United States v. Stewart , 744 F.3d 17 ( 2014 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-2395
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
BETH A. STEWART,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Circuit Judge,
Souter,* Associate Justice,
and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
Lawrence Gatei, with whom Immigration & Business Law Group,
LLP was on brief, for appellant.
Renée M. Bunker, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Thomas E. Delahanty II, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
February 26, 2014
*
Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the
Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
STAHL, Circuit Judge. Following a bench trial on a
record of stipulated facts, Defendant-Appellant Beth A. Stewart was
convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States for
participating in a sham marriage to secure a change in immigration
status for her spouse. She appeals, arguing that the prosecution
was time-barred because she committed no overt act in furtherance
of the conspiracy within the five-year period before the return of
the indictment. We disagree, and affirm.
I. Facts & Background
On September 22, 2011, a grand jury returned a one-count
indictment charging Stewart with conspiracy to defraud the United
States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The indictment was filed
the following day. The indictment charged that Stewart was a
United States citizen, and that her spouse (identified only by his
initials, FN) was a citizen of Kenya who had entered the United
States legally, but whose authorization to remain was set to
expire. The indictment alleged that, "[f]rom on or about March 29,
2005, and continuing until a date unknown but at least June 22,
2007, . . . Stewart knowingly and willfully conspired and agreed,
with others both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to
participate in a sham marriage for the purpose of defrauding the
United States." According to the indictment, the conspiracy had
two objects: (1) for Stewart to "profit financially by accepting
payments from co-conspirators, including [FN], in exchange for
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participating in a sham marriage and helping [FN] obtain a change
of his immigration status"; and (2) for FN to "acquire a change of
United States immigration status to which he would not otherwise
have been entitled by falsely representing to agencies of the
United States Government that the marriage into which [FN] had
entered was bona fide when in fact it was not."
Finally, the indictment alleged that Stewart committed
the following overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy: (1) she
entered into a sham marriage with FN on March 29, 2005, knowing
that "the sole purpose of the wedding was to permit FN to apply for
a change in immigration status to which he would not otherwise have
been entitled"; (2) between the wedding date and October 27, 2005,
she traveled to Massachusetts and obtained various documents to
make it appear that she and FN were living together when in fact
they were not, understanding that these documents would be filed in
support of FN's petition to have his immigration status changed;
(3) on October 7, 2005, she and FN attended an interview at the
Boston offices of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
("USCIS") in support of that petition, with FN being granted
conditional residency on that date based upon the information they
had provided; and (4) on June 22, 2007, she traveled to
Massachusetts and signed a Form I-751, Petition to Remove
Conditions on Residence, on FN's behalf, which form was
subsequently filed with USCIS.
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Stewart filed a motion to dismiss the indictment as
time-barred, arguing that the signing and filing of the Form I-751
-- the only overt act alleged within the five-year statute of
limitations period, see 18 U.S.C. § 3282 -- was not done in
furtherance of the conspiracy. She contended that the object of
the conspiracy had been achieved on October 7, 2005, when USCIS
granted FN lawful permanent resident ("LPR") status on a
conditional basis.1 Thus, she insisted, the Form I-751 was
irrelevant to the conspiratorial objectives. The government argued
that FN's receipt of conditional LPR status was simply the first
step toward unconditional legal permanent residence and eventually
citizenship, and the filing of the Form I-751 was a further step in
that process. The district court denied Stewart's motion, holding
that the indictment was facially sufficient to put her on notice of
the elements of the crime and the nature of the charge, and that it
was not for the court to inquire whether the evidence would
ultimately be sufficient to support that charge.
The matter then proceeded to a bench trial on a record of
stipulated facts and associated exhibits. We summarize those
stipulations here. FN was a Kenyan national who entered the United
States in 2001 on a visa that was set to expire in September of
2006. Through various third parties, Stewart learned that a
1
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a) and (h)(1), an alien spouse who is
granted LPR status within two years of the qualifying marriage is
considered to have obtained that status on a conditional basis.
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marriage arranger was looking for someone to marry a foreign
national in return for $4,000. She agreed to participate in the
sham marriage. On March 29, 2005, Stewart met FN for the first
time at the City Hall in Auburn, Maine, where the two applied for
and obtained a marriage license. They were married later that day,
with Stewart and FN both signing the marriage license and listing
as their residence an address where neither had ever lived.
