Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kohl's Department Stores, Inc. , 774 F.3d 127 ( 2014 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1268
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
KOHL'S DEPARTMENT STORES, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Thompson, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Donna J. Brusoski, Attorney, Office of the General Counsel,
with whom P. David López, General Counsel, Carolyn L. Wheeler,
Acting Associate General Counsel, and Jennifer S. Goldstein, Acting
Assistant General Counsel, were on brief, for appellant.
Melinda J. Caterine, with whom Fisher & Phillips LLP, was on
brief, for appellee.
December 19, 2014
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Appellant Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") asserts that Appellee Kohl's
Department Stores, Inc. ("Kohl's") refused to provide former
employee Pamela Manning ("Manning") with reasonable accommodations
in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42
U.S.C. § 12112. The EEOC also asserts that by failing to comply
with the ADA, Kohl's constructively discharged Manning. The
district court entered summary judgment in favor of Kohl's on both
claims. We affirm.
I. Background
The following undisputed facts are summarized in the
light most favorable to the EEOC, the nonmoving party. See, e.g.,
McGrath v. Tavares, 757 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2014). Manning
suffers from type I diabetes. In October 2006, Manning was hired
as a part-time sales associate at Kohl's. She held this position
until January 2008, when she was promoted to a full-time sales
associate. As a full-time associate working thirty-six to forty
hours per week, Manning worked predictable shifts which usually
started no earlier than 9:00 a.m. and ended no later than 7:00 p.m.
In January 2010, Kohl's restructured its staffing system
nationwide, resulting in a reduction in hours for Manning's
department. Manning maintained her full-time status because she
performed work for various other departments depending on the
store's needs.
-2-
Due to the restructuring, Kohl's scheduled Manning to
work various shifts at different times during the day, and her
scheduled hours became unpredictable as a result.1 For example,
Manning worked more "swing shifts" –- a night shift followed by an
early shift the next day. In March 2010, Manning informed her
immediate supervisor, Michelle Barnes ("Barnes"), that working
erratic shifts was aggravating her diabetes and endangering her
health. Barnes told Manning to obtain a doctor's note to support
her accommodation request. Manning visited her endocrinologist,
Dr. Irwin Brodsky ("Dr. Brodsky"), who determined that the stress
Manning experienced due to working erratic hours deleteriously
contributed to her high glucose levels. Dr. Brodsky wrote a letter
to the store manager of Kohl's, Tricia Carr ("Carr"), requesting
that Kohl's schedule Manning to work "a predictable day shift
(9a-5p or 10a-6p)," R. at 74, so that Manning could better manage
her stress, glucose level, and insulin therapy.
Upon receiving Dr. Brodsky's letter, Carr contacted
Kohl's human resources department seeking guidance in responding to
Manning's request. She emailed a copy of the letter to Michael
1
Numerous Kohl's employees testified throughout discovery that
full-time associates were expected and required to have "open
availability," meaning they could be scheduled to work at any time
of the day or night. See R. at 92, 95 (Barnes Dep.); id. at 178
(Gamache Dep.); id. at 370-71, 399-401 (Treichler Dep.); id. at 445
(St. John Dep.); id. at 453 (Wilner Dep.). Full-time associates
were also required to work two night or evening shifts each week,
and every other weekend as well. See, e.g., id. at 370 (Treichler
Dep.).
-3-
Treichler ("Treichler") in Human Resources and told him that
Manning had submitted a written doctor's "request[] that I
accommodate [Manning] with day time hrs only." Id. at 75.
Treichler told Carr that with Manning "being a full-time
associate[,] she would still need to be required to work nights and
weekends and that definitely we would make sure she had no swing
shifts, [and] that we would make sure . . . that she really took
her breaks." Id. at 160 (Carr Dep.). Treichler asked Carr to meet
with Manning and propose the no-swing-shift option. Carr's
deposition testimony describing this sequence of events is
consistent with an email she received from Treichler responding to
her request for guidance, which stated, in part: "Clearly we can
not have [Manning] not work nights. BUT, we can work with her to
avoid the 'swing shifts' - A [sic] close followed by an open." Id.
at 76.
Subsequently, Carr and Barnes arranged to meet with
Manning on March 31, 2010, to discuss Manning's concerns. During
their meeting, Manning requested "a steady schedule, [but] not
specifically 9:00 to 5:00." Id. at 282 (Manning Dep.). As she
described it, "I was asking for a midday shift, what I had before,
the hours that I had before [the departmental restructuring]." Id.
at 281 (Manning Dep.). Manning also expressed a willingness to
work on weekends.
