United States v. Cardona-Vicenty , 842 F.3d 766 ( 2016 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-1065
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JOSE D. CARDONA-VICENTY,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Thompson, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Jose Luis Novas-Debien, III for appellant.
Julia Meconiates, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief,
Appellate Division, Francisco A. Besosa-Martínez, Assistant United
States Attorney, and Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States
Attorney were on brief, for appellee.
December 2, 2016
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. Jose D. Cardona-Vicenty
("Cardona") pled guilty to conspiring to distribute narcotics near
three public housing projects and possessing a firearm in
furtherance of the drug trafficking offense. After accusing his
first lawyer of coercing him into accepting a plea agreement,
Cardona was appointed new counsel for sentencing purposes. On
appeal, Cardona argues that the district court's assignment of new
counsel, who also represented a co-defendant in the drug
trafficking conspiracy, resulted in a conflict of interest for
counsel number two. He also claims that the district court erred
in failing to hold a Foster hearing to address the purported
conflict. Cardona insists that these errors require us to vacate
his sentence and remand the case for resentencing with new counsel.
But because there was no clear error with the sentencing court's
fact finding and no actual conflict of interest, we affirm the
sentence imposed below.
Background1
On April 23, 2014, Cardona was indicted, along with
forty-seven co-defendants, for his involvement in a drug
trafficking conspiracy which operated out of three public housing
1
As this sentencing appeal follows a guilty plea, "we
glean the relevant facts from the change-of-plea colloquy, the
unchallenged portions of the presentence investigation report
('PSI Report'), and the record of the [relevant] disposition
hearing[s]." United States v. Vargas, 560 F.3d 45, 47 (1st Cir.
2009).
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projects in Mayagüez, Puerto Rico. Several months later, Cardona
pled guilty to Counts One and Six of the indictment pursuant to a
Plea Agreement (the "Agreement"). Count One charged him with
conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute various amounts
of heroin, cocaine, crack cocaine, and marijuana within a thousand
feet of the three public housing projects, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 860, and 846. Count Six charged him with
carrying and using a firearm in relation to the drug trafficking
offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and (2). The
remaining charges against him (Counts Two through Five) were
dismissed pursuant to the Agreement.
By the terms of the Agreement, the parties agreed to
calculate Cardona's total offense level at 33, but made no
stipulation as to Cardona's Criminal History Category.2 The
parties agreed to recommend a sentence at the lower end of the
Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines") range for the possession
count and the mandatory minimum of five years for the firearm
charge. Additionally, Cardona agreed to waive his right to appeal
the judgment and sentence if sentenced in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the Agreement. And the government agreed that
2
The offense level at 33 was based on the following: a
base offense level of 34 under USSG §§ 2D1.1(c)(4) and 2D1.2(a)(1);
plus 2 levels under USSG § 3B1.1(c) for his role as a leader,
organizer, manager, or supervisor in the drug organization; minus
3 levels for acceptance of responsibility.
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it would not seek any further adjustments to or departures from
Cardona's offense level outside of the enhancements already
applied.
On August 27, 2014 (20 days after Cardona's change of
plea, but before sentencing), Cardona's attorney at the time, Peter
Diaz-Santiago ("Diaz"), moved to withdraw because Cardona had
accused Diaz -- falsely, in Diaz's opinion -- of coercing him into
pleading guilty. In response to Diaz's motion, the district court
set a hearing date -- September 15, 2014 -- to learn the details
surrounding Cardona's claims and Diaz's desire to withdraw. The
district court requested that Miguel Oppenheimer ("Oppenheimer"),
an attorney for one of Cardona's drug trafficking co-defendants,
attend the hearing "to assist if need be."
At the proceeding, Cardona sought to withdraw his guilty
plea. As per the court's instruction, Oppenheimer interviewed
Cardona and Diaz to better understand the circumstances
surrounding Cardona's attempts to withdraw his plea and Diaz's
request to withdraw as defense counsel. After meeting with both
Cardona and Diaz, Oppenheimer summarized their respective
positions for the court and then questioned both individuals under
oath. Cardona testified that he felt pressured to either accept
the plea deal or go to trial and receive a life sentence if
convicted. On the other hand, Diaz stated that he met with Cardona
on multiple occasions to discuss the charges against him, denied
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Cardona's allegations of coercion, and stated that although
Cardona was unhappy with the amount of time offered in the
Agreement, Cardona still chose to plead guilty and never indicated
that he was hesitant to accept the plea or that he did not want to
sign the Agreement. Rounding out the dispute, the government
argued that Cardona's request to withdraw his plea should be denied
because he was essentially attempting to re-negotiate his plea
deal -- as the government saw it, he still wanted to plead guilty;
he just wanted a better deal.
