O'Brien v. Town of Bellingham ( 2019 )


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  •               United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 18-1704
    JOSEPH O'BRIEN,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    TOWN OF BELLINGHAM, Commonwealth of Massachusetts;
    RICHARD PERRY, individually and in his official capacity
    as a police officer; TIMOTHY JOYCE, individually and in his
    official capacity as a police officer; JAMES RUSSELL,
    individually and in his official capacity as a police officer;
    BRIAN KUTCHER, individually and in his official capacity
    as a police officer; JOHN MELANSON, individually and in his
    official capacity as a police officer,
    Defendants, Appellees,
    ERIC ZIMMERMAN, individually and in his official capacity as a
    police officer; MICHAEL GILBOY, individually and in his official
    capacity as a police officer,
    Defendants.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Jennifer C. Boal, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
    Before
    Howard, Chief Judge,
    Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges.
    Edward J. McCormick III, with whom McCormick & Maitland was
    on brief, for appellant.
    Evan C. Ouellette, with whom Leonard H. Kesten, Deidre Brennan
    Regan, and Brody, Hardoon, Perkins & Kesten, LLP were on brief,
    for appellees.
    November 22, 2019
    -2-
    TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.           On April 9, 2012, Bellingham
    police officers responded to a call regarding an unresponsive and
    potentially intoxicated individual in the woods behind Shirley
    Drive in Bellingham, Massachusetts.               When the officers arrived,
    they came upon Joseph O'Brien ("O'Brien") laying in a shallow
    ravine with his pants unbuckled.               There are conflicting versions
    as to what occurred next, but the officers eventually placed
    O'Brien in handcuffs and took him to the Bellingham Police Station
    (the   "Police      Station").        There,    O'Brien   became    increasingly
    irrational    and    violent     --   destroying    property,      attacking   and
    threatening the police officers, and harming himself.
    Thereafter, O'Brien pleaded guilty to several state
    criminal charges stemming from those incidents, including assault
    and battery and resisting arrest.                Subsequently, O'Brien filed
    this civil rights suit in which he asserted excessive force claims
    under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Massachusetts state law against the
    police officers that apprehended him in the woods and those who
    attempted to subdue him at the Police Station.                     After lengthy
    pre-trial    briefing,    the     district      court   granted    the   officers'
    motion for summary judgment, holding that Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
    (1994),1 barred O'Brien's excessive force claims as they
    1   The Supreme Court in Heck, acknowledging its "expressed
    . . . concerns for finality and 
    consistency," 512 U.S. at 484
    –85,
    found that "the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not
    -3-
    relate to the events in the woods and some of the incidents at the
    Police Station.     The court held that the excessive force claims
    arising from the events at the Police Station failed as a matter
    of law because the undisputed facts did not establish the use of
    excessive force, and in any event, that the defendants were
    entitled to qualified immunity.            O'Brien then filed the present
    appeal.   For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    I.   Background
    A.   Factual Background2
    O'Brien maintains that he has no recollection of the
    events related to either his arrest in the woods or the post-arrest
    incidents in the Police Station.       For his claims arising from the
    events in the woods, O'Brien relies on the testimony of two
    eyewitnesses,     Bonnie   Bourque     ("Bourque")     and   Paul   Nilson
    appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding
    criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that
    necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his
    conviction or confinement," 
    id. at 486.
    As a result, it held that
    where a § 1983 action for damages "would necessarily imply the
    invalidity of" a plaintiff's conviction or sentence, such an action
    is not cognizable under § 1983 "unless the plaintiff can
    demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
    invalidated." 
    Id. at 487.
    2  Because this case is being reviewed at the summary judgment
    stage, the factual record is presented "in the light most favorable
    to [O'Brien,] the nonmoving party."     Dennis v. Osram Sylvania,
    Inc., 
    549 F.3d 851
    , 855 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Benoit v. Tech.
    Mfg. Corp., 
    331 F.3d 166
    , 173 (1st Cir. 2003)).
    -4-
    ("Nilson"), which we recount below.        For his claims resulting from
    the events at the Police Station, we have the benefit of video
    security footage.
    1.   Events in the Woods
    On April 9, 2012, Bourque -- who was inside her Shirley
    Drive residence in Bellingham, Massachusetts -- heard shouting in
    the woods behind her property.     When she walked outside toward the
    back of her property, Bourque saw O'Brien sitting in a small ravine
    in the woods behind her backyard, accompanied by a younger man and
    a dog.    Bourque asked the younger man if O'Brien needed help and
    whether she should call the police.           The younger man informed
    Bourque that O'Brien's name was "Joe" and left with the dog.
    Though Bourque tried to talk to O'Brien, he refused to respond, he
    lay down, and he did not move much.        Bourque went back inside and
    called the Bellingham Police Department.
    Defendant-appellee Timothy Joyce, a Bellingham police
    officer   ("Officer   Joyce"),   arrived    at   Bourque's   door   shortly
    thereafter.    Bourque and Officer Joyce walked over to the woods
    behind Bourque's house, and they found O'Brien laying down on his
    back in the ravine with his pants undone.           Officer Joyce walked
    over to O'Brien's left side, shook him by the shoulder, and asked
    him some questions, including why his pants were undone.              When
    O'Brien stood to buckle his pants, Officer Joyce shouted at him:
    -5-
    "[G]et down on the ground.              Put your hands behind your back.
    You're    under     arrest."       Officer           Joyce    immediately     yelled,
    "resisting arrest," pulled pepper spray out of his coat, and
    sprayed O'Brien in the face.              O'Brien's pants fell around his
    ankles, making it impossible for him to run away.                        Two other
    Bellingham police officers, including defendant-appellee Sergeant
    James Russell ("Sergeant Russell"), arrived on the scene and also
    started pepper spraying O'Brien.                 All three officers sprayed
    O'Brien simultaneously.         Bourque testified that O'Brien did not
    threaten the officers or become aggressive before they pepper
    sprayed him.
