Batista v. Cooperativa De Vivienda Jardines De San Ignacio ( 2015 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 13-1817
PRISCILLA BATISTA,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v.
COOPERATIVA DE VIVIENDA JARDINES DE SAN IGNACIO, ET AL.
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Gustavo A. Gelpí, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Thompson, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Guillermo F. DeGuzmán, with whom DeGuzmán Law Offices, was on
brief, for appellant.
Luis A. Guzmán Dupont, for appellees.
January 13, 2015
BARRON, Circuit Judge. The appellant contends the Fair
Housing Act's requirement that landlords must make reasonable
accommodations for their disabled tenants entitles her to stay in
her apartment of many years, even though she had been told she was
no longer eligible for the federal subsidy on which she had been
relying to make the rent. She also contends her landlord
impermissibly discriminated against her because of her disability
in other ways, and also that it retaliated against her for pursuing
her Fair Housing Act rights. The District Court granted summary
judgment for that landlord, a private housing cooperative in San
Juan, Puerto Rico, and a number of the cooperative's board members,
whom the appellant had also named as defendants. For the reasons
discussed below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand in
part.
I.
Since 1983, Priscilla Batista has leased the same
three-bedroom apartment at the Cooperativa de Vivienda Jardines de
San Ignacio, a San Juan, Puerto Rico housing cooperative. Her two
children used to live in the three-bedroom apartment with her, but
they moved out in 1997 and 2003, respectively.
For most of the time Batista has lived at the
Cooperativa, she received benefits under the federal housing
assistance program known as Section 8, and these benefits enabled
her to cover the rent for her apartment. Under that program,
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government subsidies are available for "low-income families" so
they may "obtain[] a decent place to live." 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a).
Those subsidies assist Section 8 recipients with the rent they owe
to private landlords. See id. § 1437f(o). Although the Section 8
program is a federal one, it is administered by so-called "public
housing agencies" at the state and local level. See id. §
1437f(b)(1). In Puerto Rico, the entity responsible for
administering the Section 8 program is the Puerto Rico Housing
Finance Authority.
One of the obligations of the Housing Finance Authority
is to conduct a management review of buildings that house
recipients of Section 8 assistance. During such a review of the
Cooperativa in October of 2007, the Puerto Rico Housing Finance
Authority observed that four units, including Batista's three-
bedroom Unit 1714A, were "over-housed" for Section 8 purposes. By
"over-housed," the agency meant the tenants in those four units
were living in units larger than those they qualified for under
Section 8. The Cooperativa accordingly sent Batista -- who was by
then living alone in the three-bedroom unit -- a letter later that
month informing her that, under Section 8, she was required either
to transfer to an appropriately sized unit (in which case she could
continue to receive Section 8 assistance) or to remain in her
three-bedroom Unit 1714A but pay the fair market rent without such
assistance.
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The Cooperativa sent Batista additional letters in
November of 2008 and February of 2009 informing her that a
two-bedroom apartment was available and advising her that, if she
chose to stay in Unit 1714A, she would have to pay market-rate rent
without the Section 8 assistance as of April 1, 2009. Batista did
not respond to any of the letters.
Three weeks before the April 1 deadline, however, Batista
submitted a request to the Cooperativa for reasonable accommodation
under the Fair Housing Act on account of her disability.1
Batista's accommodation request stated that, in addition to a
bedroom, her disability requires that she have one room for
physical therapy and another room for reading and crafts -- and,
consequently, that moving to a smaller unit would compromise her
health. The request further stated that in light of her hyper-
sensitivity to sounds, Batista could not move to the proposed two-
bedroom unit, which she claimed was noisier than her current unit.
Upon receiving this request, the Cooperativa asked the
Housing Finance Authority and the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development ("HUD") for guidance on how to resolve the
matter. The Cooperativa also tabled any increase in Batista's rent
for Unit 1714A until it heard back.
1
Batista suffers from osteoporosis and fibromyalgia, as well
as severe fatigue, depression, migraines, blood anemia, colon
irritability, and hypersensitivity to sound.
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The Housing Finance Authority responded to the
Cooperativa's inquiry on May 13, 2009. The Housing Finance
Authority's letter to the Cooperativa stated that the Cooperativa
"should offer a smaller unit to the member and require paying the
market rent if [Batista] refuses to transfer to another unit." The
letter also stated that when a tenant, such as Batista, "requests
a reasonable accommodation for medical conditions, the
[Cooperativa] must determine the eligibility of [the] applicant on
a case by case basis."
