Rivera-Coca v. Lynch , 844 F.3d 374 ( 2016 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 16-1115
    GERMAN DONALDO RIVERA-COCA,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    LORETTA E. LYNCH,
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
    Respondent.
    PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
    OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
    Before
    Kayatta, Selya and Barron,
    Circuit Judges.
    Ilana Etkin Greenstein and Macias & Greenstein, LLC on brief
    for petitioner.
    Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
    General, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Eric
    W. Marsteller, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration
    Litigation, Rachel L. Browning and Juria L. Jones, Trial Attorneys,
    Office of Immigration Litigation, on brief for respondent.
    December 30, 2016
    SELYA, Circuit Judge.             The petitioner, German Donaldo
    Rivera-Coca, is a Honduran national.           He seeks judicial review of
    a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which
    denied his application for asylum and withholding of removal.
    Concluding,   as   we   do,   that    the    BIA's    order   is   supported    by
    substantial evidence, we deny the petition.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    We rehearse the facts as recounted by the petitioner and
    then limn the travel of the case.             The petitioner owned a small
    accounting firm in Puerto Cortes, Honduras, which frequently did
    business with that nation's Liberal Party (though the petitioner
    states that he is not politically inclined and does not support
    any particular political party).             Early in 2011, the petitioner
    discovered    political   propaganda        posters    supporting    the   rival
    National Party displayed on the walls and windows of his office.
    He tore down the posters but they soon reappeared.
    After the petitioner removed the posters a second time,
    three or four men, dressed in clothing typically worn by National
    Party activists, came to his office and assaulted him.                         The
    petitioner says that he reported the matter to the police and that
    he sought medical treatment.         He asserts that, despite his report,
    the police never investigated the matter.
    A few days later, the petitioner discovered that the
    posters were once more in evidence.           He removed them but, shortly
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    thereafter, he started receiving threats.       We briefly describe the
    threats.   The petitioner testified that a handwritten note was
    delivered to his office and — although the original note was never
    produced — he claimed that it said that he "had to be very careful"
    and that those who do not respect "the blue ones" regret it.1        The
    petitioner did not report this message to the police.
    One evening in March of 2011, a stranger dressed in what
    the petitioner described as typical National Party attire (a white
    shirt and blue jeans) approached the petitioner on the street.
    The stranger told the petitioner that he was "going to die if [he
    did not] join [them]."     Once again, the petitioner did not report
    this threat to the police.
    The petitioner's family also became involved: on a few
    unspecified   occasions,    National    Party    activists    told   the
    petitioner's wife that they knew where her husband lived and where
    he was. In addition, caravans of cars bearing National Party flags
    stopped in front of the family's home.     The occupants of the cars
    shouted, "I know who you are and I know who you're dealing with."
    Concerned about the situation, the petitioner took his
    family to his mother-in-law's house (five or six hours away).
    Despite this relocation, caravans of cars continued to appear.
    1 The petitioner testified that "the           blue   ones"   was   a
    shorthand for members of the National Party.
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    Men shouted from the cars, "Never mind where you go.                  Never mind
    where you are.        We know where you are."
    The petitioner decided to flee to the United States.
    Leaving his family in Honduras, he entered the United States
    without documentation in May of 2011.                He was apprehended and
    questioned by Border Patrol agents.               He told the agents that he
    intended to live and work in the United States for two years and
    that he did not fear returning to Honduras.                       But during an
    interview some months later, the petitioner changed his tune,
    saying that he in fact feared persecution and was afraid to return
    to Honduras.
    In   due    course,      the    Department   of   Homeland    Security
    initiated removal proceedings, charging that the petitioner was
    present in the United States without legal sanction.                See 8 U.S.C.
    § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).         The petitioner conceded removability but
    cross-applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
    under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT).                      He
    argued that he had a well-founded fear of persecution based on his
    recent experiences in Honduras.
    After a merits hearing, an immigration judge (IJ) denied
    the petitioner's requests for relief and ordered his removal.                    In
    doing so, the IJ noted several inconsistencies in the petitioner's
    testimony and expressed serious doubts about his credibility.                   The
    IJ   went   on   to    find   that    the    petitioner's     testimony   was   not
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    "otherwise credible," that is, that the petitioner had not overcome
    the inconsistencies in his testimony through readily available
    corroborating evidence and, thus, had failed to carry his burden
    of proving eligibility for relief.