    As the officers were spraying O'Brien, Bourque fled from
    the woods and ran back toward her house, stopping at her back deck,
    which    was    roughly   the   length    of     a    football   field   away   from
    O'Brien's location in the woods.                     She did not see what was
    happening in the woods while she was running, but she heard O'Brien
    scream    for      "help."       From      her        deck,    Bourque      witnessed
    defendant-appellee Sergeant Richard Perry ("Sergeant Perry") cross
    through the woods from Caroline Drive towards where O'Brien and
    the other officers were.            At that point, a hill and a shed
    obfuscated Bourque's view of O'Brien and the officers.                       Bourque
    testified that she did not see any officer strike or hit O'Brien.
    -6-
    Nilson, who also witnessed portions of the incident,
    lived on Caroline Drive on the other side of the woods from
    Bourque.    Nilson heard a commotion and ventured into his backyard
    to where his property bordered the woods.        From that vantage point,
    he saw O'Brien in the woods surrounded by police officers screaming
    "help, help, help."      According to Nilson, the officers attempted
    to   talk     O'Brien    into    voluntarily     being      handcuffed    for
    approximately ten to fifteen minutes, without success.
    Eventually, Officer Joyce managed to get one handcuff on
    O'Brien's wrist while keeping the other cuff in his hand.              O'Brien
    swung Officer Joyce around with one arm, while the other officers
    attempted to subdue him by striking him multiple times in the back
    and torso with their service batons.          This had no apparent effect
    on O'Brien, who continued to resist by swinging his arms and
    swatting at the officers.       According to Nilson, O'Brien continued
    resisting until one or two officers struck him on the head with
    their batons, knocking him to the ground.            O'Brien finally stopped
    fighting, and the officers handcuffed him.
    2.     Events at the Police Station
    After   O'Brien    was   taken   into    custody,   the    police
    transported him to the Police Station for booking.               The entire
    -7-
    incident that occurred at the Police Station was captured on video
    with audio.3
    Officers brought O'Brien into the Police Station at
    5:52 p.m.   Simultaneously, Emergency Medical Technicians ("EMTs")
    from the Bellingham Fire Department, who had been summoned to treat
    O'Brien, arrived at the Police Station and entered the booking
    area.   O'Brien, who was handcuffed, was immediately placed in a
    chair and questioned by a Bellingham firefighter/EMT regarding his
    medical needs.
    Defendant-appellee     Officer    John    Melanson      ("Officer
    Melanson") uncuffed O'Brien's right hand and fastened that cuff to
    a long chain attached to a bar on the wall, leaving O'Brien's right
    hand unrestrained.       The bar was located next to the door that
    officers    used   to   bring   detainees    into    the   Police   Station.
    Subsequently, O'Brien began screaming.        The EMTs informed O'Brien
    that he would be transported to a local hospital, but O'Brien
    insisted on being taken to Massachusetts General Hospital in
    3  In the "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of
    their Motion for Summary Judgment," the defendants cited to the
    time-stamped video recording to support their version of the events
    that transpired at the Police Station. O'Brien has not disputed
    the authenticity of the video evidence. Rather, in opposition to
    summary judgment, O'Brien objected to the defendants' "description
    and characterization of the images" without offering his own view
    of the contents of the video. He merely stated that "the video
    speaks for itself."
    -8-
    Boston.     O'Brien continued arguing with and cursing at the EMTs,
    until they eventually retreated.       Next, O'Brien cursed at the
    officers and threatened them with violence.     He told the officers
    that he would "kick the shit out of" and "beat the fuck out of"
    them, and he growled.     He asked the officers if they would kill
    him, and called them "pussies."        O'Brien continued to scream,
    growl, and threaten to commit graphic acts of violence against the
    officers.    He also told them that he had "a lot of fight left in
    him."
    Some minutes later, O'Brien spat on the floor, growled,
    wiped mucus on the walls, and tore down a window covering.        He
    then grabbed the handset of a telephone and attempted to smash a
    glass window with it, while taunting the officers to shoot him.
    Officer Melanson, using a baton, struck O'Brien in the leg once to
    stop him from breaking the window.     O'Brien squared off and swung
    the phone handset at the officers.     Sergeant Perry also deployed
    a baton.    O'Brien hit the officers, and they struck him with batons
    before retreating.     O'Brien continued to swing at the officers,
    telling them to shoot him.
    Subsequently, O'Brien hit the window multiple times and
    picked up a metal chair, prompting Officer Melanson to pepper spray
    him.    Unaffected, O'Brien struck the window with the chair, then
    picked up a different chair, which the officers snatched from him.
    -9-
    He then grabbed the phone handset, swung it around, and used it to
    smash the glass window.    O'Brien taunted, "where's your gun?"     He
    proceeded to destroy a window blind and strike at the broken window
    with his uncuffed hand and arm.    He told Sergeant Perry, "give me
    your gun," and hurled a printer across the room.         Once again,
    O'Brien was pepper sprayed with no apparent effect.
    Because   the    Bellingham   Police   Department   was   not
    equipped with tasers, Sergeant Russell called the Franklin Police
    Department to have an officer with a taser respond.    He also called
    the Worcester and the Norfolk County Sheriff's departments to have
    a cell extraction team come to the Police Station to subdue
    O'Brien, but they were unable to respond.
    O'Brien proceeded to hit the broken window with his
    uncuffed hand and arm once again, further shattering the panes.
    Sergeant Perry struck O'Brien's leg with a baton and ordered
    O'Brien to stay in the corner away from the window.    Blood appeared
    to drip from O'Brien's hand and arm due to cuts sustained while
    smashing the window.      O'Brien reached to his cuff and demanded
    that the officers give him the key to uncuff himself.          Officer
    Joyce pepper sprayed O'Brien, who returned to the window and again
    hit the glass shards with his hand.         Officer Melanson struck
    O'Brien in the torso with a baton and O'Brien swung his fist at
    him.   Once again, Officer Joyce pepper sprayed O'Brien, who
    -10-
    returned to the window and tried to dislodge shards of glass.
    Officer Melanson again struck O'Brien with a baton and told him to
    back away.      The struggle continued as the officers attempted
    unsuccessfully to control O'Brien.
    Almost    forty   minutes   after   arriving    at    the    Police
    Station,   Franklin     Police   Officer   defendant      Eric    Zimmerman
    ("Officer Zimmerman") arrived with a taser.        The officers ordered
    O'Brien to get on his knees and repeatedly told him to stop
    resisting or he would be tased, and that he would receive the
    medical attention he needed if he submitted.              O'Brien refused.