After receiving the Housing Finance Authority's letter
and a separate response from HUD, the Cooperativa performed a
noise-level test for the two-bedroom apartment it had offered
Batista. According to the Cooperativa, the results of its
independent "noise pollution test" showed that the two-bedroom unit
it had offered would not have been unsuitably loud. The
Cooperativa did not, however, analyze Batista's medical condition
itself. Instead, the Cooperativa relied on findings HUD had
compiled after it had received the Cooperativa's letter seeking
assistance in responding to Batista's request for reasonable
accommodation.
The Cooperativa then denied Batista's accommodation
request. Batista nonetheless remained in her three-bedroom unit.
(She stopped receiving Section 8 benefits at some point
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thereafter.2) And, while still residing there, she filed an
administrative complaint with HUD on April 12, 2010. The complaint
alleged the Cooperativa had violated the Fair Housing Act by
failing to provide the accommodation she sought. The complaint
also alleged the Cooperativa had retaliated against her because she
had recently prevailed in a separate HUD proceeding against the
Cooperativa. That earlier proceeding arose out of the
Cooperativa's failure to provide Batista with a key to the garbage
depository on her floor.
In that earlier proceeding, the HUD Administrative Law
Judge found that the Coopertiva's failure in that regard had caused
Batista undue hardship in light of her disability and, on that
basis, issued a Consent Order sanctioning the Cooperativa. This
Consent Order required the Cooperativa to give Batista a key to the
depository, pay her $10,000, issue a written apology, and "[r]emove
any and all blemishes, sanctions, etc, arising out of this case,
from [her] record, including any outstanding fees and the
revocation of her voting privileges."
2
The Cooperativa contends that Batista's participation in
Section 8 was canceled as a consequence of her decision to remain
in an "over-housed" unit. Batista disputes this. She points out
that she received letters from the Cooperativa requesting that she
pick up "negative rent" checks through 2011, and -- although she
admits that neither the letters nor the checks reference "Section
8" specifically -- she claims that those checks identify her as a
Section 8 recipient through 2011. Resolution of this factual
dispute is unnecessary to deciding this appeal, as there is no
dispute that Batista no longer receives the subsidy.
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In evaluating the reasonable accommodation and
retaliation claims in Batista's April 2010 complaint, HUD found in
favor of the Cooperativa as to each. HUD concluded that Batista
had not submitted medical documentation stating that a three-
bedroom unit, as opposed to a two-bedroom unit like the one the
Cooperativa had offered, was necessary to accommodate her
disability. HUD further found that the Cooperativa had not
retaliated against Batista in violation of the Fair Housing Act.
HUD did not address whether the fact that Batista had been denied
Section 8 assistance for the apartment in which she continued to
reside was relevant to the reasonable accommodation claim.
Batista then filed suit in federal court. She named the
Cooperativa and a number of its past and present board members as
defendants. In addition to reasonable accommodation and
retaliation claims under the Fair Housing Act, Batista also alleged
a separate disparate treatment claim under that Act as well. The
District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on May
15, 2013, finding in their favor on the merits of the reasonable
accommodation and disparate treatment claims and concluding that it
lacked jurisdiction to decide the retaliation claim. Batista
timely appealed that decision.
II.
We review a district court's decision granting summary
judgment de novo. Geshke v. Crocs, Inc., 740 F.3d 74, 76 (1st Cir.
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2014). In doing so, we evaluate "the record in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion"; we also "draw[] all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Morrissey v. Bos.
Five Cents Sav. Bank, 54 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1995). Our review
"is not cabined by the lower court's rationale." González-Droz v.
González-Colón, 660 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2011). Instead, we may
affirm the entry of summary judgment "on any ground made manifest
by the record," Geshke, 740 F.3d at 77, so long as the record
"reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,"
Estate of Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2010).
A.
We begin with Batista's reasonable accommodation claim.
