Ramos-Mercado v. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ( 2009 )


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  •                Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 08-1769
    MARITZA I. RAMOS-MERCADO, et al.,
    Plaintiffs, Appellants,
    v.
    PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY, et al.,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Lynch, Chief Judge,
    Selya and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
    Marcelle D. Martell Jovet for appellants.
    Leticia Casalduc-Rabell, Assistant Solicitor General, with
    whom Maite D. Oronoz-Rodríguez, Acting Solicitor General, and
    Ileana M. Oliver-Falero, Acting Deputy Solicitor General, were on
    brief, for appellees Rodríguez-Ruiz and Hernández-Ramos in their
    individual capacities.
    Marie L. Cortés, López López & Associates, for appellees
    Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, Rodríguez-Ruiz, and
    Hernández-Ramos in their official capacities.
    December 18, 2009
    PER CURIAM.       Appellant Maritza Ramos-Mercado commenced
    this   action   pursuant   to    
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
         against      her   former
    employer,   appellee    Puerto     Rico       Electric   Power     Authority,      and
    others.   She alleged in her complaint that the appellees deprived
    her of property without due process of law when they refused to
    reinstate her as a career attorney following a ten-year leave of
    absence. The district court dismissed her complaint for failure to
    state a claim.
    We affirm, concluding that Ramos-Mercado was provided
    with all the process that was due under the facts of this case.
    I.
    Ramos-Mercado's      claims        arise   out   of    her    employment
    relationship     with   the     Puerto    Rico     Electric       Power    Authority
    ("PREPA"), a public corporation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
    PREPA originally hired Ramos-Mercado as a career attorney in 1980.
    Ramos-Mercado worked in that capacity until 1997, when she was
    appointed to a twelve-year term as a Superior Court Judge for the
    Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.             At the time of the appointment,
    Ramos-Mercado agreed to be voluntarily separated from her PREPA
    position. She alleges that the terms of the separation granted her
    the right to return to PREPA at the end of her judicial service, at
    a pay grade commensurate to that of her former position.
    On February 27, 2007, two years before Ramos-Mercado's
    judicial term expired, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court permanently
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    and immediately removed her from office.           The following week,
    Ramos-Mercado met in person with appellee Jorge Rodríguez-Ruiz,
    PREPA's Executive Director at the time, to ask to be reinstated as
    a PREPA attorney.        Rodríguez-Ruiz assured Ramos-Mercado that he
    would    forward   her   reinstatement   request   to   appellee   Aníbal
    Hernández-Ramos, PREPA's Director of Human Resources.
    By letter dated April 11, 2007, Rodríguez-Ruiz advised
    Ramos-Mercado that she was ineligible for immediate reinstatement.
    He cited Public Law No. 184 of August 3, 2004, § 6.8, and PREPA's
    personnel regulations, which limit the right of certain individuals
    who have been removed from public office to be employed as civil
    servants.    Rodríguez-Ruiz pointed out that Ramos-Mercado had been
    removed from her position in the judiciary and concluded that she
    would therefore be ineligible for employment with PREPA until she
    had undergone "habilitation" with the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
    Office of Human Resources.1
    In a response dated April 20, 2007, Ramos-Mercado argued
    that the law cited by Rodríguez-Ruiz was inapplicable to public
    corporations such as PREPA.     She stated her view that there was "no
    legal impediment" to her reinstatement.       She did not ask for any
    1
    The Director of the Office of Human Resources is
    authorized, in his or her discretion, to readmit certain
    individuals to the public service who would otherwise be
    ineligible. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 1462g(2). The process
    for requesting and receiving the Director's permission is known as
    "habilitation" or "rehabilitation."
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    further meetings, nor did she dispute the factual basis for PREPA's
    decision (i.e., her removal from the judiciary).
    Rodríguez-Ruiz wrote a final response on June 11, 2007.
