Charron v. County of York ( 2022 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 21-1753
JOHN A. CHARRON,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF YORK; WILLIAM L. KING, JR., individually and in his
official capacity as Sheriff of York County; RACHEL A. HORNING,
individually and in her official capacity as Deputy Sheriff of
York County; DARREN CYR, individually and in his official
capacity as Deputy Sheriff of York County; HEATH MAINS,
individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Sheriff of
York County; STEVEN THISTLEWOOD, individually and in his
official capacity as Deputy Sheriff of York County; WILFRED
VACHON, individually and in his official capacity as Deputy
Sheriff of York County,
Defendants, Appellees,
CHRISTOPHER MOSS; ERIC J. PILVELAIT,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge,
Selya and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Gregory O. McCullough, with whom Sanford Law Offices was on
brief, for appellant.
John J. Wall, III, with whom Monaghan Leahy, LLP was on brief,
for appellees.
September 27, 2022
KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff John Charron was
arrested in March 2016 after a confrontation among neighbors left
a Pontiac Sunfire abandoned in a snowbank. An occupant of the
Sunfire alleged that Charron had pushed the car into the snowbank
using his plow truck -- an allegation Charron denied. Deputies of
the York County Sheriff's Office arrested Charron and charged him
with several crimes. Charron worked to develop a body of
exculpatory physical evidence that pointed strongly towards his
innocence. The charges against him were eventually dropped, after
which Charron brought an array of federal and state-law claims
against the County of York and various County officials.1 The
district court granted summary judgment for the County defendants.
For the following reasons, we now affirm.
I.
On the night of March 8, 2016, an individual who
requested anonymity called 911 to report a disturbance at his
neighbor's house.2 He reported hearing "a lot of tires burning
out, spinning out, a lot of people screaming, yelling, swearing
1Charron also brought claims against Christopher Moss and
Eric Pilvelait, whose role in this case we will shortly explain.
The final judgment against Moss and Pilvelait is not before us on
appeal, and we do not discuss the claims against them further. As
used in this opinion, "defendants" does not include Moss and
Pilvelait.
2The night's events evidently spilled over into the early
morning hours of March 9.
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and stuff," "a lot of people yelling 'I'm gonna fucking kill you,'
and stuff like that." The caller said it sounded "like people
fighting pretty bad." Dispatch told officers that the caller had
reported "some sort of disturbance" involving "a lot of yelling,
cars burning out, [and] males yelling threats." Dispatch said
that the caller had reported the address as "the second house on
the right" on "Langley Shores Drive" in Acton, Maine.
Deputies Rachel Horning and Darren Cyr were both
dispatched to the area. On their way, they received notice that
a female caller on Buzzell Road wanted her son removed from the
house.3 Buzzell Road is less than half a mile from Langley Shores
(plural) Drive. They are connected by Langley Shore (singular)
Drive. Dispatch noted that the two calls involved locations
"fairly close to each other" and stated that they "may be related."
Horning recounted that when she arrived at the Buzzell
Road home, she found Christopher Moss ("Moss") and his parents
Walter and Denise.4 Moss claimed to have been at the house of his
3 That call apparently involved at least one hang-up, and
the Sheriff's Office was unable to reconnect.