    After around twenty minutes, Officer Zimmerman deployed the taser.
    O'Brien called the officer a "pussy" and asked him to "give [him]
    another one."       The officers informed O'Brien that he required
    medical attention and that he would be tased if he did not comply.
    O'Brien refused and he was tased a second time without significant
    effect.    O'Brien told the officers that he would keep the taser
    barb as evidence and that he would swallow it.         He then grabbed a
    clock off the wall and appeared to swallow the taser barb.
    O'Brien asked the officers if they were going to burn
    down the Police Station, as "that [was their] only option."
    Officer Perry asked O'Brien if he was going to allow the officers
    to restrain him so that they could take him to the hospital,
    remarking that O'Brien had "bled all over the floor."                  O'Brien
    -11-
    refused and was informed that the officers were going to take the
    next step if he did not comply by allowing them to place handcuffs
    on both his hands, but he refused once again.
    Subsequently,   Defendant-appellee    Bellingham   Officer
    Brian Kutcher ("Officer Kutcher") positioned a tactical weapon
    that shot forty-millimeter rubber projectiles and asked, "are you
    going to comply?"   Officer Kutcher commanded O'Brien to get on the
    ground approximately nine times, but O'Brien refused.        Officer
    Kutcher then fired a rubber projectile.   O'Brien grabbed the clock
    that he had previously torn off the wall from the floor and began
    using it as a shield.   Officer Kutcher repeatedly ordered O'Brien
    to get down on the ground, to which O'Brien repeatedly responded,
    "fuck you."    Officer Kutcher then fired two more projectiles.
    Among other statements, O'Brien shouted "you're gonna have to kill
    me and you're gonna have to do murder right here."      O'Brien was
    commanded to get on the ground approximately fourteen more times,
    to which he continually responded, "fuck you."     Kutcher fired a
    final rubber projectile at 7:13 p.m., with no effect.        By this
    time, the floor around O'Brien was covered with his blood and glass
    from the shattered windows.
    Sergeant Perry approached O'Brien to try to seize the
    clock, but O'Brien held it up and said, "I'll smash it right in
    your face."   After asking O'Brien to put the clock down, Sergeant
    -12-
    Perry displayed a baton, causing O'Brien to swing the clock at
    him.   In response, first Sergeant Perry and then Officer Kutcher
    struck O'Brien with batons, and O'Brien whacked Sergeant Perry
    multiple times with the clock until the officers were able to
    snatch the clock away from him.     The officers continued to command
    O'Brien to get on the ground to be cuffed.       Then, O'Brien began
    swinging the phone handset once again.     Officer Kutcher commanded
    O'Brien to drop the phone, yet he refused and Officer Kutcher
    deployed a long wooden baton and, approaching O'Brien, once again
    commanded him to "drop the phone."        O'Brien kicked at Officer
    Kutcher, who struck at the phone.    In this scuffle, O'Brien dropped
    the phone handset and charged at Officer Kutcher, who struck at
    O'Brien and cleared the phone out of O'Brien's reach with the
    wooden baton before retreating.
    O'Brien was told again to get on the ground so he could
    be cuffed and transported to a hospital to be evaluated and
    treated.    O'Brien responded, among other things, that he was
    already dead.    When O'Brien was told that a K-9 dog would be
    brought into the booking area if he did not get down on the ground,
    he responded, "I like dogs."      Franklin Police Officer defendant
    Michael Gilboy ("Officer Gilboy") arrived at 7:25 p.m. holding a
    restrained police dog.   While the dog barked at O'Brien, O'Brien
    approached the dog and reached out to pet it.    He then told Officer
    -13-
    Gilboy    that   "your   fucking      dog   is     a   pussy."     Officer         Gilboy
    eventually retreated, and the dog was never released.                               After
    approximately twenty more minutes, a mellowed O'Brien requested
    water, which he was quickly given.                A few minutes later, O'Brien
    finally    submitted     and   got    on    the    ground.       O'Brien   was      then
    handcuffed, placed on a stretcher, and taken to Milford Hospital.
    The entire episode lasted nearly two hours.
    At the hospital, O'Brien was treated for a ketamine
    overdose and lacerations to his right hand that required suturing.
    He was also diagnosed with a mildly displaced avulsion fracture to
    his left wrist and nondisplaced fractures to his right wrist.                         As
    O'Brien    conceded,     however,     "it    is    impossible      to   say    with     a
    reasonable degree of medical certainty whether" these fractures
    resulted    from    force      used    by    any       police    officer      or     were
    self-inflicted by O'Brien's own actions.4
    4  We have previously held that "the commonly accepted meaning
    among lawyers and judges to the term 'reasonable degree of
    scientific certainty'" is "a standard requiring a showing that the
    injury was more likely than not caused by a particular stimulus,
    based on the general consensus of recognized [scientific]
    thought." Burke v. Town of Walpole, 
    405 F.3d 66
    , 91 (1st Cir.
    2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary
    1294 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "reasonable medical probability" or
    "reasonable medical certainty," as used in tort actions)). This
    is consistent with the "preponderance of the evidence" standard
    which "simply requires the trier of fact 'to believe that the
    existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence before
    [he] may find in favor of the party who has the burden to persuade
    the [trier of fact] of the fact's existence.'" Concrete Pipe &
    Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal.,
    -14-
    3.   Guilty Pleas as to State Criminal Charges
    O'Brien pleaded guilty to the following charges arising
    out of his April 2012 arrest in the woods: (1) assault and battery
    by means of a dangerous weapon -- on Officer Joyce by means of
    handcuffs and on Sergeant Russell by means of a tree branch -- in
    violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15A(b); (2) resisting
    arrest in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268, § 32B; and
    (3) assault and battery on a public employee as to Officer Joyce,
    Sergeant Russell, and Sergeant Perry, in violation of Mass. Gen.