After hearing from Cardona, Diaz, and the government,
the district court denied Cardona's request to withdraw his guilty
plea, finding his allegations against his attorney to be "totally
frivolous" and ultimately granted Diaz's request to withdraw,
assigning Oppenheimer as Cardona's new counsel for sentencing
purposes. Upon Oppenheimer's appointment, the government
vocalized concerns regarding a potential conflict of interest
arising from a murder that Cardona had allegedly ordered from jail
that was ultimately executed by a co-defendant who was also
represented by Oppenheimer. The government opined that this might
cause a conflict because Oppenheimer "might want to argue one way
for one defendant and another way for another defendant" and
accordingly remarked that a Foster hearing3 might be necessary.
3 A Foster hearing requires a trial court
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However, the court did not believe that an actual conflict existed,
noting that neither the Agreement nor any facts included in the
Agreement contained anything regarding the alluded-to murder and
that the murder was not at issue in Cardona's case.
In any event, Oppenheimer advised the court that he would
check with Cardona's co-defendant to ensure that there were no
potential conflicts and he would let the court know if a Foster
hearing was necessary. Oppenheimer never informed the court of
any conflict and proceeded to represent Cardona for sentencing
purposes. On December 7, 2014, after Cardona's co-defendant had
already been sentenced for his role in the drug trafficking
conspiracy pursuant to his own plea agreement and two days before
Cardona's sentencing hearing, Oppenheimer filed a sentencing
memorandum reiterating, among other things, Cardona's wish to
recant his guilty plea.
On the day of the hearing, Cardona pressed his contention
that he was coerced into pleading guilty. But after hearing
[T]o comment on some of the risks confronted
where defendants are jointly represented to
insure that defendants are aware of such
risks, and to inquire diligently whether they
have discussed the risks with their attorney,
and whether they understand that they may
retain separate counsel, or if qualified, may
have such counsel appointed by the court and
paid for by the government.
United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1972).
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Cardona's reiterated plaint, the court reminded Cardona that it
had already denied his request to withdraw his plea and would not
reconsider its decision.
After the court reaffirmed its ruling, the government,
concerned about Cardona's continued attempts to withdraw his
guilty plea, decided to introduce evidence of Cardona's role as a
leader and his use of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy.4
The court then accepted probation's recommendation of an
applicable Criminal History Category of III (rejecting Cardona's
push for a lower one) and determined the appropriate offense level
was 34 rather than 33, resulting in a Guidelines range of 188-235
months for Count One.5 Nonetheless, consistent with the plea
4Although the government introduced evidence of
Cardona's role as a leader and his use of a firearm in furtherance
of the conspiracy at sentencing, this was only in response to
Cardona's continued attempts to withdraw his guilty plea. The
government made clear that it did not intend to violate the
Agreement and only sought to introduce the evidence "to show [that
Cardona] indeed possessed firearms and was a leader," contrary to
his plea withdrawal assertions. The government never asked the
court to find Cardona in breach of the Agreement. Indeed, at
sentencing, the government recommended an offense level and
sentence in accordance with the terms of the Agreement and did not
argue for any additional enhancements that were not provided for
in the Agreement. The sentencing judge also noted before allowing
the government to introduce the evidence that it was "not a
violation of the Plea Agreement" to do so.
5 Cardona was sentenced on December 9, 2014. USSG
Amendment 782 became effective on November 1, 2014, after the plea
agreement was entered. Amendment 782 permits a retroactive, two-
level reduction of the base offense levels for drug offenders
sentenced pursuant to USSG §§ 2D1.1 and 2D1.11. See USSG App. C.
Supp., Amend. 782. Applying the new base offense level under
Amendment 782, the court adopted probation's recommendation,
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agreement, the government recommended a sentence of 168 months for
Count One and the mandatory minimum of 60 months for Count Six.
Rejecting this recommendation as inadequate, the court
sentenced Cardona to a below-Guidelines sentence of 180 months on
Count One and 60 months on Count Six, to be served consecutively.
This timely appeal followed.6
Discussion
Cardona contends that the district court denied him his
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel
because the court failed to hold a Foster hearing and Oppenheimer
labored under a conflict of interest.7 The government argues that
the failure to hold a Foster hearing resulted in no reversible
error because there was no actual conflict of interest. "Where an
started with a base offense level of 32, and added 2 levels for
Cardona's role as a leader pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1(c). The court
then calculated Cardona's total offense level at 34, declined to
award Cardona credit for acceptance of responsibility because of
his ongoing efforts to withdraw his plea, and declined to add any
additional enhancements.
