Stauffer v. Internal Revenue Service ( 2019 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 18-2105
HOFF STAUFFER,
Administrator of the Estate of Carlton Stauffer,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges.
Thomas E. Crice, for appellant.
Julie Ciamporcero Avetta, Attorney, Tax Division, Department
of Justice, with whom Richard E. Zuckerman, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Travis A. Greaves, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Andrew E. Lelling, United States Attorney,
Gilbert S. Rothenberg, Attorney, and Joan I. Oppenheimer,
Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.
September 16, 2019
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. This case concerns Internal
Revenue Code ("IRC") provisions governing the timeliness of a claim
for refund of overpaid federal taxes and the renunciation of a
durable power of attorney under Pennsylvania law. Hoff Stauffer
("Hoff") filed suit on behalf of his father's estate (the "Estate")
against the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), alleging that the
agency improperly denied his April 2013 claim for his father's
2006 tax refund as untimely, see I.R.C. § 6511(a)(2018). The
Estate averred that the applicable statute of limitations for the
filing of a tax refund claim was tolled due to Hoff's father's
financial disability, see id. § 6511(h)(1). The district court
dismissed the Estate's complaint, holding that the limitations
period was not tolled because Hoff held a durable power of attorney
authorizing him to act on his father's behalf in financial matters.
See Stauffer v. Internal Revenue Serv., No. CV 15-10271-MLW, 2018
WL 5092885 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2018); see also § 6511(h)(2)(B).
After careful review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In October 2005, Hoff and his father, Carlton Stauffer
("Carlton"), executed a written durable power of attorney (the
"DPA").1 Hoff requested the DPA to better assist Carlton in the
1 The DPA was executed in Pennsylvania, while Carlton was a
Pennsylvania citizen, and references provisions of the
Pennsylvania power of attorney statute. Accordingly, the district
-2-
management of his finances because Carlton was both elderly and
mentally ill. The DPA granted Hoff broad powers over Carlton's
finances, including the authority to "prepare, execute and file in
[Carlton's] behalf . . . any and all income tax declarations and
returns . . . and to represent [Carlton] before the Internal
Revenue Service . . . with respect to any claim or proceeding
having to do with [his] tax liabilities."
After the DPA came into effect, Hoff discovered that
Carlton had lost track of millions of dollars in assets in the
form of uncashed checks, matured bonds, and stocks. Hoff began
recovering these assets and opened an investment account in
Carlton's name at T. Rowe Price to deposit the recovered funds.
In lieu of the existing DPA, T. Rowe Price required its own
standardized, limited power of attorney form (the "TRP POA"), which
Carlton executed on January 5, 2006. The TRP POA only authorized
Hoff to conduct transactions within Carlton's T. Rowe Price account
(e.g., to buy, sell and trade account assets, and to make
withdrawals).
Despite Hoff's financial management efforts, the father-
son relationship began to deteriorate in March 2006. During a
court held that it was governed by Pennsylvania law. Stauffer,
2018 WL 5092885, at *10. Neither party challenges this choice of
law holding on appeal.
-3-
face-to-face meeting (the "March 15 meeting"), Carlton and Hoff
had an argument regarding Hoff's management of his father's
financial affairs. Part of the tension resulted from Hoff's
insistence that, as a condition of his continued assistance,
Carlton stop permitting his girlfriend to overspend his money.2
To control Carlton's girlfriend's excessive spending, Hoff
suggested that Carlton limit her expenses to a monthly allowance.
A falling out ensued.
Hoff claims to have told Carlton at the March 15 meeting
that he would no longer be exercising any rights granted to him
under the DPA. Then, Carlton drafted three notices revoking the
DPA. However, he never sent these notices, and Hoff never received
them. Carlton and Hoff also stopped talking. Carlton would not
pick up Hoff's calls or return his calls or messages. The fallout
led Hoff to tell his sister (Carlton's daughter), Carlton's
accountant, and Carlton's attorneys that he was no longer acting
as his father's agent under the DPA.3
2 According to Hoff, Carlton's girlfriend was spending from
$100,000 to $200,000 per year -- an amount Carlton could not
afford. By way of comparison, Carlton was only spending $50,000
to $60,000 per year on himself.