4 At various points in this opinion, we draw upon the content
of Horning's arrest report narrative. In a footnote, Charron cites
a Federal Rule of Evidence concerning hearsay and asserts that
"the County Defendants cannot rely on any statements in Horning's
narrative because she is not a party opponent." Yet Charron never
analyzes the many other considerations involved in determining
whether a statement constitutes hearsay and, if so, whether it is
nevertheless admissible. Given his cursory treatment of the issue
and his own repeated reliance on the narrative's contents, see
F.R. Evid. 106, we deem his putative hearsay objection to Horning's
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friend, Eric Pilvelait, when Pilvelait's neighbor, Charron (who is
decades older than Moss and Pilvelait), came to the house in his
plow truck.5 According to Moss, Pilvelait and Charron had a long-
running feud. Moss said that when Charron got to Pilvelait's
driveway, he began "peeling his tires" and "yelling threats." Moss
claimed that he and Pilvelait got into Pilvelait's car, that
Charron lifted his plow and struck the car, that the plow scraped
over the hood of the car, and that both airbags deployed. Moss
claimed that Charron then pushed the car down to the end of the
street. Moss said that Charron yelled "[y]ou guys are fucking
dead," and that Moss feared for his life. Horning noted that she
"could see and smell that [Moss] had been drinking." At some
point, Horning photographed what she described as injuries Moss
claimed to have sustained in the crash.6
narrative and its contents waived for lack of development. See
United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
5 Pilvelait evidently lives on Buzzell Road. The narrative
in Horning's arrest report says that Pilvelait's house is on
Langley Shores Drive, though the report elsewhere lists
Pilvelait's address as being on Buzzell Road. Horning tried to
speak with Pilvelait at his house before proceeding to Charron's
home. No one answered the door. Neither party alleges on appeal
that Horning mistakenly visited the wrong house on the night of
March 8.
6 Charron speculates these photographs may have been taken
after the night in question and disputes whether they show any
injuries. The photographs appear to show blood on Moss's forehead.
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Moss's father Walter told Horning that Charron had
called him twice that night. The first time, Charron said that
Pilvelait and Moss "were laying rubber strips in his driveway and
that someone was going to get hurt." The second time, Charron
said that "he had his plow truck and he was going to take [Pilvelait
and Moss] into the ditch." Walter said that he went to go collect
his son and Pilvelait, but that when he arrived, Charron "had
already pushed them down the road."
Horning -- who was by this time with other officers --
examined Pilvelait's car (a Pontiac Sunfire) where it had crashed
into a snowbank, apparently near the intersection of Langley Shore
Drive and Langley Shores Drive.7 Horning believed the damage to
the Sunfire (along with car parts strewn in the road) was
consistent with Moss's story. She tried to interview Pilvelait at
his house, but no one answered the door.
Along with officers Heath Mains and Steven Thistlewood,
Horning and Cyr proceeded to Charron's house, where he was
arrested. Charron says that when the officers arrived, he
protested, "I didn't do anything. They rear-ended me. Why are
you arresting me? They came to my house and terrorized me."
Charron was taken to jail, where he declined to provide a statement
7 Charron's counsel would ultimately provide pictures of
Charron's truck next to another Sunfire of the same make and model.
But, as used in this opinion, "the Sunfire" refers to the car
driven by Pilvelait on the night of March 8.
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to Horning. Horning's arrest report indicated that Charron was
arrested for aggravated reckless conduct and criminal threatening.
Horning signed a Uniform Summons and Complaint charging
Charron with aggravated reckless conduct.8 He was released on a
$3,000 cash bail, subject to conditions of release that initially
included, among other things, (1) a prohibition against using or
possessing alcoholic beverages; (2) a prohibition against
possessing firearms; and (3) submission to searches "at any time
without articulable suspicion or probable cause." Sheriff William
King published details of the allegations against Charron,
including in a statement posted to Facebook.
The police photographed the Sunfire on the night of the
incident but did not take it into evidence. Instead, the car was
towed. Charron later located the Sunfire and his attorney
purchased it on May 10 "to preserve it as evidence."
On June 7, Charron was indicted on one count of
aggravated reckless conduct; two counts of aggravated assault; two
counts of criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon; and one
count of driving to endanger.
8Aggravated reckless conduct is the only charge that appears
on Charron's Uniform Summons and Complaint. His bail bond
paperwork lists both aggravated reckless conduct and criminal
trespass, but the parties on appeal do not suggest that Charron
was actually charged with criminal trespass. A police press
release stated that Horning had charged Charron with aggravated
reckless conduct and criminal threatening. We do not discuss
criminal trespass further.
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Charron later provided the prosecutor with a crash
analysis interpreting physical markings on the Sunfire to indicate
that the car had collided with the back of Charron's truck. That
scenario was consistent with Charron's claim that the Sunfire had
rear-ended him and inconsistent with Moss's claim that the
collision had occurred head-on. The report also concluded that
there was "no objective physical evidence on the [Sunfire] that
suggests that [Charron] was able to lift the plow on the front of
[his truck] and drop it onto the hood" of the Sunfire.
