Colon-Lorenzana v. South American Restaurants , 799 F.3d 31 ( 2015 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1698
NORBERTO-COLÓN LORENZANA; GLADYS GOZA-GONZÁLEZ;
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP COLÓN-GOZA,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SOUTH AMERICAN RESTAURANTS CORP.,
Defendant-Appellee,
AFC ENTERPRISES INC.; CAJUN OPERATING COMPANY; CAJUN FUNDING
CORP.; COMPANY A OF UNKNOWN; JOHN DOE,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Marcos E. López, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Lynch and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
José R. Santiago-Pereles and Santiago-Pereles, Rinaldi &
Collazo, P.S.C. on brief for appellants.
Ricardo F. Casellas, Diana Pérez Seda, Casellas Alcover &
Burgos, P.S.C., Dora M. Peñagarícano, and McConnell Valdés LLC on
brief for appellees.
August 21, 2015
HOWARD, Chief Judge. Crying foul over the trademarking
and continued sale of a chicken sandwich, plaintiffs-appellants
Norberto Colón Lorenzana and Gladys Goza González filed suit in
the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.1
On appeal, Colón challenges the district court's order dismissing
the federal claims brought under the Lanham Act and Copyright Act,
and its declination of jurisdiction over the supplemental Puerto
Rico law claims. See Colón-Lorenzana v. S. Am. Rest. Corp., 2014
WL 1794459 (D.P.R. May 6, 2014). After careful review of the
record, we affirm on all fronts.
I.
We review the grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo, construing the
facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Lister
v. Bank of Am., 790 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 2015). Our factual
analysis is based upon the relevant allegations contained within
the amended complaint. Mass. Retirement Sys. v. CVS Caremark
Corp., 716 F.3d 229, 231 (1st Cir. 2013).
In 1987, Norberto Colón Lorenzana began working for
South American Restaurant Corporation ("SARCO"), a franchisee and
operator of Church's Chicken locations in Puerto Rico. As
1 The complaint is captioned "Norberto Colón Lorenzana,
Gladys Goza González, and their conjugal partnership." For the
sake of convenience, we will refer to both appellants generally as
"Colón".
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pertinent to this action, he suggested to his superiors the concept
for a new chicken sandwich that could be included on Church's menu.
Seizing upon Colón's idea, a series of taste tests were performed
that eventually culminated with Church's offering the item for
sale, beginning in December of 1991. Colón christened this
creation the "Pechu Sandwich."2
In 1999, wanting to protect its new item, the franchisor
of Church's Chicken applied for and received a certificate of
registration from the Puerto Rico Department of State trademarking
the name "Pechu Sandwich". The Puerto Rico registration, after a
series of transfers, was eventually conferred on defendant SARCO.
In October of 2005, and concurrent to the active Puerto Rico
registration, SARCO filed an application with the United States
Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"), and received a federal
trademark registration for the name "Pechusandwich"3 in September
of 2006.
2 The sandwich consists of a fried chicken breast patty,
lettuce, tomato, American cheese, and garlic mayonnaise on a bun.
3 The term "Pechusandwich" appears at only three places in
the amended complaint, including in Colón's allegation related to
the issuance of the federal trademark. All other references in
the amended complaint are to "Pechu Sandwich". The record below
is silent as to whether this is a typographical error or the form
in which the federal trademark issued. For the purpose of clarity
we use "Pechu Sandwich".
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Believing that SARCO misappropriated his intellectual
property, Colón now claims that he is entitled to a percentage of
the profits derived from the Pechu Sandwich's success. He brought
suit primarily alleging a violation of Section 38 of the Lanham
Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 1120, asserting that SARCO committed fraud
upon the USPTO in the procurement of the federal trademark for the
Pechu Sandwich.4
After both parties consented to the matter being heard
before a magistrate judge, SARCO promptly filed a motion to dismiss
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court, construing
the pleadings generously to Colón, also gleaned a claim for
violations of the Copyright Act5 and a second claim under the
Lanham Act of trademark infringement6 but nonetheless allowed the
motion in full. This timely appeal followed.
4 While neither party raises the issue, Colón's claim of
ownership may fail on the grounds that the Pechu Sandwich was
likely created within the scope of his employment. See J. Thomas
McCarthy McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 16:36
(4th ed.) ("If an employee designs a mark in the course of
employment and the employer uses it, it would seem clear that the
employer is the 'owner' of the mark.").
5 The district court noted that "[t]he amended complaint does
not specifically plead a claim under, or cite to the U.S. Copyright
Act." Colón more clearly asserts a Copyright Act claim in his
opposition to SARCO's motion to dismiss, and SARCO filed a reply
brief arguing that such a claim was waived. Nonetheless, the
district court concluded the claim was adequately pled to warrant
analysis under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
6 Colón does not seize upon the generosity of the district
court and fails to develop any argument in his appellate briefing
related to trademark infringement. Accordingly, any such claims
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II.