-4-
Carr responded that she had spoken to "higher-ups" at the
corporate management level, and that she could not provide a
consistently steady nine-to-five schedule.2 Manning became upset,
2
This is where the dissent parts ways with our view of the
record. The dissent states that Carr failed to offer Manning any
alternative accommodation at the March 31 meeting, even though she
had been expressly authorized to offer Manning a schedule with no
swing shifts. The dissent views Carr's failure to bring up the
swing shifts as evidence that would allow a jury to find that
Kohl's was not making a good faith effort to engage with Manning.
We disagree. While a reasonable jury could have found that Carr
was authorized to offer "no swing shifts," and that she did not
volunteer this information at her meeting with Manning, we are
unable to ascribe the same significance to these facts as does the
dissent.
Manning's requested accommodation was, as stated by Dr.
Brodsky, "a predictable day shift." Indeed, at his deposition Dr.
Brodsky agreed that in his letter to Kohl's he "asked that Ms.
Manning be allowed to work a predictable work shift either nine to
five or ten to five." He further testified that the "only
situation . . . about which [he] rendered an opinion is the one
that [he] listed in the letter," and he agreed that "any variations
beyond the nine a.m. to five p.m. or the [ten] a.m. to six p.m.
[schedule] would require [him] to have a further discussion with
Ms. Manning[.]" Manning herself said that she requested "a steady
schedule, not specifically 9:00 to 5:00." No one is in a better
position than Manning and her doctor to tell us what Manning's
requested accommodation actually was, and the evidence on this
point is uncontested. Manning was not simply asking for "no swing
shifts," she was in fact looking to be relieved of the obligation
to work night shifts as well.
The uncontested evidence in the record also demonstrates that
Carr was never authorized to grant Manning's request. Indeed, the
only evidence is that for Manning to continue working as a
full-time associate, Kohl's would continue to require Manning to
work nights. Thus, there is no evidence that Carr refused to
extend a requested reasonable accommodation that she had been
authorized to give. This is not a case in which an employer
privately decides that it would grant a requested accommodation,
but then elects not to offer it as part of strong-arm negotiating
tactics in the hopes that the employee would accept something less
than he or she originally requested.
-5-
told Carr that she had no choice but to quit because she would go
into ketoacidosis3 or a coma if she continued working unpredictable
hours, put her store keys on the table, walked out of Carr's
office, and slammed the door. Concerned, Carr followed Manning
into the break room outside, asking what she could do to help.
During this conversation, Carr attempted to calm Manning down and
requested that she reconsider her resignation and discuss other
potential accommodations. Manning responded, "Well, you just told
me Corporate wouldn't do anything for me." Id. at 458-59 (Manning
Medical Examination). Manning did not discuss any alternative
accommodations with Carr, but instead cleaned out her locker and
left the building. A few days later, on April 2, 2010, Manning
contacted the EEOC, seeking to file a discrimination claim.
On April 9, 2010, Carr called Manning to request that she
rethink her resignation and consider alternative accommodations for
both part-time and full-time work. Manning asked Carr about her
schedule, and Carr informed her that she would need to consult with
the corporate office about any accommodations. After this phone
Given the state of this record, we are unable to agree with
the dissent's view of Kohl's negotiating tactics. We do not
believe a reasonable jury could find that Kohl's failed to
negotiate in good faith based on Carr's authorization to offer "no
swing shifts."
3
Diabetic ketoacidosis is a serious medical complication that is
caused by low insulin levels. In response, the body burns fatty
acids, causing potentially dangerous levels of acidity to build up
in the bloodstream.
-6-
call, Manning had no further contact with anyone at Kohl's.
Because it had not heard from Manning, Kohl's treated her departure
as voluntary and terminated her employment later that month.
The EEOC brought this current suit on Manning's behalf in
the United States District Court for the District of Maine in
August 2011. The district court entered summary judgment in favor
of Kohl's, concluding on the ADA claim that Manning had failed to
engage in an interactive process in good faith and on the
constructive discharge claim that a reasonable person in Manning's
position would not have felt compelled to resign.
II. Discussion
The EEOC appeals the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Kohl's on both the ADA discrimination claim
and the constructive discharge claim. We review a district court's
grant of summary judgment de novo. E.g., Acevedo-Parrilla v.
Novartis Ex-Lax, Inc., 696 F.3d 128, 136 (1st Cir. 2012). We draw
"'all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,'" id.
(quoting Sánchez-Rodríguez v. AT & T Mobility P.R., Inc., 673 F.3d
1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012)), "'without deference to . . . the district
court,'" id. (quoting Hughes v. Bos. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d
264, 268 (1st Cir. 1994)).