3 In May 2006, two of Carlton's attorneys contacted Hoff for his
assistance in closing the sale of a family business. Hoff
responded by telling the attorneys he was no longer acting as
Carlton's agent under the DPA and thus could not help them. The
attorneys then drafted a new POA, but neither Carlton nor Hoff
-4-
The father and son, however, reconciled approximately
four years later as reflected by a series of financial
transactions. In May or June 2009, Carlton loaned Hoff $1.25M to
purchase a home. With Carlton's permission, Hoff withdrew this
amount from the T. Rowe Price account. Then, in 2012, Carlton
asked Hoff for $100,000, which Hoff withdrew from the same account
at his father's request.
In late October 2012, Carlton passed away. Hoff was
named the personal representative of the Estate the following
month. As representative of the Estate, Hoff filed his father's
tax returns for the tax years 2006 through 2012 in late April 2013.
The 2006 return reported a tax overpayment of $137,403, of which
the Estate claimed a refund of $97,364 and requested that $40,000
of the remaining $40,039 be applied to Carlton's 2007 tax
liability. The IRS denied the claim for the 2006 tax refund as
untimely pursuant to I.R.C. § 6511(a), which establishes the
statutory timetable for filing tax refund claims. After an
internal appeal, the IRS issued its final denial of the Estate's
refund claim on January 7, 2015.
On February 5, 2015, the Estate filed suit in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the IRS4
ever signed it.
4 Hoff's complaint incorrectly named the IRS, rather than the
-5-
seeking a refund of Carlton's 2006 tax overpayment. The Estate's
complaint alleged that its refund claim (filed in 2013) was timely
because Carlton's financial disability tolled the three-year
statutory period to file the claim under I.R.C. § 6511(h)(1). On
September 29, 2018, the district court dismissed the Estate's
complaint, finding that: (1) Carlton had the capacity to execute
the DPA; (2) Hoff was, as of 2005, authorized under the DPA to act
on behalf of Carlton in financial matters for the purposes of
I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(B); (3) Hoff did not renounce the DPA; and (4)
Carlton did not effectively revoke the DPA. Stauffer, 2018 WL
5092885, at *6-11. Accordingly, the court held that the statutory
period for the filing of Carlton's 2006 tax refund claim was never
tolled under § 6511(h)(1) and thus had expired in October 2010,5
which consequently deprived the court of subject matter
jurisdiction over the Estate's suit. See Muskat v. United States,
554 F.3d 183, 194 (1st Cir. 2009) ("[A] district court has
jurisdiction to adjudicate only those refund claims that have first
United States, as defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). The
government has not raised an issue in this regard, and we do not
address it.
5 Because Carlton did not timely file a tax return for 2006, the
district court held that the applicable statute of limitations for
the filing of his refund claim was two years and not three years
as the Estate alleged in its complaint. Stauffer, 2018 WL 5092885,
at *1 n. 2; see I.R.C. § 6511(a).
-6-
been 'duly filed' with the Secretary of the Treasury." (citing 26
U.S.C. § 7422(a))). This appeal ensued thereafter.
II. ANALYSIS
The Estate's attack on the district court's decision is
two-pronged: its first swing is directed at the court's factual
finding that Hoff never renounced the DPA, while the second takes
aim at the court's legal conclusion that the DPA qualified Hoff as
a person authorized to act on behalf of Carlton in financial
matters for the purposes of I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(B). The Estate
misses on both swings. We address the Estate's arguments in
inverse order, directing our attention first to its challenge of
the district court's interpretation of I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(B).
A. Hoff's Qualification as a Person Authorized to Act on Behalf
of Carlton in Financial Matters Pursuant to § 6511(h)(2)(B)
We review the district court's interpretation of I.R.C.
§ 6511(h)(2)(B) -- the legal basis for the court's decision to
dismiss the Estate's complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction -- de novo. Muskat, 554 F.3d at 194.
The IRC states that "[n]o suit for a tax refund may be
maintained in a United States district court 'until a claim for a
refund . . . has been duly filed.' 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a). Thus,
timely filing of a refund claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite
to a tax refund suit." Me. Med. Ctr. v. United States, 675 F.3d
110, 114 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Phila. Marine Trade Ass'n v.
-7-
Comm'r, 523 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2008)). The timeliness of a
refund claim6 is governed by I.R.C. § 6511(a), which provides that
a "[c]laim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax
imposed" must be filed "within 2 years from the time the tax was
paid" when, as here, "no return was filed by the taxpayer." This
two-year statute of limitations is commonly referred to as a "look-
back period." Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235,
239 n.1, 240 (1996). Generally, a taxpayer who fails to file his
refund claim within the applicable limitations period 7 may no
longer obtain his overpayment refund or credit. I.R.C.
