Salvati v. American Insurance Co. ( 2017 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 16-1403
    LUCIA SALVATI, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS THE ASSIGNEE OF ROBERT
    EASTON, AJAX INVESTMENT PARTNERS, LLC, LOVEJOY WHARF, LLC,
    BEVERLY WHARF, LLC, NORTH WASHINGTON WHARF, LLC, AND AB WHARF,
    LLC,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant, Appellee.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Barron, Stahl, and Lipez,
    Circuit Judges.
    Donald R. Grady, Jr., with whom Frank J. Federico, Jr., Susan
    E. Bochnak, and Sheff Law Offices, P.C. were on brief, for
    appellant.
    Gregory P. Varga, with whom Linda L. Morkan, Jonathan E.
    Small, and Robinson & Cole LLP were on brief, for appellee.
    April 26, 2017
    LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.           In this insurance dispute, we
    must decide whether the plaintiff in a wrongful death action, who
    reached    a       settlement   with    the    defendants      and   their    primary
    insurance carrier, can recover the amount exceeding the primary
    policy limits from the defendants' excess insurer.                     The district
    court concluded that the settlement agreement did not trigger the
    excess policy because the agreement was not accompanied by a court
    judgment. Hence, it granted the excess insurer's motion to dismiss
    the plaintiff's claims under the policy.                    While we disagree with
    the   district       court's    interpretation        of    the   pertinent    policy
    language, we affirm the dismissal because the plaintiff has not
    presented      a    plausible   argument       that   the    settlement     agreement
    triggered the excess insurer's duty to indemnify.
    I.
    A. The Accident
    On June 17, 2010, Gerardo Salvati died as a result of
    injuries    he      sustained   while    doing    maintenance        work    for   Ajax
    Management Partners, LLC at the Lovejoy Wharf building in Boston.
    On that day, Mr. Salvati was asked to examine the condition of the
    brick facade of the building.             While he was standing on a ladder
    inspecting the building, a sizable chunk of brickwork came loose
    and suddenly fell from the building, crashing into him and causing
    him to fall to his death.              According to the operative complaint
    - 2 -
    before the district court, the building had been in a state of
    disrepair for years, and the owners of the property were aware
    that the building's loose and decaying brickwork was in need of
    repair.
    In    September    2011,   Gerardo    Salvati's   wife,    Lucia
    (hereinafter referred to as "Salvati"), filed a lawsuit in Suffolk
    County Superior Court, seeking damages for wrongful death and loss
    of consortium individually and in her capacity as executrix of her
    husband's estate.       The defendants in that action (the "Underlying
    Defendants") were Robert Easton, Gerardo Salvati's supervisor at
    the time of his death and the person holding the ladder when the
    accident occurred, and a group of individuals and limited liability
    companies who owned the building where the accident occurred.1           The
    Underlying Defendants had two insurance policies: a primary policy
    through Western World Insurance Company ("Western World") in the
    amount of $1 million and an excess policy through the American
    Insurance Company ("AIC") in the amount of $9 million (the "Excess
    Policy").        The   Underlying   Defendants   informed   both   insurance
    companies of Salvati's claims.
    1 The other defendants were Ajax Investment Partners, LLC,
    Lovejoy Wharf, LLC, Beverly Wharf, LLC, North Washington Wharf,
    LLC, and AB Wharf, LLC.    Because Ajax Management had workers'
    compensation coverage, it was not a defendant in either the state
    court wrongful death action or the instant litigation.
    - 3 -
    In October 2012, AIC informed the Underlying Defendants
    that it would not defend them against, or indemnify them for
    damages   from,   Salvati's   suit.2         AIC's   disavowal   of   coverage
    effectively left the Underlying Defendants with only the primary
    policy    from   Western   World.      The    Underlying   Defendants    thus
    initially told Salvati that they were insured for only $1 million,
    although Salvati later learned of the Excess Policy.             The parties
    attempted mediation, during which Salvati requested damages in
    excess of the primary insurance coverage, but within the coverage
    amount of the Excess Policy.        Despite AIC's refusal to defend the
    Underlying Defendants, a representative and an attorney from AIC
    were present at the mediation sessions.              The parties failed to
    reach an accord during mediation.        In November 2014, Salvati sent
    a demand letter to AIC seeking payment under the Excess Policy,
    but AIC once again refused to provide coverage.
    B. The Settlement Agreement
    Salvati and the Underlying Defendants finally reached a
    $6 million settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement") in
    December 2014.     The Settlement Agreement has three key elements
    relevant to this appeal.      First, as the district court observed,
    2 AIC explained that it was denying coverage because, inter
    alia, the policy did not apply to liability stemming from an injury
    to an employee of the insured party during the course of his
    employment.
    - 4 -
    it "provided for the total payment of $6,000,000 to Salvati."
    Salvati v. Am. Ins. Co., No. 1:15-cv-13136-RWZ, slip op. at 2 (D.
