Ramos-Mercado v. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority , 356 F. App'x 426 ( 2009 )

Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 08-1769
MARITZA I. RAMOS-MERCADO, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY, et al.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Selya and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Marcelle D. Martell Jovet for appellants.
Leticia Casalduc-Rabell, Assistant Solicitor General, with
whom Maite D. Oronoz-Rodríguez, Acting Solicitor General, and
Ileana M. Oliver-Falero, Acting Deputy Solicitor General, were on
brief, for appellees Rodríguez-Ruiz and Hernández-Ramos in their
individual capacities.
Marie L. Cortés, López López & Associates, for appellees
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, Rodríguez-Ruiz, and
Hernández-Ramos in their official capacities.
December 18, 2009
PER CURIAM. Appellant Maritza Ramos-Mercado commenced
this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against her former
employer, appellee Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, and
others. She alleged in her complaint that the appellees deprived
her of property without due process of law when they refused to
reinstate her as a career attorney following a ten-year leave of
absence. The district court dismissed her complaint for failure to
state a claim.
We affirm, concluding that Ramos-Mercado was provided
with all the process that was due under the facts of this case.
I.
Ramos-Mercado's claims arise out of her employment
relationship with the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority
("PREPA"), a public corporation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
PREPA originally hired Ramos-Mercado as a career attorney in 1980.
Ramos-Mercado worked in that capacity until 1997, when she was
appointed to a twelve-year term as a Superior Court Judge for the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. At the time of the appointment,
Ramos-Mercado agreed to be voluntarily separated from her PREPA
position. She alleges that the terms of the separation granted her
the right to return to PREPA at the end of her judicial service, at
a pay grade commensurate to that of her former position.
On February 27, 2007, two years before Ramos-Mercado's
judicial term expired, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court permanently
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and immediately removed her from office. The following week,
Ramos-Mercado met in person with appellee Jorge Rodríguez-Ruiz,
PREPA's Executive Director at the time, to ask to be reinstated as
a PREPA attorney. Rodríguez-Ruiz assured Ramos-Mercado that he
would forward her reinstatement request to appellee Aníbal
Hernández-Ramos, PREPA's Director of Human Resources.
By letter dated April 11, 2007, Rodríguez-Ruiz advised
Ramos-Mercado that she was ineligible for immediate reinstatement.
He cited Public Law No. 184 of August 3, 2004, § 6.8, and PREPA's
personnel regulations, which limit the right of certain individuals
who have been removed from public office to be employed as civil
servants. Rodríguez-Ruiz pointed out that Ramos-Mercado had been
removed from her position in the judiciary and concluded that she
would therefore be ineligible for employment with PREPA until she
had undergone "habilitation" with the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
Office of Human Resources.1
In a response dated April 20, 2007, Ramos-Mercado argued
that the law cited by Rodríguez-Ruiz was inapplicable to public
corporations such as PREPA. She stated her view that there was "no
legal impediment" to her reinstatement. She did not ask for any
1
The Director of the Office of Human Resources is
authorized, in his or her discretion, to readmit certain
individuals to the public service who would otherwise be
ineligible. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 1462g(2). The process
for requesting and receiving the Director's permission is known as
"habilitation" or "rehabilitation."
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further meetings, nor did she dispute the factual basis for PREPA's
decision (i.e., her removal from the judiciary).
Rodríguez-Ruiz wrote a final response on June 11, 2007.
He once again cited Ramos-Mercado's removal from public office as
a barrier to her reinstatement, listing a number of laws and
regulations that made her ineligible for employment. The letter
concluded: "If you are not in agreement with this decision, you
have a term of thirty days from receipt of this notice in which to
request review before the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals."
The following month, Ramos-Mercado filed a complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico, naming PREPA, Rodríguez-Ruiz, Hernández-
Ramos, and others as defendants. She alleged that she had a
protected property interest in her employment with PREPA and that
the defendants deprived her of that interest without due process of
law when they refused to reinstate her, all in violation of her
constitutional rights. She also asserted supplemental claims under
Puerto Rico law.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss Ramos-Mercado's
complaint for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion, finding that
Ramos-Mercado did not have a protected property interest in her
employment with PREPA. The court also declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the Commonwealth law claims. See 28
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U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Judgment was entered for the defendants, and
this appeal followed.
II.
We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim de
novo, accepting as true the well-pleaded factual allegations in the
complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff. Rivera v. Centro Médico de Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10,
15 (1st Cir. 2009).
Ramos-Mercado alleges that the appellees violated the
Constitution by depriving her of the right to be reinstated as a
career attorney without due process of law. To prevail on that
claim at trial, she would have to prove that: (1) she had a
protected property interest in her right to be reinstated, and (2)
the appellees, acting under color of Commonwealth law, deprived her
of that interest without providing constitutionally adequate
procedures. See Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 8 (1st
Cir. 2007).