    The IJ did not stop there but, rather, used both a belt
    and suspenders. She held that even if the absence of corroborating
    evidence was overlooked and the petitioner's testimony was deemed
    fully credible, the mistreatment that he allegedly suffered did
    not rise to the level of past persecution.           By the same token,
    that mistreatment did not justify a well-founded fear of future
    persecution.    She added that no probative evidence showed that the
    petitioner was likely to be targeted should he be repatriated,
    especially given the recent election (2013) of a new president in
    Honduras and the ascension to power of a new administration.
    With this preface in place, the IJ               ruled that the
    petitioner was not entitled to asylum, withholding of removal, or
    CAT protection.    The petitioner countered by appealing to the BIA.
    He asseverated that the IJ committed clear error in evaluating his
    credibility, in requiring corroborating evidence, in concluding
    that past persecution had not been demonstrated, and in concluding
    that no well-founded fear of future persecution existed.
    The     BIA   dismissed    the    petitioner's   appeal.    Its
    reasoning was relatively narrow: it affirmed the IJ's holding that,
    even presuming the petitioner to be credible, he had not carried
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    either his burden of explaining the lack of corroborating evidence
    or of showing that what he had experienced rose to the level of
    persecution.      Relatedly, it affirmed the IJ's ruling that the
    petitioner had not demonstrated an objectively reasonable basis to
    support his claim of a well-founded fear of future persecution.
    This timely petition for judicial review followed.               See
    8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).
    II.   ANALYSIS
    In this venue, the petitioner challenges the denial of
    his claims for asylum and withholding of removal.                    He does not
    challenge the denial of his CAT claim.                    We limit our analysis
    accordingly and treat the CAT claim as waived.                     See Ahmed v.
    Holder, 
    611 F.3d 90
    , 98 (1st Cir. 2010).
    In the immigration context, judicial review normally
    focuses on the decision of the BIA, which constitutes the agency's
    final order.     See Wan v. Holder, 
    776 F.3d 52
    , 55 (1st Cir. 2015).
    But where, as here, the BIA merely adds its gloss to the IJ's
    findings and conclusions, we treat the two decisions as a unit and
    review them together.      See 
    id. at 55-56.
    We start with the petitioner's asylum claim because a
    claim for withholding of removal "imposes a 'more stringent burden
    of proof on an alien than does a counterpart claim for asylum.'"
    Morgan   v.    Holder,   
    634 F.3d 53
    ,     60   (1st    Cir.   2011)   (quoting
    Rodriguez-Ramirez v. Ashcroft, 
    398 F.3d 120
    , 123 (1st Cir. 2005)).
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    Thus, if the petitioner "fails to establish a well-founded fear of
    persecution sufficient to ground an asylum claim, a counterpart
    claim for withholding of removal . . . necessarily fails."             Amouri
    v. Holder, 
    572 F.3d 29
    , 35 (1st Cir. 2009).
    Absent any material error of law — and we discern none
    here — our review of a refusal to grant asylum is aimed at
    determining       whether   the    agency's     denial     is   supported   by
    substantial evidence in the record.           See Da Silva v. Ashcroft, 
    394 F.3d 1
    , 4 (1st Cir. 2005).         In the course of that review, we must
    accept the agency's findings of fact, including its credibility
    determinations, as long as they are "supported by reasonable,
    substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a
    whole."    INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481 (1992) (citation
    omitted).        Consequently, the agency's fact-based determination
    that an alien is not entitled to asylum must be upheld unless "any
    reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
    contrary."       8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
    Of course, the agency's rulings of law are reviewed de
    novo.     See Da 
    Silva, 394 F.3d at 5
    .          In this context, however,
    courts    must    afford    some   deference    to   the   BIA's   reasonable
    interpretations of statutes and regulations relating directly to
    immigration matters.        See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 
    526 U.S. 415
    ,
    425 (1999); see also 
    Ahmed, 611 F.3d at 94
    (explaining that the
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    BIA   is   afforded   "a   measure   of   respect"   with   regard   to   its
    interpretations of immigration statutes).