    He once again cited Ramos-Mercado's removal from public office as
    a barrier to her reinstatement, listing a number of laws and
    regulations that made her ineligible for employment.           The letter
    concluded: "If you are not in agreement with this decision, you
    have a term of thirty days from receipt of this notice in which to
    request review before the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals."
    The following month, Ramos-Mercado filed a complaint
    under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     in the United States District Court for the
    District of Puerto Rico, naming PREPA, Rodríguez-Ruiz, Hernández-
    Ramos, and others as defendants.           She alleged that she had a
    protected property interest in her employment with PREPA and that
    the defendants deprived her of that interest without due process of
    law when they refused to reinstate her, all in violation of her
    constitutional rights. She also asserted supplemental claims under
    Puerto Rico law.
    The defendants filed a motion to dismiss Ramos-Mercado's
    complaint for failure to state a claim.            See Fed. R. Civ. P.
    12(b)(6).    The district court granted the motion, finding that
    Ramos-Mercado did not have a protected property interest in her
    employment   with   PREPA.   The   court    also   declined   to   exercise
    supplemental jurisdiction over the Commonwealth law claims. See 28
    -4-
    U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).     Judgment was entered for the defendants, and
    this appeal followed.
    II.
    We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim de
    novo, accepting as true the well-pleaded factual allegations in the
    complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
    plaintiff.    Rivera v. Centro Médico de Turabo, Inc., 
    575 F.3d 10
    ,
    15 (1st Cir. 2009).
    Ramos-Mercado alleges that the appellees violated the
    Constitution by depriving her of the right to be reinstated as a
    career attorney without due process of law.         To prevail on that
    claim at trial, she would have to prove that: (1) she had a
    protected property interest in her right to be reinstated, and (2)
    the appellees, acting under color of Commonwealth law, deprived her
    of   that   interest   without   providing   constitutionally   adequate
    procedures.    See Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 
    491 F.3d 1
    , 8 (1st
    Cir. 2007).
    The district court held that Ramos-Mercado did not have
    a protected property interest in her right to be reinstated.        See
    Ramos-Mercado v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 
    550 F. Supp. 2d 287
    , 292
    (D.P.R. 2008).   We find it unnecessary to address that issue.     Even
    assuming that Ramos-Mercado had a protected property interest in
    her right to be reinstated, it is evident from the face of the
    complaint and its attachments that the appellees provided her with
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    "all the process that was due" before they deprived her of that
    interest.    Mard v. Town of Amherst, 
    350 F.3d 184
    , 194 (1st Cir.
    2003).
    Before explaining why that is so, we emphasize the focus
    of the relevant inquiry.        The procedural component of the Due
    Process Clause is concerned with process rather than outcome.               See
    Zinermon v. Burch, 
    494 U.S. 113
    , 125-26 (1990).                  Although the
    parties vigorously dispute the correctness of PREPA's decision as
    a matter of Commonwealth law, that debate is not material to the
    constitutional      question   of      what     process   was    due.       See
    Torres-Rosado v. Rotger-Sabat, 
    335 F.3d 1
    , 10 (1st Cir. 2003).
    Rather,    "to   determine   whether    a     constitutional    violation   has
    occurred, it is necessary to ask what process [PREPA] provided, and
    whether it was constitutionally adequate."            Zinermon, 
    494 U.S. at 126
    .
    A.   Constitutional Adequacy of the Procedure
    Constitutional     adequacy        is   measured     against    the
    fundamental principle that "individuals whose property interests
    are at stake are entitled to 'notice and an opportunity to be
    heard.'"    Dusenbery v. United States, 
    534 U.S. 161
    , 167 (2002)
    (quoting United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 
    510 U.S. 43
    , 48 (1993)). Beyond that, however, due process is "flexible and
    calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
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    demands."    Gilbert v. Homar, 
    520 U.S. 924
    , 930 (1997) (internal
    citations and quotation marks omitted).