The district court held that Ramos-Mercado did not have
a protected property interest in her right to be reinstated. See
Ramos-Mercado v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 550 F. Supp. 2d 287, 292
(D.P.R. 2008). We find it unnecessary to address that issue. Even
assuming that Ramos-Mercado had a protected property interest in
her right to be reinstated, it is evident from the face of the
complaint and its attachments that the appellees provided her with
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"all the process that was due" before they deprived her of that
interest. Mard v. Town of Amherst, 350 F.3d 184, 194 (1st Cir.
2003).
Before explaining why that is so, we emphasize the focus
of the relevant inquiry. The procedural component of the Due
Process Clause is concerned with process rather than outcome. See
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1990). Although the
parties vigorously dispute the correctness of PREPA's decision as
a matter of Commonwealth law, that debate is not material to the
constitutional question of what process was due. See
Torres-Rosado v. Rotger-Sabat, 335 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2003).
Rather, "to determine whether a constitutional violation has
occurred, it is necessary to ask what process [PREPA] provided, and
whether it was constitutionally adequate." Zinermon, 494 U.S. at
126.
A. Constitutional Adequacy of the Procedure
Constitutional adequacy is measured against the
fundamental principle that "individuals whose property interests
are at stake are entitled to 'notice and an opportunity to be
heard.'" Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002)
(quoting United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S.
43, 48 (1993)). Beyond that, however, due process is "flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
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demands." Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
There is no question that Ramos-Mercado was on notice of
PREPA's position as of April 19, 2007, when she acknowledges having
received the first letter from Rodríguez-Ruiz. That letter
informed her of PREPA's decision not to reinstate her and
adequately described the basis for that decision. The only
question, then, is whether Ramos-Mercado was given a sufficient
opportunity to contest PREPA's decision. See Chmielinski v.
Massachusetts, 513 F.3d 309, 316 (1st Cir. 2000).
In that regard, we note that Ramos-Mercado could have
sought post-deprivation judicial review of PREPA's decision in the
Commonwealth court system. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, §§ 2102,
2171-2176; id. tit 4, § 24y(c). Although the availability of
comprehensive post-deprivation procedures of that sort does not
necessarily eliminate the need for a pre-deprivation check against
mistaken decisions, it does affect the necessary scope of such pre-
deprivation procedures. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 545-47 & n.12 (1985); Mard, 350 F.3d at 193.
PREPA argues that, under the facts of this case, the
exchange of letters between Ramos-Mercado and Rodríguez-Ruiz
provided Ramos-Mercado with a constitutionally adequate pre-
deprivation opportunity to challenge PREPA's position. As we have
indicated, Ramos-Mercado clearly articulated her legal argument in
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opposition to PREPA's position in her April 20, 2007, letter.
Rodríguez-Ruiz then replied on June 11, 2007, indicating that PREPA
had considered and rejected her argument.
Only one fact was material to PREPA's decision: the fact
that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court removed Ramos-Mercado from her
judicial office. That "independently verifiable" fact has never
been disputed. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 933 (citing Codd v. Velger,
429 U.S. 624, 627-28 (1977) (per curiam)). Ramos-Mercado and PREPA
differed only as to the proper interpretation and application of
Commonwealth law and PREPA's personnel regulations.2
Given the purely legal character of the dispute, the
nature of the interests involved, and the availability of post-
deprivation judicial review, we conclude that the opportunity for
Ramos-Mercado to present her legal argument in writing was all the
process that was due prior to the deprivation in this case. See
Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 933-34; Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113-14
(1977); Penobscot Air Servs. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 164 F.3d 713,
723-24 (1st Cir. 1999). Ramos-Mercado has therefore failed to
2
Although Ramos-Mercado has never disputed the fact of her
removal from the judiciary, she suggested for the first time on
appeal that there were other factual disputes between her and
PREPA. We deem that argument waived. In any event, it is beside
the point because the supposedly disputed facts were not material
to PREPA's decision, which turned solely on the fact that Ramos-
Mercado had been removed from office. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3,
§ 1462g(1) (removal from public service renders individual
ineligible for public employment until habilitated); P.R. Elec.
Power Auth., Regulations for Career Service Personnel Management,
§ VIII(G) (Oct. 2006) (same).
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state a due process claim. Our disposition makes it unnecessary to
address the individual capacity appellees' qualified immunity
arguments.
B. Supplemental Claims
In addition to her due process claim, Ramos-Mercado
asserted a supplemental Commonwealth law claim in her complaint.
The district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over that
claim, citing its dismissal of the federal claim. See Ramos-
Mercado, 550 F. Supp. 2d at 293. We hold that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in so doing, as the motion to dismiss
was decided far in advance of trial and all claims over which the
district court had original jurisdiction were properly dismissed.
See McCloskey v. Mueller, 446 F.3d 262 (1st Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED.
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