United States v. Sepulveda ( 2022 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 20-2193
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
GEORGE SEPULVEDA,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge,
Selya and Gelpí, Circuit Judges.
William C. Dimitri for appellant.
Lauren S. Zurier, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Rodney Santi, Acting United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
May 13, 2022
GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. Appellant George Sepulveda
("Sepulveda") appeals the district court's denial of his motion
for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A),
as amended by the First Step Act ("FSA"). Sepulveda argues before
us, as he did below, that several factors — including his young
age at the time of the offenses of conviction, the length of the
sentence imposed, and sentencing disparities with his
co-defendants and others similarly situated, as well as his post-
conviction rehabilitation efforts — warrant a sentence reduction.
We affirm the district court's ruling.
I. Background
In 1997, following a forty-four day trial, a jury
convicted Sepulveda of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c),
conspiracy to commit racketeering, id. § 1962(d), murder in aid of
racketeering, id. § 1959(a), witness intimidation, id.
§ 1512(b)(3), and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, id.
§ 922(g)(1). United States v. Sepulveda, No. 95–75 (D.R.I. Oct.
2, 1997), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183 (1st
Cir. 1999). Sepulveda's convictions relate to crimes involving
the Almighty Latin Kings Nation ("Latin Kings"), one of the largest
street gangs operating in the United States. Latin Kings is a
hierarchical organization, in which Sepulveda, also known as "King
Paradise," served as the group's president or "Inca" of the
Providence, Rhode Island chapter. See Lara, 181 F.3d at 190-91.
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The district court imposed three concurrent life sentences for the
racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, and murder in aid
of racketeering charges, consecutive to the state sentence he was
serving at the time, as well as concurrent twenty- and ten-year
terms for the other federal offenses.
Sepulveda has repeatedly and unsuccessfully challenged
his convictions and sentence. We upheld the convictions and
sentence in Lara, 181 F.3d at 206, and affirmed the denial of
Sepulveda's habeas corpus petition. See, e.g., Sepulveda v.
United States, 330 F.3d 55, 58 (1st Cir. 2003).
Following the passage of the FSA, Sepulveda filed a pro
se motion for compassionate release. Therein, he argued that
"extraordinary and compelling" reasons warranted the reduction of
his sentence, to wit, his age at the time of his crimes, the length
of his sentence, the disparity of his sentence compared with those
of other convicted Latin Kings members, and his rehabilitation
efforts.
The district court denied Sepulveda's request, rejecting
each of his arguments and finding that the reasons proposed were
not "extraordinary and compelling." United States v. Sepulveda
(Sepulveda II), No. 95-75 (D.R.I. Oct. 8, 2020). The district
court considered also the applicable sentencing factors. It
concluded that Sepulveda remained a danger to the community and
that the factors weighed against granting compassionate release.
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As a result, the district court denied Sepulveda's motion for
compassionate release. The district court additionally denied his
requests for an evidentiary hearing and for reconsideration.1
Sepulveda timely appealed.
II. Discussion
Section 3582(c)(1)(A) authorizes a court to reduce a
term of imprisonment when extraordinary and compelling reasons so
warrant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Said provision
requires that "such a reduction is consistent with applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." Id.§ 3582(c)(1)(A). To grant compassionate release, "the district
court must consider any applicable [§] 3553(a) factors, and
'determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction . . . is
warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances
of the case.'" United States v. Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th 48, 52
(1st Cir. 2022) (third alteration in original) (internal citation
omitted) (quoting United States v. Saccoccia, 10 F.4th 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 2021)).
In 2018, Congress passed the FSA. See Pub. L. No.
115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). Pertinently, the FSA amended the
compassionate release statute to allow incarcerated individuals to
1 The district judge who presided over Sepulveda's trial and
sentencing, as well as ruled upon all post-conviction motions, is
the same judge who denied Sepulveda's compassionate release
motion.