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party
demonstrates that there is "no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
-7-
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord Acevedo-Parrilla, 696 F.3d at 136.
There is no genuine dispute of material fact when the moving party
demonstrates that the opposing party has failed "to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). We now examine each of the EEOC's claims, in turn.
A. The ADA Discrimination Claim
To establish a case of disability discrimination under
the ADA, the EEOC must establish that: "'(1) [Manning] is disabled
within the meaning of the ADA, (2) [Manning] was able to perform
the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable
accommodation, and (3) [Kohl's], despite knowing of [Manning]'s
disability, did not reasonably accommodate it.'" Freadman v.
Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir. 2007)
(quoting Rocafort v. IBM Corp., 334 F.3d 115, 119 (1st Cir. 2003)).
The EEOC's failure to satisfy any one of these elements warrants
the entry of summary judgment against it as a matter of law. See
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–23. We bypass any discussion about
the first two elements and proceed directly to the third element,
the basis for our affirmance.4
4
The district court considered but rejected the argument by
Kohl's that Manning was not qualified to perform the "essential
functions" of her job (element (2)). Instead, the district court
granted summary judgment to Kohl's under the accommodation issue
(element (3)) because it found that Manning failed to engage in the
-8-
Under the third element, an employee's request for
accommodation sometimes5 creates "a duty on the part of the
employer to engage in an interactive process." See Enica v.
Principi, 544 F.3d 328, 338 (1st Cir. 2008). The interactive
process involves an informal dialogue between the employee and the
employer in which the two parties discuss the issues affecting the
employee and potential reasonable accommodations that might address
those issues. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). It requires bilateral
cooperation and communication. See Enica, 544 F.3d at 339.
We must emphasize that it is imperative that both the
employer and the employee have a duty to engage in good faith, and
that empty gestures on the part of the employer will not satisfy
the good faith standard. If an employer engages in an interactive
process with the employee, in good faith, for the purpose of
discussing alternative reasonable accommodations, but the employee
fails to cooperate in the process, then the employer cannot be held
liable under the ADA for a failure to provide reasonable
interactive process in good faith. We proceed directly to the
interactive process analysis because "[w]e may uphold an entry of
summary judgement on any basis apparent from the record." McGrath,
757 F.3d at 25.
5
This court does not regard an employer's participation in the
interactive process as an absolute requirement under the ADA.
Instead, we have held that we "resolve the issue on a case-by-case
basis." Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2001). In
this case, we do not need to address whether Kohl's had a duty to
engage in an interactive process, since it did in fact initiate
such a dialogue with Manning.
-9-
accommodations. See, e.g., id. ("[T]he process requires open
communication by both parties, and an employer will not be held
liable if it makes 'reasonable efforts both to communicate with the
employee and provide accommodations based on the information it
possessed . . . .'" (last alteration in original) (quoting Phelps
v. Optima Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 2001)));
Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178 F.3d 731, 736 (5th Cir. 1999)
("[A]n employer cannot be found to have violated the ADA when
responsibility for the breakdown of the 'informal, interactive
process' is traceable to the employee and not the employer."
(quoting Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135
(7th Cir. 1996))).
Here, the record shows that after Manning left the
meeting on March 31, 2010, Carr pursued her, attempted to calm her
down, asked her to reconsider her resignation, and requested that
she contemplate alternative accommodations. Manning refused,
instead confirming that she quit by cleaning out her locker and
departing the building. Ten days later, Carr called Manning,
repeating her request for Manning to reconsider her resignation and
to contemplate alternative accommodations. Manning never responded
-10-
to Carr.6 Approximately one week after this phone call, Kohl's
terminated Manning's employment.
While Kohl's response to Manning's accommodation request
may well have been ham-handed, based on the undisputed facts, we
cannot find that its subsequent overtures should be construed as
empty gestures.7 The refusal to give Manning's specific requested
accommodation does not necessarily amount to bad faith, so long as
the employer makes an earnest attempt to discuss other potential
6
The record indicates that a member of the EEOC's staff may have
told Manning not to continue to participate in the interactive
process following her precipitous departure from Kohl's. During
her medical examination, when asked about Carr's April 9, 2010,
phone call to Manning, requesting that she reconsider her
resignation, this was her response:
MS. MANNING: . . . I just wanted to get off the phone as fast
as I could. And then I called --
DR. BOURNE: You could not talk?
MS. MANNING: No. And I told her that I couldn't talk.
DR. BOURNE: Per EEOC's directions?
MS. MANNING: Yes.