In July 2016, the prosecutor dismissed the case against
Charron because the prosecutor was "no longer certain about what
had occurred" on the night in question.
As to what actually transpired on March 8, defendants
now largely admit the key features of Charron's version of events:
The Sunfire's driver peeled the car's tires in Charron's driveway,
its occupants yelled threats, and the car sped away. Charron
unsuccessfully pursued the Sunfire in his truck. The Sunfire then
returned and rear-ended Charron. Charron got his truck free of
the Sunfire and returned home. He heard the Sunfire race to the
end of Langley Shore Drive and discerned that the car had become
stuck in the snow. He got back into his truck and drove to the
end of Langley Shore Drive to get a closer look. As he backed
away towards home, Moss exited the Sunfire and chased him. When
Charron reached home, Moss banged on his door, yelled for him to
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come out, and broke the passenger-side window of Charron's truck.
Walter Moss then arrived at Charron's house and left with his son.
Charron filed this suit against the County, its sheriff,
the four officers involved in his arrest, and a court officer who
was not present for the events of March 8, but who later relayed
information between police and the prosecutor assigned to
Charron's case.9 As relevant on appeal, Charron claimed violation
of his civil rights, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, and defamation per se. Central to Charron's case is
the notion that County officers knew or should have known that
Moss's version of events was false.
In a comprehensive order, the district court granted
summary judgment for the County defendants. See Charron v. Cnty.
of York, No. 18-cv-00105, 2020 WL 1868767 (D. Me. Apr. 14, 2020).
The court concluded that Charron had not shown any constitutional
violation and that, even if he had, qualified immunity would shield
the County officials from liability for false arrest, malicious
prosecution, and failure to preserve or disclose evidence. Id. at
*41–48. The court rejected Charron's claims of municipal and
supervisory liability. Id. at *48–49. The court further rejected
Charron's state-law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment,
malicious prosecution, and defamation per se. Id. at *49–52. And
9 As explained above, Charron also brought claims against
Moss and Pilvelait that are not before us on appeal.
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in any event, the court continued, Maine's discretionary-function
immunity would shield the County defendants from liability for the
conduct at issue. Id. at *52–53.
II.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment
de novo. Velazquez-Ortiz v. Vilsack, 657 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir.
2011). We will affirm "if the record, viewed in the light most
favorable to the [non-movant], reveals no genuine issue of material
fact and demonstrates that the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law." Id.A.
We begin with Charron's federal claim for false arrest,
his state-law claim for illegal arrest, and his claims for false
imprisonment. To survive summary judgment on the two arrest
claims, Charron must show that a jury could reasonably conclude
that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him. See, e.g.,
Karamanoglu v. Town of Yarmouth, 15 F.4th 82, 87 (1st Cir. 2021)
(explaining that the federal constitutional tort of false arrest
arises from arrests made without probable cause and without legal
process); Richards v. Town of Eliot, 780 A.2d 281, 292 (Me. 2001)
(officers entitled to summary judgment on state-law claim for
illegal arrest because a jury could not reasonably find that
officers lacked probable cause to arrest). And he affirmatively
agrees that, for purposes of this appeal, his false imprisonment
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claim rises and falls with the probable cause determination. The
parties do not argue that the probable-cause inquiry differs
between federal and Maine law, and we assume that Maine law tracks
the federal inquiry.10
"Probable cause exists when police officers, relying on
reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances, have information
upon which a reasonably prudent person would believe the suspect
had committed or was committing a crime." United States v. Jones,
432 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Young,
105 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997)). The probable-cause inquiry
"focuses on what the officer knew at the time of the arrest" and
evaluates "the totality of the circumstances." Id. The "inquiry
is not necessarily based upon the offense actually invoked by the
arresting officer but upon whether the facts known at the time of
the arrest objectively provided probable cause to arrest." Id."Probable cause 'is not a high bar.'" District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (quoting Kaley v.