Stewart understood that the purpose of the marriage was to allow FN
to stay in the United States and that she would be paid for her
participation. After the ceremony, Stewart was paid $1,000. In
June, FN gave Stewart a money order for $1,500, which she used to
secure an apartment in Lewiston, Maine. FN never resided in that
apartment, and in fact lived in Massachusetts. Stewart
occasionally traveled to Massachusetts after the marriage: once,
she went to what she understood to be FN's apartment, where the two
posed for photographs; another time, she obtained a Massachusetts
identification card, listing as her residence a Lowell,
Massachusetts, address where she had never lived; yet another time,
she and FN opened a joint bank account. In May, FN (or someone
acting on his behalf) signed Stewart's name to several USCIS forms,
seeking to have FN's immigration status changed on the basis of the
marriage. FN also signed a Form I-485 seeking the same relief. In
August, FN gave Stewart an additional $1,500. Stewart gave FN
copies of her I.R.S. W-2 forms for 2002–2004, which FN or someone
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acting on his behalf used to generate what purported to be
Stewart's tax returns for those years. The marriage certificate,
photographs, Massachusetts identification card, and tax returns, as
well as copies of checks drawn on their joint account, were all
submitted to USCIS along with their joint petitions. On October 7,
2005, Stewart and FN attended an interview in support of the
petitions at the Boston office of USCIS, where they both
intentionally created the impression that they entered into their
marriage in good faith, lived together, and intended to establish
a life together. Based on the written and verbal information they
provided, USCIS granted their petitions and granted FN conditional
residency. In February of 2006 and March of 2007, Stewart and FN
signed and filed joint tax returns for 2005 and 2006, respectively,
listing themselves as spouses and listing Stewart's daughter as a
dependent. In June of 2006, Stewart signed a residential lease
extension indicating that she and FN continued to live together in
Lowell, Massachusetts; in April of 2007, she signed a lease
indicating that she and FN had rented an apartment in Dracut,
Massachusetts. On June 22, 2007, Stewart and FN signed USCIS Form
I-751, seeking to have the conditions on FN's residency lifted.
They submitted their 2005 and 2006 tax returns and the leases in
support of their application. At some point, the I-751 petition
was withdrawn. In addition to the agreed-upon $4,000, FN provided
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Stewart $100 per month through at least November 2009 to help
support Stewart and her daughter.
Neither party sought to introduce additional evidence
aside from the stipulated facts and exhibits. In post-trial
briefing, Stewart argued that the government had failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the object of the conspiracy
consisted of anything beyond procuring the 2005 change in residency
status and the payment of $4,000 to Stewart. She contended that,
because the conspiratorial objective was achieved with FN's
attainment of conditional LPR status, the filing of Form I-751 was
not in furtherance of the conspiracy. Because, the argument
continued, FN was granted conditional LPR status nearly six years
before the grand jury returned the indictment, the government had
not met its burden of proving that she had committed any overt act
within the five-year limitations period. The district court
disagreed, and found her guilty as charged in the indictment. This
appeal followed.
II. Analysis
The central question raised in this appeal is whether the
district court correctly found that the filing of Form I-751 was an
overt act committed in furtherance of the objects of the conspiracy
as alleged in the indictment. Stewart argues that the district
court erred in denying her motion to dismiss on limitations
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grounds, a ruling we review de novo, see United States v. Bucci,
582 F.3d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 2009).
The conspiracy statute under which Stewart was charged
provides that:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any
offense against the United States, or to defraud the
United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act
to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 371. Because § 371 does not include a statute of
limitations, the general five-year statute of limitations applies.
See id. § 3282(a) ("Except as otherwise expressly provided by law,
no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense,
not capital, unless the indictment is found . . . within five years
next after such offense shall have been committed."). Where, as
here, a conspiracy charge requires proof of an overt act, the
government must show that the conspiracy still existed, and that at
least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed,
during the limitations period. Grunewald v. United States, 353
U.S. 391, 396–97 (1957); see also Fiswick v. United States, 329
U.S. 211, 216 (1946) (limitations period begins running as of the
date of the last overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy's
objects); United States v. Ferris, 807 F.2d 269, 272 (1st Cir.
1986) (government bears the burden of establishing that the
indictment was issued within the limitations period). Thus, "the
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crucial question in determining whether the statute of limitations
has run is the scope of the conspiratorial agreement, for it is
that which determines both the duration of the conspiracy, and
whether the act relied on as an overt act may properly be regarded
as in furtherance of the conspiracy." Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 397.
At the indictment stage, the government need not "show,"
but merely must allege, the required elements. An indictment "must
be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the
essential facts constituting the offense charged." Fed. R. Crim.
P. 7(c)(1). "[A]n indictment is sufficient if it specifies the
elements of the offense charged, fairly apprises the defendant of
the charge against which he must defend, and allows him to contest
it without fear of double jeopardy." United States v. Eirby, 262
F.3d 31, 37–38 (1st Cir. 2001). The indictment's allegations are
assumed to be true, and "courts routinely rebuff efforts to use a
motion to dismiss as a way to test the sufficiency of the evidence
behind an indictment's allegations." United States v. Guerrier,
669 F.3d 1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 2011).
The indictment here was returned on September 22, 2011,
and filed the next day. Thus, we will assume that September 23,
2006, is the critical date after which the indictment must have
alleged the commission of at least one overt act in furtherance of
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the conspiracy.2 The district court correctly held that the
indictment did so: it alleged that, "[o]n June 22, 2007, [Stewart]
traveled from Maine to Massachusetts and signed the Form I-751,
Petition to Remove Conditions of Residency, on FN's behalf. This
form was thereafter filed with [USCIS]."
