Rodriguez v. United States ( 1997 )


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    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________


    No. 95-2322


    ANGEL RODRIGUEZ,

    Petitioner, Appellant,

    v.

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

    Respondent, Appellee.

    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Selya, Circuit Judge, _____________
    Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
    and Lynch, Circuit Judge. _____________

    ____________________

    Angel Rodriguez on brief pro se. _______________
    Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Richard L. Hoffman, _______________ __________________
    Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.


    ____________________

    December 12, 1997
    ____________________
















    Per Curiam. Appellant Angel Rodriguez appeals from __________

    the denial of his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. 2255. For

    the following reasons, we agree with the district court that

    the motion was meritless.

    1. Appellant's claim that the forfeiture of his

    property was excessive under the Eighth Amendment is not

    cognizable in a 2255 proceeding since appellant seeks only

    relief from a monetary-type penalty and not release from

    confinement. See Smullen v. United States, 94 F.3d 20, 25 ___ _______ _____________

    (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that a claim that defendant is

    entitled to a reduced restitution order falls outside the

    scope of 2255).

    2. Appellant's argument that the forfeiture

    violates the prohibition against double jeopardy fails for

    the simple reason that the forfeiture was imposed in the same ____

    proceeding that resulted in appellant's conviction. Compare __________ _______

    Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 784 ______________________ ___________

    (1994) (the collection of a tax on dangerous drugs sought in

    a separate proceeding initiated subsequently to the ________ ____________

    termination of the proceeding in which defendants were

    convicted violates the prohibition against double jeopardy; a

    second punishment "must be imposed during the first

    prosecution or not at all").

    3. Appellant's claims regarding the alleged

    ineffective assistance rendered by his trial counsel were not



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    presented to the district court in the 2255 motion. We

    therefore will not consider them for the first time on

    appeal. See Dziurgot v. Luther, 897 F.2d 1222, 1224 (1st ___ ________ ______

    Cir. 1990) (per curiam). Appellant's ignorance of the law

    does not provide an excuse for this default. See Eagle Eye ___ _________

    Fishing Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 20 F.3d _____________ _________________________________

    503, 506 (1st Cir. 1994) ("the right of self-representation

    is not a license not to comply with relevant rules of

    procedural and substantive law") (internal quotation marks

    and citations omitted).

    4. In any event, appellant's failure to assert all

    but one of his claims in his first 2255 motion is an abuse

    of the writ under McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991). _________ ____

    Again, appellant's pro se status and ignorance of the law

    does not constitute "cause" sufficient to excuse this

    omission. See, e.g., Saahir v. Collins, 956 F.2d 115, 118 ___ ____ ______ _______

    (5th Cir. 1992) (ignorance of the law is not an objective

    external impediment); Rodriguez v. Maynard, 948 F.2d 684, _________ _______

    687-88 (10th Cir. 1991) (where the factual and legal bases

    for the new claims existed when the first habeas petition was

    filed, petitioner's ignorance of the legal significance of

    those claims does not amount to cause). Nor, obviously,

    would failure to consider these claims on appeal amount to a

    fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Andiarena v. United ___ _________ ______

    States, 967 F.2d 715, 719 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (this ______



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    narrow exception applies only where a constitutional

    violationlikely caused the conviction of an innocent person).

    The one claim that appellant did present in the

    first 2255 motion -- the government's alleged sentencing

    entrapment and counsel's alleged ineffective assistance in

    connection therewith -- cannot be raised again because the

    district court disposed of it on the merits in that first

    2255 proceeding. See Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing ___

    Section 2255 Cases ("[a] second or successive motion may be

    dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or

    different grounds for relief and the prior determination was

    on the merits").

    5. It follows that the district court did not

    abuse its discretion in not holding a hearing on appellant's

    forfeiture claims. See United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, ___ _____________ ______

    225-26 (1st Cir. 1993).

    The judgment of the district court is affirmed. ________



















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