R. at 461-62 (Manning Medical Examination).
Assuming this is what happened, Manning should have been
directed to do precisely the opposite: she should have been
informed that she was obliged to continue to engage with the
interactive process in good faith. It thus may well be that
Manning's current predicament is due to erroneous advice provided
by the EEOC. Such a fact, if true, would be troubling, given the
EEOC's duty to investigate discrimination claims and authorize
lawsuits. One would expect that the EEOC should know that an
employee's failure to cooperate in an interactive process would
doom her ADA claim.
7
The EEOC suggests that Kohl's did not act in good faith because
Carr's attempts to reconcile with Manning were disingenuous "empty
gestures." As discussed below, the record does not support this
assertion.
-11-
reasonable accommodations. Here, Kohl's refused to provide
Manning's preferred schedule, but was willing to discuss other
schedules that would balance Manning's needs with those of the
store. Manning refused to hear what Kohl's had to offer. "'It is
difficult to judge the reasonableness of accommodations when the
employee withdraws before we can say with any authority what these
accommodations would have been.'" Griffin v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 661 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Loulseged, 178
F.3d at 734). Manning's refusal to participate in the interactive
process is the reason why the record lacks facts regarding what
reasonable accommodations Kohl's might have offered had Manning
cooperated. We conclude that Kohl's acted in good faith when it
initiated an interactive process and displayed its willingness to
cooperate with Manning, not once but twice, to no effect. See,
e.g., Phelps, 251 F.3d at 28.
Furthermore, we conclude that Manning's refusal to
participate in further discussions with Kohl's was not a good-faith
effort to participate in an interactive process. See, e.g., Enica,
544 F.3d at 339 (quoting Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135); Phelps, 251 F.3d
at 28. Indeed, because Manning chose not to follow up with Carr's
offer to discuss alternative accommodations, Manning was primarily
responsible for the breakdown in the interactive process.8 See
8
The EEOC cites to Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495 (3d
Cir. 2010) in support of its claim that the refusal by Kohl's to
accommodate Manning's requests constituted a termination of the
-12-
Phelps, 251 F.3d at 27 (holding plaintiff responsible for the
breakdown in the interactive process when she "failed to cooperate
in such a process"); see also Griffin, 661 F.3d at 225 (quoting
Loulseged, 178 F.3d at 734).
In sum, when an employer initiates an interactive
dialogue in good faith with an employee for the purpose of
discussing potential reasonable accommodations for the employee's
disability, the employee must engage in a good-faith effort to work
out potential solutions with the employer prior to seeking judicial
redress. Manning did not do so in this case, and therefore, the
EEOC has failed "to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to [its] case . . . ." See
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Accordingly, we hold that summary
judgment against the EEOC on the ADA discrimination claim is
warranted as a matter of law.9
B. The Constructive Discharge Claim
To establish a claim of constructive discharge, the EEOC
must show that Manning's working conditions were "so onerous,
abusive, or unpleasant that a reasonable person in [her] position
interactive process. We find Colwell distinguishable, because in
that case, the evidence indicated that the employer may have been
more responsible for a failure to communicate. See id. at 507–08.
Here, Kohl's attempted to communicate with Manning twice, to no
effect.
9
We must emphasize that our holding is limited to the highly
idiosyncratic facts of this case and should not be interpreted as
upsetting our current ADA jurisprudence.
-13-
would have felt compelled to resign." Suárez v. Pueblo Int'l,
Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Vega v. Kodak
Caribbean, Ltd., 3 F.3d 476, 480 (1st Cir. 1993)). In other words,
work conditions must have been so intolerable that Manning's
decision to resign was "void of choice or free will" -- that her
only option was to quit. See Torrech-Hernández v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
519 F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir. 2008). This standard is entirely
objective -- we do not put weight on the employee's subjective
beliefs, "'no matter how sincerely held.'" Id. at 52 (quoting
Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 28 (1st Cir. 2002)).
Here, the EEOC fails to meet this objective "reasonable
person" standard. The EEOC argues that Manning's fears that she
would go into ketoacidosis or slip into a coma were objectively
reasonable because her doctor told her that continuing to work
erratic shifts could cause these serious medical complications.
Even assuming, arguendo, that being concerned about these health
issues is objectively reasonable, we still find that Manning's
choice to resign was "grossly premature, as it was based entirely
on [her] own worst-case-scenario assumption" that Kohl's would not
provide her with accommodations. See id. According to the record,
after Manning left the meeting in Carr's office on March 31, 2010,
Carr followed Manning into the break room. Carr gave Manning her
first opportunity to reconsider her resignation and offered to
discuss other potential accommodations with Manning. Manning
-14-
ignored this first overture, despite seeing that Carr was willing
to discuss and negotiate alternative accommodations. On April 9,
2010, Carr called Manning over the phone, repeating her request
that Manning reconsider both her resignation and her refusal to
discuss alternative accommodations. Manning also ignored this
second overture.