    Mass. Mar. 15, 2016) (Memorandum of Decision and Order).         Second,
    in exchange for tendering the full $1 million of the Western World
    primary insurance policy, the Agreement released both Western
    World and the Underlying Defendants from any further liability.
    Third, the Agreement assigned all rights previously held by the
    Underlying Defendants against AIC to Salvati, allowing her to seek
    recovery of the remaining $5 million from the Excess Policy.
    However, the Agreement also stipulated that the settlement was not
    contingent on the ultimate availability of the excess coverage,
    and specified that the Underlying Defendants did not represent
    that excess coverage was necessarily available.          Moreover, the
    Underlying    Defendants   expressly   disclaimed   wrongdoing   in   the
    Agreement.
    Pursuant to Massachusetts law, which requires court
    approval of settlements of cases in which workers' compensation
    benefits have been paid, see 
    Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 152, § 15
    , the
    Superior Court approved the Settlement Agreement, and the case was
    dismissed with prejudice.
    C. The Present Case
    In April 2015 Salvati, acting as the assignee of the
    Underlying Defendants, filed a two-count complaint against AIC in
    - 5 -
    Suffolk County Superior Court.             In Count I, she alleged that AIC
    had breached its contract (i.e. the Excess Policy agreement) with
    the Underlying Defendants by refusing to indemnify them for the
    liability they had incurred through the Settlement Agreement.                  In
    Count II, she sought a declaratory judgment that she was entitled
    to collect the remainder of the settlement amount from AIC under
    the Excess Policy.
    AIC removed the case to federal court and filed a motion
    to dismiss, which the district court denied.               Meanwhile, Salvati
    filed   an   amended      complaint   in    which   she   added    claims   under
    Massachusetts       General   Laws    chapter    93A   (Count     III,   consumer
    protection) and chapter 176D (Count IV, unfair and deceptive acts
    in insurance), as well as two counts of professional negligence
    based on AIC's failure to settle her claims against the insureds
    (Counts V and VI).        AIC responded with a second motion to dismiss.
    The district court granted this motion, holding that the
    amended complaint failed to state a cognizable claim for breach of
    contract (Count I) and declaratory judgment (Count II).                  The court
    reasoned that AIC's duty to indemnify could only be triggered when
    the Underlying Defendants became legally obligated to pay Salvati.
    Here, however, the Underlying Defendants had not incurred such an
    obligation    "because      the   Underlying    Action    was   dismissed    with
    prejudice     and    no    judgment    entered      against     the   Underlying
    - 6 -
    Defendants, AIC's insured."     Moreover, the court noted that "AIC
    was not a party to the underlying settlement and thus never agreed
    or became contractually bound to pay the $5,000,000."        Salvati,
    No. 1:15-cv-13136-RWZ, slip op. at 5.
    The court also concluded that, because AIC's obligation
    to pay under the terms of the Excess Policy was a necessary
    condition to the Chapter 93A consumer protection claim (Count IV)
    and the professional negligence claims (Counts V and VI), it was
    appropriate to dismiss those claims.     Finally, the court dismissed
    Count III, which alleged a violation of Massachusetts General Laws
    chapter 176D for failure to settle an insurance claim in which
    liability has become reasonably clear, on the ground that Chapter
    176D "provides no private cause of action and is enforceable only
    by the commissioner of insurance."      
    Id. at 6
     (quoting Metro. Prop.
    & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bos. Reg'l Physical Therapy, Inc., 
    538 F. Supp. 2d 338
    , 343 (D. Mass. 2008)).    On appeal, Salvati argues that the
    district court erred in dismissing each of her claims.
    II.
    We review a district court's dismissal for failure to
    state a claim de novo. Coll. Hill Props., LLC v. City of Worcester,
    
    821 F.3d 193
    , 195 (1st Cir. 2016).         As this case comes to us
    through diversity jurisdiction, we look to state law to determine
    the substantive rules of decision.      See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
    - 7 -
    
    304 U.S. 64
    , 78 (1938).             It is undisputed that Massachusetts law
    applies     in     this    case.       The     insured    risk     was    located     in
    Massachusetts,          and    the     underlying        accident        occurred     in
    Massachusetts.          See Bushkin Assocs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 
    473 N.E.2d 662
    , 669 (Mass. 1985).
    A. Count One: Breach of Contract
    We begin with the breach of contract claim because the
    determination of AIC's contractual obligation will in turn affect
    our review of most of the remaining claims.                 We review de novo the
    district court's interpretation of the excess insurance contract.
    See Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Field, 
    670 F.3d 93
    , 97 (1st Cir.
    2012).
    The    scope     of    coverage    is    determined    by     the    policy
    language, Sanders v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 
    843 F.3d 37
    , 45 (1st Cir.
    2016),     and,    in     construing    the    policy,    we   "consider      what    an
    objectively       reasonable        insured,    reading     the    relevant       policy
    language, would expect to be covered," Hazen Paper Co. v. U.S.