    Laws ch. 265, § 13D.   O'Brien also pleaded guilty to the following
    charges arising out of the incident in the Police Station's booking
    room: (1) assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (a
    phone handset) as to Officer Melanson and Sergeant Perry, in
    violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15A(b); (2) malicious
    destruction of property valued in excess of $250 -- a window,
    chairs, and ceiling tiles -- in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws
    ch. 266, § 127; and (3) malicious destruction of property valued
    in excess of $250 -- a breathalyzer machine "BT" printer -- also
    in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 127.
    As part of the plea colloquy, the Assistant District
    Attorney recited the following facts regarding O'Brien's arrest:
    
    508 U.S. 602
    , 622 (1993) (quoting In re Winship, 
    397 U.S. 358
    ,
    371–72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
    -15-
    Your Honor, regarding indictment 12-0608, on October
    (sic) 9, 2012, the Bellingham police responded to a
    wooded area behind [redacted] Shirley Road in the Town
    of Bellingham for a reported unknown male who appeared
    to be sleeping in a drainage ditch and, when he was
    awoken, appeared to be intoxicated or under the
    influence of something, and he was stumbling around.
    Officer Timothy Joyce initially responded, Sergeant Neil
    (sic) Russell shortly thereafter.    They both assisted
    Mr. O'Brien to his feet. His speech was slurred and he
    was unsteady on his feet.       Officer Joyce made the
    determination to place him into protective custody, and
    he conducted a pat-down search for his safety.
    Mr. O'Brien began to tense up and resist. Mr. O'Brien
    was taken to the ground and pushed himself up while
    police were on his back.       Officer Joyce removed a
    switchblade pocket knife from Mr. O'Brien's right pocket
    and pants, and the blade was still open at this time.
    During the struggle, Sergeant Russell disengaged from
    Mr. O'Brien and drew his OC spray. Officer Joyce
    continued to struggle with Mr. O'Brien and his left hand
    was caught in the open handcuff. As Mr. O'Brien pulled
    away from Officer Joyce, the officer's middle ring and
    little   fingers   twisted   in   the   open   handcuff.
    . . . O'Brien and Officer Joyce fell to the ground with
    their combined weight and landed on Officer Joyce's
    wrist. When Officer Joyce separated from Mr. O'Brien,
    the open handcuff got caught on the officer's glove and
    ripped the area around his wrist.         It was later
    determined the wrist was fractured due to these actions.
    Once the officers created about fifteen feet of
    separation and distance from Mr. O'Brien, he grabbed a
    tree branch and struck Sergeant Russell on the right
    side of his face. Sergeant Russell sprayed him with OC,
    which had no effect, apparently, on Mr. O'Brien, who got
    into a fighter's stance and closed fists and screamed
    that he had been waiting all his life training for
    something like this. Officer Joyce drew his baton and
    gave orders for Mr. O'Brien to get on the ground, which
    he refused. Both officers used a series of leg strikes
    to Mr. O'Brien, which had little or no effect on him.
    The officers requested more backup.
    -16-
    Sergeant Perry arrived on the scene and recognized him
    from the September 2, 2011 incident in which he had
    assaulted police. Mr. O'Brien continued to yell threats
    at Sergeant Perry. The three police were finally able
    to get Mr. O'Brien to the ground, where he continued to
    resist and fight. Officer John Melanson then arrived
    on the scene, and he and Sergeant Perry escorted
    Mr. O'Brien back to the Bellingham police station for
    booking.5
    When asked by the court whether those facts "fairly and
    accurately describe[d] [his] conduct," O'Brien answered "yes."
    Additionally, when the judge asked O'Brien whether he understood
    that by pleading guilty he was "admitting to the truth of those
    matters that were just stated in court," he once again responded
    "yes."   O'Brien also answered in the affirmative when the judge
    asked him whether he was "pleading guilty . . . because [he was]
    guilty[] and for no other reason," and whether he had discussed
    "these matters" with his attorney, including his rights, "any
    defenses [he] may have, and the consequences of pleading guilty."
    The state judge accepted O'Brien's plea for which he found that
    there was a factual basis.
    B.   Procedural History
    On April 6, 2015, O'Brien filed suit against Sergeants
    Perry and Russell and Officers Joyce, Kutcher, and Melanson of the
    Bellingham Police Department, as well as Officers Zimmerman and
    5  The Assistant District Attorney also recounted the incidents at
    the Police Station.
    -17-
    Gilboy of the Franklin Police Department.              O'Brien alleged that
    they had used excessive force and had committed assault and battery
    against him in apprehending him in the woods and in subduing him
    at the Police Station. 6          On September 11, 2015, the parties
    consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge for all
    purposes.    After more than two years of litigation, the parties
    filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice as to the Franklin
    Police Department defendants Officers Zimmerman and Gilboy.
    In the weeks prior to trial -- which was scheduled to
    begin on April 2, 2018 -- the remaining defendants, Sergeants Perry
    and   Russell       and    Officers    Joyce,    Kutcher,      and     Melanson
    (the "Defendants")        filed   various    motions   in    limine.      After
    reviewing those motions and O'Brien's responses, the district
    court determined that some issues raised were more appropriate for
    the summary judgment context, and that they were "for the court,
    not   the   jury,   to    decide."     Accordingly,    the    district   court
    postponed the trial and set a schedule for summary judgment
    briefing, directing the parties to focus on the applicability of
    the judicial estoppel doctrine and whether O'Brien's excessive
    force claims were viable in light of Heck.
    6  O'Brien did not claim false arrest. While O'Brien also sued
    the Town of Bellingham, the court granted the Town's motion to
    dismiss on October 14, 2015.
    -18-
    As ordered, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on
    the grounds that Heck barred O'Brien's claims and they were
    entitled to qualified immunity.     O'Brien opposed, and additionally
    filed a motion to vacate the dismissal of Officers Zimmerman and
    Gilboy, claiming that the stipulation of dismissal for those
    defendants was predicated on the parties' agreement that "no motion
    for summary judgment would be filed."          On May 30, 2018, the
    district court issued an order noting that the Defendants had not
    asserted as a basis for their motion that the undisputed facts
    showed no excessive force.     Nonetheless, it notified O'Brien that
    it was considering granting summary judgment sua sponte as to the
    excessive force claims related to the incidents at the Police
    Station on the ground that, based on the undisputed facts -- i.e.,
    the video of the incident -- no reasonable jury could find that
    the Defendants had used excessive force.      O'Brien filed a response
    on June 15, 2018.
