United States v. Moran ( 2019 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 18-1876
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
BRYAN MORAN,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Indira Talwani, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Selya, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Mary A. Davis, with whom Tisdale & Davis, P.A. was on brief,
for appellant.
Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Andrew E. Lelling, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
November 27, 2019
BARRON, Circuit Judge. Bryan Moran ("Moran") pleaded
guilty on May 9, 2018 to possession with intent to distribute
fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. He
reserved his right to challenge, on appeal, the denial of his
motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suppress
certain evidence -- specifically, fentanyl obtained from within
closed black garbage bags that were found in his sister's storage
unit during a warrantless search. He now contends that his
conviction must be vacated because the District Court erred in
denying that motion for reconsideration. The District Court based
its ruling on the ground that a person with apparent authority to
consent to that search -- namely, Moran's sister -- gave it, even
if she did not have actual authority to do so. Because we agree
with Moran that the government failed to meet its burden to show
that his sister had either actual or apparent authority to consent
to that search, we reverse the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, vacate his conviction, and remand the case.
I.
Just over one week before the search in question, Moran
stored several closed, opaque, black plastic garbage bags that
contained some of his effects in a storage unit that belonged to
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his sister, Alysha Moran ("Alysha").1 A week later, after Moran
was arrested and while he was being held at the Middlesex County
Billerica House of Corrections on a separate charge, he learned
that Alysha's storage unit needed to be emptied. He asked her -
- on a recorded phone call -- to move his bags.
A detective from the police department for the Town of
Wilmington, Massachusetts was informed of the call. That detective
and officers from the police department for the Town of North
Reading, Massachusetts then went to Alysha's apartment and
obtained her oral consent to conduct a search of her apartment.
At some point after she consented to the search of her apartment,
Alysha signed a "Consent For Search" form that the law enforcement
personnel conducting the search had provided to her. This form
authorized law enforcement authorities to "conduct a search of
[her] premises/vehicle" -- specifically, of her apartment, her
car, and her storage unit -- and "to take possession of any items
found which are relevant to the police investigation." In signing
the form, Alysha certified that she was consenting to the search
"voluntarily, without threats of promises of any kind."
1 The facts recited are either undisputed or drawn from the
District Court's initial Memorandum & Order denying Moran's motion
to suppress. The District Court reconsidered the suppression
motion and issued a subsequent Memorandum & Order, but the District
Court did not modify its initial findings of fact.
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Law enforcement authorities then searched Alysha's car
and her storage unit. The District Court found that, when the
authorities that conducted the search of Alysha's storage unit
opened it, "Alysha differentiated the contents of the unit, stating
the black bags belonged to Moran while the boxes containing
Christmas decorations belonged to her." The District Court also
found that "[a]lthough it is unclear whether Alysha gave express
consent to search Moran's bags, it is undisputed that she did not
limit her written consent or object to any portion of the search."
Before law enforcement authorities searched the contents
of the storage unit, Alysha left the premises to pick up her child.
The law enforcement authorities who conducted the search removed
the closed garbage bags that are at issue from the storage unit.
A police canine was brought to the scene to check for drugs and
did not alert when it sniffed the bags. (The canine was not
trained to detect fentanyl.) The authorities proceeded to open
the bags and search their contents, and find fentanyl inside them.
Alysha later stated in an interview with a detective from the Town
of Wilmington and an agent from the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration that she did not know the bags contained fentanyl.
Moran was indicted for possession with intent to
distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He
filed a motion to suppress the fentanyl as the fruit of an illegal
search of the bags. The District Court denied the motion to
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suppress on the ground that, although Moran had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in those bags, the law enforcement
authorities did not need a warrant to search them because Alysha
had actual authority to consent to their search and voluntarily
had given such consent.
Moran filed a motion for reconsideration of the District
Court's denial of the motion to suppress. In denying the motion
for reconsideration, the District Court declined to reach the issue
of whether Alysha had actual authority to consent to the search of
the bags. The District Court found instead that Alysha had
apparent authority to consent to their search. This appeal
followed.
II.
The Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution
protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "The Fourth Amendment generally
requires that the government obtain a warrant based on probable
cause before conducting a search." United States v. Hood, 920
F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). The warrant
requirement, however, is not absolute; "police need not seek a
warrant where 'voluntary consent has been obtained, either from
the individual whose property is searched, or from a third party
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who possesses common authority over the [property].'" United
States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Illinois
v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990)).