    Fid.   &   Guar.     Co.,     
    555 N.E.2d 576
    ,   583   (Mass.       1990).      Any
    ambiguities in the policy's terms are resolved against the insurer.
    Vickodil v. Lexington Ins. Co., 
    587 N.E.2d 777
    , 778 (Mass. 1992).
    The insured, however, "generally bears the burden of proving that
    a particular claim falls within a policy's coverage."                       Allmerica
    - 8 -
    Fin. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 
    871 N.E.2d 418
    , 425 (Mass. 2007).
    1. The Scope of AIC's Excess Policy
    The language at the heart of this dispute appears in the
    primary indemnification provision of the Excess Policy, where AIC
    agrees to "pay on behalf of any Insured those sums in excess of
    the Primary Insurance that any Insured becomes legally obligated
    to pay as damages."3    Salvati argues that AIC's duty to indemnify
    the   Underlying   Defendants   was   triggered   when   the   Underlying
    Defendants signed the Settlement Agreement, which "effectuate[d]
    a full and complete settlement . . . in the amount of $6,000,000."
    By failing to indemnify the Underlying Defendants (or her, as their
    assignee), she thus claims, AIC breached its contract.
    AIC responds that its duty to indemnify was not triggered
    by the Settlement Agreement because only a judgment can "legally
    obligate[]" a party to pay "damages."      The district court agreed,
    holding that "there was never any legal determination of liability"
    because "no judgment entered against the Underlying Defendants,"
    and thus AIC has no duty to indemnify the Underlying Defendants
    (or Salvati) for the $5 million of the Settlement Agreement in
    excess of Western World's payment.
    3Such damages also must be covered by primary insurance and
    arise from an event occurring during the policy period.
    - 9 -
    Our own review of the indemnification language, in the
    context   of   the   policy   as    a   whole,   leads   us   to   a   different
    conclusion.     See Gen. Convention of New Jerusalem in U.S., Inc. v.
    MacKenzie, 
    874 N.E.2d 1084
    , 1087 (Mass. 2007) ("The words of a
    contract must be considered in the context of the entire contract
    rather than in isolation.").         As we shall explain, multiple policy
    provisions reveal that the requisite "legal obligat[ion]" to pay
    "damages" can arise from either a court judgment or a settlement
    agreement that is wholly contractual in nature.
    As a general matter -- and contrary to AIC's assertion
    -- the term "damages" does not itself signify the need for a court
    judgment.      Black's Law Dictionary defines "damages" as "[m]oney
    claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for
    loss or injury."     Damages, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
    This definition does not require that a court, or any other formal
    body, order the payment of such compensation.            Nor does the Excess
    Policy set forth a more limited meaning of "damages"; the term is
    not defined in the policy. Hence, we must look to other provisions
    of the policy to determine whether "damages" resulting from a
    settlement are within the scope of AIC's duty to indemnify.
    We find one clue in the Excess Policy's definition of
    the term "Suit" as "a civil proceeding in which damages insured by
    this policy are alleged."          This definition goes on to specify, in
    - 10 -
    pertinent part, that such civil proceedings include arbitrations
    and "[a]ny other alternative dispute resolution proceeding[s] in
    which such damages are claimed."    Obligations to pay arising out
    of an arbitration or alternative dispute resolution proceeding are
    not judgments, but rather contractual obligations.        It is "a
    general rule in the construction of a written instrument that the
    same word occurring more than once is to be given the same meaning
    unless a different meaning is demanded by the context."   Barilaro
    v. Consol. Rail Corp., 
    876 F.2d 260
    , 265 n.10 (1st Cir. 1989)
    (quoting Dana v. Wildey Sav. Bank, 
    2 N.E.2d 450
    , 453 (Mass. 1936)).
    The policy's recognition that "damages" may be claimed in non-
    judicial proceedings, therefore, contradicts AIC's position that
    the term "damages" in the indemnification provision covers only
    obligations to pay arising out of a judgment.
    Moreover, the way in which the word "settlement" is used
    in the Excess Policy reinforces the view that AIC's duty to
    indemnify may be triggered by a settlement, including one that is
    not memorialized in a judgment.    The policy provides that, if the
    limits of a primary insurance policy are reduced or exhausted "by
    payments of judgments or settlements arising out of Occurrences,
    our policy will apply in excess of such reduced or exhausted limit
    of insurance."    Similarly, AIC's duty to defend is triggered
    "[a]fter the applicable limits of insurance of Primary Insurance
    - 11 -
    and Other Insurance cease to apply because of exhaustion by the
    payment of judgments or settlements."       Through the use of the word
    "or," these provisions depict "judgments" and "settlements" as
    alternatives; "settlements" are not presented as simply a subset
    of "judgments."
    This understanding of the term "settlement" informs our
    interpretation of another provision of the Excess Policy, the
    condition that "settlement [by the insured] requires our prior
    written authorization."4         Such a requirement of prior approval
    makes sense only if settlements could trigger AIC's duty to
    indemnify.    In light of the provision discussed above that frames
    settlements and judgments as alternatives, settlements that are
    not memorialized in a judgment must be included within the scope
    of this requirement.