§ 6511(b)(1).
Notwithstanding, the applicable limitations period will
be tolled or "suspended" if a taxpayer is financially disabled.
Id. § 6511(h)(1) ("In the case of an individual, the running of
the [look-back] periods . . . shall be suspended during any period
of such individual's life that such individual is financially
disabled."). The IRC defines a financially disabled taxpayer as
an individual who "is unable to manage his financial affairs by
6 "A tax return that claims a refund is considered a 'claim' for
purposes of § 6511." Walter v. United States, No. 09-420, 2009
WL 5062391, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2009) (citing 26 C.F.R. § 301–
6402–3(a) (1, 5), (c)).
7 When, unlike here, a taxpayer files a timely tax return, the
applicable limitations period for any overpaid tax refund claim is
three years. I.R.C. § 6511(a).
-8-
reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment
. . . which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted
or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months." Id. § 6511(h)(2)(A).
Not all financially disabled individuals, however, are
entitled to the benefit of § 6511(h)(1)'s tolling provision. The
IRC sets forth an exception to the exception: "An individual
shall not be treated as financially disabled during any period
that . . .[any] person is authorized to act on behalf of such
individual in financial matters." Id. § 6511(h)(2)(B). But that
provision does not provide any statutory guidance as to what
qualifies a person as one "authorized to act on behalf of [a
financially disabled taxpayer] in financial matters." Id. It is
this statutory vacuum that makes way for Hoff's challenge of the
district court's interpretation.
The Estate urges us to adopt a reading of § 6511(h)(2)(B)
under which a person will be considered "authorized to act on
behalf of [a financially disabled taxpayer] in financial matters"
only if he or she has: (1) authority to file the financially
disabled taxpayer's tax returns; (2) a duty to file the financially
disabled taxpayer's tax returns; and (3) actual or constructive
knowledge that the tax returns for a particular year have to be
filed on behalf of the disabled taxpayer. The Estate claims that,
-9-
because Hoff did not meet these three purported requirements, the
statute of limitations for the filing of Carlton's tax refund
should have remained suspended through his death in October 2012
due to his financial disability. We disagree.
As a preliminary matter, we do not need to decide whether
the Estate's first purported requirement -- authority to file the
financially disabled taxpayer's tax returns -- must be met in order
to strip a disabled taxpayer of § 6511(h)(1)'s tolling benefit.
Hoff's authority to file Carlton's tax returns is not at issue
here. The DPA explicitly granted him the authority to file
Carlton's tax returns, as well as any other tax-related claim
before the IRS. Thus, ever mindful of the principles that guide
our interpretation of a statute, we turn to the Estate's purported
"duty" and "actual or constructive knowledge" requirements for a
person to qualify as "authorized to act on behalf of [a financially
disabled taxpayer] in financial matters" under § 6511(h)(2)(B).
We have generally recognized that "[t]he words of the
statute are the first guide to any interpretation of the meaning
of the statute . . . if the meaning is plain." Greebel v. FTP
Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 192 (1st Cir. 1999). First, we
"determine whether the language at issue has a plain and
unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the
case." In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico, 919 F.3d
-10-
121, 128 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519
U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). "The plainness or ambiguity of statutory
language is determined by reference to the language itself, the
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader
context of the statute as a whole." Id. (citation omitted).8 "If
the statute's language is plain, 'the sole function of the courts
is to enforce it according to its terms.'" Id. (quoting United
States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)).
However, if "the language is not plain and unambiguous, we then
turn to other tools of statutory construction, such as legislative
history." Id. (citing Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136
F.3d 854, 858 (1st Cir. 1998)).
Here, the key word for our analysis of § 6511(h)(2)(B)is
"authorized." By urging us to adopt the "duty" and "constructive
knowledge" requirements, the Estate asks us to interpret the term
"authorized" in § 6511(h)(2)(B) beyond its plain and unambiguous
meaning. And this we cannot do. The Estate's proposed definition
of "authorized" finds no support in § 6511(h)(2)(B)'s plain
language or its statutory context.
8 To examine § 6511(h)(2)(B)'s context we "look to the provisions
of the whole law, and to its object and policy," U.S. Nat'l Bank
of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993)
(internal quotation omitted), and "consult[] any precedents or
authorities that inform [our] analysis," Dolan v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006).