United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014)). "[U]ncorroborated
10 The parties quibble over who should be considered the
arresting officer. Contrary to Charron's assertions, we think
this dispute immaterial to the summary judgment analysis.
Likewise, Charron's insistence that "[n]one of the deputies made
a determination of probable cause" is irrelevant to the probable-
cause analysis -- "an objective inquiry" in which "[t]he 'actual
motive or thought process of the officer is not plumbed.'" Holder
v. Town of Sandown, 585 F.3d 500, 504 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting
Bolton v. Taylor, 367 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 2004)).
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testimony of a victim or other percipient witness, standing alone,
ordinarily can support a finding of probable cause." Karamanoglu,
15 F.4th at 87–88 (alteration in original) (quoting Acosta v. Ames
Dep't Stores, Inc., 386 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 2004)). To be sure,
"courts will not ignore 'facts tending to dissipate probable
cause.'" Id. at 88 (quoting Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560
F.3d 1012, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2009)). But even "where a witness
account is disputed, police officers do not have an 'unflagging
duty' to complete a full investigation before making a probable
cause determination." Id. (quoting Acosta, 386 F.3d at 11).
In debating whether the facts known to the officers
objectively establish probable cause of an offense justifying an
arrest, the parties focus their attention on the offense of
aggravated reckless conduct. So shall we.
Maine law provides that "[a] person is guilty of
aggravated reckless conduct if the person with terroristic intent
engages in conduct that in fact creates a substantial risk of
serious bodily injury to another person." Me. Stat. tit. 17-A,
§ 213. Terroristic intent means the intent to "[c]ause serious
bodily injury or death to multiple persons" "for the purpose of
intimidating or coercing a civilian population or to affect the
conduct of government." Id. § 2(25) (2013).11 And serious bodily
11 Terroristic intent can also mean the intent to "[c]ause
substantial damage to multiple structures" or "to critical
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injury is defined as "a bodily injury which creates a substantial
risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or
loss or substantial impairment of the function of any bodily member
or organ, or extended convalescence necessary for recovery of
physical health." Id. § 2(23). Charron does not dispute that
ramming the Sunfire with a plow truck and pushing it and its
multiple occupants down the road would satisfy the elements of
aggravated reckless conduct, so any argument to the contrary is
waived, and we may assume for the purposes of this case that such
conduct would suffice. Our inquiry therefore turns on whether the
officers had probable cause to believe that Charron engaged in
that conduct.
As we have explained, Walter Moss told Horning that
Charron called him and said "that someone was going to get hurt"
and that "he was going to take [Moss and Pilvelait] into the
ditch." Christopher Moss told Horning that Charron had made good
on these threats by striking the Sunfire with his plow truck with
enough force to cause the airbags to deploy and pushing the car
down the road. Horning then observed the Sunfire in a snowbank.
Its airbags were deployed and it had suffered "excessive damage,"
including "scrape marks coming from the windshield all the way
infrastructure" "for the purpose of coercing a civilian population
or to affect the conduct of government." Me. Stat. tit. 17-A,
§ 2(25).
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down." She also saw car parts in the street as she approached the
Sunfire. She then found a plow truck in Charron's driveway. She
later testified that she "looked at" the plow on Charron's truck
that night, but did not check to see how high the plow could be
raised.
Charron insists that Moss's story was facially
implausible (and actually impossible) for a number of reasons,
including the location and position of the Sunfire when the pushing
purportedly began; the length and shape of the road down which he
allegedly pushed the Sunfire; the location of car parts in the
street; the fact that officers found the Sunfire front-first in
the snowbank; and the appearance of tire treads leading into the
snow. He argues that the gouge marks on the Sunfire's hood did
not correspond to any protrusions on his snow plow (but did
correspond to protrusions under his rear bumper), and that "[a]ll
that was needed to confirm" Charron's version of events "beyond
any doubt . . . was a tape measure and letting Charron show the
height of his plow blade at maximum height." He says that Moss
was unreliable because, among other things, officers should have
suspected Moss of criminal activity based on his father's story
and his mother's contact with 911. And he contends that officers
should have credited Charron's claim that the younger men had
harassed and rear-ended him.