    Finally, the Excess Policy also requires the insured to
    "[c]ooperate with [AIC] in the investigation or settlement of any
    claim, or the defense of any insured against any Suit."             Again,
    the   presentation    of   two    alternatives   --   a   "claim"   and   a
    "Suit" -- is significant.         The policy appears to recognize that
    the "settlement of [a] claim" may occur before a civil proceeding
    4According to the policy, this condition applies only in
    jurisdictions where AIC cannot defend the insured against a suit.
    - 12 -
    (a "Suit") has commenced.5               Any such settlement would not be
    accompanied by the entry of a judgment.
    In sum, a close review of the terms of the Excess Policy
    indicates that AIC's obligation to indemnify may be triggered by
    the settlement of a claim that is not accompanied by a judgment.6
    Hence, a settlement agreement that imposes upon the insured a
    "legal[] obligat[ion] to pay" an amount in excess of the primary
    insurance may meet the terms of the indemnification provision.
    2. The Applicability of the Excess Policy to the Settlement
    Agreement
    AIC contends that, even if the Underlying Defendants
    could have become "legally obligated to pay . . . damages" through
    a settlement, the agreement at issue here did not trigger AIC's
    duty       to   indemnify   because   it    did   not    legally   obligate     the
    Underlying       Defendants   to   pay     anything     beyond   the   $1   million
    5
    A similar distinction is made in another provision of the
    policy, which gives AIC discretion to "a. [i]nvestigate any
    Occurrence, claim or Suit; or b. [s]ettle any claim or Suit."
    6
    We dismiss out of hand AIC's contention that our precedent
    dictates that the Excess Policy's language can be satisfied only
    by a judgment. AIC cites Great American Insurance Co. v. Riso,
    Inc. for the proposition that "the duty to indemnify is triggered
    only 'when a judgment within the policy coverage is rendered
    against [the] insured.'"     
    479 F.3d 158
    , 160 (1st Cir. 2007)
    (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bos. Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v.
    Commercial Union Ins. Co., 
    545 N.E.2d 1156
    , 1158 (Mass. 1989)).
    Neither Great American Insurance Co. nor the Massachusetts case it
    quotes addresses whether a settlement could satisfy the "legally
    obligated to pay as damages" language.
    - 13 -
    available through Western World's primary policy.          Although the
    Settlement Agreement purported to create a "settlement . . . in
    the amount of $6,000,0000," the only payment it required was a
    check from Western World for $1 million.       The remaining value was
    attributed to the assignment to Salvati "of all rights [the
    Underlying Defendants] may have . . . with regard to the Excess
    Liability Policy . . . issued by [AIC]."      Moreover, AIC points out
    that the Settlement Agreement released the Underlying Defendants
    from liability, and the parties agreed to dismissal of the suit,
    precluding liability on the part of the Underlying Defendants.
    Because the settlement did not obligate the Underlying Defendants
    to pay a "sum in excess of the Primary Insurance," AIC contends,
    the Agreement did not trigger AIC's indemnification liability.
    Therefore, AIC did not breach its contract with the Underlying
    Defendants by refusing to indemnify them.
    This   reading    reflects   the   plain   language     of   the
    Settlement Agreement.       Salvati does not respond to this argument
    in her briefs or, indeed, offer any theory to support a conclusion
    that the Settlement Agreement imposes on the Underlying Defendants
    a "legal[] obligat[ion] to pay" sufficient to trigger the Excess
    Policy's   indemnification     provision.     Instead,   Salvati    simply
    asserts that, because the primary policy was exhausted and $5
    million of the $6 million settlement amount remains unpaid, AIC
    - 14 -
    must pay that remaining amount. See Appellant's Brief ("App. Br.")
    at   26   ("AIC   should   then    have     tendered   the   excess     amount    of
    $5,000,000.00 to the insured, who would have paid that amount to
    the Plaintiff.").
    Similarly,     without     explaining      how    they      support    a
    "legal[]    obligat[ion],"        Salvati    also   sets     out    a   series    of
    principles and facts concerning the obligations of excess insurers
    generally and of AIC in this case.             She acknowledges that "[t]he
    primary insurer must exhaust the full limits of its coverage before
    an excess insurer can be required to contribute to a compromise
    settlement or judgment."          App. Br. at 15; see 15 Couch on Ins.
    § 220:32 (3d ed. 2016) ("[I]t is only after the underlying primary
    policy has been exhausted does [sic] the excess or umbrella
    coverage kick in.").       And she correctly points out that "Western
    World exhausted its policy limits [through] the settlement."                  App.
    Br. at 26; see 15 Couch on Ins. § 220:32 ("[P]rimary coverage is
    'exhausted' when the primary insurers pay their policy limits in
    settlement or to satisfy a judgment against the insured.").
