken into consideration in the
guidelines ( e.g., as a specific offense characteristic or
other adjustment), if the court determines that, in light
of unusual circumstances, the guideline level attached to
that factor is inadequate.
Where, for example, the applicable offense guideline and
adjustments do take into consideration a factor listed in
this subpart, departure from the applicable guideline
range is warranted only if the factor is present to a
degree substantially in excess of that which ordinarily
is involved in the offense. Thus, disruption of a
governmental function, S5K2.7, would have to be quite
28
serious to warrant departure from the guidelines when the
applicable offense guideline is bribery or obstruction of
justice. When the theft offense guideline is applicable,
however, and the theft caused disruption of a
governmental function, departure from the applicable
guideline range more readily would be appropriate.
Similarly, physical injury would not warrant departure
from the guidelines when the robbery offense guideline is
applicable because the robbery guideline includes a
specific adjustment based on the extent of any injury.
However, because the robbery guideline does not deal with
injury to more than one victim, departure would be
warranted if several persons were injured.
Also, a factor may be listed as a specific offense
characteristic under one guideline but not under all
guidelines. Simply because it was not listed does not
mean that there may not be circumstances when that factor
would be relevant to sentencing. For example, the use of
a weapon has been listed as a specific offense
characteristic under many guidelines, but not under
immigration violations. Therefore, if a weapon is a
relevant factor to sentencing for an immigration
violation, the court may depart for this reason.
An offender characteristic or other circumstance that is
not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence
should be outside the applicable guideline range may be
relevant to this determination if such characteristic or
circumstance is present to an unusual degree and
distinguishes the case from the "heartland" cases covered
by the guidelines in a way that is important to the
statutory purposes of sentencing.
USSG S5K2.0 (1995).
29
Document Info
Docket Number： 96-2071
Filed Date： 8/18/1997
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/21/2015