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In making these arguments, Charron misapprehends the
probable cause standard. Probable cause requires only a "fair
probability." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). "It
does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that
a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and
credibility determinations are seldom crucial in deciding whether
the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt." Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975). The officers were not accident
reconstructionists analyzing precise measurements from a critical
distance. They were initially dispatched in response to reports
of men yelling threats and peeling tires. Walter Moss's story
indicated that Christopher Moss and Pilvelait had at some point
driven down to Charron's driveway, while Christopher Moss
recounted Charron yelling threats near Pilvelait's driveway.
These events are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, any arguable
inconsistency in these stories does not defeat probable cause.
Cf. Karamanoglu, 15 F.4th at 88 ("[P]robable cause to believe one
person committed a crime by definition does not foreclose the
possibility that probable cause would also exist to believe another
person committed the same or a parallel crime.").12 Whoever had
12 Similarly, to the extent Charron claims that he told
officers on the night of his arrest that Moss had smashed his truck
window, that fact would not preclude an inference that Charron had
first rammed the Sunfire as alleged. As for the glass on Charron's
rear bumper, he develops no argument on appeal that the officers
observed the glass on the night of his arrest.
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been the initial aggressor, this was clearly a volatile situation
that had escalated into a dangerous one. Walter Moss reported
that Charron had threatened "to take [Moss and Pilvelait] into the
ditch," and, lo and behold, Pilvelait's car was found in a
snowbank. Nor do we find it unreasonable to believe that a truck
with its plow crashed onto the hood of a car could push the car
down a winding road and then brake to let it spin into a snowbank.
Given Charron's threat and the physical evidence consistent with
that threat (at least at a high level of generality), there was
ample reason to believe that Charron struck the Sunfire with his
plow truck and pushed it down the road, where it ultimately landed
in the snowbank.13 Although Charron protested that he had been the
victim, "[a] reasonable police officer is not required to credit
a suspect's story." Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 32 n.2 (1st Cir.
2004). And "the availability of alternative inferences does not
prevent a finding of probable cause so long as the inference upon
which the officer relies is reasonable." Id. at 32. That the
officers' initial view of events turned out to be unsubstantiated
13 Charron protests that officers should not have relied on
Walter Moss's statement that by the time he arrived to collect his
son, Charron "had already pushed them down the road" because Walter
had not witnessed the alleged vehicular confrontation. But
Walter's statement to that effect is unnecessary to establish
probable cause. Likewise, we need not rely on the written witness
statements of Moss or Pilvelait, which Charron suggested below
were collected after his arrest. Finally, our conclusion does not
require crediting Horning's assertion that Charron appeared
intoxicated.
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does not negate probable cause to arrest. "[O]n the record before
us the officers' mistake was understandable and the arrest a
reasonable response to the situation facing them at the time."
Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971).
What's more, we "have rejected the proposition that a
police officer has a standing obligation to investigate potential
defenses or resolve conflicting accounts prior to making an
arrest." Holder v. Town of Sandown, 585 F.3d 500, 505 (1st Cir.
2009). Instead, "an officer normally may terminate her
investigation when she accumulates facts that demonstrate
sufficient probable cause." Acosta, 386 F.3d at 11. So Charron's
arguments that the officers should have taken up a tape measure or
got him to raise his plow to its maximum height are unavailing.
On this record, no reasonable jury could find facts that
would lead to a determination that the officers lacked probable
cause to arrest Charron. This conclusion dooms Charron's arrest-
specific claims. Likewise, Charron develops no argument that his
false imprisonment claims can survive a finding that probable cause
existed to arrest him.
B.
We turn next to Charron's federal and state malicious
prosecution claims. These causes of action are similar, though
not identical. To make out a federal Fourth Amendment malicious
prosecution claim, Charron must show that "the defendant
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(1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process
unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings
terminated in plaintiff's favor." Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723
F.3d 91, 101 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d
636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012)).14 Under Maine law, malicious prosecution
requires showing "(1) [t]he defendant initiated, procured or
continued a criminal action without probable cause; (2) [t]he
defendant acted with malice; and (3) [t]he plaintiff received a
favorable termination of the proceedings." Trask v. Devlin, 788
A.2d 179, 182 (Me. 2002). Both causes of action thus share a
common requirement -- the absence of probable cause, either to
justify the seizure (as required to make out a Fourth Amendment
claim) or to justify the criminal action (as required by Maine
law). We begin and end our analysis with this requirement.