    She also argues that the scope of AIC's duty to indemnify
    must be determined by the basis for the settlement, that is,
    "'whether any portion of the settlement was made in compensation
    for' the [Underlying Defendants'] acts, and if so, whether the
    acts fell under [the excess] insurer's coverage."                  App. Br. at 16
    - 15 -
    (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
    229 F.3d 56
    , 66 (1st Cir. 2000)).         She asserts that "the entire
    settlement was made in compensation for the acts of the Underlying
    Defendants," and that those acts were covered by AIC's Excess
    Policy.   App. Br. at 18.   She further claims that "the Settlement
    Agreement was made in good faith and in reasonable anticipation of
    liability."   App. Br. at 20; see, e.g., Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v.
    Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 
    480 F.3d 1254
    , 1261 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting
    that an insurer is only bound by a settlement agreement "so long
    as the settlement is covered, reasonable, and made in good faith").
    But even if the Settlement Agreement meets all of these
    prerequisites,   this   compliance   does    not   demonstrate   how   the
    Settlement Agreement "legally obligated" the Underlying Defendants
    to pay her the $5 million she seeks to recover from AIC.         Nor does
    Salvati argue that, in light of other policy language, the text of
    the indemnification provision requires less than AIC suggests.
    She does not contend that AIC somehow waived the right to rely on
    that language, perhaps through its continued refusal to defend or
    indemnify the Underlying Defendants.7       And she does not assert that
    7 Other jurisdictions, for example, have found that by
    breaching its duty to defend the insured, an insurer waives the
    right to rely on similar policy language. See, e.g., Twin City
    Fire Ins. Co., 
    480 F.3d at 1261
    ; Jones v. S. Marine & Aviation
    Underwriters, Inc., 
    888 F.2d 358
    , 361 (5th Cir. 1989).
    - 16 -
    we should refuse to enforce the provision on policy grounds, or
    that Massachusetts law does not require the strict enforcement of
    such language.
    We do not mean to suggest that such arguments necessarily
    would have succeeded.         But Salvati's failure to explain how the
    Settlement Agreement triggered the Excess Policy's indemnification
    provision leaves us without a rationale for finding that AIC's
    refusal to indemnify constituted a breach of contract.                        We thus
    affirm, on this different ground, the district court's decision to
    dismiss Count I.
    We note, however, that this outcome was not inevitable.
    A   settlement        structured   differently          could     have       met   the
    requirements     of     the   Excess    Policy     by    creating        a   "legal[]
    obligat[ion]" on the part of the Underlying Defendants.                      In fact,
    it was possible to structure such a settlement while also achieving
    the parties' apparent goal of shielding the Underlying Defendants
    from direct exposure to liability.
    The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that
    in cases where an insurer such as AIC declined to settle a claim
    for an amount within its policy limits, a settlement agreement
    between the plaintiff and the insured that has been reduced to a
    judgment may create a legal obligation that would satisfy an
    insurance   policy's      requirements,     even    when    the    settlement      is
    - 17 -
    accompanied by a separate agreement releasing the insured from
    liability.       See Campione v. Wilson, 
    661 N.E.2d 658
    , 661-62 (Mass.
    1996); see also Gray v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 
    871 F.2d 1128
    ,
    1131-33 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (release of insured from liability after
    default judgment did not nullify the basis for assignment of
    insured's cause of action against insurer).                   In Campione, the
    parties entered into a settlement agreement and an agreement for
    judgment contemporaneously with an assignment of claims and a
    conditional       release    of    the    defendants   (contingent       on   their
    cooperation with the plaintiffs' future lawsuit).8                 661 N.E.2d at
    660.       Salvati could have pursued a similar arrangement here.9
    The difference between this approach and the Settlement
    Agreement may seem technical, but it is significant.                In Campione,
    the    judgment    entered    by    the    court   pursuant   to   the   parties'
    8
    Cognizant of the risk of collusion between the plaintiff
    and the insured present in such arrangements, the Campione court
    explained that "the risk of collusion in this case appears minimal
    in view of the seriousness of the accident, the existence of
    liability, and the probability that a fact finder will find that
    damages exceeded any existing insurance coverage." 661 N.E.2d at
    663.
    9
    Although this arrangement involves a judgment, we note that
    there is no inconsistency between our comments here and our holding
    in the previous section that a judgment is not required to satisfy
    the policy language. There could be a settlement agreement, unlike
    the agreement here, that by its terms meets the "legally obligated
    to pay" requirement of the excess policy language, even in the
    absence of a judgment. However, we take no position as to whether
    the logic of Campione would apply to a settlement without a
    judgment; Campione does not expressly resolve that issue.
    - 18 -
    agreement imposed upon the insured a legal obligation to pay the
    plaintiff. The court concluded that "the legal basis for the claim
    against the insurer" did not "disappear[] when the insured became
    insulated from liability due to a release or a covenant not to
    execute."    661 N.E.2d at 662.     One commentator has explained the
    rationale as follows:
    [i]f the plaintiff were to renege on its promise and
    attempt to collect the judgment from the insured rather
    than from the insurer, the insured would have a breach
    of contract claim against the plaintiff, but the
    plaintiff's promise [would] not [have] extinguish[ed]
    either the insured's responsibility for the plaintiff's
    damages or the underlying tort liability.