    On June 1, 2018, the Defendants filed a motion to amend
    their answer to the complaint to add the affirmative defense of
    judicial   estoppel,   which   O'Brien   opposed.   Subsequently,   the
    district court heard oral arguments on the Defendants' motion to
    amend and O'Brien's motion to vacate.          On June 21, 2018, the
    district court denied O'Brien's motion to vacate the dismissals of
    Officers Zimmerman and Gilboy.
    -19-
    On    June   27,    2018,     the     district     court       granted     the
    Defendants' motion to amend their answer to the complaint and their
    motion for summary judgment.                     The district court found that
    O'Brien's claims arising out of the episode in the woods were
    barred by Heck.         It explained that any claim based on the premise
    that O'Brien was "lawfully permitted to resist arrest and/or use
    force     to    defend      himself       from       excessive        force    . . . would
    necessarily         undermine     his    convictions"      arising       from    the     same
    events.    The district court also discarded any theory of liability
    based on Bourque's testimony that O'Brien "was attacked and pepper
    sprayed without provocation by the officers" as "too . . . directly
    inconsistent with [O'Brien's] plea in the criminal case."
    Concerning       the     incident     at   the    Police       Station,    the
    district court's decision was twofold.                    First, the district court
    found that Heck barred O'Brien's claims against Officer Melanson
    and Sergeant Perry related to the events leading up to when O'Brien
    struck them with the phone handset.7                   Further, the district court
    concluded that any claims against Officer Melanson and Sergeant
    Perry "past the point where they were hit by O'Brien with the phone
    h[andset]," or against the other defendants involved in that
    incident,      ultimately       failed     as    a    matter     of    law    because    the
    7  As the district court noted, its task was complicated by the
    fact that O'Brien did not identify his theories of relief.
    -20-
    undisputed    facts    showed      that     the     officers'    actions    were
    objectively reasonable and, thus, that the officers had not used
    excessive force.
    Alternatively, the district court concluded that "the
    Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in connection with
    any excessive force claims arising out of the events at the police
    station."    On July 24, 2018, O'Brien filed the present appeal.
    II.    Discussion
    A.      Denial of O'Brien's Motion to Vacate the Stipulation of
    Dismissal
    We need not linger over the merits of this issue as we
    lack jurisdiction to entertain it.                The Defendants assert that
    O'Brien failed to comply with two jurisdictional requirements:
    first, that he did not file a notice of appeal within thirty days
    of the order's issuance, and second, that he did not reference the
    district court's ruling on the motion to vacate in the notice that
    he eventually filed.        The Defendants' second point suffices to
    dispose of this issue.
    The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require that a
    party    "designate   the   judgment,     order,     or   part   thereof   being
    appealed" in a notice of appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B), and
    this requirement is generally characterized as jurisdictional in
    nature.     See Smith v. Barry, 
    502 U.S. 244
    , 248 (1992).                  "This
    raises the question of whether the notice, as drafted, confers
    -21-
    jurisdiction upon this court to review" the challenged ruling.
    Chamorro v. Puerto Rican Cars, Inc., 
    304 F.3d 1
    , 3 (1st Cir. 2002).
    The Supreme Court has stated that we must construe Rule 3(c)'s
    specificity requirement liberally, see 
    Barry, 502 U.S. at 248
    ,
    and, therefore, "[a] mistake in designating a judgment . . . in
    the notice of appeal ordinarily will not result in loss of the
    appeal as long as the intent to appeal a specific judgment can be
    fairly inferred from the notice and [the] appellee is not misled
    by the [unclear notice]," Spookyworld, Inc. v. Town of Berlin (In
    re Spookyworld, Inc.), 
    346 F.3d 1
    , 6 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Kelly
    v. United States, 
    789 F.2d 94
    , 96 n.3 (1st Cir. 1986)).               In
    examining the notice, we consider "the appellant's intent on the
    record as a whole."     Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 
    402 F.3d 1
    , 8 (1st Cir. 2005).
    O'Brien's notice of appeal makes no reference to the
    district court's ruling on the motion to vacate the stipulation of
    dismissal.    Rather, O'Brien stated that he was appealing "from the
    Court's   ruling   allowing   the    defendants'   Motion   for   Summary
    Judgment entered on June 27, 2018, and the Court's Judgment
    dismissing the instant matter also entered on June 27, 2018, as
    well as any and all rulings by the Court."          Neither of the two
    rulings specifically identified in the notice of appeal relate or
    refer to the ruling on the motion to vacate.       Omitting the ruling
    -22-
    on that motion, "while, at the same time, designating . . .
    completely separate and independent order[s] loudly proclaims
    [O'Brien's] intention not to appeal," Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
    
    981 F.2d 7
    , 11 (1st Cir. 1992), from the ruling on the motion to
    vacate.      Furthermore, O'Brien's inclusion of the phrase "as well
    as any and all rulings by the Court" in his notice of appeal does
    not overcome the deficiency.         This language is insufficient to
    give notice to either the Defendants or the court of O'Brien's
    intent to appeal another, specific order.           See 
    id. Nor can
    that
    intent be inferred from the notice or the record, leaving us
    without jurisdiction to review it.             
    Kelly, 789 F.2d at 96
    n.3
    (finding that the court may be flexible in entertaining an appeal
    even if the specific judgment that is the subject of the potential
    appeal is not designated in the notice of appeal so long as "the
    intent to appeal from a specific judgment can be fairly inferred
    from the notice, and [the] appellee is not misled by the mistake");
    see   also    
    Barry, 502 U.S. at 248
      ("Rule   3's    dictates   are
    jurisdictional in nature . . . .         Although courts should construe
    Rule 3 liberally when determining whether it has been complied
    with, noncompliance is fatal to an appeal.").                 That ends this
    matter.
    -23-
    B.   The Defendants' Motion to Amend Their Answer
    O'Brien next challenges the district court's ruling
    allowing the Defendants to amend their answer to the complaint to
    include the affirmative defense of judicial estoppel after the
    close of discovery and the filing of their motion for summary
    judgment.