"[A]n employee is obliged not to assume the worst, and
not to jump to conclusions too [quickly]." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, Manning not only jumped to a conclusion
prematurely, but she also actively disregarded two opportunities to
resolve her issues. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that a
reasonable person would simply not feel "compelled to resign" when
her employer offered to discuss other work arrangements with her.
See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, 441 (7th Cir. 2000)
("Instead of discussing the new work schedule[,] . . . [the
employee] resigned. While this was certainly her prerogative, we
do not believe this was her only option. . . . [W]e cannot conclude
that a reasonable person in her position would have been compelled
to resign."); see also Torrech-Hernández, 519 F.3d at 50-51.
Because we find that a reasonable person in Manning's position
would not have concluded that departing from her job was her only
available choice, the EEOC has failed to meet the "reasonable
person" element for a constructive discharge claim. We
-15-
consequently hold that summary judgment against the EEOC on the
constructive discharge claim is warranted as a matter of law.
III. Conclusion
We are sympathetic to Manning's medical issues.
Moreover, we note that had the matter ended at the refusal by
Kohl's to grant Manning's request for a steady work schedule,
Manning might well have had viable causes of action. Yet, for both
of her claims, we cannot ignore the multiple subsequent
opportunities that Kohl's offered to Manning to discuss alternative
reasonable accommodations. Consequently, the facts, even when read
in the EEOC's favor, substantiate neither a claim for ADA
discrimination nor a claim for constructive discharge. It follows
that the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor
of Kohl's on both claims.
AFFIRMED.
-Dissenting Opinion Follows-
-16-
KAYATTA, Circuit Judge, dissenting. A reasonable jury
could properly view the facts in this case very differently than
does the majority. So viewed, those facts should preclude summary
judgment unless we are to bless as a matter of law a negotiating
tactic that is unfair to disabled employees who reasonably believe
that they confront imminent serious harm if an accommodation is not
provided. To explain why this is so, I begin with a brief example
of how a reasonably competent plaintiff's lawyer would fairly
describe the well-supported facts to a jury, and I then follow with
an analysis of why those facts could support a verdict in EEOC's
favor. Finally, I explain why it follows that the constructive
discharge claim should survive as well.
I. The Facts
Fending off the stress-induced exacerbation of a life-
threatening condition, and believing that she faced imminent
serious harm if she could not secure an accommodation, Manning
requested less erratic work hours--especially no swing shifts--to
allow her to work without suffering harmful medical consequences.
Kohl's demanded that Manning provide a note from her doctor, which
she then did. Dr. Brodsky's note focused on the problem caused
Manning by swing shifts in particular. He explained that, as
someone with type 1 diabetes, Manning "takes five daily injections
of insulin that must be timed to match her meals and activity," but
that she was "having difficulty matching her insulin action to her
-17-
work schedule in your store when she swings shifts (e.g. working
late shift one day and returning for an early shift the next day)."
Dr. Brodsky's note further informed Kohl's that "[a] more
predictable and regular schedule should help smooth her blood sugar
control and help prevent serious complications of diabetes."
Although the note referenced, parenthetically, 9:00 a.m. to 5:00
p.m. and 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. shifts, a fact-finder could
reasonably conclude that the doctor offered those shifts simply as
acceptable examples, and that Manning merely requested a consistent
day-to-day schedule as a way of avoiding swing shifts. The
district court therefore properly operated on the premise that
Manning's request was for a "more regular and predictable
schedule," somewhere between the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m.,
that did not include swing shifts.10
Manning repeated her request for a steady work schedule
and no swing shifts during the meeting with store manager Carr and
assistant store manager Barnes. In response, Carr and Barnes left
Manning with the impression that no individual accommodation would
10
Rather than focus on how Kohl's may have reasonably interpreted
Manning's request, including Dr. Brodsky's note, the majority asks
the wrong question: How did Dr. Brodsky interpret his note at his
later deposition? The majority then illogically declares that
interpretation to be the reading that a jury must assume Kohl's
actually adopted. In any event, as I explain in the body of this
dissent, infra, a jury could easily find Kohl's responsible for the
breakdown in the interactive process not because it rejected
Manning's request (however interpreted), but because it failed to
offer even the accommodation it determined it could make.