As we have explained, there was probable cause at the
time of Charron's arrest. On the other hand, we think it clear
that the evidence marshalled by his attorney that led to the
dismissal of his prosecution clearly eliminated that probable
cause. Simply put, the facts confirmed and presented in the crash
analysis procured by Charron's attorney rendered unreasonable any
14 Because we ultimately find, as we will explain, that the
defendants did not cause charges to be initiated or maintained
against Charron without probable cause, we need not consider
whether a contrary such finding may have opened the door to a
procedural due process claim under federal law. See Thompson v.
Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1337 n.2 (2022).
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continued claim that Charron's truck rammed or pushed the car.
Rather, it appears very likely that the car hit the truck from
behind as Charron claimed. So we can narrow our inquiry to
determining whether any defendant caused or extended the
prosecution (or the seizure) after learning of the facts that
eliminated the probable cause.
We begin with the March 9 Uniform Summons and Complaint
signed by Horning. In so doing we assume without deciding that
such a complaint can constitute legal process for the purpose of
a malicious prosecution claim. We also assume without deciding
that the conditions to which Charron was subject while released on
bail constituted a seizure for the purpose of his Fourth Amendment
claim.
We have already determined that there was probable cause
to arrest Charron for aggravated reckless conduct on March 8. And
we see nothing in the record that would support a finding that
Horning had acquired new exculpatory information by March 9.
Charron did not provide a statement to officers detailing his
version of events once at the jail. Nor does Charron allege that
officers conducted an additional physical investigation before
Horning issued the initial complaint, such as by returning to
examine his truck or plow or measuring the distance between the
marks on the hood of the Sunfire. And to the extent that Charron
alleges inconsistencies between Moss's initial account of events
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and written witness statements from Moss and Pilvelait, he does
not argue on appeal that Horning collected the relevant statements
before signing the Uniform Summons and Complaint. In short,
Charron has not raised a triable question as to whether, by
March 9, any defendant had come into possession of facts that
defeated the probable cause that existed on March 8.
That brings us to the superseding complaint filed on
March 23 and the indictment secured on June 7. Both of these
charging actions were taken by Assistant District Attorney Kyle
Myska. Myska is not a defendant in this lawsuit, and Charron
develops no argument on appeal that the County is vicariously
liable for Myska's actions. As a result, Myska's own conduct in
filing the March 23 complaint and procuring the June 7 indictment
cannot form the basis of Charron's malicious prosecution claims.
That does not end our inquiry, though, because Charron also alleges
that the officers withheld exculpatory information that would have
persuaded Myska not to pursue charges against Charron. We will
assume without deciding that the withholding of exculpatory
information so as to cause a prosecution to continue could, as a
matter of Maine law, create a viable claim of malicious
prosecution. Similarly, we will assume that such a withholding
that causes a seizure to continue could as a matter of Fourth
Amendment law create a viable claim.
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In pressing this argument that the defendants caused
Myska to do something that Myska would not have otherwise done,
Charron confronts a problem of causation. In chronicling the
information he claims the defendants withheld, Charron lists his
protestations of innocence, photos taken on the night of the
arrest, photos of the Sunfire a few days later, photos taken by
Deputy Shaw, and the car's whereabouts. But the record shows that
after Myska received all of this information he continued with
securing an indictment and pursuing the prosecution even after
discussions with Charron's counsel. Myska put the brakes on only
after Charron's counsel produced the expert's accident
reconstruction. And no one suggests that the defendants withheld
that report.