The government does not dispute the District Court's
finding that the bags at issue belonged to Moran. The government
also recognizes that the District Court denied Moran's motion for
reconsideration on the ground that Alysha had apparent authority
to consent to the search of the black garbage bags and not on the
ground on which it had initially relied in denying the motion to
suppress -- namely, that Alysha had actual authority to give such
consent. Nevertheless, we may affirm the District Court's ruling
on any ground manifest in the record, see United States v. Rivera,
825 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 2016), and the government first asks us
to do so on the ground that Alysha had actual authority to grant
the necessary consent. We thus begin with the actual authority
issue. After explaining why we cannot affirm on that basis, we
then turn to the apparent authority issue. With respect to both
issues, we review the District Court's legal conclusions de novo
and its findings of fact for clear error. Meada, 408 F.3d at 20.2
2 Moran argues that, despite Alysha's authorization for the
police to "take possession" of items relevant to the investigation
and the District Court's finding that Alysha did not limit her
written consent or verbally object during the search, Alysha's
general consent to search the storage unit did not extend to his
bag's stored therein. We assume, without deciding, that Alysha
did consent to a search of Moran's bags and address only whether
she had the actual or apparent authority to do so.
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A.
A third party may consent to search another's effects if
the third party "possesse[s] common authority over . . . [the]
effects sought to be inspected." United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164, 171 (1974). "Common authority rests 'on mutual use of
the property by persons generally having joint access or control
for most purposes.'" Meada, 408 F.3d at 21 (quoting Matlock, 415
U.S. at 171 n.7). Such "mutual use" makes it "reasonable to
recognize that [the third party] has the right to permit the
inspection in [her] own right and that the other[] [party has]
assumed the risk" that the third party will grant that permission.
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
Insofar as the government adequately develops the argument
that Moran did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
closed, opaque black bags, see United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d
1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory
manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,
are deemed waived."), the argument lacks merit, see Meada, 408
F.3d at 23 (explaining that "a person generally has an expectation
of privacy in items he places in a closed container"); compare
United States v. Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498, 501-02 (1st Cir. 1994)
(finding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in a closed container that other people placed items within and
that he left in the trunk of a rented car even when he was not a
passenger), and United States v. Basinski, 226 F.3d 829, 836-38
(7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the defendant, who entrusted a
briefcase to a lifelong friend and asked him to store and then
destroy it, maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
briefcase), with United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847, 854-56
(1st Cir. 1982) (finding that a defendant relinquished his privacy
interest in a closed container when he asked a business's
maintenance employee to store a box in the business's barn, a place
"unoriented to security," and did not inquire about the box during
the four months that it was in the barn).
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Thus, as we recently explained, to establish that the
third party had the actual authority to consent to the search of
effects that belong to another, the government must show that the
third party had mutual use of those effects -- here the contents
of the bags -- such that there is a "shared privacy interest" in
them. United States v. Casey, 825 F.3d 1, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2016);
see also Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (finding that
a third party had actual authority to consent to the search of his
cousin's duffel bag when the third party not only stored the bag,
but was also a "joint user" of an interior compartment of the bag).
The government bears the burden of making that showing. See
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181.
There is no evidence that, when Moran left his bags at
Alysha's, he told her that she could open the bags and gain access
to what was inside. And there is no evidence that one could see
through the bags to the contents. In addition, the fact that
Alysha had access to the bags at issue by virtue of their presence
in her storage unit does not, on its own, establish her mutual use
of whatever they contained. See United States v. James, 353 F.3d
606, 614 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that "one does not cede dominion
over an item to another just by putting [another] in possession").
And while the record does show that Moran had authorized Alysha to
move the bags at issue without giving her explicit direction as to
what she should do with them, that fact also fails to establish
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that she had mutual use of the contents of those closed containers,
notwithstanding that they were in her storage unit. See United
States v. Basinski, 226 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding
that a third party did not have authority to consent to a search
of a briefcase when the defendant gave the third party the
briefcase and asked him to destroy the case and its contents).
To fill in the gap in evidence that could show that
Alysha had the requisite mutual use, the government relies on
transcripts of recorded phone calls from November of 2015 that
Moran made from the correctional facility in which he was then
being held. The government argues that the law enforcement
personnel who conducted the search knew the contents of those
recorded calls and that those recordings reveal a pattern of Alysha
going into Moran's closed containers -- including bags that
belonged to him. The government then contends that, in light of
the evidence demonstrating that pattern of behavior, it has met
its burden to show that Alysha had mutual use of the garbage bags
at issue, at least when that pattern is considered along with the
other facts bearing on her potential mutual use of them that we
have just reviewed. But, we do not agree.