-11-
Consistent with the interpretative scheme outlined
above, we begin our statutory examination with the plain meaning
of "authorized." See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 192. The term
"authority" is not defined in the IRC, and the use of the term
"authorized" in § 6511(h)(2)(B) is too situational to draw
parallels to its use elsewhere in the code.9 Since the other
provisions of the IRC are not helpful to our analysis here, we
turn to the dictionary definition of the term for further clarity.
The root word for "authorized" is "authority," which is
defined as: (1) "[t]he official right or permission to act, esp.
to act legally on another's behalf; esp., the power of one person
to affect another's legal relations by acts done in accordance
with the other's manifestations of assent," Authority, Black's Law
9 Compare I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(B), with, e.g., id. § 5609 (stating
that "the seizing officer is authorized to destroy," inter alia,
"unregistered still[s] . . . where it shall be impracticable to
remove the same"), § 7808 ("The Secretary [of the Treasury] is
authorized to designate . . . depositaries in each State . . . ."),
and § 9040(b) ("The Commission is authorized . . . to institute
actions in the district courts of the United States to seek
recovery of any amounts determined to be payable to the Secretary
[of the Treasury] as a result of an examination and audit
. . . ."). But see id. § 5559 (drawing a distinction between
situations where the Secretary of Treasury is "required" to make
a quantitative determination versus situations where he is
"authorized" to make such determinations), § 7509 ("[T]he
Secretary [of the Treasury] shall be authorized and directed
. . . ." (emphasis added)), § 7516 (using the term "authorized" in
conjunction with "discretion"), and § 7804(a) (using the terms
"authorized" and "shall" in the same sentence in reference to the
Commissioner's powers to appoint and supervise employees).
-12-
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); (2) "the power delegated by a principal
to an agent," id.; (3) "power to influence or command thought,
opinion, or behavior," Authority, Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/authority
(last visited Aug. 15, 2019); and (4) "freedom granted by one in
authority," id. These dictionary definitions reveal no ambiguity.
None of the above definitions imply that the existence of a "duty"
is a requisite for a person's authority. To the contrary, the
provided definitions illustrate that one who acts with "authority"
has been bestowed with the power to perform an action on another's
behalf. By contrast, a duty imposes an obligation to perform a
certain act.10 While there are duties that flow from grants of
authority (e.g., those of loyalty and care in agency law), the
relevant question here is whether in this context, definitionally
speaking, one who is "authorized" to take a certain course of
action should be understood narrowly to mean only one who has an
affirmative obligation to take such action. The answer is clearly
10 The same dictionaries cited for the definition of "authority"
define "duty" as: (1) "[a] legal obligation that is owed or due to
another and that needs to be satisfied," Duty, Black's Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); (2) "that which one is bound to do,
and for which somebody else has a corresponding right," id.;
(3) "obligatory tasks, conduct, service, or functions that arise
from one's position (as in life or in a group)," Duty, Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/duty (last visited Aug. 15, 2019); (4) "a
moral or legal obligation," id.
-13-
no. The plain language of § 6511(h)(2)(B) simply does not
contemplate the Estate's purported "duty" requirement. Because
the term "authorized" is unambiguous within its statutory context,
our examination of its meaning stops here, and we need not proceed
to examine § 6511(h)(2)(B)'s legislative history. See In re Fin.
Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico, 919 F.3d at 128.
Therefore, we hold that a person may be considered
"authorized to act on behalf of [a financially disabled taxpayer]
in financial matters" for purposes of § 6511(h)(2)(B) even if he
has no affirmative obligation to act on the taxpayer's behalf.
Our decision is consistent with that of at least one
other court that faced a similar controversy. In Plati v. United
States, 99 Fed. Cl. 634, 640 (2011), the plaintiff's son and
attorney-in-fact -- who brought the action on his mother's behalf
(the financially disabled taxpayer) -- averred that he was unable
to file her refund claim within the applicable limitations period
because of his mother's insistence on "keeping control" over her
financial affairs. Based on this, the son sought that his mother
be granted "refuge in the suspension of the look-back period
because of [his mother's] financial disability," despite his
authority to file his mother's tax returns pursuant to a DPA. Id.
at 640-41. In denying the plaintiff's requested relief, the
United States Court of Federal Claims stressed that:
-14-
[U]nder [I.R.C.] § 6511(h)(2)(B), the relevant
question is whether any person was "authorized to act
on behalf of [the taxpayer] in financial matters,"
(emphasis added), not whether the authorized person
actually took such action. The statute is not
concerned with whether the taxpayer's affairs were
actually managed, nor whether they were managed
competently, but rather whether someone had been given
the authority to act. One may certainly possess the
authority conferred by a power of attorney without
implementing, exercising, or acting on that power.