To the extent Charron suggests that Myska never received
Shaw's photographs, this contention is belied by the photos'
inclusion in a disclosure Charron's counsel said that he received
from Myska during discovery. To the extent Charron faults Horning
for failing to relay other information from Shaw, that claim also
fails. When Shaw emailed Horning the photos he'd taken of
Charron's truck, he said:
John requested I photograph his truck in the
day light, in an attempt to prove his point.
John's claim is the pair re[ar-]ended his
truck where it sits. He had the portland press
harold there telling his story . . . so here
ya go if you want them.
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Charron says that he never claimed his truck was rear-
ended in his driveway and notes that he was not present when Shaw
took the photographs. But even if the information in Shaw's email
(or otherwise relayed from Shaw to Horning) was helpful to Charron,
the record indicates that Myska was aware of Charron's theory
before procuring the indictment, and that the state simply took
the position that Charron was not truthful. Myska obtained the
indictment against Charron even after Charron's counsel argued to
him that the collision could not have occurred as the state claimed
and furnished photos and videos purporting to demonstrate as much.
Charron has not raised a triable issue as to whether the outcome
would have been different if Myska had possessed more information
from Deputy Shaw.
Charron also faults the police officers for failing to
secure the Sunfire and "allow[ing] or caus[ing] it to be concealed
from the prosecutor and defense counsel" and court officer Vachon
"for taking no real action to locate, secure, and produce the
Sunfire." But the record is clear that Charron's own lawyer had
the Sunfire weeks before Myska obtained the indictment.
Charron has thus failed to raise a triable issue as to
whether any of the named defendants caused the initiation or
continuation of his prosecution or seizure without probable cause.
Given this conclusion, we need not discuss any remaining elements
of Charron's federal or state-law malicious prosecution claims.
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C.
Charron also raises a federal due process claim, which
he styles as a claim for "the failure to preserve and the active
concealment of exculpatory evidence."15 He relies on out-of-
circuit precedent for the proposition that he can prevail by
showing that "(1) the defendant destroyed exculpatory evidence in
bad faith or engaged in other misconduct (2) that caused a
deprivation of the plaintiff's liberty." Armstrong v. Daily, 786
F.3d 529, 551 (7th Cir. 2015). We assume for the purposes of this
case that Charron has correctly articulated the law in arguing
that the defendants' actions caused Myska to do something that
Myska would not have otherwise done. But see Lewis v. City of
Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 2019) ("[T]he Fourth
Amendment, not the Due Process Clause, is the source of the right
in a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention, whether before
or after the initiation of formal legal process."). We also assume
Charron suffered a qualifying liberty deprivation. Even so, his
claim fails for essentially the reasons already discussed in
analyzing his malicious prosecution claims. Simply put, before
15We have said that "a procedural due process claim may not
be redressed under section 1983 where an adequate state remedy
exists." Reid v. New Hampshire, 56 F.3d 332, 341 (1st Cir. 1995).
We note that Charron's state-law malicious prosecution claim and
his federal due process claim seem to rest on substantially the
same underlying facts. But defendants do not argue on appeal that
Charron's procedural due process claim is foreclosed by the
presence of an adequate state-law remedy.
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obtaining the indictment Myska had all the material information
that the officers had.16
This ends our discussion of Charron's alleged
constitutional injuries. Because we conclude that none of
Charron's constitutional claims against the officers can survive
summary judgment, we need not discuss his claims of supervisory or
municipal liability. See Wilson v. Town of Mendon, 294 F.3d 1, 6–
7 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[If an] officer has inflicted no constitutional
harm, neither the municipality nor the supervisor can be held
liable." (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799
(1986) (per curiam))).
D.
Finally, Charron brings a state-law defamation claim
against Horning and Sheriff King. Under Maine law, defamation
requires: "(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning
another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the
publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement
16 To the extent that Charron takes issue with the fact that
Myska "did not receive the measurement photos and other bound items
conclusively linking the signature marks on the hood of the Sunfire
to the protrusions on the underside of the rear bumper of Charron's
plow truck until June 13, 2016, a week after Charron was indicted,"
those photos and accompanying items were procured and furnished by
Charron's counsel, not County officers. So it is not clear how
the timing of their provision to Myska could form the basis of a
due process violation by County officers.
