Piper v. Chater ( 1998 )


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    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________


    No. 97-1972


    PAMELA PIPER,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONER,
    SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

    Defendant, Appellee.

    ____________________


    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

    [Hon. Shane Devine, Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
    Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________

    Jonathan P. Baird on brief for appellant. _________________
    Paul M. Gagnon, United States Attorney, David L. Broderick, ________________ ___________________
    Assistant United States Attorney, and Wayne G. Lewis, Assistant ________________
    Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, on brief for
    appellee.


    ____________________

    February 10, 1998
    ____________________














    Per Curiam. Pamela Piper, who suffers from urinary __________

    incontinence and other impairments, appeals from the district

    court's judgment upholding the denial of her application for

    Social Security benefits by the Commissioner of Social

    Security. After a careful review of the record, we affirm,

    essentially for the reasons given in the district court's

    opinion. The following addresses only the most significant

    issue raised by appellant.

    Piper objects to the hypothetical posed by the

    administrative law judge (ALJ) at her disability hearing.

    She contends that the ALJ erred in postulating an individual

    who needed to use the bathroom "at will." Although the

    vocational expert (VE) originally testified that such an

    individual could perform certain sedentary and light jobs,

    the VE later clarified that the individual could not do so if

    the bathroom trips were "frequent," i.e., took place ten or

    more times per eight-hour work day in addition to breaks and

    lunch, or more than once per hour in addition to breaks and

    lunch. In his opinion, the ALJ used the ambiguous "at will"

    language in describing Piper's limitations and did not make

    an express finding on the critical question whether Piper's

    use of the bathroom was frequent. See Ellison v. Sullivan, ___ _______ ________

    921 F.2d 816, 822 (8th Cir. 1990) (an ALJ may not ignore a







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    "critical assumption" underlying a vocational expert's

    testimony).

    Like the district court, we conclude that the ALJ

    implicitly and supportably determined that Piper did not use

    the bathroom so frequently as to preclude employment. Based

    on her treatment and employment history, activities and

    reported tendency to exaggerate her symptoms, the ALJ was

    warranted in concluding that her need for bathroom breaks was

    below the more than one time per hour figure which the VE

    said would compromise her ability to work. It was the ALJ's

    responsibility to determine issues of credibility and to draw

    inferences from the record evidence. See Irlanda Ortiz v. ___ _____________

    Secretary of Health & Human Services, 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st _____________________________________

    Cir. 1991) (given the claimant's treatment history and the

    medical evidence, the ALJ did not err in deciding that the

    claimant's complaints were not credible "to the extent

    alleged").

    Affirmed. _________

















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Document Info

Docket Number: 97-1972

Filed Date: 2/12/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015