    To qualify for asylum, an alien must carry the burden of
    establishing that he is a "refugee" within the meaning of the
    Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).        See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1);
    see also 
    id. § 1101(a)(42)(A)
    (defining "refugee" as any person
    outside his home country who is unable or unwilling to return due
    to persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution).              An
    alien may carry this burden either by proving past persecution
    based on "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
    social group, or political opinion," or by proving a well-founded
    fear of future persecution based on one of these five protected
    grounds.    
    Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A);
    see 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b); see also
    Bocova v. Gonzales, 
    412 F.3d 257
    , 262 (1st Cir. 2005), superseded
    in unrelated part by 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(i), as recognized in Ivanov
    v. Holder, 
    736 F.3d 5
    , 20 (1st Cir. 2013).           If the alien succeeds
    in showing that he has suffered past persecution, a rebuttable
    presumption arises that he will suffer future persecution as well.
    See Palma-Mazariegos v. Gonzales, 
    428 F.3d 30
    , 34 (1st Cir. 2005).
    An alien may satisfy his burden of proving entitlement
    to asylum "by [his] own testimony if that testimony is specific
    and credible."    Chhay v. Mukasey, 
    540 F.3d 1
    , 6 (1st Cir. 2008).
    This allocation of the burden of proof has consequences: if the
    alien's testimony is not itself compelling, the "absence of easily
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    obtainable corroborating documentation can be the final straw."
    
    Id. Indeed, Congress
    has specifically allowed IJs to require
    corroboration even to support otherwise credible testimony.      See
    8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also Soeung v. Holder, 
    677 F.3d 484
    , 488 (1st Cir. 2012).   If the IJ "determines that the applicant
    should provide [corroborating evidence], such evidence must be
    provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot
    reasonably obtain [it]."    8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).   A failure
    either to provide readily available corroborating evidence or to
    offer a compelling explanation for such a failure can be fatal to
    an asylum claim.   See 
    Soeung, 677 F.3d at 487-88
    ; 
    Chhay, 540 F.3d at 6
    .
    In the case at hand, the IJ rested her decision on two
    independently sufficient grounds.       First, she ruled that the
    petitioner's testimony did not suffice to carry his burden of proof
    because she had serious doubts about his truthfulness and the
    petitioner failed to produce corroborating evidence to overcome
    these doubts.   Second, the IJ ruled that, even if she overlooked
    her doubts about the petitioner's credibility and the lack of
    corroborating evidence, the mistreatment that he experienced did
    not rise to the level of persecution.     She added that with past
    persecution not proven, the record (unaided by any presumption)
    failed to show a well-founded fear of future persecution.
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    The BIA did not pass directly upon the petitioner's
    credibility, but upheld the IJ's finding that the petitioner had
    failed to submit readily available corroborating evidence and,
    thus, had failed to carry his burden of proof.                   It also upheld the
    IJ's alternate holding that the petitioner had failed to prove
    persecution.     We hold that substantial evidence supports the BIA's
    lack-of-corroborating-evidence rationale.                  Because this rationale
    is independently sufficient to sustain the denial of asylum, we
    take no view of the BIA's lack-of-persecution rationale.
    We    are   bound     to    accept        the   IJ's    and    the      BIA's
    determinations      regarding    the       unpersuasiveness        of    the    alien's
    testimony, the availability of corroborating evidence, and the
    effect of not producing corroborating evidence "unless the record
    compels a contrary conclusion."              
    Chhay, 540 F.3d at 6
    (citing,
    inter alia, Kho v. Keisler, 
    505 F.3d 50
    , 57 (1st Cir. 2007)).                        The
    record before us compels no such conclusion.
    The    IJ   would    have       been      permitted    to     require     the
    petitioner to produce corroborating evidence even if she had found
    him "otherwise credible," as the BIA assumed for the purpose of
    his appeal.     See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); 
    Soeung, 677 F.3d at 488
    .    Here,    however,     the     IJ   identified      several      gaps    in   the
    petitioner's testimony that prompted her to require additional
    corroborating evidence. For example, she observed that even though
    the    petitioner      "had     appeared        to     testify      sincerely        and
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    forthrightly," other evidence in the record called his story into
    serious question.         For instance, the petitioner testified that
    after his assault, he went to the doctor and then to the police.
