Mangla v. Brown University ( 1998 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion










    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    ____________________

    No. 96-2333

    GAURAV MANGLA,

    Plaintiff - Appellant,

    v.

    BROWN UNIVERSITY,

    Defendant - Appellee.

    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

    [Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Boudin, Circuit Judge, _____________

    John R. Gibson,* Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________

    and Pollak,** Senior District Judge. _____________________

    _____________________

    Douglas A. Giron for appellant. ________________
    Christopher H. Little, with whom John E. Bulman and Little _____________________ ______________ ______
    Bulman & Reardon, P.C. were on brief for appellee. ______________________



    ____________________

    February 2, 1998
    ____________________
    ____________________

    * Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

    ** Of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
    designation.












    JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge. Gaurav Mangla JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge. _____________________

    appeals from a judgment as a matter of law entered in favor of

    Brown University following a trial on his breach of contract and

    promissory estoppel claims. He argues that the district court

    erred in granting judgment, as a reasonable jury could have found

    that Brown breached the contract, acted arbitrarily and in bad

    faith, and that Brown was estopped from denying him admission to

    the graduate school. He argues that the court improperly raised

    certain evidence and overlooked and misconstrued other evidence

    in reaching this decision. We affirm the judgment of the

    district court.

    Mangla applied for admission to the Brown Graduate

    School in September 1993, and was admitted as a probationary

    special student, a category of enrollment that permits the

    taking of graduate level courses but which is not in itself a

    degree program. His admission in this capacity was recommended

    by the Computer Science Department and approved by the graduate

    council. Associate Dean Joan Lusk met with Mangla at that time

    and explained to him that his admission was probationary because

    he lacked the requisite academic background or course work in

    computer science. Lusk further told Mangla that in order to be

    admitted to the degree program he would need to successfully

    complete course work in the Computer Science Department. Mangla

    claims to have satisfactorily completed seven of the eight

    courses required for a Master's degree.




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    After completing such course work, Mangla inquired of

    Dean Lusk about his probationary status, and she instructed him

    to obtain a faculty advisor for his Master's Project. In

    response, Mangla obtained a letter signed by Professor Stanley

    Zdonik, stating that Mangla "will be working under my supervision

    for his Master's project." Mangla claims that at the time he

    believed the letter served as a letter of recommendation for

    admission into the degree program.

    In September 1995, Brown informed Mangla that his

    special student status was discontinued and that he had not been

    admitted into the Master's program. Mangla thereafter filed a

    new, formal application for admission into the Master's program.

    The Computer Science Department faculty reviewed the new

    application and voted to recommend that Mangla's application be

    denied. Mangla then appealed to the Graduate Council which voted

    unanimously to uphold the department's decision.

    Mangla brought this action for breach of contract and

    promissory estoppel for Brown's refusal to admit him into its

    Master's program. The action was tried before a jury, but at the

    close of evidence, the judge granted judgment as a matter of law

    to Brown and dictated detailed findings into the record. The

    district court first decided that there was no breach of contract

    because Mangla knew that one of the things he had to do in

    performing his side of the contract was to obtain a favorable

    recommendation from the Computer Science Department faculty and

    there was no evidence that any such recommendation was obtained.


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    The court acknowledged Mangla's testimony that Dean Lusk told him

    he would absolutely be admitted if he passed his courses or if he

    got a faculty member to act as his advisor. The court stated,

    however, that the key testimony was Mangla's admissions that

    notwithstanding anything that Dean Lusk may have told him, he

    knew that a recommendation from the faculty was a requirement for

    his admission into the Master's Program.

    The court further found that there was no promissory

    estoppel because there was no reasonable reliance on any of the

    alleged representations. There was explicit language in the

    Graduate School manual that even the department does not have the

    power to offer admission and that offers of admission have

    binding force only when made by the Graduate School in writing.

    The court stated that Mangla's argument that he was entitled to

    the written offer of admission is nothing more than a

    circumvention of the explicit requirement set forth in the

    Graduate School manual. Further, the district court stated that

    it was quite a stretch to interpret Professor Zdonik's letter as

    amounting to a recommendation by the Department that Mangla be

    accepted. Even viewing the letter in the light most favorable to

    Mangla, the district court determined that it defied logic and

    reason to read the letter as a recommendation from the Computer

    Science Department. Thus, the district court held that there was

    no issue for the jury to decide, and judgment as a matter of law

    was granted.