    Douglas R. Richmond, The Consent Judgment Quandary of Insurance
    Law, 
    48 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 537
    , 556 (2013).        But see
    13-67 Corbin on Contracts § 67.14 (2016) (explaining that, where
    a plaintiff breaches its promise and attempts to collect from the
    released party, courts will generally consider the release to be
    a discharge of liability).   In the case at hand, by contrast, the
    Underlying Defendants never incurred any "legal[] obligat[ion],"
    either through a contract or a judgment, to pay Salvati.          The
    indemnification provision was not, therefore, triggered, and AIC's
    refusal to indemnify the Underlying Defendants was not a breach of
    contract.
    We recognize that AIC's denial of coverage has left
    Salvati in a difficult position, and that our adherence to the
    - 19 -
    terms of the Excess Policy may seem unforgiving.         We cannot,
    however, rewrite the Settlement Agreement so that it triggers the
    Excess Policy.     Nor can we rewrite the language of the Excess
    Policy to cover the Settlement Agreement.     Consequently, we must
    affirm the district court's dismissal of Count I.
    B. Remaining Counts
    The district court dismissed four of Salvati's five
    remaining counts after concluding that AIC's obligation to pay
    under the Excess Policy was a necessary precondition of those
    counts.    As explained above, while we disagree with the district
    court's reasoning, we similarly find that Salvati has failed to
    demonstrate that AIC is obligated to pay her under the Excess
    Policy.    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
    Count II (declaratory judgment), Count IV (violation of Mass. Gen.
    Laws ch. 93A), and Counts V and VI (professional negligence).
    The district court dismissed Salvati's final claim,
    Count III, based on a different rationale, with which we agree.
    Massachusetts General Laws chapter 176D, which prohibits unfair
    and deceptive insurance practices, "provides no private cause of
    action and is enforceable only by the commissioner of insurance."
    Thorpe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 
    984 F.2d 541
    , 544 n.1 (1st Cir.
    1993).    When bringing a claim under Chapter 93A, which encompasses
    unfair and deceptive insurance practices, a plaintiff may argue
    - 20 -
    that an insurer acted in violation of Chapter 176D.   However, "to
    the extent that [the count] attempts to state an independent claim
    for recovery under [C]hapter 176D, it must fail."      M. DeMatteo
    Const. Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 
    182 F. Supp. 2d 146
    , 160 (D.
    Mass. 2001).    We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal
    of Count III.
    III.
    Because appellant has failed to show that the Settlement
    Agreement triggered AIC’s duty to indemnify, and because she may
    not bring a claim under Chapter 176D, none of her causes of action
    survive.   Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of
    AIC's motion to dismiss the complaint.
    So ordered.
    -Concurring Opinion Follows-
    - 21 -
    STAHL, Circuit Judge, concurring.               While I join this
    opinion, I write separately to express my concerns about its
    potential ramifications.         It goes without saying that the typical
    consumer    who     purchases    excess     insurance    expects     that    such
    insurance will protect him or her in the event of a catastrophic
    accident    where    liability    is     relatively   certain    and    where   a
    potential judgment will likely exceed the primary coverage.                 Here,
    the Underlying Defendants, recognizing the extent of Salvati's
    claim, reasonably believed that their primary and excess insurance
    policies would protect them.             Likewise, Salvati, having gained
    knowledge    of     the   Defendants'      primary    and   excess     coverage,
    knowledge in part gained through the excess carrier's presence
    during the settlement discussions, reasonably believed that the
    excess policy would cover the amount of the settlement that
    exceeded    the     primary     policy    limit.        Notwithstanding      that
    reasonable expectation, we now hold that the documents presented
    to us on appeal, interpreted with the aid of fragmentary guidance
    from Massachusetts courts, require us to find that this particular
    settlement agreement did not trigger an obligation to indemnify
    under the excess insurance policy.          While the opinion's parsing of
    the relevant contractual terms is admirable, the end result lays
    bare several troubling practical consequences that may ultimately
    decrease the incentives for plaintiffs, defendants, and insurers
    - 22 -
    to settle, which in turn may lead to more trials, higher costs,
    and less effective excess insurance coverage.10
    My concerns stem from a hypothetical.               Think about a
    case like this one, only where the settlement discussions occur
    after this opinion's release.          Given our strict interpretation of
    the   terms     of   the    Settlement    Agreement    and    the   Underlying
    Defendants' excess insurance policy, it seems somewhat unrealistic
    to expect future plaintiffs to settle their claims unless the
    defendants either assume liability or the primary carrier throws
    in its entire policy and the litigation continues towards a trial,
    which should obviously implicate the excess carrier.                Of course,
    it seems that this problem would not occur if the excess carrier
    was the same carrier as the primary carrier.                 However, this is
    likely not the case for many insureds.                See Scott M. Seaman &
    Charlene       Kittredge,    Excess      Liability    Insurance:     Law     and
    Litigation, 
    32 Tort & Ins. L.J. 653
    , 653-54 (1997) (observing that
    "the importance of excess insurance and the role of excess insurers
    as    active    participants    in     coverage   litigation     ha[s]     grown
    10See Campione v. Wilson, 
    661 N.E.2d 658
    , 663 (Mass. 1996)
    (noting the importance of "giv[ing] effect to" heavily-negotiated
    insurance settlements, especially where "the plaintiffs have
    voluntarily assumed the burden of proving any claims that [an
    underlying defendant] may have against [an excess insurer]," the
    underlying defendant's "liability for the accident is reasonably
    clear, the primary insurer has paid the full limits of its policy,
    and damages are substantial").