We first determine whether any violation of the
Copyright Act exists. For a claim alleging a violation of the
Copyright Act to proceed past infancy, the "complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). "If the factual allegations in the complaint are too
meager, vague, or conclusory to remove the possibility of relief
from the realm of mere conjecture, the complaint is open to
dismissal." S.E.C. v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 2010)
(en banc).
Colón claims that SARCO violated his intellectual
property rights for both the "recipe" of the Pechu Sandwich and
the name of the item itself. He asserts that the term Pechu
Sandwich is a creative work, of which he is the author.
In assessing whether a work is suitable for copyright
protection, we are mindful that "[t]he immediate effect of our
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative
labor [and] . . . the ultimate aim is . . . to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good." Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). Against this rubric,
are deemed waived. See, e.g., United States v. Oladosu, 744 F.3d
36, 39 (1st Cir. 2014).
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Congress has enumerated eight categories of works available for
copyright protection:
(1) literary works; (2) musical works,
including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic
works, including any accompanying music; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5)
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6)
motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural
works.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
Contrary to Colón's protests on appeal, the district
court properly determined that a chicken sandwich is not eligible
for copyright protection. This makes good sense; neither the
recipe nor the name Pechu Sandwich fits any of the eligible
categories and, therefore, protection under the Copyright Act is
unwarranted. A recipe -- or any instructions -- listing the
combination of chicken, lettuce, tomato, cheese, and mayonnaise on
a bun to create a sandwich is quite plainly not a copyrightable
work.7 See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (the mere listing of ingredients
is not subject to copyright protection); see also Publ'ns Int'l
Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that recipes are functional directions to achieve a
result and therefore not copyrightable). As for the "Pechu
Sandwich" moniker, we have previously held that "copyright
7 We note that the complaint contains no allegation that the
"recipe" for the Pechu Sandwich is in a form of expression beyond
that of a list.
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protection simply does not extend to 'words and short phrases,
such as names, titles, and slogans.'" CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean
Coast Props., Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1520 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting 37
C.F.R. § 202.1(a)). Colón has not articulated any reason for
deviating from that sound guidance here.
Thus, because neither the name "Pechu Sandwich" nor the
recipe are eligible for copyright protection, no violation of the
Copyright Act exists.
III.
We next pivot to the meat of Colón's allegations and
evaluate whether he has pled sufficient facts to state a claim for
fraud in the procurement of a federal trademark. The district
court determined that a claim under Section 38 of the Lanham Act
must sufficiently plead: (1) that the registrant (SARCO) made a
false representation to the USPTO regarding a material fact; (2)
that the petitioner knew or should have known the representation
was false; (3) that the petitioner intended to induce the USPTO to
act or refrain from acting based upon such representation; (4)
that the USPTO reasonably relied on the misrepresentation; and (5)
that some damage was proximately caused by the USPTO's reliance on
the false material fact. See J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on
Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 31:61 (6th ed. 2015). These
criteria have been adopted in some form by other circuits and
applied by district courts within our circuit. See, e.g., Patsy's
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Italian Rest., Inc. v. Banas, 658 F.3d 254, 270-71 (2d Cir. 2011);
Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 918 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1990);
San Juan Prods., Inc. v. San Juan Pools of Kansas, Inc., 849 F.2d
468, 473 (10th Cir. 1988); Bay State Sav. Bank v. Bay State Fin.
Servs., 484 F. Supp. 2d 205, 221 (D. Mass. 2007); Gen. Linen Serv.,
Inc. v. Gen. Linen Serv. Co., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 187, 191 (D.N.H.
2014); Clark Cap. Mgmt. v. Navigator Invs., LLC, 2014 WL 6977601
at *1 (D.R.I. 2014).
In analyzing the amended complaint, the district court
measured Colón's claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1120 against the
heightened standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). To the extent that
Colón presses any discernible argument against the application of
Rule 9(b), he only refers in passing to a district court case
stating that "Twombly does not require heightened fact pleading of
specifics." Torres v. Bella Vista Hosp., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 2d
123, 132-33 (D.P.R. 2007) (citing United States v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 559 (2007)).
We need not linger over the potential elements of a
Section 38 claim or the application of Rule 9(b) because the
complaint fails for a more fundamental reason. It simply fails to
sufficiently allege that any false statement exists. Colón merely
offers conjecture about SARCO's actions and intentions. He avers
that SARCO "intentionally, willfully, fraudulently and maliciously
procured the registration of Plaintiff's creation in the Patent
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and Trademark Office without his consent and . . . with the intent
to injure the Plaintiffs," but the complaint is silent as to any
facts to support such conclusions. Even applying the more lenient
provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, courts "do not unlock the doors
of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions." Iqbal 556 U.S. at 678-79. Instead, "[a] claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual contact that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Colón's complaint allows for no such
inference.
Thus, Colón has failed to sufficiently plead that SARCO
committed fraud in the procurement of a federal trademark for the
Pechu Sandwich.8
IV.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
8Because the district court properly dismissed the federal
claims, it was well within the district court's discretion to
relinquish the supplemental claims brought under Puerto Rico law.
See Ortiz-Rivera v. Astra Zeneca LP, 363 F. App'x 45, 48 (1st Cir.
2010); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
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