The Fair Housing Act prohibits discriminatory housing practices
based on a person's handicap. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)
(prohibiting discrimination "in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of
services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of
a handicap" of an individual). One type of discriminatory housing
practice is the "refusal to make reasonable accommodations in
rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations
may be necessary to afford [handicapped persons] equal opportunity
to use and enjoy a dwelling." Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
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The Cooperativa conceded that Batista qualifies as
handicapped under the Act and that it either knew or should have
known that fact. See Astralis Condo. Ass'n v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 620 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 2010). But the
District Court determined there was not a triable issue of fact as
to whether the Cooperativa had failed to provide a "reasonable and
necessary" accommodation, see id., and we agree.3
According to Batista, she was simply "requesting to use
her HUD subsidy" under Section 8 to fund the rent for the three-
bedroom apartment that she believed she was entitled to stay in due
to the disability-based accommodation that she contends the Fair
Housing Act required the Cooperativa to make. But while the Fair
Housing Act obliges private landlords to adjust their policies to
make reasonable accommodations for their tenants who otherwise
receive Section 8 subsidies, see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B), the
Puerto Rico Housing Finance Authority, not the Cooperativa, is the
entity responsible for administering Section 8 benefits. In doing
so, the Housing Finance Authority, not the Cooperativa, established
the over-housing policy that led to the former's revocation of
Batista's Section 8 benefits. And so far as we are aware, Batista
3
Because we conclude Batista has not shown her requested
accommodation is a "reasonable" one, we need not address whether
she is right that the Cooperativa's decision to reject her
accommodation request was insufficiently particularized because it
failed to account for her emotional condition, osteoporosis,
fibromyalgia, or migraines in making its decision to deny her
request.
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has never challenged the Housing Finance Authority's determination
that, under its over-housing policy, she does not qualify for the
subsidy so long as she stays in the three-bedroom unit.
Perhaps she could. See Pub. Hous. Mgmt. & Occupancy
Div., U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Public Housing Occupancy
Guidebook 64 (2003), available at
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_10760.pdf
("Exceptions to the largest permissible unit size" for Section 8
purposes "may be made in case of reasonable accommodations for a
person with disabilities."); cf. 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(a)(1)(iii)
(public housing agency must give Section 8 participant family
opportunity for informal hearing to consider whether determination
of family unit size under applicable subsidy standards complies
with applicable laws and regulations); Colvin v. Hous. Auth. of
City of Sarasota, Fla., 71 F.3d 864, 866 (11th Cir. 1996)
(recognizing right to challenge termination of Section 8 assistance
under certain circumstances). But Batista has sued the Cooperativa
instead. And the Cooperativa is not responsible for the Section 8
subsidy determination. Nor has the Cooperativa said it would
decline to make the current apartment available to Batista if she
were deemed eligible for a Section 8 subsidy to pay the market
rent.
As a result, Batista must -- but has not -- explained why
a private landlord, like the Cooperativa, acts unlawfully in
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refusing to provide the subsidy itself. See Howard v. City of
Beavercreek, 276 F.3d 802, 806 (6th Cir. 2002) ("An accommodation
is 'reasonable' when it imposes no 'fundamental alteration in the
nature of the program' or 'undue financial and administrative
burdens.'" (quoting Smith & Lee Assocs. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d
781, 795 (6th Cir. 1996))). Indeed, not even Batista argues her
requested accommodation would be a "reasonable" one under the Act
if the subsidy she previously received were not reinstated.
Seeing no way this suit against the private landlord
could result in an order to the administering agency for the
Section 8 program to reverse course and reinstate the rental
subsidy, we do not see how the requested accommodation could be a
reasonable one. Its denial by the Cooperativa rested solely on
Batista's inability to pay, which she appears to concede arises
only from her need for federal rental support. See Salute v.
Stratford Greens Garden Apartments, 136 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir.
1998) ("impecunious people with disabilities stand on the same
footing as everyone else"); cf. id. at 310 (Calabresi, J.,
dissenting) (addressing a claim brought by Section 8-eligible
recipients who alleged they were in need of the assistance because
their disability had made them poor). And thus, she does not
contend the denial of the accommodation resulted from any policy of
the Cooperativa that would prevent her from acquiring the funds
necessary to make the rent, which she does not contend must be
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lowered. We accordingly affirm the District Court's decision to
grant the defendants summary judgment on this claim.
B.