Id. at 641 (alterations in the original) (quoting Bova v. United
States, 80 Fed. Cl. 449, 458 n.12 (2008)).11 Within the context
of § 6511(h)(2)(B), we see no significant difference between the
son's failure to file his mother's tax returns due to her
insistence on controlling her finances in Plati and Hoff's failure
to file Carlton's tax returns due to their falling out. In both
cases, the sons -- as agents of their parents -- failed to act
pursuant to the authority they had been granted.
The Estate's argument in support of an "actual or
constructive knowledge" requirement is even less persuasive. The
statute's plain language does not include any term into which such
a requirement can plausibly be read, nor does the Estate point to
any contextual basis (e.g., provisions of the whole law) from which
11 In Bova, 80 Fed. Cl. at 458 n. 12, the United States Court of
Federal Claims held that a non-verbal agreement between a
financially disabled taxpayer and her accountant stipulating that
he was not to act pursuant to the power of attorney had no bearing
on the applicability of I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(B).
-15-
it can be inferred. Thus, we also hold that, for purposes of
§ 6511(h)(2)(B), a person "authorized to act on behalf of [a
financially disabled taxpayer] in financial matters" is not
required to have actual or constructive knowledge of the need to
file tax returns in a specific year.12
Accordingly, the DPA qualified Hoff as a person
"authorized to act on behalf of [Carlton] in financial matters"
pursuant to § 6511(h)(2)(B). We move on to Hoff's factual
challenge.
B. Renunciation of the DPA
We review the district court's factual findings for
clear error. Me. Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d at 114.13 As we have stated
12 As a factual matter, we would not, in any case, be persuaded
to believe that Hoff lacked constructive knowledge of the need to
file Carlton's tax returns. The record reflects that he was fully
aware of his father's gross financial mismanagement.
13 On the eve of oral argument, Hoff submitted a letter pursuant
to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j), arguing for the first time that our
review of the district court's determination that he did not
renounce the DPA is de novo. Relying on the Pennsylvania Superior
Court's decision in Consol. Rail Corp. v. ACE Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co., 182 A.3d 1011 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018), appeal denied, 191 A.3d
1288 (Pa. 2018), Hoff contended that whether a principal-agent
relationship exists is a pure question of law subject to de novo
review whenever the facts underlying the relationship are
undisputed. Although Hoff's reliance on Consolidated Rail is
misplaced, we need not wade into the matter. Hoff's opening brief
-- submitted over a year after the Pennsylvania Superior Court
decided Consolidated Rail -- conceded that the applicable standard
of review was clear error. New arguments cannot be raised in a
Rule 28(j) letter. See Ruskai v. Pistole, 775 F.3d 61, 66 (1st
Cir. 2014); Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir. 2004).
-16-
before, "[t]he clear-error standard is extremely deferential.
Under it, 'we ought not to upset findings of fact or conclusions
drawn therefrom unless, on the whole of the record, we form a
strong, unyielding belief that a mistake has been made.'" United
States v. Márquez, 280 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting
Cumpiano v. Banco Santander, 902 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1990)).
Carlton and Hoff's execution of the DPA gave rise to a
principal-agent relationship. See generally 20 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 5601 (2015).14 Under Pennsylvania law, an agent's renunciation
of the duties and obligations of such relationship must be
positive, unequivocal, and made known to the principal for it to
be effective. Bergner v. Bergner, 67 A. 999, 1001 (Pa. 1907).
Furthermore, "the burden of proving renunciation of one's
obligations rests on the party asserting it." Shafer v. A. I. T.
S., Inc., 428 A.2d 152, 155 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
The district court found that the Estate did not meet
its burden of proving that Hoff renounced the DPA. Our review of
the record leads us to conclude the same. Thus, we find no error
in the district court's finding, much less a clear error.
Since Hoff failed to raise this argument in his opening brief, we
deem it waived. See Med. Mut. Ins. Co. of Me. v. Indian Harbor
Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 57, 61 (1st Cir. 2009).
14 As mentioned above, the parties do not contest that the DPA
was governed by Pennsylvania law.