-18-
be forthcoming. Specifically, Carr told Manning that if she gave
Manning the scheduling accommodation Manning wanted, then she would
have to do that for everyone else at the store. Barnes reinforced
this point by telling Manning that "we were keeping to consistency
in regards to all full timers in the building and their schedules."
Carr further explained that "the needs of the business dictate[d]
when [Manning] work[ed]" and "would require at times shifts that
are early, days, mids and closes." These statements, taken
together, basically told Manning that Kohl's would not offer
Manning any scheduling accommodation that was not both available to
all other workers and compatible with a business need to have
fluctuating shifts.11 As a concrete demonstration of this point,
Carr and Barnes flatly rejected the accommodation Manning requested
and, importantly, offered her no alternative accommodation even
though Kohl's--through HR manager Treichler--had already expressly
authorized Carr to offer Manning a schedule with no swing shifts,
the availability of which did not turn on its being offered to all
other employees as Carr falsely told Manning.
11
The majority correctly notes that Kohl's employees testified
that full-time employees were required to work two night shifts per
week and have "open availability," or the flexibility to work any
time of the day, although it appears that this scheduling
expectation was not recorded in writing. However, there is also
testimony in the record that exceptions to this scheduling practice
were "pretty regularly" made, and "there was a fair amount of
leeway within those [full-time] positions." The district court
therefore considered it disputed that open availability and working
two night shifts per week were strict requirements for full-time
employees.
-19-
With a vulnerable employee known to Kohl's to believe she
faced imminent harm if her shifts could not be changed, the
negotiating tactics employed by Carr and Barnes caused Manning to
flee the one-sided discussions and announce that she had no choice
but to quit. It is true that Carr chased after Manning and spoke
with her in the break room, and then called her again ten days
later. But in neither conversation did Carr propose alternative
accommodations, request other information, or otherwise indicate
that Kohl's had relented. In the break room, Carr failed to
suggest any accommodation, including the accommodation that Carr
knew she could offer and that Manning's doctor said she most
needed--no swing shifts. During the second conversation, by phone
on April 9, Manning asked about her work schedule after Carr asked
her to consider other accommodations for full-time and part-time
employment (none of which Carr actually offered, or even said she
had authority to offer).12 Carr replied that she would need to
consult with the corporate office about any schedule
accommodations, in contradiction with the corporate office's
earlier authorization for Carr to avoid scheduling Manning for
swing shifts. Four times unable to get a specific counteroffer
from Kohl's of any accommodation, and told that the person she was
12
Although part-time employment can be a reasonable accommodation,
29 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(b), Kohl's knew that it was not the volume of
work that jeopardized Manning's health, but its erratic
distribution.
-20-
speaking to didn't even have any authority to offer one, Manning
gave up and moved on.
II. The Interactive Process
My colleagues point to nothing in the foregoing
presentation of the evidence that lacks support in the record.
They nevertheless conclude that Manning forfeited her rights under
the ADA because she was not more resilient in the face of Kohl's
negotiating tactics. This conclusion misapprehends the nature of
the interactive process. While Kohl's approach (as described by
Manning) might be well-suited in some hard-edged business or
diplomatic negotiations, it fits poorly with the type of "good
faith," "interactive process" that the applicable regulations
require here. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)13; see Enica v. Principi,
544 F.3d 328, 339 (1st Cir. 2008). The EEOC's interpretive
guidance directs employers to use a "problem solving approach" to
identify reasonable accommodations in consultation with the
employee. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9.14 Pursuit of this problem-
13
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) provides that "[t]o determine the
appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the
covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with
the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This
process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the
disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could
overcome those limitations."
14
The EEOC's interpretive guidance on the ADA provides, in
relevant part, that
When an individual with a disability has requested
a reasonable accommodation to assist in the performance
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solving approach requires that the employer, once it becomes aware
of the disability of an employee, "engage in a meaningful dialogue
with the employee to find the best means of accommodating that
disability." Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 100, 108
(1st Cir. 2005). Interactive discussions should involve "a flexible
give-and-take with the disabled employee so that together they can
determine what accommodation would enable the employee to continue
working." EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 805 (7th
Cir. 2005). Here, Kohl's did not give even what it could easily
give.
Accepting as we must for summary judgment purposes the
foregoing presentation of the facts--all well-supported by
of a job, the employer, using a problem solving approach,
should:
(1) Analyze the particular job involved and
determine its purpose and essential functions;
(2) Consult with the individual with a disability to
ascertain the precise job-related limitations imposed by
the individual's disability and how those limitations
could be overcome with a reasonable accommodation;
(3) In consultation with the individual to be
accommodated, identify potential accommodations and
assess the effectiveness each would have in enabling the
individual to perform the essential functions of the
position; and
(4) Consider the preference of the individual to be
accommodated and select and implement the accommodation
that is most appropriate for both the employee and the
employer.