In addition to her failure-to-accommodate claim, Batista
also alleged in her complaint that the Cooperativa had "engaged in
a definite pattern of discriminatory actions against [her]" in
violation of the Fair Housing Act. The Cooperativa had done so,
Batista contends, by instituting multiple claims against her,
disallowing her from voting in resident-member assemblies,
attempting to prevent visitors from entering the premises to see
her, threatening to evict her from her unit, and more.
The District Court treated these allegations as
presenting a disparate treatment claim under the Fair Housing Act,
see generally Astralis Condo. Ass'n, 620 F.3d at 66 (Fair Housing
Act "contemplates three types of claims for perceived
discrimination: 'disparate treatment, disparate impact, and failure
to make reasonable accommodations'" (quoting Smith & Lee Assocs.,
102 F.3d at 790)), and so do we. Summary judgment for the
defendant is warranted on a disparate treatment claim "if the
plaintiff cannot produce either (a) direct evidence of
discriminatory intent or (b) indirect evidence creating an
inference of discriminatory intent." Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d
823, 831 (8th Cir. 2010).
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We may assume the Cooperativa did what Batista alleges --
attempting to collect money from her she did not owe, stopping her
from voting in the resident-member assemblies, threatening to evict
her, and so on. But even still, Batista has put forward no
evidence, nor pointed us to any, to suggest that an impermissible,
disability-based discriminatory purpose motivated the Cooperativa's
actions.
In fact, Batista argued below (and did so again in her
brief on appeal) that the Cooperativa's "true intent was to
eliminate Section 8 beneficiaries from the housing cooperative,"
and thus one unrelated to her disabled status. And while Batista
has tried on appeal to recast her argument by claiming that "[i]t
isn't hard to visualize how [her] position, as a handicapped person
protected under several applicable federal laws supporting
reasonable accommodation, was particularly troublesome for [the
appellees] in light of their 'intent to eliminate Section 8
beneficiaries' from Cooperativa," this argument still frames the
Cooperativa's actions as having been motivated by an "intent to
eliminate Section 8 beneficiaries" from the Cooperativa rather than
by her status as a disabled person protected by the Fair Housing
Act. Thus, we affirm the District Court's decision to grant the
Cooperativa summary judgment on this claim as well.
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C.
Finally, Batista alleges that after the Administrative
Law Judge found in her favor in the proceeding about the garbage
depository issue, the Cooperativa "swift[ly]" retaliated against
her. The Cooperativa did so, she claims, by (1) "initiating
collection proceedings against [her] for amounts she allegedly owed
since 1998" and (2) "denying her request for reasonable
accommodations and ignoring her need to remain in her present three
bedroom apartment due to her multiple health conditions."
Batista's complaint does not directly refer to the
Consent Order the Administrative Law Judge issued at the close of
the garbage depository case, but the District Court interpreted
Batista's retaliation claim as if it were an effort to enforce that
Order. Consistent with that understanding, the District Court then
dismissed the claim without prejudice -- for, under 42 U.S.C.
§ 3612(m), only the First Circuit has jurisdiction to enforce such
an Order. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(m) ("[A]ny person entitled to
relief under the order may petition for a decree enforcing the
order in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in
which the discriminatory housing practice is alleged to have
occurred.").
But the paragraph of Batista's complaint that sets forth
the retaliation claim does not cite to the provision for enforcing
consent orders, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(m). Instead, the paragraph refers
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to section 813(c)(1) of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3613(c)(1), which deals with private enforcement of the Act's
guarantees. And one of those guarantees, of course, is freedom
from "coerc[ion], intimidat[ion], threat[], or interfer[ence] . . .
on account of [a person's] having exercised or enjoyed" the right
to seek redress for housing discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
Thus, although the complaint is less than clear as to its
target, Batista's retaliation claim is best understood as an
attempt to enforce not the Consent Order itself, but the right
against retaliation the Fair Housing Act secures -- a right the
District Court surely does have jurisdiction to enforce. See id.
§ 3613(a)(1)(A) ("An aggrieved person may commence a civil action
in an appropriate United States district court or State court not
later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an
alleged discriminatory housing practice . . . to obtain appropriate
relief . . . ."). Accordingly, we reverse the District Court's
decision to dismiss Batista's retaliation claim with prejudice, and
we remand for the District Court to decide the claim on the merits.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand in part. No costs are awarded.
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