The recordings came about when, in November of 2015,
Moran was incarcerated on a different charge and had stored his
possessions with his girlfriend, Tina Tomasi. According to the
transcript of the first call from the correctional facility in
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which he was being held, which occurred on November 5, 2015, Moran
explained to Tomasi how to weigh and price orders for purchases
-- presumably of drugs -- for two customers. On a second call
from later that day between Moran and Alysha, on which the
government also relies, the transcript shows that Moran asked his
sister to "teach" Tomasi "how to do it." Alysha responded that
she would "do it for her."
The third recorded phone call on which the government
relies occurred on the same day from the same correctional
facility. It was between Moran and Alysha. The transcript of the
recording of that call shows that Moran told Alysha to "go get all
[his] shit" and "all [his] money" from Tomasi. Moran further said,
according to the transcript, "Alysha, I'm going to trust you as my
sister, and to do things right, and fuckin keep things right, and
that's that." He then told her that "people are going to be
calling, and [she was] going to have to go see them." When she
said during that call that she would keep the stuff in storage, he
responded: "Yeah, but, then, what are you going to do? Go to the
storage everyday [sic], every second you have to go get it? . . .
[T]hey come like, like that, like three, four, five times a day
. . . ."3
3
The record also includes the transcript of a fourth phone
call, made on November 8, 2015, in which Alysha told Moran that
Tomasi had not brought all of Moran's possessions to Alysha.
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Based on this third phone call, the District Court found
that "[Moran] directed [Alysha] to access his property in order to
supply contraband to two individuals." But, the District Court
made no finding that the direction that Moran gave Alysha at that
time to access that property also encompassed the bags that Moran
placed in Alysha's storage unit almost five months later, in March
of the following year, and that are at issue here. Nor did the
District Court make any other finding based on the calls that would
support the conclusion that Alysha enjoyed mutual use of the
particular bags in question on this appeal. Finally, neither the
evidence of this third call nor of the other two -- nor, for that
matter, any other evidence in the record -- makes manifest, either
on their own or when considered together, that Alysha was an
ongoing participant in Moran's drug business up through the time
of the search of the bags that are at issue in this case.4
Thus, we do not see how either the evidence of the phone
calls, or the District Court's finding as to what the third phone
call established, supplies a basis for concluding that the
government met its burden to show that Alysha had mutual use of
the specific bags whose contents Moran seeks to suppress and thus
that she had actual authority to consent to their search. We
4
In fact, there is no evidence in the record that Alysha was
involved in Moran's dealing at any point after that November call.
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therefore reject the government's actual-authority-based argument
for affirming the District Court's ruling.
B.
That the government cannot meet its burden to show that
Alysha had actual authority to consent to the search of the closed
black garbage bags found in her storage unit does not, however,
end the matter. The government also asks us to affirm the District
Court on the ground that Alysha had apparent authority to consent
to the search of those items. We thus now turn to that issue.
To resolve the apparent authority issue, we must
determine whether "the facts available to the officer[s] at the
moment [of the search would] warrant a[n] [officer] of reasonable
caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority" to
consent, regardless of whether the consenting party actually did
have such authority. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188 (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted). We consider the facts
available to law enforcement personnel at the time of the search
to determine whether law enforcement "had a mistaken--but
objectively reasonable--belief [that] the party in fact had the
requisite authority to consent to the search." Casey, 825 F.3d at
14 (emphasis added). In this analysis, we consider whether a
reasonable person would "act upon [the consent] without further
inquiry." Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188).
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Once again, the government bears the relevant burden of
proof. See United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir.
2003) (citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181). We find that law
enforcement authorities' belief that Alysha had authority to
consent was not objectively reasonable.
We held in United States v. Infante-Ruiz that an
officer's determination that a driver's consent to search the
rented car's trunk constituted consent to search the defendant's
briefcase stored in the trunk was unreasonable. 13 F.3d 498, 504-
05 (1st Cir. 1994). We based that conclusion on the evident
reasons to doubt that the scope of the driver's consent to the
search of the trunk encompassed the defendant's closed container
located inside the trunk. Id. at 505. We explained that the car
driver's "general permission to search the car and its trunk was
qualified by [the driver's] further statement to the officer,
before the [officer] opened and searched the briefcase, that the
briefcase belonged to [the defendant]." Id. We emphasized that,
because of that statement regarding the ownership of the briefcase,
"the scope of [the driver's] consent was ambiguous -- an ambiguity
that could have been but was not clarified by further inquiry."
