United States v. Vazquez , 854 F.3d 126 ( 2017 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-1828
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
CARLOS VÁZQUEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lipez, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
Andrew S. McCutcheon, Research and Writing Specialist, Eric
Alexander Vos, Federal Public Defender, and Vivianne M. Marrero-
Torres, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Supervisor, Appeals
Section, on brief for appellant.
Juan Carlos Reyes-Ramos, Assistant United States Attorney,
Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and
Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief,
Appellate Division, on brief for appellee.
April 20, 2017
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Defendant Carlos Vázquez
appeals his sentence for possession of a firearm in furtherance of
a drug-trafficking offense and possession with intent to
distribute controlled substances. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On October 31, 2014, local and federal agents searched
the residence where Vázquez lived with his girlfriend and their
two-year-old child; they also searched four vehicles belonging to
him. The agents discovered cocaine, crack cocaine and marijuana,
drug paraphernalia, two loaded assault rifles, a loaded pistol,
and more than one hundred fifty rounds of ammunition. Some of the
ammunition and "a large quantity of crack cocaine" were lying in
plain view in the master bedroom, and marijuana, cocaine, and drug
paraphernalia were lying on the dining room table.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Vázquez pled guilty to
violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) ("Count 1") and 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii) ("Count 5"). The parties recommended
a sentence of sixty months' imprisonment for Count 1, the statutory
minimum. For Count 5, Vázquez recommended a sentence of thirty-
seven months, and the Government recommended sixty months. The
imprisonment terms were to run consecutively.
At sentencing, the district court calculated recommended
sentences of sixty months for Count 1 and thirty-three to forty-
one months for Count 5 under the United States Sentencing
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Guidelines (the "Guidelines"). The district court discussed
Vázquez's possession of three guns, including "two assault
weapons," "high-capacity" magazines, and various drugs and drug
paraphernalia "inside his house where a one-and-a-half-to-two-
year-old minor lived" and in his vehicles. It also "considered
Mr. Vázquez's upbringing" and the need for deterrence, "especially
here in Puerto Rico, where . . . there is just too much crime."
The district court recognized that murder rates had "gone down"
substantially, which it attributed to "people like Mr. Vázquez
[being] off the streets" and "the firearms initiative between the
Department of Justice of Puerto Rico and the United States
Attorney's Office."
Weighing the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), the district court determined that a sixty-month
sentence for Count 1 was "not an appropriate sentence" because
even "one pistol, one revolver," would get a sixty-month minimum
sentence, but Vázquez had "two assault weapons, a pistol, [and] a
tremendous amount of ammunition." Thus, "sixty months [did] not
reflect the seriousness of the offense," "protect the public" from
Vázquez, or promote deterrence.
The district court therefore sentenced Vázquez to
eighty-four months' imprisonment for Count 1. However, it
expressed "concern" about the Government's above-Guidelines
recommendation of sixty months' imprisonment for Count 5. It
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therefore sentenced Vázquez within the Guidelines, although it
considered "a sentence at the higher end" of the Guidelines range
"appropriate" given "the amount of drugs" and the presence of "a
toddler" and imposed a sentence of forty-one months for Count 5.
The sentences were to be served consecutively, for a total of 125
months of imprisonment.
Vázquez timely appealed his sentence.
ANALYSIS
Vázquez argues that the district court committed
procedural error by (1) rejecting Vázquez's upbringing as a
mitigating factor, (2) imposing an upward variance based primarily
on deterrence, rather than case-specific factors, and (3) failing
to address his disparity arguments. Vázquez also asserts that the
sentence was substantively unreasonable. We review sentencing
decisions for procedural and substantive reasonableness, employing
a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.1 See United States v.
Arroyo-Maldonado, 791 F.3d 193, 197 (1st Cir. 2015).
1 The Government contends that Vázquez forfeited his arguments
that the district court did not consider his upbringing, factors
other than deterrence, or his sentencing disparity precedent. He
did not. Vázquez addressed his upbringing, the need to consider
factors other than deterrence, and sentencing disparity in both
his sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing, and he
lodged a general objection after the district court's sentence.
The district court therefore had notice of Vázquez's arguments and
his disagreement with the sentence, and that satisfies the purpose
of the objection requirement. See United States v. Ortiz-
Rodríguez, 789 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding no forfeiture
where defendant "raised the same basic challenge to the
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A. Vázquez's Sentence Was Not Procedurally Unreasonable
Vázquez's arguments for why the district court committed
procedural error rest on a misreading of its rationale. First,
the district court did not "refuse[] to consider his upbringing";
it specifically stated that it did so, but it considered the
circumstances of Vázquez's crime -- particularly his possession of
multiple weapons and the presence of a child near large quantities
of drugs -- more important.
Similarly, the district court did not base its sentence
"primarily on deterrence" and crime in Puerto Rico. In fact, the
district court was primarily concerned with the individual aspects
of Vázquez's crime. Its discussion of crime in Puerto Rico was
just one of many factors it considered, and "the incidence of
particular crimes in the relevant community appropriately informs
and contextualizes the relevant need for deterrence."2 Ortiz-
Rodríguez, 789 F.3d at 19 (quoting United States v. Flores–
Machicote, 706 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2013)). In addition, we give
reasonableness of the sentence [in the district court] that [he
then made] on appeal"); United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 972
(1st Cir. 1995) (explaining that the raise-or-waive rule allows
district courts to correct errors and "prevents sandbagging").
2 If, as Vázquez suggests, the district court had relied primarily
on its unsupported finding that Puerto Rico's murder rate had
fallen significantly between 2011 and 2014 "based on the firearms
initiative" to justify its upward variance, he might have had a
stronger argument. The district court did not do that here,
however.
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"significant weight" to the district court's statement that it
considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. United
States v. Torres-Landrúa, 783 F.3d 58, 68 n.12 (1st Cir. 2015)
(quoting United States v. Santiago-Rivera, 744 F.3d 229, 233 (1st
Cir. 2014)).
Finally, the district court heard Vázquez's disparity
argument and the Government's counterargument at the sentencing
hearing, and it stated that it had "considered [Vázquez's]
sentencing memorandum," which made the disparity argument in
detail. The district court then explained various individualized
factors that supported its sentence. "[A] court's reasoning can
often be inferred by comparing what was argued by the parties . . .
with what the judge did." United States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468
F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Landrón-
Class, 696 F.3d 62, 78 (1st Cir. 2012). Here, we can infer that
the district court determined that the particular facts of this
case made it dissimilar to the cases cited by Vázquez. It did not
abuse its discretion in doing so.
B. Vázquez's Sentence Was Not Substantively Unreasonable
"[T]he linchpin of a reasonable sentence is a plausible
sentencing rationale and a defensible result." United States v.
Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2008). "Because we have already
found the district court's sentencing rationale to rest within the
range of acceptable discretion, 'we limit our review to the
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question of whether the sentence, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, resides within the expansive universe of reasonable
sentences.'" United States v. Pedroza-Orengo, 817 F.3d 829, 837
(1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. King, 741 F.3d 305, 308
(1st Cir. 2014)).
Vázquez's sentence for Count 5 was within the
Guidelines, his total sentence was only five months more than the
120 months requested by the Government pursuant to his plea
agreement (which would have triggered an appeal waiver), and there
are aggravating circumstances in this case. The sentence
therefore "resides within the expansive universe of reasonable
sentences." Pedroza-Orengo, 817 F.3d at 837 (quoting King, 741
F.3d at 308); see also United States v. Pantojas-Cruz, 800 F.3d
54, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2015).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm Vázquez's sentence.
Affirmed.
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