6 The government argues that Cardona's claims are
precluded by the waiver-of-appeal clause of the Agreement.
Cardona's claims can easily be resolved on the merits. Therefore,
"[f]or ease in analysis," we "assume arguendo that the waiver-of-
appeal provision does not bar the maintenance of this appeal."
United States v. Dávila-Tapia, 491 F. App'x 197, 198 (1st Cir.
2012).
7 Cardona does not challenge the appropriateness of the
court's decision to appoint Oppenheimer as his lawyer after
utilizing Oppenheimer as a type of independent counsel or
investigator for the court to address Diaz's motion to withdraw
and Cardona's claims of coercion. We do not consider the
appropriateness of that practice here because Cardona does not
raise this argument on appeal.
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ineffective assistance [of counsel] claim is premised on counsel's
alleged conflict of interest, we review the ultimate issue de novo,
but defer to the district court's subsidiary fact findings unless
they are clearly erroneous." Reyes-Vejerano v. United States, 276
F.3d 94, 97 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Familia-Consoro v. United
States, 160 F.3d 761, 764-65 (1st Cir. 1998)).
Under the Sixth Amendment, "a defendant has a right to
conflict-free representation." United States v. Hernandez-Lebron,
23 F.3d 600, 603 (1st Cir. 1994). A lawyer can represent multiple
defendants, but not if the joint representation "gives rise to a
conflict of interests adversely affecting the lawyer's
performance" -- for then there would be a Sixth Amendment
violation. Id.And given the "ubiquitous and insidious" risks of
multiple representation, the Sixth Amendment imposes a duty on
trial courts to investigate a defendant's timely objections to
joint representation and to inquire into the propriety of multiple
representation whenever the trial court "knows or reasonably
should know that a particular conflict exists." Id. at 603-04.
"Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c) expands these duties by
requiring an inquiry into the possibility of a conflict in all
cases where jointly-charged defendants retain the same counsel."
Id. at 604. Specifically, under Rule 44(c), "[u]nless there is
good cause to believe that no conflict of interest is likely to
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arise," the court is required to "take appropriate measures to
protect each defendant's right to counsel." Fed. R. Crim. P.
44(c). Rule 44(c) requires a "district court [to] inquire into
each instance of joint representation of multiple defendants, and
[requires the court to] advise each defendant of his right to
separate counsel." United States v. Coneo-Guerrero, 148 F.3d 44,
47 (1st Cir. 1998). The timing and form of this inquiry is left
to the discretion of the court. See Foster, 469 F.2d at 5.
"If a satisfactory inquiry does not appear on the record,
the government has the burden of persuasion of demonstrating that
prejudice to the defendant was improbable." United States v.
Mazzaferro, 865 F.2d 450, 454 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing Foster, 469
F.2d at 5). If a satisfactory inquiry was held, the defendant
"bears the burden of persuasion that he was deprived of a fair
trial resulting from a conflict of interest arising from the joint
representation." Id.Here, no Foster inquiry was held. However, even if we
assume that a Foster inquiry was required, the government has
sufficiently demonstrated that any prejudice to Cardona was
improbable because there was no actual conflict of interest.8
8 While we ultimately find that there was no conflict of
interest here, given the "ubiquitous and insidious" risks of
multiple representation discussed earlier, we caution that courts
-- in order to avoid any risk of impropriety -- should give more
express attention than was afforded here when making attorney
appointments which result in dual representation of co-defendants.
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As mentioned above, the joint representation of co-
defendants does not in itself constitute a per se violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free representation. See Burger
v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783 (1987); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335, 348 (1980)(holding that "multiple representation does not
violate the Sixth Amendment unless it gives rise to a conflict of
interest" and "a reviewing court cannot presume that the
possibility for conflict has resulted in ineffective assistance of
counsel"). Indeed, "[t]he Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel is violated when an actual conflict of
interest adversely affects counsel's representation." Bucuvalas
v. United States, 98 F.3d 652, 656 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Cuyler,
446 U.S. at 348). And "[a] defendant 'who raised no objection at
trial [or at the district court below] must demonstrate that an
actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's
performance.'" Familia-Consoro v. United States, 160 F.3d 761,
764 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50)). To
establish an actual conflict of interest, a "defendant must show
that (1) the attorney could have pursued a plausible alternative
defense strategy, and (2) the alternative strategy was inherently
in conflict with or not undertaken due to the attorney's other
interests or loyalties." Id. (citing United States v. Soldevila-
Lopez, 17 F.3d 480, 486 (1st Cir. 1994)). In other words, Cardona
"can prevail only if there was a plausible alternative defense
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strategy that was either foreclosed or inhibited by the joint
representation." United States v. Lachman, 521 F.3d 12, 21 (1st
Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Nelson-Rodriguez, 319 F.3d 12,
41-42 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Caribe-Garcia v. United
States, 539 U.S. 928 (2003)). If Cardona can demonstrate that
some plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic might have
been pursued, "[h]e need not show that the defense would
necessarily have been successful if it had been used, but merely
that it possessed sufficient substance to be a viable alternative."