On appeal, Stewart revives her argument that the
indictment should have been dismissed because the conspiratorial
object was achieved on October 7, 2005, when FN attained
conditional LPR status, and any subsequent acts could not have been
in furtherance of an already-completed conspiracy. However, at the
motion-to-dismiss stage, the allegations are taken as true, leaving
for the jury the questions of the actual scope of the
conspiratorial agreement, whether the acts alleged actually
occurred, and, if so, whether they furthered the conspiracy's
objectives. See United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 11 (1st Cir.
2009) ("Determining the contours of the conspiracy ordinarily is a
factual matter entrusted largely to the jury."). Here, whether
Stewart's agreement encompassed the removal of the conditions on
FN's LPR status was not appropriate for resolution at the motion-
to-dismiss stage.
2
See United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 157 (3d Cir.
2008) (an indictment is "found" within the meaning of § 3282(a)
when it has been returned by the grand jury and filed); United
States v. Srulowitz, 819 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1987) (same).
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To the extent that Stewart raises a separate sufficiency-
of-the-evidence argument (and it is not clear from her briefing
that she does), we reject that argument as well. "We review the
evidence and all the reasonable inferences that arise therefrom in
the light most favorable to the verdict." United States v.
Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109, 111 (1st Cir. 2011).3
After reviewing the parties' stipulations and post-trial
memoranda, the district court found Stewart "guilty as charged as
set forth in the indictment." The district court, by necessary
implication, accepted the government's contention that the
conspiracy's objectives were not achieved when FN first received
conditional LPR status. Stewart argues that conditional LPR status
is the "change of United States immigration status to which [FN]
would not otherwise have been entitled" contemplated by the
indictment. Thus, she claims, removal of conditions would not
effect a "change in status," and seeking such removal could not be
in furtherance of the conspiracy. In support of this argument,
Stewart cites inapplicable statutes and distinguishable caselaw.
First, she points to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(b), which, she
contends, is the law that governs the time when a person's status
3
We will assume, in light of the unusual proceedings below --
a bench trial solely on a stipulated record -- that Stewart
preserved this issue by arguing in her post-trial brief that the
statute of limitations barred her conviction. Treating this
request as the functional equivalent of a motion for acquittal, we
review her sufficiency claim de novo. See Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at
115.
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is adjusted. However, § 1255(d) states that aliens, like FN, who
were granted conditional LPR status on the basis of marriage under
8 U.S.C. § 1186a may not be granted unconditional LPR status under
§ 1255's general LPR program. See Gallimore v. Attorney Gen., 619
F.3d 216, 229 n.11 (3d Cir. 2010). Section 1186a provides that "an
alien spouse . . . shall be considered, at the time of obtaining
the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence,
to have obtained such status on a conditional basis subject to the
provisions of this section." 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1). In order to
remove the conditional basis, the couple must, within the ninety-
day period before the second anniversary of the grant of
conditional LPR status, file a joint petition averring, inter alia,
that the marriage "was not entered into for the purpose of
procuring an alien's admission as an immigrant." Id.
§ 1186a(c)(1)(A), (d)(1)(A)(i)(III), (d)(2)(A). They must also
appear for a personal interview with USCIS. Id. § 1186a(c)(1)(B),
(d)(3). If the couple fails to comply with these requirements, or
if USCIS makes an adverse determination on the petition, the
alien's permanent resident status is terminated and he is subject
to removal. Id. §§ 1186a(c)(2)(A), (3)(C), 1227(a)(1)(D)(i). This
petition -- Form I-751 -- was a necessary step in achieving the
conspiratorial objective of helping FN acquire an immigration
status to which he would not otherwise have been entitled. Stewart
would have the court narrowly define "immigration status" to refer
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only to conditional LPR status. However, while receipt of
conditional LPR status is surely a change in status, the
immigration process involves multiple changes in status up through,
ultimately, naturalization and citizenship.4 The term "immigration
status," as used in the indictment, is broad enough to encompass
steps taken subsequent to receipt of conditional LPR status,
including removal of that conditional basis.5
4
Aside from the removal-of-conditions process, "the rights,
privileges, responsibilities and duties which apply to all other
lawful permanent residents apply equally to conditional permanent
residents," 8 C.F.R. § 216.1, but that does not mean that removal
of conditions is not a change in status or, at minimum, a step
toward a subsequent change in status.