    The   Defendants    mention,    without    elaborating,       that
    O'Brien's notice of appeal "does not separately or specifically
    reference the ruling on the motion to amend their answer."            While
    this   passing    reference    to   an   argument    would   ordinarily    be
    insufficient to warrant our consideration, see United States v.
    Zannino, 
    895 F.2d 1
    , 17 (1st Cir. 1990), we pause here because of
    the jurisdictional ramifications.
    It is true that O'Brien's notice of appeal does not
    specifically reference the district court's order granting the
    Defendants' motion to amend their answer.           Instead, it designates
    the Court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment and the
    judgment dismissing the case, both entered on June 27, 2018.               As
    before, we consider "the appellant's intent on the record as a
    whole and . . . whether the appellee has been misled by the
    appellant's unclear notice."        
    Marie, 402 F.3d at 8
    .     Here, we note
    that although O'Brien did not specifically identify the order on
    the Defendants' motion to amend in his notice of appeal, the
    -24-
    summary judgment ruling, which he did specifically include in his
    notice of appeal, elaborated on the district court's reasons for
    granting the Defendants' motion to amend, and both orders were
    issued on the same day.   Hence, it is unlikely that the Defendants
    were misled "by the inartfully drafted notice of appeal."    Young
    v. Gordon, 
    330 F.3d 76
    , 80 (1st Cir. 2003).      And in any event,
    because the underlying controversy is easily resolved in favor of
    the Defendants, we need not tackle the jurisdictional issue here.
    See Markel Am. Ins. Co. v. Díaz-Santiago, 
    674 F.3d 21
    , 27 (1st
    Cir. 2012) ("[W]e take shelter . . . under the familiar principle
    that where an appeal presents a difficult jurisdictional issue,
    yet the substantive merits underlying the issue are facilely
    resolved in favor of the party challenging jurisdiction, the
    jurisdictional issue may be avoided." (quoting Kotler v. Am.
    Tobacco Co., 
    926 F.2d 1217
    , 1221 (1st Cir. 1990))).
    To begin with, O'Brien faces a high standard of review
    hurdle.   We review the district court's decision granting the
    Defendants' motion to amend their answer for abuse of discretion.
    Klunder v. Brown Univ., 
    778 F.3d 24
    , 34 (1st Cir. 2015).      This
    means that a district court's order granting a motion to amend an
    answer to a complaint will be upheld "so long as 'the record
    evinces an arguably adequate basis for the court's decision.'"
    -25-
    
    Id. (quoting Juárez
    v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 
    708 F.3d 269
    , 276 (1st Cir. 2013)).
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that
    after the time to amend "as a matter of course" has expired, "a
    party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written
    consent   or   the   court's    leave."     Fed.   R.    Civ.   P.   15(a)(2).
    According to the rule, "[t]he court should freely give leave when
    justice so requires."          
    Id. "[W]hen a
    litigant seeks leave to
    amend after the expiration of a deadline set in a scheduling
    order," however, "Rule 16(b)'s more stringent good cause standard
    supplants Rule 15(a)'s leave freely given standard."                   United
    States ex rel. D'Agostino v. EV3, Inc., 
    802 F.3d 188
    , 192 (1st
    Cir. 2015); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) ("A schedule may be
    modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent.").
    Still, district court judges "enjoy great latitude in carrying out
    case-management functions."          Jones v. Winnepesaukee Realty, 
    990 F.2d 1
    , 5 (1st Cir. 1993).
    As a general rule, affirmative defenses enumerated in
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), including estoppel, are
    "deemed waived unless raised in the answer."            Davignon v. Clemmey,
    
    322 F.3d 1
    , 15 (1st Cir. 2003); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1)
    ("In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state
    any . . . affirmative defense, including . . . estoppel.").              This
    -26-
    Court, however, has identified exceptions to Rule 8(c)'s bar of
    untimely affirmative defenses, including when: (1) "the defendant
    asserts it without undue delay and the plaintiff is not unfairly
    prejudiced by any delay," or (2) "the circumstances necessary to
    establish entitlement to the affirmative defense did not obtain at
    the time the answer was filed."     
    Davignon, 322 F.3d at 15
    .
    O'Brien correctly asserts that the Defendants filed
    their motion to amend after the case-management order deadline for
    amending the pleadings had passed, and thus that "Rule 16(b)'s
    more stringent good cause standard supplant[ed] Rule 15(a)'s leave
    freely given standard."    
    D'Agostino, 802 F.3d at 192
    .   Even under
    the more stringent standard, however, O'Brien's contentions that
    the district court abused its discretion are unconvincing, as the
    record clearly "evinces an arguably adequate basis for the court's
    decision."     
    Klunder, 778 F.3d at 34
    (quoting 
    Juárez, 708 F.3d at 276
    ).
    First, "the circumstances necessary to establish [the
    Defendants'] entitlement to [judicial estoppel] did not obtain at
    the time the answer was filed."    
    Davignon, 322 F.3d at 15
    .    As the
    Defendants pointed out, they did not receive a copy of the plea
    colloquy concerning O'Brien's state court convictions until after
    they had answered the complaint, and they did not know that O'Brien
    was planning to introduce facts that contradicted the basis of his
    -27-
    prior convictions until the deposition of certain witnesses during
    discovery.     Moreover, by raising the judicial estoppel defense
    first in connection with their motion in limine and later in their
    motion for summary judgment, the Defendants put O'Brien on notice
    of the defense.       And considering that the court postponed trial
    and set a schedule for summary judgment briefing, "in part, to
    give   . . .    the   parties    sufficient     time   for    a   thoughtful
    consideration of the issues," O'Brien had a more than adequate
    opportunity to address the defense.       Thus, while O'Brien contends
    that he "suffered [from] the delay" in the Defendants' request to
    amend their answer, he did not explain, and we do not see, how he
    suffered any prejudice.      In the end, O'Brien has simply not shown
    that   the    district   court   abused   its    "great      latitude"   over
    case-management functions under Rule 16(b).            
    Jones, 990 F.2d at 5
    .