    The reports that he submitted, though, indicated that he went first
    to the police and then to the doctor three to five days later.
    Moreover, the police report included no mention of any assault.
    To cite another example, the IJ observed that even though
    the petitioner initially told Border Patrol agents that he did not
    fear returning to Honduras, he reversed his field a few months
    later.     On a different point, the IJ noted that the petitioner
    offered no evidence indicating that his accounting business ever
    existed.
    The    petitioner         did   not   produce     the    corroborating
    evidence    that    the    IJ    reasonably       required.         See    8     U.S.C.
    §   1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).          For    example,    he   submitted     no       credible
    evidence proving the existence of his accounting business.                         Nor
    did he submit an affidavit or statement from his wife or mother-
    in-law verifying any aspect of his story.                So, too, he failed to
    furnish the original threat letter that he claimed to have received
    (even though he testified that his wife had saved it).
    Nor did the petitioner adequately explain his failure to
    supply corroborating evidence.              Such evidence appears to have been
    readily available, given that the petitioner remained in contact
    with his family in Honduras and asserted that they could provide
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    statements to support his claim.             Yet, when the petitioner was
    asked whether he had an "affidavit or a letter from [his] wife" or
    mother-in-law supporting his version of the events, he simply
    responded: "No."
    To say more would be pointless.           The petitioner does not
    argue that the IJ failed to follow proper procedures or that he
    was entitled to additional notice that corroboration would be
    required.      By   the    same   token,     he    does   not   challenge   the
    reasonableness of the IJ's request.           And any such challenge would
    be fruitless: the IJ expected him to produce important items of
    corroboration   that      the   petitioner    himself     had   indicated   were
    readily available.
    The short of it is that the IJ expressed reasonable
    concerns about the credibility of the petitioner's testimony and
    anticipated     that      he    would      supply     reasonably     available
    documentation to support his claims.              In response, the petitioner
    stonewalled: he failed to furnish either corroborating evidence or
    a plausible explanation for the absence of it. We hold, therefore,
    that the IJ's and the BIA's lack-of-corroboration rationale is
    supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a
    whole.
    The petitioner's claim of a well-founded fear of future
    persecution can be swiftly dispatched.               To show a well-founded
    fear of future persecution without the benefit of any rebuttable
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    presumption based on past persecution, see 
    Palma-Mazariegos, 428 F.3d at 34-35
    , an alien must establish both that he had a genuine
    fear of future persecution and that an objectively reasonable basis
    existed for that fear.    See Nikijuluw v. Gonzales, 
    427 F.3d 115
    ,
    121-22 (1st Cir. 2005).     The petitioner might have been afraid,
    but he has not identified an objectively reasonable basis for that
    fear.
    To be sure, the petitioner submitted general information
    about the political climate in Honduras.     That evidence mentioned
    isolated incidents in which political dissidents were targeted by
    National Party activists during the period leading up to the 2013
    election.      Overall,   though,   that   election   was   generally
    transparent, orderly, and credible.     It resulted in the seating of
    a new president, and nothing in the record suggests that this new
    administration supports (or even tolerates) violent persecution of
    its opponents.    Seen in this light, we have no sound basis for
    disturbing the agency's determination that the petitioner has not
    carried his burden of establishing a well-founded fear of future
    persecution.    See 
    Rodriguez-Ramirez, 398 F.3d at 123
    .
    Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the IJ's and
    the BIA's denial of the petitioner's claim for asylum must stand.
    This conclusion effectively ends our inquiry: our disposition of
    the petitioner's asylum claim dooms his withholding of removal
    claim as well.     See 
    Amouri, 572 F.3d at 35
    (noting that if the
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    petitioner "fails to establish a well-founded fear of persecution
    sufficient to ground an asylum claim, a counterpart claim for
    withholding of removal . . . . necessarily fails"); Rodriguez-
    
    Ramirez, 398 F.3d at 123
    (similar).
    III.   CONCLUSION
    We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
    we deny the petition for judicial review.
    So ordered.
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