-17-
We agree with the district court's assessment of the
deposition testimony upon which it primarily relied to reach its
finding that Hoff did not renounce the DPA. See Stauffer, 2018
WL 5092885, at *10. During the deposition, which was taken for a
separate Pennsylvania state court proceeding,15 Hoff was asked, "Do
you recall ever discussing the possible termination of the power
of attorney directly with your father?"; to which he responded, "I
don't, but I could have said . . . I'm not doing anything with it
now, it's really a non-issue, but it would hurt my feelings if it
were terminated." Below and now before us, the Estate attempts
to save itself from Hoff's deposition testimony by contradictorily
asserting that Hoff actually told Carlton during the March 15
meeting that "he would no longer be exercising any rights granted
to him under the [DPA]." But, as the district court noted, "if
true, this [purported statement] would not constitute a
renunciation" because it "only expresses an intent not to use the
[DPA], not a 'positive and unequivocal' renunciation of it." Id.(quoting Bergner, 67 A. at 1001); see 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5604(b)
(2017) ("Unless the power of attorney states a time of termination,
it is valid notwithstanding the lapse of time since its
15 See Estate of Stauffer v. Bielava, No. 906 MDA 2015, 2016 WL
4882571 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 20, 2016).
-18-
execution."). 16 As such, Hoff's purported March 15 meeting
statement is -- as a matter of law -- inconsequential to the
question of whether he renounced the DPA.
A close look at Hoff's deposition testimony further
supports the district court's conclusion that Hoff never renounced
the DPA. During his deposition, Hoff testified that he was not
going to do anything with the DPA "now," referencing a point in
time after the March 15 meeting. This strongly suggests that Hoff
believed his rights under the DPA went uninterrupted after the
March 15 meeting, which clearly contradicts his claim of
renunciation during said meeting. Moreover, in a letter Hoff sent
to Carlton's psychologist, Dr. Stanley E. Schneider, Hoff
represented that he held the DPA until Carlton's death in 2012.
16 We note that the language used by the district court strongly
suggests that it did not grant credibility to Hoff's contradictory
statement, which was memorialized in a supplemental answer to
interrogatories submitted a mere five days after a deposition in
the present case. See Stauffer, 2018 WL 5092885, at *10 ("[I]f
true, this would not constitute a renunciation. The purported
statement only expresses an intent . . . ." (emphasis added));
see also State Police Ass'n of Mass. v. Comm'r, 125 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 1997) (holding that our "mode of review requires us to accept
[the lower court's] credibility determinations and its findings
about historical facts unless, after careful evaluation of the
evidence, we are left with an abiding conviction that those
determinations and findings are simply wrong"); Constructora Maza,
Inc. v. Banco de Ponce, 616 F.2d 573, 576 (1st Cir. 1980) ("The
presumption of correctness reflected in the 'clearly erroneous'
rule applies not only when the district court's findings are based
upon its assessment of conflicting testimony, but also when . . .
much of the evidence is documentary . . . .").
-19-
See Stauffer, 2018 WL 5092885, at *10.
The Estate also contends that the district court erred
in finding that Hoff did not renounce the DPA because "uncontested
evidence" establishes that Hoff notified individuals to whom he
had previously represented himself as Carlton's agent -- Carlton's
daughter, accountant, and attorneys -- that he would no longer act
pursuant to the DPA. These notifications to third parties,
however, do not help the Estate. For a renunciation to be
effective "it is essential that it be made known to the principal,"
Bergner, 67 A. at 1001, and the Estate fails to identify any part
of the record that undermines the district court's conclusion that
"there is no evidence [showing] that any of [the third parties]
communicated [Hoff's unwillingness to act under the DPA] to
Carlton." Stauffer, 2018 WL 5092885, at *10.
Finally, we point out an additional consideration that
favors the district court's finding that Hoff did not renounce the
DPA. After the March 15 meeting, Carlton drafted three letters
purporting to revoke Hoff's DPA.17 We find no reason for Carlton
to have drafted the three letters purporting to revoke the DPA if
Hoff had previously made it unequivocally clear to Carlton that he
renounced the DPA during the March 15 meeting. See Bergner, 67 A.
17 As stated above, none of these letters were ever sent to Hoff.
-20-
at 1001. One cannot revoke an agency that has already been
renounced.
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the
district court's finding that Hoff never renounced the DPA was
correct. Thus, the court did not commit clear error in reaching
this factual conclusion.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the district
court's judgment dismissing the Estate's complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
Affirmed.
-21-