    There is no question that Ramos-Mercado was on notice of
    PREPA's position as of April 19, 2007, when she acknowledges having
    received    the   first     letter    from    Rodríguez-Ruiz.          That   letter
    informed    her    of   PREPA's      decision      not    to   reinstate    her    and
    adequately   described       the   basis     for   that    decision.        The   only
    question, then, is whether Ramos-Mercado was given a sufficient
    opportunity to contest PREPA's decision.                       See Chmielinski v.
    Massachusetts, 
    513 F.3d 309
    , 316 (1st Cir. 2000).
    In that regard, we note that Ramos-Mercado could have
    sought post-deprivation judicial review of PREPA's decision in the
    Commonwealth court system.            See 
    P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, §§ 2102
    ,
    2171-2176; 
    id.
     tit 4, § 24y(c).                 Although the availability of
    comprehensive post-deprivation procedures of that sort does not
    necessarily eliminate the need for a pre-deprivation check against
    mistaken decisions, it does affect the necessary scope of such pre-
    deprivation procedures.        See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
    
    470 U.S. 532
    , 545-47 & n.12 (1985); Mard, 
    350 F.3d at 193
    .
    PREPA argues that, under the facts of this case, the
    exchange    of    letters    between    Ramos-Mercado          and   Rodríguez-Ruiz
    provided    Ramos-Mercado      with    a     constitutionally        adequate     pre-
    deprivation opportunity to challenge PREPA's position.                     As we have
    indicated, Ramos-Mercado clearly articulated her legal argument in
    -7-
    opposition to PREPA's position in her April 20, 2007, letter.
    Rodríguez-Ruiz then replied on June 11, 2007, indicating that PREPA
    had considered and rejected her argument.
    Only one fact was material to PREPA's decision: the fact
    that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court removed Ramos-Mercado from her
    judicial office.    That "independently verifiable" fact has never
    been disputed.     Gilbert, 
    520 U.S. at
    933 (citing Codd v. Velger,
    
    429 U.S. 624
    , 627-28 (1977) (per curiam)). Ramos-Mercado and PREPA
    differed only as to the proper interpretation and application of
    Commonwealth law and PREPA's personnel regulations.2
    Given the purely legal character of the dispute, the
    nature of the interests involved, and the availability of post-
    deprivation judicial review, we conclude that the opportunity for
    Ramos-Mercado to present her legal argument in writing was all the
    process that was due prior to the deprivation in this case.     See
    Gilbert, 
    520 U.S. at 933-34
    ; Dixon v. Love, 
    431 U.S. 105
    , 113-14
    (1977); Penobscot Air Servs. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 
    164 F.3d 713
    ,
    723-24 (1st Cir. 1999).      Ramos-Mercado has therefore failed to
    2
    Although Ramos-Mercado has never disputed the fact of her
    removal from the judiciary, she suggested for the first time on
    appeal that there were other factual disputes between her and
    PREPA. We deem that argument waived. In any event, it is beside
    the point because the supposedly disputed facts were not material
    to PREPA's decision, which turned solely on the fact that Ramos-
    Mercado had been removed from office. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3,
    § 1462g(1) (removal from public service renders individual
    ineligible for public employment until habilitated); P.R. Elec.
    Power Auth., Regulations for Career Service Personnel Management,
    § VIII(G) (Oct. 2006) (same).
    -8-
    state a due process claim. Our disposition makes it unnecessary to
    address   the   individual   capacity    appellees'   qualified   immunity
    arguments.
    B.   Supplemental Claims
    In addition to her due process claim, Ramos-Mercado
    asserted a supplemental Commonwealth law claim in her complaint.
    The district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over that
    claim, citing its dismissal of the federal claim.             See Ramos-
    Mercado, 
    550 F. Supp. 2d at 293
    .        We hold that the district court
    did not abuse its discretion in so doing, as the motion to dismiss
    was decided far in advance of trial and all claims over which the
    district court had original jurisdiction were properly dismissed.
    See McCloskey v. Mueller, 
    446 F.3d 262
     (1st Cir. 2006).
    AFFIRMED.
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