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9.
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competent proof in the record--it seems most unfair to say that
Manning forfeited her rights under the ADA. Manning communicated
to Kohl's the fact that she was disabled, she provided specific
medical evidence describing how the swing shifts threatened her
health, and she proposed a specific but flexible accommodation. In
other words, she did everything necessary to enable Kohl's to
determine whether any accommodation was reasonably possible. Cf.
Griffin v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 661 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir.
2011) (employee failed to provide information to show that his
requested accommodation was necessary to manage his diabetes).
Indeed, Kohl's did determine that an accommodation was possible; it
simply never offered it.
The obligation to engage in the interactive process in
good faith arises out of a need to see to it that an employer
receives the information necessary to determine whether an
accommodation is needed, and why. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9.
Kohl's had all that information, and required nothing more
(including Manning's agreement) to offer that which it had already
determined it could accommodate. The majority seems to conclude
that because Treichler did not authorize Carr to offer Manning the
most favorable accommodation of "a predictable day shift," Carr's
failure to at least offer Manning "no swing shifts" is not evidence
of lack of good faith. In the majority's words, Carr did not
refuse "to extend a requested reasonable accommodation that she had
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been authorized to give" (emphasis added). There are two problems
with this argument.
First, on this record, a jury might well conclude that
Kohl's actually understood that the key thing Manning needed and
that she sought was consistency in the form of no swing shifts.
Dr. Brodsky's note clearly emphasized the problem swing shifts
posed for Manning's blood sugar control. Indeed, Treichler's
response to Carr shows that he at least interpreted the doctor's
note as requesting no swing shifts: "Clearly we can not [sic] have
her not work nights. BUT, we can work with her to avoid the 'swing
shifts'--A [sic] close followed by an open." And Carr documented
in an email that Manning asked her simply, and generally, "why she
couldn't have a more day to day consistent schedule."
Second, let's assume that the majority is correct, i.e.,
that Manning's request could only be interpreted as a request for
something more than no swing shifts, and that Treichler only
authorized Carr to offer an end to swing shifts. The fact remains,
Carr never offered anything, and (if Manning is to be believed) a
jury could find that Carr and Barnes actively misled Manning into
believing that they could offer no accommodation that was not
consistent with the schedules of "all full timers" or available to
everyone else. I would think that a jury could find that such
tactics fell far enough short of "good faith" participation in an
"interactive," "problem solving" process so as to place on Kohl's
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some of the blame for the breakdown of that process. Instead, the
majority rewards Kohl's for withholding even the accommodation it
could make--and misrepresenting its availability--by declaring that
Kohl's wins the whole case as a matter of law. All the employer
now need do is keep its lips moving, not offer anything, imply that
it cannot offer what even it determines it clearly can, and hope
that the employee becomes disheartened enough to give up.
The majority's language betrays a failure to focus on the
role of a jury in this case. The majority observes that Kohl's
negotiating tactics did not "necessarily amount to bad faith"
(emphasis added), so long as it was "earnest." I agree. Therefore
the EEOC does not win on summary judgment. Why Kohl's wins,
though, is not explained. To be blunt, what exactly did Kohl's say
that could not be viewed as an empty gesture, or worse? Kohl's had
two chances to offer no swing shifts, it never offered anything,
and the party who did make an offer and supply requested
information (Manning) loses as a matter of law?
It would therefore appear that the majority reserves a
heightened judicial scrutiny for breakdowns in the interactive
process only when the employee may have erred. In Jacques v.
Clean-Up Group, Inc., 96 F.3d 506 (1st Cir. 1996), the employer
entirely failed to engage in any interactive process, apparently
unaware of its obligation to do so, and claimed to have interpreted
the employee's request for an accommodation as an "implicit
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refusal" to accept a work assignment. Id. at 515. Our court
acknowledged that it was "painfully aware that the [employer's]
failure to engage in an informal interactive process with [the
employee] regarding accommodation options beyond those which he
requested results from its failure to be properly informed of its
obligations under the ADA." Id. We nonetheless sustained a jury
verdict for the employer, noting that "cases involving reasonable
accommodation turn heavily upon their facts and an appraisal of the
reasonableness of the parties' behavior." Id. Somehow, then, a
reasonable jury could find that the oblivious employer in Jacques
did not forfeit its rights, but, according to the majority in this
case, no reasonable jury could find that Manning preserved hers.