Brien v. United States, 695 F.2d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing
Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072, 1079 (5th Cir. 1975)).
But speculative or theoretical conflicts of interests do
not amount to a Sixth Amendment violation. See Soldevila-Lopez,
17 F.3d at 487 (finding appellant's claim of a conflict of interest
to be based on "mere speculation" and holding that "[a] theoretical
or merely speculative conflict of interest will not invoke the per
se rule") (citing United States v. Aeillo, 900 F.2d 528, 530–31
(2d Cir. 1990)); Brien, 695 F.2d at 15 (holding that "the tactics
[the appellant] suggests that his attorney could have pursued
appear to be merely hypothetical choices that in reality could not
have benefited [the appellant] and were often not in any conflict
with [his attorney's] other loyalties"); Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350(noting that the mere possibility of a conflict is not sufficient
to establish a violation of a defendant's right to conflict-free
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representation and that a defendant must "show[] that his counsel
actively represented conflicting interests" in order to establish
an actual conflict).
Cardona begins by conjuring up three hypothetical
situations which he contends could have given rise to a conflict
of interest. First, he theorizes that if the government had sought
to nullify the plea agreement given his perceived "breach"
(presumably based on his attempts to withdraw his guilty plea),
this may have resulted in a trial where he might have had to defend
against murder allegations. Second, he suggests that if the court
had allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea, and if he had then
chosen to plead guilty without a plea agreement, he may have had
to defend against a cross reference guideline for the murder
pursuant to USSG § 2A1.1. And third, he hypothesizes that even if
his plea agreement remained intact, he may have had to defend
against a § 2A1.1 cross reference at the recommendation of
probation.
But even Cardona concedes that the would-be conflicts he
complains of "did not materialize." The government never moved to
find Cardona in breach of his plea agreement (despite his continued
attempts to withdraw his guilty plea), and the court repeatedly
denied Cardona's multiple attempts to withdraw his plea (a ruling
he does not contest on appeal). And with that plea agreement
impermeable below, Cardona never faced trial and he never, under
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any other contrivance he imagines, had to defend against a USSG §
2A1.1 cross reference guideline for murder. Because none of the
hypothetical situations he outlines actually occurred, there was
no opportunity for his attorney at the time to pursue any
"plausible alternative defense strategy that was either foreclosed
or inhibited by [Oppenheimer's] joint representation." 9 Lachman,
521 F.3d at 21.10
As "[w]e [have] long ago cautioned," where the conflict
relies on "some attenuated hypothesis having little consequence to
the adequacy of representation," Brien, 695 F.2d at 15, we will
not grant an "undeserved 'windfall' to defendants by
[automatically] vacating convictions." Nelson-Rodriguez, 319 F.3d
at 42 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Newton, 326
F.3d 253, 263–64 (1st Cir. 2003) (rejecting a rule of "automatic
9
For each hypothetical scenario, Cardona seems to allege
that but for the purported conflict, his attorney could have
pursued alternative defense strategies: (1) the cross examination
of witnesses regarding his supposed participation in a murder; and
(2) the possibility of him or his co-defendant deciding to
cooperate and implicate the other at trial. Because we find no
conflict we need say no more.
10 Ever persistent, Cardona insists that the government's
statement after Oppenheimer was appointed -- that Oppenheimer
"might want to argue one way for one defendant and another way for
another defendant" -- satisfies his burden of "showing an
alternative defense strategy, which might bear negatively on the
defense of the other client" and sufficiently establishes an actual
conflict. Cardona's argument that the government's statement
somehow amounts to a defense strategy is nonsensical. Nor does
the government's statement amount to an actual conflict of
interest: at best, the government pointed out a potential conflict
that was never actualized given both co-defendants' guilty pleas.
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reversal in cases where a defense attorney's conflict of interest
does not adversely affect counsel's performance, observing that
such a rule 'makes little policy sense'") (quoting Mickens v.
Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 (2002)). That is so because the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been
accorded "not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has
on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial." Mickens,
535 U.S. at 166 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,
658 (1984)). Where there is no conflict of interest and thus no
effect on counsel's representation or a defendant's fair trial
interests, there is no Sixth Amendment violation. See Newton, 326
F.3d at 263–64.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the sentence of
the court below.
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