    C.   District Court's Grant of Summary Judgment
    This Court "review[s] the district court's grant of
    summary judgment de novo."       Scholz v. Goudreau, 
    901 F.3d 37
    , 44
    (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 
    777 F.3d 1
    , 4 (1st Cir. 2015)).      Because we "afford plenary review to
    orders granting or denying summary judgment[,] . . . we 'must view
    the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party
    opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in
    -28-
    that party's favor.'"      Podiatrist Ass'n, Inc. v. La Cruz Azul de
    P.R., Inc., 
    332 F.3d 6
    , 13 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Griggs-Ryan v.
    Smith, 
    904 F.2d 112
    , 115 (1st Cir. 1990)).
    1. Heck Bars O'Brien's Excessive Force Claims Arising from
    the Incident in the Woods
    In Heck, the Supreme Court held that when a person
    convicted of a crime files a § 1983 claim seeking damages for an
    "allegedly unconstitutional conviction" or for "other harm," the
    district court "must consider whether a judgment in favor of the
    plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction
    or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless
    the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has
    already been 
    invalidated." 512 U.S. at 486
    –87.    A plaintiff's
    excessive force claim and his conviction "may be so interrelated
    factually as to bar the § 1983 claim."         Thore v. Howe, 
    466 F.3d 173
    ,   180   (1st   Cir.   2006).     Therefore,   to   determine   Heck's
    applicability, a court must examine "the relationship between the
    § 1983 claim and the conviction, including asking whether the
    plaintiff could prevail only by 'negat[ing] an element of the
    offense of which he [was] convicted.'"         
    Id. at 179
    (alterations
    in original) (quoting 
    Heck, 512 U.S. at 486
    n.6).           Whether Heck
    bars § 1983 claims is a jurisdictional question that can be raised
    at any time during the pendency of litigation.             See White v.
    Gittens, 
    121 F.3d 803
    , 806 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Henderson ex
    -29-
    rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 
    562 U.S. 428
    , 434 (2011) (noting that
    objections to subject-matter jurisdiction "may be raised at any
    time").
    In    this    case,    the     record    reflects      that   O'Brien's
    excessive force claims arising from the incident in the woods are
    "so interrelated factually" with his state convictions arising
    from   those     events   that    a   judgment      in    O'Brien's   favor   would
    "necessarily imply" the invalidity of those convictions.                          See
    
    Thore, 466 F.3d at 179
    –80.                Indeed, if the officers had used
    excessive force against O'Brien while arresting him in the woods,
    as he now claims, their unlawful behavior would have provided
    O'Brien with a defense against the charges for resisting arrest
    and assault and battery under state law.                    See Commonwealth v.
    Moreira, 
    447 N.E.2d 1224
    , 1228 (Mass. 1983) ("[W]e conclude that
    where the officer uses excessive or unnecessary force to subdue
    the arrestee, regardless of whether the arrest is lawful or
    unlawful, the arrestee may defend himself by employing such force
    as reasonably appears to be necessary."); Commonwealth v. Graham,
    
    818 N.E.2d 1069
    ,    1078    (Mass.    App.    Ct.    2004)   ("At   least    in
    circumstances where the evidence supports a claim of excessive or
    unnecessary      force    by     police    and     the    concomitant     right    to
    self-defense, we think the judge must also instruct that the
    Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the police
    -30-
    did not engage in excessive force, as well as that the defendant
    did not act in self-defense."); Commonwealth v. Francis, 
    511 N.E.2d 38
    , 40 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) ("Even in circumstances where the
    defendant would be justified in using force in lawful defense of
    his person against a third person, he may not do so against a
    police or correction officer unless the officer uses excessive or
    unnecessary force.").
    Similarly, the district court correctly found that Heck
    bars any claim that Officer Melanson and Sergeant Perry used
    excessive force leading up to when O'Brien struck them with the
    phone handset.    Granting a judgment against Officer Melanson and
    Sergeant Perry would have implied that O'Brien's conduct was
    justified, while the officers' actions were unjustified, which
    would   have   necessarily   undermined   the   validity   of   O'Brien's
    assault and battery convictions.          As we explained in Thore,
    although "[a] § 1983 excessive force claim brought against a police
    officer that arises out of the officer's use of force during an
    arrest does not necessarily call into question the validity of an
    underlying state conviction . . . [,] it is not necessarily free
    from Heck" 
    either. 466 F.3d at 180
    .    And because O'Brien has not
    specified any theory of relief, let alone attempted to identify a
    factual scenario which would survive Heck, we need not go any
    further, as any argument to that effect is waived.         See Zannino,
    
    -31- 895 F.2d at 17
    ("It is not enough merely to mention a possible
    argument   in   the   most    skeletal   way,     leaving   the    court    to    do
    counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh
    on its bones.").
    The arguments that O'Brien does raise on appeal are
    confusing, conclusory, and easily discarded.                First, O'Brien's
    assertion that the Defendants waived a defense based on Heck is
    unavailing as we have already noted that it is a jurisdictional
    issue that can be raised sua sponte by the court.                 See 
    White, 121 F.3d at 806
    .
    Next, O'Brien claims that because the Assistant District
    Attorney stated in the plea colloquy that the incident in the woods
    occurred on "October 9" rather than "April 9," the Defendants "have
    not furnished sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of summary
    judgment in their favor based on the holding in" Heck.                Moreover,
    O'Brien avers that because his indictment does not delineate the
    exact   locations     of     the   crimes,   it    is   "difficult,        if    not
    impossible," to determine whether they occurred in the woods or at
    the Police Station.        Accordingly, O'Brien asserts, the Defendants
    "have not satisfied their burden to establish that the claims for
    excessive force are so factually interrelated so as to bar [his]
    §[]1983 claims."
    -32-
    These points are meritless.            The facts set out by the
    Assistant District Attorney in the plea colloquy clearly and
    unambiguously delineate which offenses relate to which incident.
    Moreover, the record as a whole supports the conclusion that, in
    his plea colloquy, the Assistant District Attorney was referring
    to O'Brien's arrest by the Bellingham Police Department in the
    woods on April 9, 2012, even if he misspoke by saying "October"
    instead of "April."       Crucially, O'Brien did not contest the date
    of the incident in response to the Defendants' statement of facts,
    and he did not present evidence supporting the conclusion that the
    Assistant District Attorney could have been referring to any other
    incident.      Accordingly,     the   district      court   correctly      granted
    summary judgment as to O'Brien's claims arising from the incident
    in the woods.
