Day v. Nakamura ( 1995 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion








    Jun 30, 1995
    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT



    ____________________


    No. 95-1475

    ROY A. DAY,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    KENZO NAKAMURA, ET AL.,

    Defendants, Appellees.


    ____________________

    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

    ____________________

    Before

    Cyr, Boudin and Lynch,
    Circuit Judges. ______________

    ____________________

    Roy A. Davis, pro se, on motion for summary reversal. ____________
    Marshall D. Stein and Cherwin & Glickman on motion for summary __________________ ___________________
    affirmance and memorandum in support of motion for summary affirmance
    for appellees.


    ____________________


    ____________________


















































































    Per Curiam. Plaintiff-appellant, Roy A. Day, ___________

    appeals pro se from the district court's dismissal of his ___ __

    complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

    Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Appellees have moved for summary

    affirmance. Day has moved for summary reversal. We

    summarily affirm the dismissal of this complaint.

    I. Diversity Jurisdiction ______________________

    "Once challenged, . . . , the party seeking to

    invoke jurisdiction has the burden of alleging with

    sufficient particularity the facts indicating that it is not

    a legal certainty that the claim involves less than the

    jurisdictional amount. A party may meet this burden by

    amending the pleadings or by submitting affidavits."

    Department of Recreation & Sports v. World Boxing Ass'n, 942 _________________________________ __________________

    F.2d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 1991).

    Day has failed to meet his burden. He did not

    amend the pleadings or submit affidavits in response to

    appellees' motion to dismiss. Although the complaint seeks

    $180,000 in compensatory damages, the entire purchase price

    of the computer was only $2,385. Therefore, even if the

    inability to purchase additional memory rendered the computer

    completely useless (which Day admits it did not), the

    compensatory damages would not approach $50,000. The

    complaint does not allege lost profits or other consequential

    business losses.



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    Whether Massachusetts or Florida law controls (a

    matter about which the parties disagree), damages for mental

    pain and suffering and punitive damages are not recoverable

    on these facts. Therefore, Day has failed to plead facts

    indicating that it is not a legal certainty that his claims

    involve less than $50,000.

    II. Federal Question Jurisdiction _____________________________

    Defendant's motion to dismiss was pursuant to both

    Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The district court

    dismissed the complaint pursuant to 12(b)(1). Day argues on

    appeal that the adequacy of the jurisdictional amount is

    "moot" because the complaint arises under the Sherman and

    Clayton Acts and that, therefore, there is federal question

    jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331. We may affirm the

    district court's 12(b)(1) dismissal on any independently

    sufficient ground, including failure to state a claim. See ___

    Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 7 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993). _________ ____

    The basis of Day's claims under the Sherman and

    Clayton Acts is that defendants engaged in the following

    "monopolistic practices":

    deny[ing] . . . citizens additional
    ``random accessory memory' . . . for NEC
    computers at a reasonable and competitive
    purchase price, solely for the purpose to
    force, coerce and intimidate the citizens
    to purchase a ``new NEC computer' by using ________________
    correspondence which is replete with
    ``falsehoods, fraud, misrepresentations
    and half-truths,'. . . .



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    As the appellees point out in their Opposition to Appellant's

    Motion for Summary Reversal, the claim is illogical: "[W]ith

    such a range of alternative[] [lap top computers] available,

    appellant's dissatisfaction with the cost of enhancing the

    memory on his NEC machine would result in his purchasing a

    competitor's product, rather than being forced to buy another

    product from NEC."

    The complaint alleges that NEC sells additional

    memory for the 286V at unreasonable and noncompetitive

    prices. It also alleges, however, that NEC -- far from

    having a monopoly in the supply of additional RAM for the

    286V -- does not have the RAM for sale at all. The alleged

    "monopolistic practices" could not even conceivably have the

    effect of restraining competition or creating a monopoly.

    The complaint's vague and contradictory allegations fail to

    state a claim under the federal antitrust laws.

    Accordingly, the district court's dismissal of this

    complaint is affirmed. See Loc. R. 27.1. Appellees' request ________ ___

    for an injunction restricting Day's filings with the district

    court is denied. Appellees may file a motion with the ______

    district court seeking an injunction from future filings if

    the need arises.









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Document Info

Docket Number: 95-1475

Filed Date: 6/30/1995

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/21/2015