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irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm
caused by the publication." Rice v. Alley, 791 A.2d 932, 936 (Me.
2002) (quoting Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65, 69 (Me. 1991)).17
"Words that falsely charge a punishable offense" are defamatory
per se, and do not require showing "special harm beyond the
publication itself." Rippett v. Bemis, 672 A.2d 82, 86 (Me. 1996)
(discussing slander). What's more, "true but incomplete
statements [can] fulfill the falsity requirement, thus forming the
basis for liability in a defamation action when those statements
falsely impute criminal conduct to the plaintiff." Schoff v. York
Cnty., 761 A.2d 869, 871 (Me. 2000).
On appeal, Charron focuses his defamation claim on a
"press release, which resulted from Horning's narrative and which
[King] asked her to fact-check."18 The information posted on the
Sheriff's Office's Facebook page reads as follows:
Last night (March 8, 2016) at approximately
11 PM, York County Sheriff's Deputeies [sic]
were summoned to the 200 block of Buzzell Road
in Acton for a report of a disturbance. The
caller reported that cars were peeling out
their tires, yelling, and they heard people
yelling.
17 Defendants on appeal develop no argument that Charron must
show more than negligence.
18 In his statement of the case, Charron says that his
defamation claim concerns "a press release and related
communications to the media and posted on the Sheriff's Facebook
page, which they have allowed to remain uncorrected on the
Internet." But his subsequent argument focuses on omissions from
"King's press release."
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At the same time, another call was received
that reported a domestic disturbance at a
residence on Lake Shores Road. Deputies soon
determined that the Buzzell Road and Lake
Shores Road calls were related.
Deputies learned that a neighborhood "feud"
had boiled over and John Charron, 53, of Acton
had confronted one of his neighbors with whom
he has had a feud. According to witnesses,
Charron drove his plow truck to the end of his
neighbor's driveway and was squealing his
tires and yelling threats to the neighbors.
The neighbor, who had a friend visiting, got
into the friend's vehicle that was parked in
the driveway. According to the victims,
Charron drove at them with his plow raised and
struck the victim's vehicle with the plow
blade going over the hood. The impact caused
both airbags to deploy. The victims suffered
bumps and bruising but did not require
hospitalization.
Deputy Rachel Horning and other deputies
apprehended John Charron and Horning charged
him with aggravated reckless conduct and
criminal threatening. Bail was set at $3000
cash.
Charron posted $3000 cash bail earlier this
afternoon. Charron is scheduled to appear in
Alfred Superior Court on April 8, 2016.
Another statement in the record is substantially identical with
the exception of the first paragraph's last sentence, which reads:
"The caller reported that cars were peeling out their tires,
yelling, and threat[en]ing other people." Because this small
difference does not affect our analysis, we treat the two
statements as one ("the press release").
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The district court rejected Charron's defamation claims.
The court explained that Charron's claim against King failed
because Charron "failed to demonstrate that Sheriff King in his
synoptic report to the public the day after the arrest knew or
should have known what the whole story was and decided to publish
only a 'partial truth.'" Charron, 2020 WL 1868767 at *52 (quoting
Schoff, 761 A.2d at 872). And the court held that Charron's claim
against Horning failed because he had not "establish[ed] that she
published anything." Id.In his briefing to us, Charron develops no argument
refuting the logic of the district court's ruling. Without such
argumentation, we decline to disturb the district court's
conclusions. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st
Cir. 1990).19
III.
We do not minimize the months-long ordeal visited upon
John Charron as the result of apparently false allegations. But
on this record, Charron has failed to raise a triable issue as to
whether the County defendants are legally liable for his
misfortune. Confronted with a violent interaction of some type,
a witness who said Charron threatened to push the car into a ditch,
19 Because we determine that none of Charron's claims can
survive summary judgment, we need not consider whether he would
have been entitled to punitive damages.
- 27 -
an occupant of the car who said that Charron made good on his
threat, and a car in a snowbank, the officers had probable cause
to end the altercation by arresting Charron. That they turned out
to be wrong simply illustrates the substantial difference between
probable cause and certainty.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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