    2. The Excessive Force Claims Arising from the Incident at
    the Police Station
    "Excessive   force    claims     are    founded    on   the    Fourth
    Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures of the
    person."     Raiche v. Pietroski, 
    623 F.3d 30
    , 36 (1st Cir. 2010)
    (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV).            It follows then that excessive
    force claims against law enforcement officers effecting a seizure
    are   "governed    by     the     Fourth     Amendment's       'reasonableness'
    standard."     McGrath v. Tavares, 
    757 F.3d 20
    , 25 (1st Cir. 2014)
    (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 
    134 S. Ct. 2012
    , 2020 (2014)).
    -33-
    "Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure
    is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful
    balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
    individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing
    governmental interests at stake."             Graham v. Connor, 
    490 U.S. 386
    ,
    396    (1989)    (some   internal    quotation      marks      omitted)     (quoting
    Tennessee v. Garner, 
    471 U.S. 1
    , 8 (1985)).              The critical question
    is    "whether    the    defendant    officer      employed      force    that    was
    unreasonable under the circumstances."                 
    Raiche, 623 F.3d at 36
    (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jennings v. Jones, 
    499 F.3d 2
    , 11 (1st Cir. 2007)).
    "Th[e] reasonableness inquiry is an objective one; it is
    not a question of subjective intent."                
    McGrath, 757 F.3d at 25
    (citing 
    Graham, 490 U.S. at 397
    ).            An assessment of reasonableness
    "must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on
    the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight."
    
    Graham, 490 U.S. at 396
    .       This evaluation must allow "for the fact
    that    police    officers   are     often    forced     to    make   split-second
    judgments -- in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and
    rapidly evolving -- about the amount of force that is necessary in
    a    particular   situation."        
    Id. at 397.
           Application    of   the
    reasonableness test "requires careful attention to the facts and
    circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of
    -34-
    the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat
    to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
    resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight."                 
    Id. at 396
    (citing 
    Garner, 471 U.S. at 8
    –9).
    In this light, we conclude that the district court did
    not err in finding that the undisputed evidence established that
    the Defendants did not use excessive force against O'Brien at the
    Police Station.       As the district court noted, "[t]he video of the
    incident show[ed] that no force [was] used against O'Brien until
    after he start[ed] acting irrationally, cursing and threatening
    the officers, and trying to smash a glass window."                Moreover, it
    is clear that the Defendants did not "employ[] force that was
    unreasonable      under     the      circumstances,"      given      O'Brien's
    unpredictable and violent actions at the Police Station.                   See
    
    Raiche, 623 F.3d at 36
    (quoting 
    Jennings, 499 F.3d at 11
    ).               Thus,
    even viewed in the light most favorable to O'Brien, we find that
    the Defendants' actions at the Police Station were objectively
    reasonable, especially under the incident's "tense, uncertain, and
    rapidly evolving" circumstances.           See 
    Graham, 490 U.S. at 397
    .
    O'Brien counters, first, that the district court should
    not   have   relied    solely   on   the    Police   Station   video   because
    deposition testimony established that summary judgment on the
    issue of excessive force was "simply not warranted."               On appeal,
    -35-
    O'Brien does not identify the deposition testimony to which he
    refers.      Moreover,   in    opposition     to    summary   judgment   below,
    O'Brien      objected    to     the       Defendants'     "description      and
    characterization of the images" without disputing the Defendants'
    proposed facts with either any evidence or even by offering his
    own view of the contents of the video.             He merely stated that "the
    video speaks for itself."           The district court found that the
    Defendants' "characterizations [of the video] generally appear
    accurate," and so do we.            In any event, we reject O'Brien's
    argument, because when the record contains video evidence, the
    authenticity    of   which     is   not    challenged,    the   court    should
    ordinarily view the facts "in the light depicted by the video
    evidence."    Underwood v. Barrett, 
    924 F.3d 19
    , 20 (1st Cir. 2019)
    (per curiam).
    O'Brien also reiterates his argument that because he
    "was handcuffed to a handrail, and thus could not escape, attack
    or physically resist at all," all the Defendants needed to do was
    "simply . . . leave him alone"; "[i]nstead, they chose to beat him
    with batons, shoot him with rubber bullets, and hit him with
    multiple taser barbs."        We similarly reject this argument.         As the
    district court stated, "the length of the chain attached to the
    bar was long enough that every time the officers retreated, O'Brien
    responded by attempting to use items in the booking room as weapons
    -36-
    or by destroying property."         Moreover, O'Brien's argument ignores
    that   he    "attempted    to    escape   from    the   handcuffs    on   several
    occasions," that he "was causing a major security issue," and that
    he "was bleeding profusely from injuries he appear[ed] to have
    sustained from breaking a glass window and the officers needed to
    subdue him in order to transport him for medical attention."
    Finally, O'Brien avers that he voluntarily complied
    after the officers gave him a glass of water and talked to him.
    Yet    the   video   reflects     that    the    officers    spoke   to   O'Brien
    rationally many times before and that they made numerous prior
    verbal attempts to calm him down throughout the two-hour ordeal,
    with no success.     The officers even appeared to minimize the amount
    of force they used.         For example, they fired the rubber bullets
    only sparingly and withheld the K-9 dog.                Thus, we conclude that
    even when viewed in the light most favorable to O'Brien, based on
    the undisputed facts, no reasonable jury could find that the
    officers'     actions     were   unreasonable     under     the   circumstances.
    Accordingly, the district court did not err in entering summary
    judgment against O'Brien on his excessive force claims arising
    from the incident at the Police Station.8
    8  Because O'Brien's excessive force claims fail as a matter of
    law, we need not decide whether the Defendants were entitled to
    qualified immunity.
    -37-
    3.   State Law Claims
    Because     O'Brien     makes   no   argument   regarding   the
    dismissal of his state law claims, any such argument is waived.
    
    Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17
    .
    III.    Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    -38-