5
At oral argument, Stewart raised, for the first time, an
argument based on the fact that § 1186a allows, in certain
circumstances, waiver of the joint petition and interview. See 8
U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4); see also, e.g., Kinisu v. Holder, 721 F.3d
29, 31–32 (1st Cir. 2013) (describing statutory framework). On
this basis, she claims that the marriage was not essential to the
removal of conditions and thus signing the I-751 was beyond the
scope of the conspiracy. Even if this argument were properly
before us, it is unpersuasive: just because a conspiratorial
objective could have been achieved via different means does not
suggest that the means selected were not in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
Also at oral argument, Stewart cited United States v. Rojas,
718 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam), for the proposition
that the offense was complete at the time the marriage occurred.
Rojas is inapt; the offense charged there was marriage fraud, not
conspiracy. See id. at 1319. The relevant statutory language,
making it an offense to "knowingly enter[] into a marriage for the
purpose of evading any provision of the immigration laws," 8 U.S.C.
§ 1325(c), necessarily means that the crime is complete upon
"enter[ing]" the marriage and "cannot plausibly be read to require
that a defendant take the additional step of filing for immigration
benefits in order for the crime to be complete," Rojas, 718 F.3d at
1320.
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Stewart urges this court to follow the Second Circuit's
decisions in United States v. Roshko (Roshko I), 969 F.2d 1 (2d
Cir. 1992), and United States v. Roshko (Roshko II), 969 F.2d 9 (2d
Cir. 1992). There, Meir Roshko entered into a sham marriage with
a U.S. citizen, received his green card, terminated his sham
marriage, and married Irene Roshko with the intent of using his new
status as the basis for adjusting Irene's status. Roshko II, 969
F.2d at 10. The court held that the conspiracy prosecution was
time-barred because only the divorce and remarriage occurred within
the limitations period; the conspiracy's objective, as alleged in
the indictment, was limited to changing Meir's immigration status.
Id. at 11; Roshko I, 969 F.2d at 5–6. Therefore, while the
termination of Meir's sham marriage and marriage to Irene may have
been in furtherance of changing Irene's status, these acts could
not be said to have been in furtherance of the conspiracy alleged.
Roshko II, 969 F.2d at 11. But see United States v. Ramos Algarin,
584 F.2d 562, 569 (1st Cir. 1978) (sham marriage arranger's act of
obtaining divorce terminating sham marriage was overt act in
furtherance of "entire plan to obtain resident alien status" for
immigrant-spouse). Although Roshko II held that the conspiracy
terminated with Meir Roshko's receipt of his green card, the
prosecution proceeded on a theory that the conspiratorial object
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was his receipt of a green card.6 Roshko I, 969 F.2d at 2. Here,
the prosecution's theory was not similarly limited, and the Roshko
cases thus say nothing about whether an I-751 petition furthers the
objective of obtaining a change in immigration status.
Finally, Stewart argues that, even if signing the I-751
was an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, she
affirmatively withdrew the form in September of 2011, and thus
abandoned the conspiracy. There are several problems with this
argument. First, it was not raised before the district court and
thus is not properly before us. See United States v. Nee, 261 F.3d
79, 86 (1st Cir. 2001) ("It is a cardinal principle that [i]ssues
not squarely raised in the district court will not be entertained
on appeal." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted))
(alteration in original). Second, it lacks evidentiary support.
The stipulation states simply that the form was withdrawn; it does
not state when or by whom. Third, mere withdrawal of the I-751 is
insufficient to constitute abandonment of the conspiracy, which
6
Moreover, Roshko's receipt of his green card in 1984
preceded the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments
of 1986, Pub. L. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537, which, among other things,
introduced the two-year conditional basis now attached to LPR
status obtained via marriage under § 1186a. See Gallimore, 619
F.3d at 222. "The purpose of this scheme is obvious: to ferret out
sham marriages entered into for the purpose of obtaining entry into
the United States." Id. Before the Amendments, a non-citizen
spouse automatically received unconditional LPR status upon
marrying a citizen. See Carpio v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1091, 1094
(10th Cir. 2010). Thus, when Roshko received his green card, the
conspiratorial objective of receiving his green card was quite
obviously achieved.
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requires that the conspirator "act affirmatively either to defeat
or disavow the purposes of the conspiracy, such as by confessing to
the authorities or informing his coconspirators that he has
forsaken the conspiracy and its goals." United States v. Mehanna,
735 F.3d 32, 57 (1st Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Finally, even if Stewart did abandon the
conspiracy in 2011, that would mean only that she would not be
liable for post-abandonment conduct of her co-conspirators. See
United States v. Guevara, 706 F.3d 38, 45–46 (1st Cir. 2013).
Withdrawal within the statute of limitations period does not shield
a conspirator from liability for pre-withdrawal acts. Id. at 46 &
n.8. Thus, Stewart's purported withdrawal offers her no
protection.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Stewart's
conviction.
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