Id.
Like the putatively consenting party in Infante-Ruiz,
Alysha made statements to the authorities who conducted the search
that clarified that the closed containers that they wished to
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search belonged to someone else. Yet, in the face of that
statement from Alysha, the law enforcement authorities who were
conducting the search, like the law enforcement personnel in
Infante-Ruiz, made no further inquiry to clarify the nature of her
consent. Thus, while the District Court determined that the
showing of apparent authority had been made, we do not agree, given
that the putatively consenting party claimed that the closed
containers belonged to someone else and the degree of uncertainty
that existed about whether she nonetheless enjoyed the kind of
mutual use of them that would give her actual authority to consent
to their search. See United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 554
(D.C. Cir. 2014) ("[T]he government's burden to establish that a
third party had authority to consent to a search . . . cannot be
met if agents, faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless
proceed without making further inquiry." (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C.
Cir. 1991))); United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 683 (6th Cir.
2010) (finding that a third party lacked apparent authority and
noting that the officers "never questioned [the third party] about
whether she had mutual use or control of the [closed container]");
United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 964 (6th Cir. 2008)
(explaining that when officers face ambiguity about a third party's
authority to consent, "either they may get a warrant, or they may
simply ask the would-be-consenter whether he or she possesses the
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authority to consent to the search of the other items that the
officers wish to explore"); United States v. Kimoana, 383 F.3d
1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that "where an officer is
presented with ambiguous facts related to authority, he or she has
a duty to investigate further before relying on the consent");
United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864 (10th Cir. 1992)
(noting the relevance of "whether the consenter explicitly
disclaimed ownership" in determining whether it was reasonable for
the officers to believe that a third party had authority to consent
to a search).
In arguing otherwise, the government relies again on the
phone calls from November of 2015. But, just as the evidence of
those calls does not establish a pattern of behavior between Alysha
and Moran that could suffice to show that she had actual authority
to consent to the search of whatever was inside of the bags at
issue, the evidence of the calls also fails to provide a
supportable basis on which law enforcement authorities could
reasonably believe that Alysha had such authority. As we have
noted, the calls from November were made nearly five months before
the search at issue, and law enforcement authorities had no
evidence that, after those calls, Alysha had anything to do with
advancing her brother's drug dealing.
The government also relies on a number of precedents in
support of its apparent authority argument, but they are each
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readily distinguishable. In two of the cases on which the
government relies, the consenting party did not state that the
closed container at issue belonged to someone else, as Alysha did
here. See United States v. Ruiz, 428 F.3d 877, 881-82 (9th Cir.
2005); United States v. Marshall, 348 F.3d 281, 288-89 (1st Cir.
2003). Thus, based on those circumstances, law enforcement
reasonably could have believed, without further questioning, that
the consenting party had mutual use and control of the container.
In the third case on which the government relies, the
police reasonably believed that the third party had joint access
to closed containers with narcotics inside in large part because
the officers discovered a note that the third party wrote showing
that she recently accessed the defendant's narcotics stash to
assist with the defendant's drug dealing, and the third party
proceeded to tell the officers which containers held drugs. See
United States v. Penney, 576 F.3d 297, 309-10 (6th Cir. 2009).
There is no comparable evidence of mutual use present here.
In the fourth, and final case on which the government
relies, a truck driver was found to have had apparent authority to
consent to the search of the truck trailer, despite the driver
disclaiming ownership, because of a custom specific to the trucking
industry. See United States v. Jenkins, 92 F.3d 430, 437-38 (6th
Cir. 1996) (finding apparent authority because "[t]he generic
relationship between the owner of a rig and its driver is
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characterized by a considerable grant of authority to the driver,"
as the driver is "typically allowed to enter the trailer . . .
[during] loading, unloading, [for] an inspection after an ominous
noise, or [for] an emergency"). The government identifies no
similar custom that could ground a finding of apparent authority
in this case. Thus, that case, too, fails to support the
government's position.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the denial of the
motion for reconsideration, vacate the conviction, and remand the
case to the District Court.
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