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file their own motions seeking compassionate release if they first
apply to the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). See id. § 603(b),
132 Stat. at 5239; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2018).
We recently held that "district courts — when
adjudicating prisoner-initiated motions for compassionate
release — have discretion, unconstrained by any policy statement
currently in effect, to consider whether a prisoner's particular
reasons are sufficiently extraordinary and compelling to warrant
compassionate release." See United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th
14, 23 (1st Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d
271, 284 (4th Cir. 2020)).2 Nonetheless, we have emphasized that
the absence of an applicable policy statement "does not mean that
a district court's discretion when adjudicating a
prisoner-initiated motion for compassionate release is unbounded,"
nor does it "creat[e] a sort of Wild West in court, with every
district judge having an idiosyncratic release policy."
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). "After all,
the district court's discretion remains circumscribed by statutory
2As we noted in Ruvalcaba, "[s]uch motions are variously
referred to as sentence-reduction motions and
compassionate-release motions." 26 F.4th at 17 n.1 (quoting
Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 4 n.2). "We use those terms
interchangeably." Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 4 n.2. "In adopting
this approach, we in no way suggest that release from imprisonment
is the only form of relief contemplated under section
3582(c)(1)(A). After all, section 3582(c)(1)(A) refers to
sentence reductions generally." Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 17 n.1.
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standards, which obligate the district court to find a reason that
is both extraordinary and compelling." Id.
a. Standard of Review
The compassionate release statute provides that "a
district court's decision to grant or deny [such type of] motion
is discretionary." Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 4 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)). Thus, "we review a district court's denial of
a compassionate release motion for abuse of discretion." Id."This standard is not monolithic and, under it, we review embedded
questions of law de novo and embedded findings of fact for clear
error." Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 19.
b. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons Analysis
The district court found that Sepulveda's proffered
reasons related to his age, length of sentence, and sentencing
disparities, did not amount to an extraordinary and compelling
reason for compassionate release. On appeal, Sepulveda relies
heavily on two recent cases where district courts granted
compassionate release to street gang members based on their age at
the time of their offenses and other factors. But these cases do
not establish that the district court abused its discretion in
denying compassionate release. Like the courts in those cases,
the district court here considered the full slate of the
defendant's proffered reasons. The district court, however,
reasonably arrived at a different conclusion: that Sepulveda’s
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particular circumstances did not rise to the requisite level of
both extraordinary and compelling. We review the district court's
treatment of the defendant's reasons sequentially.
i. Age
Sepulveda argues that the district court "did not
seriously consider" his argument that imposing a life sentence is
especially harsh punishment for an adolescent who is still
developing and capable of change and that his age at the time of
offense thus warranted compassionate release. But contrary to
Sepulveda's assertions, the district court did consider
Sepulveda's age at the time of his offense and concluded it was
not an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. Addressing
Sepulveda's specific age-based arguments, the district court
apparently reasoned that his actions did not appear to be motivated
by, or resulted from, immaturity. It noted that Sepulveda was
twenty years old and, at that time, was the Inca of the Latin Kings
in Providence. See Sepulveda II, slip op. at 3 ("Defendant was
the leader, not a follower; he was the one giving the orders.").
These are factual findings that Sepulveda does not argue were
clearly erroneous. The district court’s conclusion, hence, was
not an abuse of discretion.
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ii. Length of Sentence and Sentencing
Disparities
Next, Sepulveda argues that his then-mandatory life
sentence is in and of itself an extraordinary and compelling reason
warranting compassionate release. He goes further and, quite
confidently, asserts that, had he been sentenced today, he would
not receive a life sentence. This too, is inaccurate and misguided
as under the current, discretionary sentencing regime, the
applicable sentencing guideline sentence as to him is life
imprisonment.
Crucially, the district court reasoned that the passage
of time did not render that lengthy sentence unreasonable
considering the scope and gravity of Sepulveda's offenses. To lay
this matter to rest, the district court expressly rejected
Sepulveda's contention that at present it would have imposed upon
him a lower sentence. Highlighting the seriousness of Sepulveda's
offenses, the district court reaffirmed the sentence imposed by
stating that "[w]hile this may seem harsh to him, given the nature
of his crimes . . . his sentence was and is appropriate."