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    I. I.

    In ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law,

    the district court must examine the evidence, and inferences to

    be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-

    movant. See Rol n-Alvarado v. Municipality of San Juan, 1 F.3d ___ ______________ _________________________

    74, 76 (1st Cir. 1993). Judgment as a matter of law may then be

    granted "only if the evidence, viewed from this perspective, is

    such that reasonable minds could not differ as to the outcome."

    Id. at 77. ___

    When a judgment as a matter of law is appealed to this

    court, we must apply precisely the same criteria that constrain

    the district court. See Gibson v. City of Cranston, 37 F.3d 731, ___ ______ ________________

    735 (1st Cir. 1994). Accordingly, we review the grant of

    judgment as a matter of law under a de novo standard. See ___

    Jordan-Milton Mach., Inc. v. F/V Teresa Marie, II, 978 F.2d 32, _________________________ ____________________

    34 (1st Cir. 1992).

    II. II.

    Mangla argues that judgment as a matter of law was

    inappropriate because a reasonable jury could find that Brown

    University breached a contract with Mangla by refusing to confer

    regular degree status upon him.

    The district court, in this diversity case, was

    required to apply the substantive law of Rhode Island. However,

    after careful research, we have discovered no case in which the

    Rhode Island courts have addressed the contractual relationship

    between a private academic institution and its students. We


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    therefore resolve Mangla's breach of contract claim according to

    those legal principles which we believe the Rhode Island courts

    would most likely adopt. See Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 565 ___ _____ _____________________

    F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978). _____ ______

    The student-college relationship is essentially

    contractual in nature. See Russell v. Salve Regina College, 938 ___ _______ ____________________

    F.2d 315, 316 (1st Cir. 1991). The terms of the contract may

    include statements provided in student manuals and registration

    materials. See Lyons, 565 F.2d at 202 (construing College Manual ___ _____

    and Academic Information booklet as terms of a contract between a

    student and college). The proper standard for interpreting the

    contractual terms is that of "reasonable expectation -- what

    meaning the party making the manifestation, the university,

    should reasonably expect the other party to give it." Id. ___

    (quoting Giles v. Howard University, 428 F. Supp. 603, 605 _____ _________________

    (D.D.C. 1977)).

    Mangla maintains that he reasonably expected that if he

    satisfactorily performed his course work and obtained a sponsor

    for his master's project he would be admitted as a master's

    degree candidate in the Computer Science Department. Mangla

    bases his claim on the alleged statements of Associate Dean Lusk

    and members of the Computer Science Department faculty. However,

    Brown University's graduate school catalog specifically provided:

    Caveat. Applicants are asked to take
    particular notice of the fact that the
    individual academic departments, while
    having a major role in evaluating the
    applications of all candidates, do not
    have the power to offer admission, and

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    that offers of admission have binding
    force only when made by the Graduate
    School in writing over the signature of
    the Dean of the Graduate School or her
    representative.

    By its terms, this provision divested faculty members

    of any authority to promise admission or to determine the

    necessary prerequisites for admission. Because the provision was

    included in the graduate school catalog, Brown could reasonably

    expect students to be aware of the policy. Thus, it was

    reasonable for Brown to expect its students not to rely on oral

    statements by individual faculty members as binding promises by

    the university.

    Likewise, the statements of Associate Dean Lusk did not

    give Mangla a right to be admitted. As an apparent

    representative of the Dean of the Graduate School, Lusk arguably

    had the authority to offer admission. The caveat, however,

    restricted the acceptable form of such an offer to a signed

    writing. Mangla concedes that no such writing exists in this

    case. Therefore, the language of the graduate school catalog

    seriously compromises Mangla's claim that Lusk's statements gave

    him a contractual right to be offered admission.

    As Mangla correctly asserts, the graduate school

    catalog is not a wholly integrated contract but instead is only

    one part of a more complex contractual relationship between the

    student and the college. We do not foreclose the possibility

    that, under certain circumstances, the university could obligate

    itself through the actions and oral statements of its officials,


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    despite the language of the caveat provision. A reasonable jury,

    however, could not find that such circumstances exist in this

    case.