    - 23 -
    exponentially" due to a variety of factors, including the increased
    issuance   of    "excess    insurance    contracts   as    commercial     and
    professional     insureds    purchase   excess    coverage   as    part   of
    comprehensive risk management programs," the "increased exposures
    of the insureds" due to substantive legal changes, and the "high
    monetary stakes" accompanying coverage disputes).
    Likewise,   it    appears    equally   unrealistic     to   expect
    insured defendants to agree to assume liability with no assurance
    that their excess policy would cover the portion of liability that
    exceeds their primary coverage.          After all, defendants rely on
    their   excess   insurance    policies,    and    eschew   assumptions     of
    liability, because these policies "are risk-spreading devices.
    They exist primarily because the stakes of liability to an insured
    are greater than they are to the insurer, which can spread the
    loss across all of its customers."         Trs. of the Univ. of Pa. v.
    Lexington Ins. Co., 
    815 F.2d 890
    , 901 (3d Cir. 1987).              However,
    the risk that an excess insurer might, as has occurred here, refuse
    to cover means that an underlying defendant, facing the potential
    of millions of dollars in liability and having purchased insurance
    precisely to avoid the type of potential liability in question,
    will push for a result that is similar to what occurred here: a
    settlement that includes a release of liability or a covenant not
    - 24 -
    to execute, and an assignment of rights to sue on the excess policy
    to the plaintiff.11
    Simply put, I am concerned that parties will be less
    likely to agree to settlements in disputes where the primary
    coverage is clearly inadequate.        This outcome "run[s] counter to
    the well-accepted public policy favoring settlement of insurance
    disputes"   and   could   create    other   "perverse   incentives"   for
    insurers, such as "encouraging [them] to disclaim their duties to
    defend" and, subsequent to this, their duty to indemnify.             IMG
    Worldwide, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 
    572 F. App'x 402
    ,
    411-12 (6th Cir. 2014); see also 1 Barry R. Ostrager & Thomas R.
    Newman, Handbook on Ins. Coverage Disputes, § 6.03[b] (16th Ed.
    2013) (noting that "the insured, having purchased both primary and
    excess coverage, cannot be abandoned by its insurers" (citing
    Hocker v. N.H. Ins. Co., 
    922 F.2d 1476
     (10th Cir. 1991))).
    To that end, many courts impose a duty to defend on
    excess carriers when the potential scope of liability plainly
    11 These types of settlements are not only attractive cost-
    saving options for litigants, but frequently necessary ones in
    cases where, like this one, an insurance carrier abandons its
    insured or its insured's assignee. See, e.g., Foremost Cty. Mut.
    Ins. Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 
    897 F.2d 754
    , 759 (5th Cir. 1990)
    (noting that in situations where the insurer has refused to provide
    coverage and refused to participate in the defense of the insured,
    "the insured often can protect himself only with a covenant not to
    execute").
    - 25 -
    exceeds the limits of the primary policy.12       Likewise, other
    jurisdictions have held that an insurer waives its right to rely
    on language in an insurance contract that limits the scope of an
    insured's coverage when the insurer breaches its duty to defend.13
    12 See, e.g., Metlife Capital Corp. v. Westchester Fire Ins.
    Co., 
    224 F. Supp. 2d 374
    , 388 (D.P.R. 2002) ("[I]n circumstances
    where the claim against the insured equals an amount exceeding the
    primary policy limits, the excess insurer's duty to defend may
    also be triggered."); Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Reliance Ins. Co.,
    
    140 F. Supp. 2d 609
    , 618 (D.S.C. 2001) (holding that a prayer for
    relief that clearly implicated excess policy limits triggered an
    excess carrier's duty to defend); Phico Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. &
    Sur. Co. of Am., 
    93 F. Supp. 2d 982
    , 993-94 (S.D. Ind. 2000)
    (concluding that an excess insurer owed a duty to its insured once
    the excess insurer understood that the primary policy would be
    exhausted); Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 
    544 F. Supp. 669
    ,
    692 (W.D. Wis. 1982), aff'd, 
    718 F.2d 842
     (7th Cir. 1983) (stating
    that "if the claim against the insured exceeds the monetary limits
    set by the underlying insurer, the excess insurer's duty to defend
    is usually activated, even if the underlying insurer undertakes
    the defense as well"); cf. House of Clean, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire
    & Marine Ins. Co., 
    775 F. Supp. 2d 302
    , 306-07 (D. Mass. 2011)
    (finding that a primary insurer breached its duty to defend because
    it was on notice that the potential scope of liability would fall
    within the applicable policy but nonetheless failed to defend the
    insured).
