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<pre> [NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT] <br> United States Court of Appeals <br> For the First Circuit <br> <br> <br> <br> <br> <br>No. 96-1996 <br> <br> UNITED STATES, <br> <br> Appellee, <br> <br> v. <br> <br> DANIEL J. ORTIZ-MEDINA, a/k/a FLATTOP, <br> <br> Defendant, Appellant. <br> <br> <br> <br> APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT <br> <br> FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO <br> <br> [Hon. Daniel R. Domnguez, U.S. District Judge] <br> <br> <br> <br> Before <br> <br> Selya, Boudin and Lynch, <br> Circuit Judges. <br> <br> <br> <br> <br> Marlene Aponte Cabrera on brief for appellant. <br> Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jose A. Quiles- <br>Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, Camille Velez-Rive, Assistant <br>United States Attorney, and Nelson Perez-Sosa, Assistant United <br>States Attorney, on brief for appellee. <br> <br> <br> <br> <br> <br>July 16, 1999 <br> <br> <br> <br> <br> <br> Per Curiam. Defendant-appellant Daniel Ortiz-Medina <br> appeals from his conviction and sentence on several grounds. <br> Based upon a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we <br> conclude for the following reasons that "no substantial <br> question is presented" by this appeal. See Loc. R. 27.1. <br> I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel <br> "The rule in this circuit is that a fact-specific <br> claim of ineffective assistance cannot be raised initially on <br> direct review of a criminal conviction but must originally be <br> presented to the district court." United States v. Hunnewell, <br> 891 F.2d 955, 956 (1st Cir. 1989). Although Ortiz presented his <br> ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his motion for new <br> trial under Fed.R.Crim.P. 33, the district court properly <br> construed the claims as appropriately brought pursuant to 28 <br> U.S.C 2255. See United States v. Lema, 909 F.2d 561, 566 (1st <br> Cir. 1990)(holding that a claim of ineffective assistance of <br> counsel is not newly discovered for the purposes of Rule 33 <br> when based on facts known to the defendant at the time of <br> trial). The district court also properly dismissed the claims <br> (without prejudice), because this appeal was pending at the <br> time and Ortiz failed to make a showing of extraordinary <br> circumstances. See United States v. Buckley, 847 F.2d 991, 993 <br> n.1 (1st Cir. 1988). Ortiz' ineffective assistance of counsel <br> claims are denied without prejudice to his presenting them to <br> the district court in a 2255 motion. <br> II. Rule 33 Motion <br> "The district court's denial of the motion for a new <br> trial is reviewable only for a manifest abuse of discretion." <br> United States v. Montilla-Rivera, 115 F.3d 1060, 1064 (1st Cir. <br> 1997). "A motion for new trial based on newly discovered <br> evidence will not be allowed unless the movant establishes that <br> the evidence was: i) unknown or unavailable at the time of <br> trial, (ii) despite due diligence, (iii) material, and (iv) <br> likely to result in an acquittal upon retrial." United States <br> v. Tibolt, 72 F.3d 965, 971 (1st Cir. 1995). Under the fourth <br> requirement, "the evidence must create an actual probability <br> that an acquittal would have resulted if the evidence had been <br> available." United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1216, 1220 (1st <br> Cir. 1993). <br> Ortiz' motion was based upon "new evidence of <br> untruthfulness" on the part of one of the government witnesses. <br> "Neither our decisions nor those of other circuits have been <br> sympathetic to new trial claims based solely on the discovery <br> of additional information useful for impeaching a government <br> witness." Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1220, n.5; see also United <br> States v. Formanczyk, 949 F.2d 526, 531 (1st Cir. 1991). As the <br> district court emphasized, the argument for granting a new <br> trial on the basis of such evidence is particularly weak here <br> because the witness in question admitted at Ortiz' trial to <br> having lied to federal authorities. Ortiz has failed to show <br> that the denial of the Rule 33 motion amounted to a "manifest <br> abuse of discretion." <br> III. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) <br> Because Ortiz failed to object at trial to the <br> evidence that he now argues was evidence of "other crimes, <br> wrongs or acts," this court reviews the admission of the <br> evidence for plain error only. See United States v. Carrillo- <br> Figueroa, 34 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 1994). "Under the plain <br> error standard of review, 'appellant bears the burden of <br> persuasion to establish that there was an error, that the error <br> was clear or obvious, and that the error affected substantial <br> rights.'" United States v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 1998) <br> (citation omitted), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 119 S.Ct. 1781 <br> (1999). <br> Ortiz specifically objects to questioning of the <br> government witnesses from which, Ortiz argues, the jury could <br> have inferred that Ortiz participated in murders. The <br> transcript of the trial, however, reveals that the government <br> and the court successfully kept the witnesses from referring to <br> the murders in their testimony. There is no suggestion from the <br> transcripts of an "error so obvious that it could rise to the <br> level of substantial and fundamental prejudice required by <br> plain error review." United States v. Graham, 146 F.3d 6, 11 <br> (1st Cir. 1998). <br> IV. Sentencing <br> Ortiz argues that Fed.R.Crim.P. 32 was violated in <br> his case because the district court failed to 1) provide <br> defendant with a copy of the PSR until the day of sentencing, <br> and 2) verify that defendant and defendant's counsel had read <br> and discussed the PSR. Ortiz also contends that the probation <br> officer abandoned her neutrality in the positions she took in <br> his PSR, in violation of Rule 32. <br> The transcript of the sentencing hearing reveals that <br> neither Ortiz nor his attorney indicated to the court that more <br> time was needed to review the PSR. "[T]he failure to invoke <br> [the section of Rule 32 setting forth the time frame within <br> which the defendant must be provided with a copy of the PSR] or <br> request a continuance effectively waives the claim, absent a <br> miscarriage of justice." United States v. Barrows, 996 F.2d 12, <br> 14 (1st Cir. 1993). Ortiz has failed to make a showing that a <br> miscarriage of justice resulted from his receipt of the PSR on <br> the day of sentencing. <br> Ortiz argues that the court's failure to inquire at <br> sentencing whether he had read the report and discussed it with <br> his attorney "is itself sufficient to have the case remanded <br> for resentencing." Appellant's Brief, p. 20. "However, <br> binding precedent in this circuit has directed that if it is <br> abundantly clear from the sentencing hearing that both <br> defendant and his counsel are familiar with the report, a new <br> sentencing hearing will not be mandated, even if the court <br> failed to directly inquire whether defendant had an opportunity <br> to review the report." United States v. Manrique, 959 F.2d <br> 1155, 1157 (1st Cir. 1992). <br> The sentencing transcript demonstrates that Ortiz and <br> his attorney were familiar with the PSR. Defense counsel <br> objected to several aspects of the PSR which were discussed in <br> detail. The transcript includes references by defense counsel <br> to discussion of aspects of the PSR with Ortiz. On this <br> record, it appears that the standard of demonstrated <br> familiarity with the PSR was met. See Manrique, supra, p. 1158 <br> (noting that counsel's specific reference to the PSR "clearly <br> indicat[ed] that he read the report"). Moreover, Ortiz does <br> not allege on appeal that he did not receive a copy of the PSR, <br> instead objecting to the district court's failure to verify the <br> receipt. Under like circumstances, this court has found that <br> the requirements of Rule 32(c)(3)(A) were met. See United <br> States v. Cruz, 981 F.2d 613, 620 (1st Cir. 1992). <br> Finally, Ortiz argues that the probation officer who <br> prepared the PSR violated Rule 32 by engaging in advocacy and <br> abandoning her proscribed role as a neutral arm of the court. <br> This court has interpreted the role of the probation officer <br> under the guidelines to include the "exercise [of] his <br> independent judgment as to the application of the guidelines. <br> . . . Anything less would be a dereliction of duty." United <br> States v. Fraza, 106 F.3d 1050, 1056 (1st Cir. 1997). None of <br> the aspects of the PSR which Ortiz relies upon as <br> demonstrations of the probation officer's "advocacy" evince <br> more than "exercise [of the probation officer's] independent <br> judgment as to the application of the guidelines." Id. <br> Ortiz' conviction and sentence are affirmed. See Loc. <br> R. 27.1. This affirmance is without prejudice to Ortiz' right <br> to present his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel <br> pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. <br> <br> <br></pre>
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Document Info
Docket Number: 96-1996
Filed Date: 7/21/1999
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021