    Particularly fatal to Mangla's contract claim in this

    case was his failure to secure a recommendation from the

    department faculty. Mangla admitted at trial that he understood

    that a faculty recommendation was a prerequisite to his admission

    as a regular degree candidate. Mangla maintains that this

    requirement was reasonably met by a letter signed by Professor

    Zdonik, a member of the Computer Science department faculty. The

    Zdonik letter does not, however, recommend that Mangla be

    admitted. Rather, the letter, addressed "To whomever it may

    concern," identifies Mangla as a graduate student working under

    Zdonik's supervision "for his Master's project" and requests that

    Mangla be provided with help and the use of resources for his

    research while living in Princeton, New Jersey. Mangla does not

    claim to have informed Zdonik of his intent to use the letter as

    a letter of recommendation. Indeed, Mangla does not even contend

    the letter was a faculty recommendation, but instead contends

    that he reasonably believed it was the "equivalent of a

    recommendation." No reasonable jury could find that the letter

    signed by Zdonik reasonably fulfilled the prerequisite of a

    faculty recommendation. As a result, no reasonable jury could

    conclude that Brown should have reasonably expected Mangla to

    believe that the university was contractually obligated to admit

    him.


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    III. III.

    Mangla argues that a jury could reasonably find that

    Brown acted arbitrarily or in bad faith in refusing to admit

    Mangla as a regular degree candidate. Brown responds that

    Mangla's claim of arbitrariness must fail because the

    university's decision did not substantially depart from

    established academic norms.

    Under Rhode Island law, contracts contain an implied

    duty of good faith and fair dealing. See A.A.A. Pool Service & ___ ______________________

    Supply, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 A.2d 724, 725 ____________ ____________________________

    (R.I. 1978). Because the parties do not contend otherwise, we

    assume for the purposes of argument that Brown's duty of good

    faith extended to its review of Mangla's application for

    admission as a degree candidate. We thus turn our focus to the

    question of whether Brown met that duty.

    The decision to grant or deny admission to a student is

    a quintessential matter of academic judgment. Courts have long

    recognized that matters of academic judgment are generally better

    left to the educational institutions than to the judiciary and

    have accorded great deference where such matters are at issue.

    As the Supreme Court stated in Regents of University of Michigan _________________________________

    v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985), "Plainly, [judges] may not _____

    override [the faculty's professional judgment] unless it is such

    a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to

    demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not

    actually exercise professional judgment."


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    Applying the standard of deference enunciated in Ewing, _____

    we conclude that no reasonable jury could find that Brown acted

    arbitrarily or in bad faith in refusing to admit Mangla as a

    regular degree candidate. The Computer Science Department

    recommended against Mangla's admission on the ground that Mangla

    did not demonstrate an ability to undertake the research or

    independent work required for a Master's thesis or project. The

    department's position was based in part on negative assessments

    of Mangla's research capabilities provided by professors who had

    supervised Mangla's previous attempts at a research project.

    Mangla argues the department's decision was arbitrary

    and in bad faith because he was never informed that he would be

    judged on his ability to do independent research. Mangla,

    however, was aware that a Master's thesis or project was a

    necessary component of the Master's program. We believe it is

    self-evident that a committee evaluating an application for

    admission into a Master's program would be concerned with the

    applicant's prospects of successfully completing the degree

    requirements.

    The evidence establishes that Brown judged Mangla

    according to legitimate criteria and had a sufficient basis for

    believing that Mangla did not meet those criteria. Consequently,

    no reasonable jury could infer that Brown acted arbitrarily or in

    bad faith when it decided not to admit Mangla as a degree

    candidate.

    IV. IV.


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    Finally, Mangla argues that a reasonable jury could

    have found Brown liable on a promissory estoppel theory. We

    reject his argument.

    Under Rhode Island law, "A promise which the promisor

    should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the

    part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such

    action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only

    by enforcement of the promise." B.M.L. Corp. v. Greater _____________ _______

    Providence Deposit Corp., et al., 495 A.2d 675, 677 (R.I. 1985) _________________________________

    (quoting 1 Restatement (Second) Contracts 90 at 242 (1981)).

    Thus, the proper focus of our inquiry is again on the reasonable

    expectations of the party making the manifestation.

    As we have previously discussed, Brown should not have

    reasonably expected Mangla to rely on the oral statements of Dean

    Lusk or the individual faculty members as binding promises of

    admission. Therefore, we uphold the district court's ruling that

    no reasonable jury could find that Brown was estopped from

    denying Mangla admission as a Master's degree candidate.

    We affirm the judgment as a matter of law in favor of ______

    Brown University.














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