    13See, e.g., Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.,
    
    480 F.3d 1254
    , 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that an insurance
    contract's "'legally obligated to pay' language does not block an
    otherwise valid coverage obligation when an insurer refuses to
    defend the insured and the injured party enters into a reasonable
    and good faith settlement that precludes proceeding against the
    insured" (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wheelwright Trucking
    Co., 
    851 So.2d 466
    , 490 (Ala. 2002))); Jones v. S. Marine &
    Aviation Underwriters, Inc., 
    888 F.2d 358
    , 361 (5th Cir. 1989)
    (noting that an insurer may waive the right to rely on the "legally
    obligated to pay" language contained in the applicable insurance
    policy once the insurer breaches its defense obligation to an
    insured).
    - 26 -
    Judge Lipez's fine opinion alludes to both of these
    doctrines, but I wish to make my own views more explicit.            Our
    holding today rightly emphasizes the importance placed on the plain
    language    of   insurance   contracts     and   settlement   agreements.
    However, we must not ignore the unique purpose of excess insurance
    coverage: "to protect the insured against the risk of costs
    exceeding the limits of primary coverage."         Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co.
    v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 
    136 F. Supp. 3d 211
    , 219 (D. Conn.
    2015) (emphasis added).      Because an excess carrier may otherwise
    shirk its responsibilities to its insureds if it is allowed to
    rely on the terms of a settlement agreement with impunity, courts
    should interpret the duty to defend broadly (at least when a
    plaintiff      and   underlying   defendant      reach   a    good-faith,
    collusion-free settlement that exhausts the primary carrier's
    coverage).14     See Metlife Capital Corp., 
    224 F. Supp. 2d at 388
    (stating that "[t]he duty to defend arises when the possibility
    14 Of course, the dangers of possible collusion between the
    insured, the primary insurance carrier, and the plaintiff means
    that courts must always take steps to ensure that settlements are
    reached in good faith. See Campione, 661 N.E.2d at 663 (stating
    that Massachusetts courts "do not ignore the risk that, when a
    prejudgment settlement is combined with a release and covenant not
    to execute in favor of the tortfeasor, collusion may exist between
    the injured party and the tortfeasor"). However, these concerns
    are mitigated in this case because AIC participated in the
    mediation sessions and presumably kept itself informed of the
    settlement discussions.
    - 27 -
    exists, from a liberal interpretation of the pleadings, that the
    insured is protected by the policy issued, regardless of the final
    outcome of the case").    Similarly, a rigorous application of the
    waiver    rule   encourages   excess     insurers   to   fulfill   their
    responsibilities under the duty to defend, thereby decreasing the
    occurrence of costly litigation.       See Solo Cup Co. v. Fed. Ins.
    Co., 
    619 F.2d 1178
    , 1185 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting that "one of the
    basic purposes of" the duty to defend is the "protection of the
    insured from the expenses of litigation").
    Unfortunately, Massachusetts case law currently offers
    few insights into these issues.15      Our analysis, to some extent,
    is also affected by Salvati not raising some arguments that may
    have led to a different outcome.       See ante, at 17 (noting, among
    other things, that Salvati "does not contend that AIC somehow
    15Nonetheless, Massachusetts courts have found that in cases
    of ambiguous language in insurance contracts, the excess carrier
    may be required to "drop down" and cover an insured party after a
    policyholder enters into a settlement and the full scope of primary
    coverage is unavailable (e.g., if the primary insurer is
    insolvent). See, e.g., Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. Allianz Ins.
    Co., 
    597 N.E.2d 439
    , 443 (Mass. 1992) (upholding validity of "drop
    down" coverage in excess insurance contracts but finding relevant
    insurance contract unambiguous); Gulezian v. Lincoln Ins. Co., 
    506 N.E.2d 123
    , 124 (Mass. 1987) (stating that an ambiguous insurance
    contract "should be read to drop down to provide indemnity coverage
    to the extent that [the primary insurer's] insolvent estate does
    not"). These cases hint at the willingness of Massachusetts courts
    to consider interpreting contractual language establishing an
    excess insurer's duty to defend in a broad manner, at least in
    some circumstances.
    - 28 -
    waived the right to rely on [the text of the indemnification
    provision], perhaps through its continued refusal to defend or
    indemnify    the   Underlying   Defendants").     Even    so,   one   would
    anticipate    that   when   a   Massachusetts   court    eventually   does
    encounter another plaintiff in Salvati's position who raises these
    arguments, it will consider the practical effects of its decision
    on plaintiffs, insureds, and insurers throughout the Commonwealth.
    - 29 -