United States v. Guzman ( 1997 )


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    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________


    No. 96-1449

    UNITED STATES,

    Appellee,

    v.

    JOSE GUZMAN,

    Defendant, Appellant.

    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Circuit Judge, _____________
    Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
    Boudin, Circuit Judge. _____________

    ____________________

    Jose Guzman on brief pro se. ___________
    Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, William F. Sinnott, ________________ ___________________
    Assistant United States Attorney, and Carolyn Crotty Guttilla, Suffolk _______________________
    University Law School, on brief for appellee.


    ____________________

    December 16, 1997
    ____________________
















    Per Curiam. In this appeal from his sentence, Jose ___________

    Guzman raises three issues which he concedes were not raised

    in the district court. Accordingly, "his sentence can be

    reversed on [these grounds] only upon a showing of 'plain

    error.'" United States v. Olivier-Diaz, 13 F.3d 1, 5 (1st ______________ ____________

    Cir. 1993). After careful review of the record, we conclude

    that appellant has failed to make such a showing with respect

    to any of the issues he raises on appeal.

    The district court adopted the undisputed facts

    contained in the PSR, as permitted by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32. See ___

    United States v. Van, 87 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996). It was _____________ ___

    not "plain error" for the district court to find that those

    facts supported a finding that the substance distributed by

    appellant was "cocaine base" as that term is defined by the

    Sentencing Guidelines for the purposes of sentence

    enhancement. See U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c) and note (D). ___

    Nor does appellant's new sentencing factor manipulation

    claim provide a basis for reversing his sentence.

    "[S]entencing factor manipulation is a claim only for the

    extreme and unusual case." United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d ______________ _______

    1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995). As we reasoned in a recent case in

    which a similar claim was made, "[g]overnment agents are not

    limited to replicating a suspect's largest unsolicited crime.

    In this case, the full contours of the criminal operation --

    its size, techniques, personnel -- were, like an iceberg,



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    largely submerged; and the means of exploration were

    additional and larger transactions. . . . While the sting

    could not be endlessly prolonged and enlarged, nothing in the

    objective facts suggests 'misconduct' at all, let alone

    'extraordinary' misconduct.'" United States v. Egemonye, 62 _____________ ________

    F.3d 425 (1st Cir. 1995).

    Appellant's final argument is based upon his mistaken

    impression that the district court did not apply a three-

    level reduction in his base offense level for acceptance of

    responsibility, pursuant to the United States Sentencing

    Guidelines, 3E1.1. Our careful review of the record reveals

    that the district court adopted the guideline application

    contained in the presentence report, including a three-level

    reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Therefore,

    appellant's final claim is entirely without merit.

    Appellant's sentence is affirmed. ________





















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Document Info

Docket Number: 96-1449

Filed Date: 12/16/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015