Sepulveda II, slip op. at 3–4 (emphasis added); see also Sepulveda,
330 F.3d at 58 ("[T]he length of the petitioner's sentence was not
plucked out of thin air, but, rather, was determined by a federal
judge based upon discrete findings of fact established by a fair
preponderance of the evidence.").
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We see no basis for concluding that the district court's
determination that Sepulveda's sentence remained appropriate (made
by the same judge who originally sentenced him) was marked by any
legal or factual error. The district court also reasonably
rejected Sepulveda's claims that his sentence was disproportionate
compared to his own co-defendants based on material differences
that justified the diverging sentences. Cf. United States v.
Romero, 906 F.3d 196, 211-12 (1st Cir. 2018). Those reasonable
findings support the district court's determination that his
existing sentence length could not be an extraordinary and
compelling reason for compassionate release.
iii. Rehabilitation
Sepulveda further urged the district court to consider
the twenty-five years he has spent rehabilitating himself. On
appeal, Sepulveda argues that the district court abused its
discretion by disregarding the strides that the defendant made
over the years. The district court recognized that Sepulveda has
dedicated himself to his rehabilitation and that of others.
Sepulveda II, slip op. at 4-6. The district court also noted that
Sepulveda included as exhibits to his motion a number of
certificates for educational, vocational, and self-improvement
programs he has completed during his incarceration, as well as
letters of support from BOP staff and family members, among
others. Id. at 5. The district court, however, having rejected
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each of the defendant's other proffered reasons for compassionate
release, correctly determined that rehabilitation alone could not
be an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate
release. See Sepulveda II, slip op. at 6.
In sum, the district court acted well within its
discretion when it rejected Sepulveda's array of alleged
extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release.
Because we may affirm on the ground that Sepulveda failed to
establish an extraordinary and compelling reason, we need not
address his argument that the statutory sentencing factors weighed
in favor of a sentence reduction.
c. Denial of Request for a Hearing
Lastly, we address Sepulveda's claim that the district
court abused its discretion by not granting him a hearing, which
he weaves into his youthful status claim, arguing that without a
hearing he was impeded from further expanding his arguments. We
disagree.
It is well-settled that criminal defendants are "not
automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a pretrial or
posttrial motion." United States v. McAndrews, 12 F.3d 273, 279
(1st Cir. 1993). "Courts are busy places. Not surprisingly, then,
evidentiary hearings on motions are the exception, not the rule.
We have repeatedly stated that, even in the criminal context, a
defendant is not entitled as of right to an evidentiary hearing on
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a pretrial or posttrial motion." United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d
223, 225 (1st Cir. 1993). We review a denial of a request for an
evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. See McAndrews, 12
F.3d at 279-80. "Because the trial judge is steeped in the facts
and has a superior vantage point for assessing motions of this
sort, we will not overrule the refusal to convene an evidentiary
hearing absent a clear showing that the court's discretion has
been misused." Id.Sepulveda failed to carry this burden. Below, he does
not appear to have identified any basis for a hearing on the
motion, such as a disputed material issue of fact. On appeal, he
suggests that an evidentiary hearing was warranted to fully address
his claim that his offenses were motivated or a result of his age
at the time of the offense. But the defendant proffered case law
on this point along with testimony from another case regarding
updated information on the mental development of youths. Here,
the district court fairly believed the record developed enough to
fully address the defendant's arguments, including those regarding
his age. Such a determination was amply within its discretion
particularly because in this instance Sepulveda's age-related
arguments were tied to his motivations and reasons for his
offenses. Here, the district court had an existing reservoir of
knowledge of Sepulveda's offenses and history, dating back to his
trial and sentence. Cf. Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th at 57 ("When
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imposing a sentence, a judge necessarily acquires an intimate
knowledge of the offense of conviction and the history and
characteristics of the offender."). We thus affirm the district
court's decision to deny the request for a hearing and to decide
Sepulveda's motion on the papers.
III. Conclusion
We find no error in the district court's finding that no
extraordinary and compelling reasons exist so as to warrant a
reduction of Sepulveda's life sentence. Likewise, we find no error
in the district court's decision to deny Sepulveda's request for
an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the judgment of the district
court is
Affirmed.
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