And this is apparently so even though Kohl's, like the employee in
Jacques, "was just as well situated, if not better so, to
investigate and suggest other alternatives." Id. at 514.
Certainly no precedent compels the hard-edged view
adopted by the majority as a pronouncement with which no jury could
reasonably disagree. In exonerating the employer in Tobin, our
court stated that "[t]his is not an instance where the employer
. . . simply rejected any request for accommodation without further
discussion." Tobin, 433 F.3d at 109. Unlike the "great deal of
discussion" and "significant action on the part of company
officials" in Tobin, id., a jury could find in this case that
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Kohl's discussed only in form, not substance, and did not act at
all.
Instead, Kohl's approach is closer to that of the
employer in Colwell v. Rite Aid, 602 F.3d 495 (3d Cir. 2010).
There, the employer's manager rejected the requests of a partially
blind employee, who could not drive at night, to be scheduled for
daytime shifts only. Id. at 498-99. The Third Circuit concluded
that the manager's subsequent agreement to a meeting with an
employee, without more, would not compel a jury to find that the
employer was willing to negotiate in good faith after the manager
"had flatly refused all of [the employee's] overtures," and the
employer "d[id] not assert that [the manager] was willing to offer
any accommodations," even though the employee quit before the
meeting. Id. at 507-08; see also Sears, Roebuck & Co, 417 F.3d at
806 ("The last act in the interactive process is not always the
cause of a breakdown . . . and courts must examine the process as
a whole . . . .").
The majority quotes Enica and Phelps for the proposition
that "the process requires open communication by both parties, and
an employer will not be held liable if it makes 'reasonable efforts
both to communicate with the employee and provide accommodations
based on the information it possessed.'" Enica, 544 F.3d at 339
(quoting Phelps v. Optima Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir.
2001)). A jury could certainly find that Kohl's did not make
-27-
reasonable efforts to provide accommodations based on the
information it possessed. Indeed, it did not even make a
reasonable effort to provide the accommodation it knew it could
provide. By contrast, in Phelps the employer actually offered
several potential alternative accommodations, and the employee
conceded that she refused to participate in the interactive
process. Phelps, 251 F.3d at 27-28. Likewise, in Enica the
employer did offer and agree to several accommodations during
months of back-and-forth with the employee. Enica, 544 F.3d at
340-42. Kohl's, however, offered nothing.
III. The Constructive Discharge
Because a reasonable jury could find that Manning
reasonably believed that no accommodation was forthcoming or
possible, and that further work without an accommodation posed a
serious health risk, a jury that found Kohl's could have reasonably
accommodated Manning's needs could also conclude that Kohl's
constructively discharged Manning by not doing so. The lack of an
accommodation made Manning's working conditions "so difficult or
unpleasant that a reasonable person in [her] shoes would have felt
compelled to resign," resulting in constructive discharge. De La
Vega v. San Juan Star, Inc., 377 F.3d 111, 117 (1st Cir. 2004)
(quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). Manning's
doctor's note is clear that the erratic work schedule "induce[d]
additional stress and more sugar fluctuation" and that Manning's
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"diabetes control ha[d] recently deteriorated and exhibit[ed] a
clear stress pattern." That deterioration raised the prospect of
ketoacidosis or a coma. Kohl's unwillingness to give Manning a
predictable schedule subjected Manning to working conditions that
threatened her health. Surely a jury could find such a threat
sufficiently daunting as to compel Manning to defend herself by
refusing to work without the required protection.
Although there may be cases in which an employer fails to
accommodate but does not constructively discharge an employee, as
when working without an accommodation does not jeopardize the
employee's health, here Manning's work schedule put her in harm's
way. The "choice" between working a schedule that exacerbates a
serious medical condition and resigning is not really a choice at
all, and certainly not one that employees should have to make. See
Torrech-Hernández v. Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir.
2008) ("[I]n order for a resignation to constitute a constructive
discharge, it effectively must be void of choice or free will.").
IV. Conclusion
As best as I can tell, this is the first time that any
circuit court has held that an employer can reject an accommodation
request backed up by a doctor's note, refuse to offer an
accommodation that it has determined it can make, falsely claim
that any accommodation must be offered to all workers whether
disabled or not, and then declare the employee's ADA rights
-29-
forfeited when she gives up. Such a holding demands too much
resilience and persistence on the part of a disabled and stressed-
out employee, and takes away from jurors a task they are well-
suited to perform. I respectfully dissent.
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